perf: Sprint 19 P0/P1 性能优化落地
P0(高优先级): - P0-1: 确认数据库复合索引已存在(GORM tag),composite_index_test 验证通过 - P0-2: 连接池调优 MaxIdleConns 5→10, ConnMaxLifetime 30min→5min - P0-3: Redis 智能探测(ProbeRedis),无 Redis 自动降级到纯内存模式 P1(中优先级): - P1-1: GZIP 压缩中间件(compress/gzip 标准库,零新依赖) - P1-2: 权限缓存 TTL 30min→5min - P1-3: Argon2id 启动自适应校准(CalibrateArgon2id) 历史优化(含本次提交): - L1Cache O(n)→O(1) LRU 重构 - Auth 中间件 DB 查询合并 + 5s L1 缓存 - Logger 异步化(4096 缓冲通道) 验证: go build/vet/test 41/41 PASS, govulncheck 无漏洞
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@@ -74,14 +74,10 @@ func (m *AuthMiddleware) Required() gin.HandlerFunc {
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return
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}
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if m.isPasswordChangedSinceTokenIssued(c.Request.Context(), claims.UserID, claims.PCE) {
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c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, apierrors.New(http.StatusUnauthorized, "UNAUTHORIZED", "密码已更新,请重新登录"))
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c.Abort()
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return
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}
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if !m.isUserActive(c.Request.Context(), claims.UserID) {
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c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, apierrors.New(http.StatusUnauthorized, "UNAUTHORIZED", "账号不可用,请重新登录"))
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// Perf: merge two separate DB round-trips (password-change check + active check)
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// into a single cached user-state validation.
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if denyReason := m.validateUserState(c.Request.Context(), claims.UserID, claims.PCE); denyReason != "" {
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c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, apierrors.New(http.StatusUnauthorized, "UNAUTHORIZED", denyReason))
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c.Abort()
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return
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}
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@@ -103,7 +99,7 @@ func (m *AuthMiddleware) Optional() gin.HandlerFunc {
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token := m.extractToken(c)
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if token != "" {
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claims, err := m.jwt.ValidateAccessToken(token)
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if err == nil && !m.isJTIBlacklisted(c.Request.Context(), claims.JTI) && !m.isPasswordChangedSinceTokenIssued(c.Request.Context(), claims.UserID, claims.PCE) && m.isUserActive(c.Request.Context(), claims.UserID) {
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if err == nil && !m.isJTIBlacklisted(c.Request.Context(), claims.JTI) && m.validateUserState(c.Request.Context(), claims.UserID, claims.PCE) == "" {
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c.Set("user_id", claims.UserID)
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c.Set("username", claims.Username)
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c.Set("token_jti", claims.JTI)
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@@ -146,24 +142,82 @@ func (m *AuthMiddleware) isJTIBlacklisted(ctx context.Context, jti string) bool
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return false
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}
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// isPasswordChangedSinceTokenIssued 检查用户密码是否在令牌发放后已更改
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// 如果 tokenPCE 为 0(旧令牌),则不检查(向后兼容)
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func (m *AuthMiddleware) isPasswordChangedSinceTokenIssued(ctx context.Context, userID int64, tokenPCE int64) bool {
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if tokenPCE == 0 {
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// 旧令牌没有密码变更时间戳,不拦截
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return false
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// validateUserState performs a single cached DB lookup that replaces the two
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// previously separate checks: isPasswordChangedSinceTokenIssued + isUserActive.
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//
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// Returns "" on success, or an i18n-ready denial message on failure.
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// Results are cached for 5 seconds per user to reduce DB pressure under high
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// concurrency (e.g. 100 VU × 10 req/s = 1 000 auth middleware calls/s against
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// the same hot user IDs).
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func (m *AuthMiddleware) validateUserState(ctx context.Context, userID int64, tokenPCE int64) string {
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if m.userRepo == nil {
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return ""
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}
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// Check short-lived user-state cache (5 s TTL).
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stateCacheKey := fmt.Sprintf("user_state:%d", userID)
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if cached, ok := m.l1Cache.Get(stateCacheKey); ok {
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if state, ok := cached.(userStateEntry); ok {
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// tokenPCE > 0 means the JWT was issued for a user who had already
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// changed their password at least once. Zero/negative values come from
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// users whose PasswordChangedAt is still the Go zero-time, meaning they
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// have never changed it — skip the check in that case.
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if tokenPCE > 0 && state.passwordChangedAt > 0 && tokenPCE < state.passwordChangedAt {
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return "密码已更新,请重新登录"
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}
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if !state.active {
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return "账号不可用,请重新登录"
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}
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return ""
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}
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}
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// Cache miss — single DB round-trip.
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user, err := m.userRepo.GetByID(ctx, userID)
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if err != nil {
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return "账号不可用,请重新登录"
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}
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state := userStateEntry{
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active: user.Status == domain.UserStatusActive,
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passwordChangedAt: 0,
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}
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if !user.PasswordChangedAt.IsZero() {
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state.passwordChangedAt = user.PasswordChangedAt.Unix()
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}
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// Cache for 5 seconds — short enough to reflect account lock/disable promptly.
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m.l1Cache.Set(stateCacheKey, state, 5*time.Second)
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// Same guard: tokenPCE <= 0 means no password-change time in the JWT → skip.
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if tokenPCE > 0 && state.passwordChangedAt > 0 && tokenPCE < state.passwordChangedAt {
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return "密码已更新,请重新登录"
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}
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if !state.active {
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return "账号不可用,请重新登录"
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}
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return ""
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}
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// InvalidateUserStateCache removes the user-state cache entry so the next
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// request picks up fresh data. Call this after status change or password reset.
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func (m *AuthMiddleware) InvalidateUserStateCache(userID int64) {
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m.l1Cache.Delete(fmt.Sprintf("user_state:%d", userID))
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}
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// isPasswordChangedSinceTokenIssued 检查用户密码是否在令牌发放后已更改
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// Deprecated: use validateUserState for combined check with caching.
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func (m *AuthMiddleware) isPasswordChangedSinceTokenIssued(ctx context.Context, userID int64, tokenPCE int64) bool {
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if tokenPCE == 0 {
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return false
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}
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if m.userRepo == nil {
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return false
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}
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user, err := m.userRepo.GetByID(ctx, userID)
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if err != nil || user.PasswordChangedAt.IsZero() {
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return false
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}
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// 如果令牌的 PCE < 用户密码变更时间,说明密码在令牌发放后已更改
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return tokenPCE < user.PasswordChangedAt.Unix()
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}
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@@ -195,7 +249,10 @@ func (m *AuthMiddleware) loadUserRolesAndPerms(ctx context.Context, userID int64
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permCodes = append(permCodes, perm.Code)
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}
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m.l1Cache.Set(cacheKey, userPermEntry{roles: roleCodes, perms: permCodes}, 30*time.Minute)
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// P1-2 权限缓存 TTL 调优:5min(原 30min)
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// 理由:角色/权限变更后最长 5min 生效,与 userStateEntry TTL 保持一致。
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// 若需立即生效,调用 InvalidateUserPermCache(userID) 主动驱逐。
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m.l1Cache.Set(cacheKey, userPermEntry{roles: roleCodes, perms: permCodes}, 5*time.Minute)
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return roleCodes, permCodes
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}
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@@ -240,3 +297,10 @@ type userPermEntry struct {
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roles []string
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perms []string
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}
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// userStateEntry caches the minimal user state needed for auth checks.
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// TTL is 5 s so that account lock/disable takes effect within seconds.
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type userStateEntry struct {
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active bool
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passwordChangedAt int64 // Unix timestamp; 0 means never changed
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}
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