fix: resolve P0 security issues per governance baseline

P0-01: LIKE injection fix in device.go (2 locations)
- Added escapeLikePattern() to prevent LIKE pattern manipulation

P0-03: Token refresh blacklist fail-closed
- RefreshToken() now returns error if cache.Set fails
- Prevents token double-spend on cache failures

P0-05: CORS dangerous default configuration
- Default changed to empty origins, credentials off
- init() panics if default config is dangerous

P0-06: UpdateUser IDOR vulnerability fix
- Added authorization check (self-or-admin)
- Prevents unauthorized user profile modification

Also: Fixed frontend lint errors in device-fingerprint.test.ts and http/index.test.ts

All 518 frontend tests pass, all backend tests pass.

internal/api/handler/user_handler.go

@@ -185,6 +185,22 @@ func (h *UserHandler) UpdateUser(c *gin.Context) {
 		return
 	}
 
+	// Authorization: only self or admin can update user profile
+	currentUserID := c.GetInt64("user_id")
+	isAdmin := false
+	if roles, ok := c.Get("user_roles"); ok {
+		for _, role := range roles.([]*domain.Role) {
+			if role.Code == "admin" {
+				isAdmin = true
+				break
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if currentUserID != id && !isAdmin {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"code": 403, "message": "permission denied"})
+		return
+	}
+
 	var req struct {
 		Email    *string `json:"email"`
 		Nickname *string `json:"nickname"`

internal/api/middleware/cors.go

@@ -10,11 +10,22 @@ import (
 )
 
 var corsConfig = config.CORSConfig{
-	AllowedOrigins:   []string{"*"},
-	AllowCredentials: true,
+	AllowedOrigins:   []string{}, // 默认为空，必须显式配置
+	AllowCredentials: false,     // 默认关闭凭证，必须显式启用
+}
+
+// init 在包初始化时检测危险的 CORS 配置组合
+func init() {
+	// 检测危险的通配符 + Credentials 组合
+	for _, origin := range corsConfig.AllowedOrigins {
+		if origin == "*" && corsConfig.AllowCredentials {
+			panic("CORS 配置错误: AllowedOrigins 包含 '*' 且 AllowCredentials 为 true 是危险组合")
+		}
+	}
 }
 
 func SetCORSConfig(cfg config.CORSConfig) {
+	// 注意：显式配置危险组合时不会panic，但生产环境应避免使用
 	corsConfig = cfg
 }
 

internal/repository/device.go

@@ -236,10 +236,11 @@ func (r *DeviceRepository) ListAll(ctx context.Context, params *ListDevicesParam
 	if params.IsTrusted != nil {
 		query = query.Where("is_trusted = ?", *params.IsTrusted)
 	}
-	// 按关键词筛选（设备名/IP/位置）
+	// 按关键词筛选（设备名/IP/位置）- 转义 LIKE 特殊字符
 	if params.Keyword != "" {
-		search := "%" + params.Keyword + "%"
-		query = query.Where("device_name LIKE ? OR ip LIKE ? OR location LIKE ?", search, search, search)
+		escapedKeyword := escapeLikePattern(params.Keyword)
+		pattern := "%" + escapedKeyword + "%"
+		query = query.Where("device_name LIKE ? OR ip LIKE ? OR location LIKE ?", pattern, pattern, pattern)
 	}
 
 	// 获取总数

internal/service/auth.go

@@ -783,13 +783,16 @@ func (s *AuthService) RefreshToken(ctx context.Context, refreshToken string) (*L
 	}
 
 	// Token Rotation: 使旧的 refresh token 失效，防止无限刷新
+	// 安全敏感修复：黑名单写入失败时必须 fail closed
 	if s.cache != nil {
 		blacklistKey := tokenBlacklistPrefix + claims.JTI
 		// TTL 设置为 refresh token 的剩余有效期
 		if claims.ExpiresAt != nil {
 			remaining := time.Until(claims.ExpiresAt.Time)
 			if remaining > 0 {
-				_ = s.cache.Set(ctx, blacklistKey, "1", 5*time.Minute, remaining)
+				if err := s.cache.Set(ctx, blacklistKey, "1", 5*time.Minute, remaining); err != nil {
+					return nil, fmt.Errorf("token revocation failed: %w", err)
+				}
 			}
 		}
 	}