chore: initial snapshot for gitea/github upload

llm-gateway-competitors/litellm-wheel-src/litellm/proxy/auth/auth_checks_organization.py

@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+"""
+Auth Checks for Organizations
+"""
+
+from typing import Dict, List, Optional, Tuple
+
+from fastapi import status
+
+from litellm.proxy._types import *
+
+
+def organization_role_based_access_check(
+    request_body: dict,
+    user_object: Optional[LiteLLM_UserTable],
+    route: str,
+):
+    """
+    Role based access control checks only run if a user is part of an Organization
+
+    Organization Checks:
+    ONLY RUN IF user_object.organization_memberships is not None
+
+    1. Only Proxy Admins can access /organization/new
+    2. IF route is a LiteLLMRoutes.org_admin_only_routes, then check if user is an Org Admin for that organization
+
+    """
+
+    if user_object is None:
+        return
+
+    passed_organization_id: Optional[str] = request_body.get("organization_id", None)
+
+    if route == "/organization/new":
+        if user_object.user_role != LitellmUserRoles.PROXY_ADMIN.value:
+            raise ProxyException(
+                message=f"Only proxy admins can create new organizations. You are {user_object.user_role}",
+                type=ProxyErrorTypes.auth_error.value,
+                param="user_role",
+                code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
+            )
+
+    if user_object.user_role == LitellmUserRoles.PROXY_ADMIN.value:
+        return
+
+    # Checks if route is an Org Admin Only Route
+    if route in LiteLLMRoutes.org_admin_only_routes.value:
+        (
+            _user_organizations,
+            _user_organization_role_mapping,
+        ) = get_user_organization_info(user_object)
+
+        if user_object.organization_memberships is None:
+            raise ProxyException(
+                message=f"Tried to access route={route} but you are not a member of any organization. Please contact the proxy admin to request access.",
+                type=ProxyErrorTypes.auth_error.value,
+                param="organization_id",
+                code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
+            )
+
+        if passed_organization_id is None:
+            raise ProxyException(
+                message="Passed organization_id is None, please pass an organization_id in your request",
+                type=ProxyErrorTypes.auth_error.value,
+                param="organization_id",
+                code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
+            )
+
+        user_role: Optional[LitellmUserRoles] = _user_organization_role_mapping.get(
+            passed_organization_id
+        )
+        if user_role is None:
+            raise ProxyException(
+                message=f"You do not have a role within the selected organization. Passed organization_id: {passed_organization_id}. Please contact the organization admin to request access.",
+                type=ProxyErrorTypes.auth_error.value,
+                param="organization_id",
+                code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
+            )
+
+        if user_role != LitellmUserRoles.ORG_ADMIN.value:
+            raise ProxyException(
+                message=f"You do not have the required role to perform {route} in Organization {passed_organization_id}. Your role is {user_role} in Organization {passed_organization_id}",
+                type=ProxyErrorTypes.auth_error.value,
+                param="user_role",
+                code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
+            )
+    elif route == "/team/new":
+        # if user is part of multiple teams, then they need to specify the organization_id
+        (
+            _user_organizations,
+            _user_organization_role_mapping,
+        ) = get_user_organization_info(user_object)
+        if (
+            user_object.organization_memberships is not None
+            and len(user_object.organization_memberships) > 0
+        ):
+            if passed_organization_id is None:
+                raise ProxyException(
+                    message=f"Passed organization_id is None, please specify the organization_id in your request. You are part of multiple organizations: {_user_organizations}",
+                    type=ProxyErrorTypes.auth_error.value,
+                    param="organization_id",
+                    code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
+                )
+
+            _user_role_in_passed_org = _user_organization_role_mapping.get(
+                passed_organization_id
+            )
+            if _user_role_in_passed_org != LitellmUserRoles.ORG_ADMIN.value:
+                raise ProxyException(
+                    message=f"You do not have the required role to call {route}. Your role is {_user_role_in_passed_org} in Organization {passed_organization_id}",
+                    type=ProxyErrorTypes.auth_error.value,
+                    param="user_role",
+                    code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
+                )
+
+
+def get_user_organization_info(
+    user_object: LiteLLM_UserTable,
+) -> Tuple[List[str], Dict[str, Optional[LitellmUserRoles]]]:
+    """
+    Helper function to extract user organization information.
+
+    Args:
+        user_object (LiteLLM_UserTable): The user object containing organization memberships.
+
+    Returns:
+        Tuple[List[str], Dict[str, Optional[LitellmUserRoles]]]: A tuple containing:
+            - List of organization IDs the user is a member of
+            - Dictionary mapping organization IDs to user roles
+    """
+    _user_organizations: List[str] = []
+    _user_organization_role_mapping: Dict[str, Optional[LitellmUserRoles]] = {}
+
+    if user_object.organization_memberships is not None:
+        for _membership in user_object.organization_memberships:
+            if _membership.organization_id is not None:
+                _user_organizations.append(_membership.organization_id)
+                _user_organization_role_mapping[_membership.organization_id] = _membership.user_role  # type: ignore
+
+    return _user_organizations, _user_organization_role_mapping
+
+
+def _user_is_org_admin(
+    request_data: dict,
+    user_object: Optional[LiteLLM_UserTable] = None,
+) -> bool:
+    """
+    Helper function to check if user is an org admin for any of the passed organizations.
+
+    Checks both:
+    - `organization_id` (singular string) — legacy callers
+    - `organizations` (list of strings) — used by /user/new
+    """
+    if user_object is None:
+        return False
+
+    if user_object.organization_memberships is None:
+        return False
+
+    # Collect candidate org IDs from both fields
+    candidate_org_ids: List[str] = []
+    singular = request_data.get("organization_id", None)
+    if singular is not None:
+        candidate_org_ids.append(singular)
+    orgs_list = request_data.get("organizations", None)
+    if isinstance(orgs_list, list):
+        candidate_org_ids.extend(orgs_list)
+
+    if not candidate_org_ids:
+        return False
+
+    for _membership in user_object.organization_memberships:
+        if _membership.organization_id in candidate_org_ids:
+            if _membership.user_role == LitellmUserRoles.ORG_ADMIN.value:
+                return True
+
+    return False

llm-gateway-competitors/litellm-wheel-src/litellm/proxy/auth/auth_exception_handler.py

@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+"""
+Handles Authentication Errors
+"""
+
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any, Optional, Union
+
+from fastapi import HTTPException, Request, status
+
+import litellm
+from litellm._logging import verbose_proxy_logger
+from litellm.proxy._types import ProxyErrorTypes, ProxyException, UserAPIKeyAuth
+from litellm.proxy.auth.auth_utils import _get_request_ip_address
+from litellm.proxy.db.exception_handler import PrismaDBExceptionHandler
+from litellm.types.services import ServiceTypes
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from opentelemetry.trace import Span as _Span
+
+    Span = Union[_Span, Any]
+else:
+    Span = Any
+
+
+class UserAPIKeyAuthExceptionHandler:
+    @staticmethod
+    async def _handle_authentication_error(
+        e: Exception,
+        request: Request,
+        request_data: dict,
+        route: str,
+        parent_otel_span: Optional[Span],
+        api_key: str,
+    ) -> UserAPIKeyAuth:
+        """
+        Handles Connection Errors when reading a Virtual Key from LiteLLM DB
+        Use this if you don't want failed DB queries to block LLM API reqiests
+
+        Reliability scenarios this covers:
+        - DB is down and having an outage
+        - Unable to read / recover a key from the DB
+
+        Returns:
+            - UserAPIKeyAuth: If general_settings.allow_requests_on_db_unavailable is True
+
+        Raises:
+            - Original Exception in all other cases
+        """
+        from litellm.proxy.proxy_server import (
+            general_settings,
+            litellm_proxy_admin_name,
+            proxy_logging_obj,
+        )
+
+        if (
+            PrismaDBExceptionHandler.should_allow_request_on_db_unavailable()
+            and PrismaDBExceptionHandler.is_database_connection_error(e)
+        ):
+            # log this as a DB failure on prometheus
+            proxy_logging_obj.service_logging_obj.service_failure_hook(
+                service=ServiceTypes.DB,
+                call_type="get_key_object",
+                error=e,
+                duration=0.0,
+            )
+
+            return UserAPIKeyAuth(
+                key_name="failed-to-connect-to-db",
+                token="failed-to-connect-to-db",
+                user_id=litellm_proxy_admin_name,
+                request_route=route,
+            )
+        else:
+            # raise the exception to the caller
+            requester_ip = _get_request_ip_address(
+                request=request,
+                use_x_forwarded_for=general_settings.get("use_x_forwarded_for", False),
+            )
+            verbose_proxy_logger.exception(
+                "litellm.proxy.proxy_server.user_api_key_auth(): Exception occured - {}\nRequester IP Address:{}".format(
+                    str(e),
+                    requester_ip,
+                ),
+                extra={"requester_ip": requester_ip},
+            )
+
+            # Log this exception to OTEL, Datadog etc
+            user_api_key_dict = UserAPIKeyAuth(
+                parent_otel_span=parent_otel_span,
+                api_key=api_key,
+                request_route=route,
+            )
+            # Allow callbacks to transform the error response
+            transformed_exception = await proxy_logging_obj.post_call_failure_hook(
+                request_data=request_data,
+                original_exception=e,
+                user_api_key_dict=user_api_key_dict,
+                error_type=ProxyErrorTypes.auth_error,
+                route=route,
+            )
+            # Use transformed exception if callback returned one, otherwise use original
+            if transformed_exception is not None:
+                e = transformed_exception
+
+            if isinstance(e, litellm.BudgetExceededError):
+                raise ProxyException(
+                    message=e.message,
+                    type=ProxyErrorTypes.budget_exceeded,
+                    param=None,
+                    code=400,
+                )
+            if isinstance(e, HTTPException):
+                raise ProxyException(
+                    message=getattr(e, "detail", f"Authentication Error({str(e)})"),
+                    type=ProxyErrorTypes.auth_error,
+                    param=getattr(e, "param", "None"),
+                    code=getattr(e, "status_code", status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED),
+                )
+            elif isinstance(e, ProxyException):
+                raise e
+            raise ProxyException(
+                message="Authentication Error, " + str(e),
+                type=ProxyErrorTypes.auth_error,
+                param=getattr(e, "param", "None"),
+                code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
+            )

llm-gateway-competitors/litellm-wheel-src/litellm/proxy/auth/auth_utils.py

@@ -0,0 +1,835 @@
+import os
+import re
+import sys
+from functools import lru_cache
+from typing import Any, List, Optional, Tuple
+
+from fastapi import HTTPException, Request, status
+
+from litellm import Router, provider_list
+from litellm._logging import verbose_proxy_logger
+from litellm.constants import STANDARD_CUSTOMER_ID_HEADERS
+from litellm.proxy._types import *
+from litellm.types.router import CONFIGURABLE_CLIENTSIDE_AUTH_PARAMS
+
+
+def _get_request_ip_address(
+    request: Request, use_x_forwarded_for: Optional[bool] = False
+) -> Optional[str]:
+    client_ip = None
+    if use_x_forwarded_for is True and "x-forwarded-for" in request.headers:
+        client_ip = request.headers["x-forwarded-for"]
+    elif request.client is not None:
+        client_ip = request.client.host
+    else:
+        client_ip = ""
+
+    return client_ip
+
+
+def _check_valid_ip(
+    allowed_ips: Optional[List[str]],
+    request: Request,
+    use_x_forwarded_for: Optional[bool] = False,
+) -> Tuple[bool, Optional[str]]:
+    """
+    Returns if ip is allowed or not
+    """
+    if allowed_ips is None:  # if not set, assume true
+        return True, None
+
+    # if general_settings.get("use_x_forwarded_for") is True then use x-forwarded-for
+    client_ip = _get_request_ip_address(
+        request=request, use_x_forwarded_for=use_x_forwarded_for
+    )
+
+    # Check if IP address is allowed
+    if client_ip not in allowed_ips:
+        return False, client_ip
+
+    return True, client_ip
+
+
+def check_complete_credentials(request_body: dict) -> bool:
+    """
+    if 'api_base' in request body. Check if complete credentials given. Prevent malicious attacks.
+    """
+    given_model: Optional[str] = None
+
+    given_model = request_body.get("model")
+    if given_model is None:
+        return False
+
+    if (
+        "sagemaker" in given_model
+        or "bedrock" in given_model
+        or "vertex_ai" in given_model
+        or "vertex_ai_beta" in given_model
+    ):
+        # complex credentials - easier to make a malicious request
+        return False
+
+    if "api_key" in request_body:
+        return True
+
+    return False
+
+
+def check_regex_or_str_match(request_body_value: Any, regex_str: str) -> bool:
+    """
+    Check if request_body_value matches the regex_str or is equal to param
+    """
+    if re.match(regex_str, request_body_value) or regex_str == request_body_value:
+        return True
+    return False
+
+
+def _is_param_allowed(
+    param: str,
+    request_body_value: Any,
+    configurable_clientside_auth_params: CONFIGURABLE_CLIENTSIDE_AUTH_PARAMS,
+) -> bool:
+    """
+    Check if param is a str or dict and if request_body_value is in the list of allowed values
+    """
+    if configurable_clientside_auth_params is None:
+        return False
+
+    for item in configurable_clientside_auth_params:
+        if isinstance(item, str) and param == item:
+            return True
+        elif isinstance(item, Dict):
+            if param == "api_base" and check_regex_or_str_match(
+                request_body_value=request_body_value,
+                regex_str=item["api_base"],
+            ):  # assume param is a regex
+                return True
+
+    return False
+
+
+def _allow_model_level_clientside_configurable_parameters(
+    model: str, param: str, request_body_value: Any, llm_router: Optional[Router]
+) -> bool:
+    """
+    Check if model is allowed to use configurable client-side params
+    - get matching model
+    - check if 'clientside_configurable_parameters' is set for model
+    -
+    """
+    if llm_router is None:
+        return False
+    # check if model is set
+    model_info = llm_router.get_model_group_info(model_group=model)
+    if model_info is None:
+        # check if wildcard model is set
+        if model.split("/", 1)[0] in provider_list:
+            model_info = llm_router.get_model_group_info(
+                model_group=model.split("/", 1)[0]
+            )
+
+    if model_info is None:
+        return False
+
+    if model_info is None or model_info.configurable_clientside_auth_params is None:
+        return False
+
+    return _is_param_allowed(
+        param=param,
+        request_body_value=request_body_value,
+        configurable_clientside_auth_params=model_info.configurable_clientside_auth_params,
+    )
+
+
+def is_request_body_safe(
+    request_body: dict, general_settings: dict, llm_router: Optional[Router], model: str
+) -> bool:
+    """
+    Check if the request body is safe.
+
+    A malicious user can set the api_base to their own domain and invoke POST /chat/completions to intercept and steal the OpenAI API key.
+    Relevant issue: https://huntr.com/bounties/4001e1a2-7b7a-4776-a3ae-e6692ec3d997
+    """
+    banned_params = ["api_base", "base_url"]
+
+    for param in banned_params:
+        if (
+            param in request_body
+            and not check_complete_credentials(  # allow client-credentials to be passed to proxy
+                request_body=request_body
+            )
+        ):
+            if general_settings.get("allow_client_side_credentials") is True:
+                return True
+            elif (
+                _allow_model_level_clientside_configurable_parameters(
+                    model=model,
+                    param=param,
+                    request_body_value=request_body[param],
+                    llm_router=llm_router,
+                )
+                is True
+            ):
+                return True
+            raise ValueError(
+                f"Rejected Request: {param} is not allowed in request body. "
+                "Enable with `general_settings::allow_client_side_credentials` on proxy config.yaml. "
+                "Relevant Issue: https://huntr.com/bounties/4001e1a2-7b7a-4776-a3ae-e6692ec3d997",
+            )
+
+    return True
+
+
+async def pre_db_read_auth_checks(
+    request: Request,
+    request_data: dict,
+    route: str,
+):
+    """
+    1. Checks if request size is under max_request_size_mb (if set)
+    2. Check if request body is safe (example user has not set api_base in request body)
+    3. Check if IP address is allowed (if set)
+    4. Check if request route is an allowed route on the proxy (if set)
+
+    Returns:
+    - True
+
+    Raises:
+    - HTTPException if request fails initial auth checks
+    """
+    from litellm.proxy.proxy_server import general_settings, llm_router, premium_user
+
+    # Check 1. request size
+    await check_if_request_size_is_safe(request=request)
+
+    # Check 2. Request body is safe
+    is_request_body_safe(
+        request_body=request_data,
+        general_settings=general_settings,
+        llm_router=llm_router,
+        model=request_data.get(
+            "model", ""
+        ),  # [TODO] use model passed in url as well (azure openai routes)
+    )
+
+    # Check 3. Check if IP address is allowed
+    is_valid_ip, passed_in_ip = _check_valid_ip(
+        allowed_ips=general_settings.get("allowed_ips", None),
+        use_x_forwarded_for=general_settings.get("use_x_forwarded_for", False),
+        request=request,
+    )
+
+    if not is_valid_ip:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
+            detail=f"Access forbidden: IP address {passed_in_ip} not allowed.",
+        )
+
+    # Check 4. Check if request route is an allowed route on the proxy
+    if "allowed_routes" in general_settings:
+        _allowed_routes = general_settings["allowed_routes"]
+        if premium_user is not True:
+            verbose_proxy_logger.error(
+                f"Trying to set allowed_routes. This is an Enterprise feature. {CommonProxyErrors.not_premium_user.value}"
+            )
+        if route not in _allowed_routes:
+            verbose_proxy_logger.error(
+                f"Route {route} not in allowed_routes={_allowed_routes}"
+            )
+            raise HTTPException(
+                status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
+                detail=f"Access forbidden: Route {route} not allowed",
+            )
+
+
+def route_in_additonal_public_routes(current_route: str):
+    """
+    Helper to check if the user defined public_routes on config.yaml
+
+    Parameters:
+    - current_route: str - the route the user is trying to call
+
+    Returns:
+    - bool - True if the route is defined in public_routes
+    - bool - False if the route is not defined in public_routes
+
+    Supports wildcard patterns (e.g., "/api/*" matches "/api/users", "/api/users/123")
+
+    In order to use this the litellm config.yaml should have the following in general_settings:
+
+    ```yaml
+    general_settings:
+        master_key: sk-1234
+        public_routes: ["LiteLLMRoutes.public_routes", "/spend/calculate", "/api/*"]
+    ```
+    """
+    from litellm.proxy.auth.route_checks import RouteChecks
+    from litellm.proxy.proxy_server import general_settings, premium_user
+
+    try:
+        if premium_user is not True:
+            return False
+        if general_settings is None:
+            return False
+
+        routes_defined = general_settings.get("public_routes", [])
+
+        # Check exact match first
+        if current_route in routes_defined:
+            return True
+
+        # Check wildcard patterns
+        for route_pattern in routes_defined:
+            if RouteChecks._route_matches_wildcard_pattern(
+                route=current_route, pattern=route_pattern
+            ):
+                return True
+
+        return False
+    except Exception as e:
+        verbose_proxy_logger.error(f"route_in_additonal_public_routes: {str(e)}")
+        return False
+
+
+def get_request_route(request: Request) -> str:
+    """
+    Helper to get the route from the request
+
+    remove base url from path if set e.g. `/genai/chat/completions` -> `/chat/completions
+    """
+    try:
+        if hasattr(request, "base_url") and request.url.path.startswith(
+            request.base_url.path
+        ):
+            # remove base_url from path
+            return request.url.path[len(request.base_url.path) - 1 :]
+        else:
+            return request.url.path
+    except Exception as e:
+        verbose_proxy_logger.debug(
+            f"error on get_request_route: {str(e)}, defaulting to request.url.path={request.url.path}"
+        )
+        return request.url.path
+
+
+@lru_cache(maxsize=256)
+def normalize_request_route(route: str) -> str:
+    """
+    Normalize request routes by replacing dynamic path parameters with placeholders.
+
+    This prevents high cardinality in Prometheus metrics by collapsing routes like:
+    - /v1/responses/1234567890 -> /v1/responses/{response_id}
+    - /v1/threads/thread_123 -> /v1/threads/{thread_id}
+
+    Args:
+        route: The request route path
+
+    Returns:
+        Normalized route with dynamic parameters replaced by placeholders
+
+    Examples:
+        >>> normalize_request_route("/v1/responses/abc123")
+        '/v1/responses/{response_id}'
+        >>> normalize_request_route("/v1/responses/abc123/cancel")
+        '/v1/responses/{response_id}/cancel'
+        >>> normalize_request_route("/chat/completions")
+        '/chat/completions'
+    """
+    # Define patterns for routes with dynamic IDs
+    # Format: (regex_pattern, replacement_template)
+    patterns = [
+        # Responses API - must come before generic patterns
+        (r"^(/(?:openai/)?v1/responses)/([^/]+)(/input_items)$", r"\1/{response_id}\3"),
+        (r"^(/(?:openai/)?v1/responses)/([^/]+)(/cancel)$", r"\1/{response_id}\3"),
+        (r"^(/(?:openai/)?v1/responses)/([^/]+)$", r"\1/{response_id}"),
+        (r"^(/responses)/([^/]+)(/input_items)$", r"\1/{response_id}\3"),
+        (r"^(/responses)/([^/]+)(/cancel)$", r"\1/{response_id}\3"),
+        (r"^(/responses)/([^/]+)$", r"\1/{response_id}"),
+        # Threads API
+        (
+            r"^(/(?:openai/)?v1/threads)/([^/]+)(/runs)/([^/]+)(/steps)/([^/]+)$",
+            r"\1/{thread_id}\3/{run_id}\5/{step_id}",
+        ),
+        (
+            r"^(/(?:openai/)?v1/threads)/([^/]+)(/runs)/([^/]+)(/steps)$",
+            r"\1/{thread_id}\3/{run_id}\5",
+        ),
+        (
+            r"^(/(?:openai/)?v1/threads)/([^/]+)(/runs)/([^/]+)(/cancel)$",
+            r"\1/{thread_id}\3/{run_id}\5",
+        ),
+        (
+            r"^(/(?:openai/)?v1/threads)/([^/]+)(/runs)/([^/]+)(/submit_tool_outputs)$",
+            r"\1/{thread_id}\3/{run_id}\5",
+        ),
+        (
+            r"^(/(?:openai/)?v1/threads)/([^/]+)(/runs)/([^/]+)$",
+            r"\1/{thread_id}\3/{run_id}",
+        ),
+        (r"^(/(?:openai/)?v1/threads)/([^/]+)(/runs)$", r"\1/{thread_id}\3"),
+        (
+            r"^(/(?:openai/)?v1/threads)/([^/]+)(/messages)/([^/]+)$",
+            r"\1/{thread_id}\3/{message_id}",
+        ),
+        (r"^(/(?:openai/)?v1/threads)/([^/]+)(/messages)$", r"\1/{thread_id}\3"),
+        (r"^(/(?:openai/)?v1/threads)/([^/]+)$", r"\1/{thread_id}"),
+        # Vector Stores API
+        (
+            r"^(/(?:openai/)?v1/vector_stores)/([^/]+)(/files)/([^/]+)$",
+            r"\1/{vector_store_id}\3/{file_id}",
+        ),
+        (
+            r"^(/(?:openai/)?v1/vector_stores)/([^/]+)(/files)$",
+            r"\1/{vector_store_id}\3",
+        ),
+        (
+            r"^(/(?:openai/)?v1/vector_stores)/([^/]+)(/file_batches)/([^/]+)$",
+            r"\1/{vector_store_id}\3/{batch_id}",
+        ),
+        (
+            r"^(/(?:openai/)?v1/vector_stores)/([^/]+)(/file_batches)$",
+            r"\1/{vector_store_id}\3",
+        ),
+        (r"^(/(?:openai/)?v1/vector_stores)/([^/]+)$", r"\1/{vector_store_id}"),
+        # Assistants API
+        (r"^(/(?:openai/)?v1/assistants)/([^/]+)$", r"\1/{assistant_id}"),
+        # Files API
+        (r"^(/(?:openai/)?v1/files)/([^/]+)(/content)$", r"\1/{file_id}\3"),
+        (r"^(/(?:openai/)?v1/files)/([^/]+)$", r"\1/{file_id}"),
+        # Batches API
+        (r"^(/(?:openai/)?v1/batches)/([^/]+)(/cancel)$", r"\1/{batch_id}\3"),
+        (r"^(/(?:openai/)?v1/batches)/([^/]+)$", r"\1/{batch_id}"),
+        # Fine-tuning API
+        (
+            r"^(/(?:openai/)?v1/fine_tuning/jobs)/([^/]+)(/events)$",
+            r"\1/{fine_tuning_job_id}\3",
+        ),
+        (
+            r"^(/(?:openai/)?v1/fine_tuning/jobs)/([^/]+)(/cancel)$",
+            r"\1/{fine_tuning_job_id}\3",
+        ),
+        (
+            r"^(/(?:openai/)?v1/fine_tuning/jobs)/([^/]+)(/checkpoints)$",
+            r"\1/{fine_tuning_job_id}\3",
+        ),
+        (r"^(/(?:openai/)?v1/fine_tuning/jobs)/([^/]+)$", r"\1/{fine_tuning_job_id}"),
+        # Models API
+        (r"^(/(?:openai/)?v1/models)/([^/]+)$", r"\1/{model}"),
+    ]
+
+    # Apply patterns in order
+    for pattern, replacement in patterns:
+        normalized = re.sub(pattern, replacement, route)
+        if normalized != route:
+            return normalized
+
+    # Return original route if no pattern matched
+    return route
+
+
+async def check_if_request_size_is_safe(request: Request) -> bool:
+    """
+    Enterprise Only:
+        - Checks if the request size is within the limit
+
+    Args:
+        request (Request): The incoming request.
+
+    Returns:
+        bool: True if the request size is within the limit
+
+    Raises:
+        ProxyException: If the request size is too large
+
+    """
+    from litellm.proxy.proxy_server import general_settings, premium_user
+
+    max_request_size_mb = general_settings.get("max_request_size_mb", None)
+
+    if max_request_size_mb is not None:
+        # Check if premium user
+        if premium_user is not True:
+            verbose_proxy_logger.warning(
+                f"using max_request_size_mb - not checking -  this is an enterprise only feature. {CommonProxyErrors.not_premium_user.value}"
+            )
+            return True
+
+        # Get the request body
+        content_length = request.headers.get("content-length")
+
+        if content_length:
+            header_size = int(content_length)
+            header_size_mb = bytes_to_mb(bytes_value=header_size)
+            verbose_proxy_logger.debug(
+                f"content_length request size in MB={header_size_mb}"
+            )
+
+            if header_size_mb > max_request_size_mb:
+                raise ProxyException(
+                    message=f"Request size is too large. Request size is {header_size_mb} MB. Max size is {max_request_size_mb} MB",
+                    type=ProxyErrorTypes.bad_request_error.value,
+                    code=400,
+                    param="content-length",
+                )
+        else:
+            # If Content-Length is not available, read the body
+            body = await request.body()
+            body_size = len(body)
+            request_size_mb = bytes_to_mb(bytes_value=body_size)
+
+            verbose_proxy_logger.debug(
+                f"request body request size in MB={request_size_mb}"
+            )
+            if request_size_mb > max_request_size_mb:
+                raise ProxyException(
+                    message=f"Request size is too large. Request size is {request_size_mb} MB. Max size is {max_request_size_mb} MB",
+                    type=ProxyErrorTypes.bad_request_error.value,
+                    code=400,
+                    param="content-length",
+                )
+
+    return True
+
+
+async def check_response_size_is_safe(response: Any) -> bool:
+    """
+    Enterprise Only:
+        - Checks if the response size is within the limit
+
+    Args:
+        response (Any): The response to check.
+
+    Returns:
+        bool: True if the response size is within the limit
+
+    Raises:
+        ProxyException: If the response size is too large
+
+    """
+
+    from litellm.proxy.proxy_server import general_settings, premium_user
+
+    max_response_size_mb = general_settings.get("max_response_size_mb", None)
+    if max_response_size_mb is not None:
+        # Check if premium user
+        if premium_user is not True:
+            verbose_proxy_logger.warning(
+                f"using max_response_size_mb - not checking -  this is an enterprise only feature. {CommonProxyErrors.not_premium_user.value}"
+            )
+            return True
+
+        response_size_mb = bytes_to_mb(bytes_value=sys.getsizeof(response))
+        verbose_proxy_logger.debug(f"response size in MB={response_size_mb}")
+        if response_size_mb > max_response_size_mb:
+            raise ProxyException(
+                message=f"Response size is too large. Response size is {response_size_mb} MB. Max size is {max_response_size_mb} MB",
+                type=ProxyErrorTypes.bad_request_error.value,
+                code=400,
+                param="content-length",
+            )
+
+    return True
+
+
+def bytes_to_mb(bytes_value: int):
+    """
+    Helper to convert bytes to MB
+    """
+    return bytes_value / (1024 * 1024)
+
+
+# helpers used by parallel request limiter to handle model rpm/tpm limits for a given api key
+def get_key_model_rpm_limit(
+    user_api_key_dict: UserAPIKeyAuth,
+) -> Optional[Dict[str, int]]:
+    """
+    Get the model rpm limit for a given api key.
+
+    Priority order (returns first found):
+    1. Key metadata (model_rpm_limit)
+    2. Key model_max_budget (rpm_limit per model)
+    3. Team metadata (model_rpm_limit)
+    """
+    # 1. Check key metadata first (takes priority)
+    if user_api_key_dict.metadata:
+        result = user_api_key_dict.metadata.get("model_rpm_limit")
+        if result:
+            return result
+
+    # 2. Check model_max_budget
+    if user_api_key_dict.model_max_budget:
+        model_rpm_limit: Dict[str, Any] = {}
+        for model, budget in user_api_key_dict.model_max_budget.items():
+            if isinstance(budget, dict) and budget.get("rpm_limit") is not None:
+                model_rpm_limit[model] = budget["rpm_limit"]
+        if model_rpm_limit:
+            return model_rpm_limit
+
+    # 3. Fallback to team metadata
+    if user_api_key_dict.team_metadata:
+        return user_api_key_dict.team_metadata.get("model_rpm_limit")
+
+    return None
+
+
+def get_key_model_tpm_limit(
+    user_api_key_dict: UserAPIKeyAuth,
+) -> Optional[Dict[str, int]]:
+    """
+    Get the model tpm limit for a given api key.
+
+    Priority order (returns first found):
+    1. Key metadata (model_tpm_limit)
+    2. Key model_max_budget (tpm_limit per model)
+    3. Team metadata (model_tpm_limit)
+    """
+    # 1. Check key metadata first (takes priority)
+    if user_api_key_dict.metadata:
+        result = user_api_key_dict.metadata.get("model_tpm_limit")
+        if result:
+            return result
+
+    # 2. Check model_max_budget (iterate per-model like RPM does)
+    if user_api_key_dict.model_max_budget:
+        model_tpm_limit: Dict[str, Any] = {}
+        for model, budget in user_api_key_dict.model_max_budget.items():
+            if isinstance(budget, dict) and budget.get("tpm_limit") is not None:
+                model_tpm_limit[model] = budget["tpm_limit"]
+        if model_tpm_limit:
+            return model_tpm_limit
+
+    # 3. Fallback to team metadata
+    if user_api_key_dict.team_metadata:
+        return user_api_key_dict.team_metadata.get("model_tpm_limit")
+
+    return None
+
+
+def get_model_rate_limit_from_metadata(
+    user_api_key_dict: UserAPIKeyAuth,
+    metadata_accessor_key: Literal["team_metadata", "organization_metadata"],
+    rate_limit_key: Literal["model_rpm_limit", "model_tpm_limit"],
+) -> Optional[Dict[str, int]]:
+    if getattr(user_api_key_dict, metadata_accessor_key):
+        return getattr(user_api_key_dict, metadata_accessor_key).get(rate_limit_key)
+    return None
+
+
+def get_team_model_rpm_limit(
+    user_api_key_dict: UserAPIKeyAuth,
+) -> Optional[Dict[str, int]]:
+    if user_api_key_dict.team_metadata:
+        return user_api_key_dict.team_metadata.get("model_rpm_limit")
+    return None
+
+
+def get_team_model_tpm_limit(
+    user_api_key_dict: UserAPIKeyAuth,
+) -> Optional[Dict[str, int]]:
+    if user_api_key_dict.team_metadata:
+        return user_api_key_dict.team_metadata.get("model_tpm_limit")
+    return None
+
+
+def is_pass_through_provider_route(route: str) -> bool:
+    PROVIDER_SPECIFIC_PASS_THROUGH_ROUTES = [
+        "vertex-ai",
+    ]
+
+    # check if any of the prefixes are in the route
+    for prefix in PROVIDER_SPECIFIC_PASS_THROUGH_ROUTES:
+        if prefix in route:
+            return True
+
+    return False
+
+
+def _has_user_setup_sso():
+    """
+    Check if the user has set up single sign-on (SSO) by verifying the presence of Microsoft client ID, Google client ID or generic client ID and UI username environment variables.
+    Returns a boolean indicating whether SSO has been set up.
+    """
+    microsoft_client_id = os.getenv("MICROSOFT_CLIENT_ID", None)
+    google_client_id = os.getenv("GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID", None)
+    generic_client_id = os.getenv("GENERIC_CLIENT_ID", None)
+
+    sso_setup = (
+        (microsoft_client_id is not None)
+        or (google_client_id is not None)
+        or (generic_client_id is not None)
+    )
+
+    return sso_setup
+
+
+def get_customer_user_header_from_mapping(user_id_mapping) -> Optional[str]:
+    """Return the header_name mapped to CUSTOMER role, if any (dict-based)."""
+    if not user_id_mapping:
+        return None
+    items = user_id_mapping if isinstance(user_id_mapping, list) else [user_id_mapping]
+    for item in items:
+        if not isinstance(item, dict):
+            continue
+        role = item.get("litellm_user_role")
+        header_name = item.get("header_name")
+        if role is None or not header_name:
+            continue
+        if str(role).lower() == str(LitellmUserRoles.CUSTOMER).lower():
+            return header_name
+    return None
+
+
+def _get_customer_id_from_standard_headers(
+    request_headers: Optional[dict],
+) -> Optional[str]:
+    """
+    Check standard customer ID headers for a customer/end-user ID.
+
+    This enables tools like Claude Code to pass customer IDs via ANTHROPIC_CUSTOM_HEADERS.
+    No configuration required - these headers are always checked.
+
+    Args:
+        request_headers: The request headers dict
+
+    Returns:
+        The customer ID if found in standard headers, None otherwise
+    """
+    if request_headers is None:
+        return None
+
+    for standard_header in STANDARD_CUSTOMER_ID_HEADERS:
+        for header_name, header_value in request_headers.items():
+            if header_name.lower() == standard_header.lower():
+                user_id_str = str(header_value) if header_value is not None else ""
+                if user_id_str.strip():
+                    return user_id_str
+    return None
+
+
+def get_end_user_id_from_request_body(
+    request_body: dict, request_headers: Optional[dict] = None
+) -> Optional[str]:
+    # Import general_settings here to avoid potential circular import issues at module level
+    # and to ensure it's fetched at runtime.
+    from litellm.proxy.proxy_server import general_settings
+
+    # Check 1: Standard customer ID headers (always checked, no configuration required)
+    customer_id = _get_customer_id_from_standard_headers(
+        request_headers=request_headers
+    )
+    if customer_id is not None:
+        return customer_id
+
+    # Check 2: Follow the user header mappings feature, if not found, then check for deprecated user_header_name (only if request_headers is provided)
+    # User query: "system not respecting user_header_name property"
+    # This implies the key in general_settings is 'user_header_name'.
+    if request_headers is not None:
+        custom_header_name_to_check: Optional[str] = None
+
+        # Prefer user mappings (new behavior)
+        user_id_mapping = general_settings.get("user_header_mappings", None)
+        if user_id_mapping:
+            custom_header_name_to_check = get_customer_user_header_from_mapping(
+                user_id_mapping
+            )
+
+        # Fallback to deprecated user_header_name if mapping did not specify
+        if not custom_header_name_to_check:
+            user_id_header_config_key = "user_header_name"
+            value = general_settings.get(user_id_header_config_key)
+            if isinstance(value, str) and value.strip() != "":
+                custom_header_name_to_check = value
+
+        # If we have a header name to check, try to read it from request headers
+        if isinstance(custom_header_name_to_check, str):
+            for header_name, header_value in request_headers.items():
+                if header_name.lower() == custom_header_name_to_check.lower():
+                    user_id_from_header = header_value
+                    user_id_str = (
+                        str(user_id_from_header)
+                        if user_id_from_header is not None
+                        else ""
+                    )
+                    if user_id_str.strip():
+                        return user_id_str
+
+    # Check 3: 'user' field in request_body (commonly OpenAI)
+    if "user" in request_body and request_body["user"] is not None:
+        user_from_body_user_field = request_body["user"]
+        return str(user_from_body_user_field)
+
+    # Check 4: 'litellm_metadata.user' in request_body (commonly Anthropic)
+    litellm_metadata = request_body.get("litellm_metadata")
+    if isinstance(litellm_metadata, dict):
+        user_from_litellm_metadata = litellm_metadata.get("user")
+        if user_from_litellm_metadata is not None:
+            return str(user_from_litellm_metadata)
+
+    # Check 5: 'metadata.user_id' in request_body (another common pattern)
+    metadata_dict = request_body.get("metadata")
+    if isinstance(metadata_dict, dict):
+        user_id_from_metadata_field = metadata_dict.get("user_id")
+        if user_id_from_metadata_field is not None:
+            return str(user_id_from_metadata_field)
+
+    # Check 6: 'safety_identifier' in request body (OpenAI Responses API parameter)
+    # SECURITY NOTE: safety_identifier can be set by any caller in the request body.
+    # Only use this for end-user identification in trusted environments where you control
+    # the calling application. For untrusted callers, prefer using headers or server-side
+    # middleware to set the end_user_id to prevent impersonation.
+    if request_body.get("safety_identifier") is not None:
+        user_from_body_user_field = request_body["safety_identifier"]
+        return str(user_from_body_user_field)
+
+    return None
+
+
+def get_model_from_request(
+    request_data: dict, route: str
+) -> Optional[Union[str, List[str]]]:
+    # First try to get model from request_data
+    model = request_data.get("model") or request_data.get("target_model_names")
+
+    if model is not None:
+        model_names = model.split(",")
+        if len(model_names) == 1:
+            model = model_names[0].strip()
+        else:
+            model = [m.strip() for m in model_names]
+
+    # If model not in request_data, try to extract from route
+    if model is None:
+        # Parse model from route that follows the pattern /openai/deployments/{model}/*
+        match = re.match(r"/openai/deployments/([^/]+)", route)
+        if match:
+            model = match.group(1)
+
+    # If still not found, extract model from Google generateContent-style routes.
+    # These routes put the model in the path and allow "/" inside the model id.
+    # Examples:
+    # - /v1beta/models/gemini-2.0-flash:generateContent
+    # - /v1beta/models/bedrock/claude-sonnet-3.7:generateContent
+    # - /models/custom/ns/model:streamGenerateContent
+    if model is None and not route.lower().startswith("/vertex"):
+        google_match = re.search(r"/(?:v1beta|beta)/models/([^:]+):", route)
+        if google_match:
+            model = google_match.group(1)
+
+    if model is None and not route.lower().startswith("/vertex"):
+        google_match = re.search(r"^/models/([^:]+):", route)
+        if google_match:
+            model = google_match.group(1)
+
+    # If still not found, extract from Vertex AI passthrough route
+    # Pattern: /vertex_ai/.../models/{model_id}:*
+    # Example: /vertex_ai/v1/.../models/gemini-1.5-pro:generateContent
+    if model is None and route.lower().startswith("/vertex"):
+        vertex_match = re.search(r"/models/([^:]+)", route)
+        if vertex_match:
+            model = vertex_match.group(1)
+
+    return model
+
+
+def abbreviate_api_key(api_key: str) -> str:
+    return f"sk-...{api_key[-4:]}"

llm-gateway-competitors/litellm-wheel-src/litellm/proxy/auth/ip_address_utils.py

@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+"""
+IP address utilities for MCP public/private access control.
+
+Internal callers (private IPs) see all MCP servers.
+External callers (public IPs) only see servers with available_on_public_internet=True.
+"""
+
+import ipaddress
+from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional, Union
+
+from fastapi import Request
+
+from litellm._logging import verbose_proxy_logger
+from litellm.proxy.auth.auth_utils import _get_request_ip_address
+
+
+class IPAddressUtils:
+    """Static utilities for IP-based MCP access control."""
+
+    _DEFAULT_INTERNAL_NETWORKS = [
+        ipaddress.ip_network("10.0.0.0/8"),
+        ipaddress.ip_network("172.16.0.0/12"),
+        ipaddress.ip_network("192.168.0.0/16"),
+        ipaddress.ip_network("127.0.0.0/8"),
+        ipaddress.ip_network("::1/128"),
+        ipaddress.ip_network("fc00::/7"),
+    ]
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def parse_internal_networks(
+        configured_ranges: Optional[List[str]],
+    ) -> List[Union[ipaddress.IPv4Network, ipaddress.IPv6Network]]:
+        """Parse configured CIDR ranges into network objects, falling back to defaults."""
+        if not configured_ranges:
+            return IPAddressUtils._DEFAULT_INTERNAL_NETWORKS
+        networks: List[Union[ipaddress.IPv4Network, ipaddress.IPv6Network]] = []
+        for cidr in configured_ranges:
+            try:
+                networks.append(ipaddress.ip_network(cidr, strict=False))
+            except ValueError:
+                verbose_proxy_logger.warning(
+                    "Invalid CIDR in mcp_internal_ip_ranges: %s, skipping", cidr
+                )
+        return networks if networks else IPAddressUtils._DEFAULT_INTERNAL_NETWORKS
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def parse_trusted_proxy_networks(
+        configured_ranges: Optional[List[str]],
+    ) -> List[Union[ipaddress.IPv4Network, ipaddress.IPv6Network]]:
+        """
+        Parse trusted proxy CIDR ranges for XFF validation.
+        Returns empty list if not configured (XFF will not be trusted).
+        """
+        if not configured_ranges:
+            return []
+        networks: List[Union[ipaddress.IPv4Network, ipaddress.IPv6Network]] = []
+        for cidr in configured_ranges:
+            try:
+                networks.append(ipaddress.ip_network(cidr, strict=False))
+            except ValueError:
+                verbose_proxy_logger.warning(
+                    "Invalid CIDR in mcp_trusted_proxy_ranges: %s, skipping", cidr
+                )
+        return networks
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def is_trusted_proxy(
+        proxy_ip: Optional[str],
+        trusted_networks: List[Union[ipaddress.IPv4Network, ipaddress.IPv6Network]],
+    ) -> bool:
+        """Check if the direct connection IP is from a trusted proxy."""
+        if not proxy_ip or not trusted_networks:
+            return False
+        try:
+            addr = ipaddress.ip_address(proxy_ip.strip())
+            return any(addr in network for network in trusted_networks)
+        except ValueError:
+            return False
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def is_internal_ip(
+        client_ip: Optional[str],
+        internal_networks: Optional[
+            List[Union[ipaddress.IPv4Network, ipaddress.IPv6Network]]
+        ] = None,
+    ) -> bool:
+        """
+        Check if a client IP is from an internal/private network.
+
+        Handles X-Forwarded-For comma chains (takes leftmost = original client).
+        Fails closed: empty/invalid IPs are treated as external.
+        """
+        if not client_ip:
+            return False
+
+        # X-Forwarded-For may contain comma-separated chain; leftmost is original client
+        if "," in client_ip:
+            client_ip = client_ip.split(",")[0].strip()
+
+        networks = internal_networks or IPAddressUtils._DEFAULT_INTERNAL_NETWORKS
+
+        try:
+            addr = ipaddress.ip_address(client_ip.strip())
+        except ValueError:
+            return False
+
+        return any(addr in network for network in networks)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def get_mcp_client_ip(
+        request: Request,
+        general_settings: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
+    ) -> Optional[str]:
+        """
+        Extract client IP from a FastAPI request for MCP access control.
+
+        Security: Only trusts X-Forwarded-For if:
+        1. use_x_forwarded_for is enabled in settings
+        2. The direct connection is from a trusted proxy (if mcp_trusted_proxy_ranges configured)
+
+        Args:
+            request: FastAPI request object
+            general_settings: Optional settings dict. If not provided, imports from proxy_server.
+        """
+        if general_settings is None:
+            try:
+                from litellm.proxy.proxy_server import (
+                    general_settings as proxy_general_settings,
+                )
+
+                general_settings = proxy_general_settings
+            except ImportError:
+                general_settings = {}
+
+        # Handle case where general_settings is still None after import
+        if general_settings is None:
+            general_settings = {}
+
+        use_xff = general_settings.get("use_x_forwarded_for", False)
+
+        # If XFF is enabled, validate the request comes from a trusted proxy
+        if use_xff and "x-forwarded-for" in request.headers:
+            trusted_ranges = general_settings.get("mcp_trusted_proxy_ranges")
+            if trusted_ranges:
+                # Validate direct connection is from trusted proxy
+                direct_ip = request.client.host if request.client else None
+                trusted_networks = IPAddressUtils.parse_trusted_proxy_networks(
+                    trusted_ranges
+                )
+                if not IPAddressUtils.is_trusted_proxy(direct_ip, trusted_networks):
+                    # Untrusted source trying to set XFF - ignore XFF, use direct IP
+                    verbose_proxy_logger.warning(
+                        "XFF header from untrusted IP %s, ignoring", direct_ip
+                    )
+                    return direct_ip
+        return _get_request_ip_address(request, use_x_forwarded_for=use_xff)

llm-gateway-competitors/litellm-wheel-src/litellm/proxy/auth/litellm_license.py

@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
+# What is this?
+## If litellm license in env, checks if it's valid
+import base64
+import json
+import os
+from datetime import datetime
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Optional
+
+import httpx
+
+from litellm._logging import verbose_proxy_logger
+from litellm.constants import NON_LLM_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT
+from litellm.llms.custom_httpx.http_handler import HTTPHandler
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from litellm.proxy._types import EnterpriseLicenseData
+
+
+class LicenseCheck:
+    """
+    - Check if license in env
+    - Returns if license is valid
+    """
+
+    base_url = "https://license.litellm.ai"
+
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self.license_str = os.getenv("LITELLM_LICENSE", None)
+        verbose_proxy_logger.debug("License Str value - {}".format(self.license_str))
+        self.http_handler = HTTPHandler(timeout=NON_LLM_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT)
+        self._premium_check_logged = False
+        self.public_key = None
+        self.read_public_key()
+        self.airgapped_license_data: Optional["EnterpriseLicenseData"] = None
+
+    def read_public_key(self):
+        try:
+            from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
+
+            # current dir
+            current_dir = os.path.dirname(os.path.realpath(__file__))
+
+            # check if public_key.pem exists
+            _path_to_public_key = os.path.join(current_dir, "public_key.pem")
+            if os.path.exists(_path_to_public_key):
+                with open(_path_to_public_key, "rb") as key_file:
+                    self.public_key = serialization.load_pem_public_key(key_file.read())
+            else:
+                self.public_key = None
+        except Exception as e:
+            verbose_proxy_logger.error(f"Error reading public key: {str(e)}")
+
+    def _verify(self, license_str: str) -> bool:
+        verbose_proxy_logger.debug(
+            "litellm.proxy.auth.litellm_license.py::_verify - Checking license against {}/verify_license - {}".format(
+                self.base_url, license_str
+            )
+        )
+        url = "{}/verify_license/{}".format(self.base_url, license_str)
+
+        response: Optional[httpx.Response] = None
+        try:  # don't impact user, if call fails
+            num_retries = 3
+            for i in range(num_retries):
+                try:
+                    response = self.http_handler.get(url=url)
+                    if response is None:
+                        raise Exception("No response from license server")
+                    response.raise_for_status()
+                except httpx.HTTPStatusError:
+                    if i == num_retries - 1:
+                        raise
+
+            if response is None:
+                raise Exception("No response from license server")
+
+            response_json = response.json()
+
+            premium = response_json["verify"]
+
+            assert isinstance(premium, bool)
+
+            verbose_proxy_logger.debug(
+                "litellm.proxy.auth.litellm_license.py::_verify - License={} is premium={}".format(
+                    license_str, premium
+                )
+            )
+            return premium
+        except Exception as e:
+            verbose_proxy_logger.exception(
+                "litellm.proxy.auth.litellm_license.py::_verify - Unable to verify License={} via api. - {}".format(
+                    license_str, str(e)
+                )
+            )
+            return False
+
+    def is_premium(self) -> bool:
+        """
+        1. verify_license_without_api_request: checks if license was generate using private / public key pair
+        2. _verify: checks if license is valid calling litellm API. This is the old way we were generating/validating license
+        """
+        try:
+            if not self._premium_check_logged:
+                verbose_proxy_logger.debug(
+                    "litellm.proxy.auth.litellm_license.py::is_premium() - ENTERING 'IS_PREMIUM' - LiteLLM License={}".format(
+                        self.license_str
+                    )
+                )
+
+            if self.license_str is None:
+                self.license_str = os.getenv("LITELLM_LICENSE", None)
+
+            if not self._premium_check_logged:
+                verbose_proxy_logger.debug(
+                    "litellm.proxy.auth.litellm_license.py::is_premium() - Updated 'self.license_str' - {}".format(
+                        self.license_str
+                    )
+                )
+                self._premium_check_logged = True
+
+            if self.license_str is None:
+                return False
+            elif (
+                self.verify_license_without_api_request(
+                    public_key=self.public_key, license_key=self.license_str
+                )
+                is True
+            ):
+                return True
+            elif self._verify(license_str=self.license_str) is True:
+                return True
+            return False
+        except Exception:
+            return False
+
+    def is_over_limit(self, total_users: int) -> bool:
+        """
+        Check if the license is over the limit
+        """
+        if self.airgapped_license_data is None:
+            return False
+        if "max_users" not in self.airgapped_license_data or not isinstance(
+            self.airgapped_license_data["max_users"], int
+        ):
+            return False
+        return total_users > self.airgapped_license_data["max_users"]
+
+    def is_team_count_over_limit(self, team_count: int) -> bool:
+        """
+        Check if the license is over the limit
+        """
+        if self.airgapped_license_data is None:
+            return False
+
+        _max_teams_in_license: Optional[int] = self.airgapped_license_data.get(
+            "max_teams"
+        )
+        if "max_teams" not in self.airgapped_license_data or not isinstance(
+            _max_teams_in_license, int
+        ):
+            return False
+        return team_count > _max_teams_in_license
+
+    def verify_license_without_api_request(self, public_key, license_key):
+        try:
+            from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
+            from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import padding
+
+            from litellm.proxy._types import EnterpriseLicenseData
+
+            # Decode the license key - add padding if needed for base64
+            # Base64 strings need to be a multiple of 4 characters
+            padding_needed = len(license_key) % 4
+            if padding_needed:
+                license_key += "=" * (4 - padding_needed)
+
+            decoded = base64.b64decode(license_key)
+            message, signature = decoded.split(b".", 1)
+
+            # Verify the signature
+            public_key.verify(
+                signature,
+                message,
+                padding.PSS(
+                    mgf=padding.MGF1(hashes.SHA256()),
+                    salt_length=padding.PSS.MAX_LENGTH,
+                ),
+                hashes.SHA256(),
+            )
+
+            # Decode and parse the data
+            license_data = json.loads(message.decode())
+
+            self.airgapped_license_data = EnterpriseLicenseData(**license_data)
+
+            # debug information provided in license data
+            verbose_proxy_logger.debug("License data: %s", license_data)
+
+            # Check expiration date
+            expiration_date = datetime.strptime(
+                license_data["expiration_date"], "%Y-%m-%d"
+            )
+            if expiration_date < datetime.now():
+                return False, "License has expired"
+
+            return True
+
+        except Exception as e:
+            verbose_proxy_logger.debug(
+                "litellm.proxy.auth.litellm_license.py::verify_license_without_api_request - Unable to verify License locally. - {}".format(
+                    str(e)
+                )
+            )
+            return False

llm-gateway-competitors/litellm-wheel-src/litellm/proxy/auth/login_utils.py

@@ -0,0 +1,344 @@
+"""
+Login utilities for handling user authentication in the proxy server.
+
+This module contains the core login logic that can be reused across different
+login endpoints (e.g., /login and /v2/login).
+"""
+
+import os
+import secrets
+from typing import Literal, Optional, cast
+
+from fastapi import HTTPException
+
+import litellm
+from litellm.constants import LITELLM_PROXY_ADMIN_NAME, LITELLM_UI_SESSION_DURATION
+from litellm.proxy._types import (
+    LiteLLM_UserTable,
+    LitellmUserRoles,
+    ProxyErrorTypes,
+    ProxyException,
+    UpdateUserRequest,
+    UserAPIKeyAuth,
+    hash_token,
+)
+from litellm.proxy.management_endpoints.internal_user_endpoints import user_update
+from litellm.proxy.management_endpoints.key_management_endpoints import (
+    generate_key_helper_fn,
+)
+from litellm.proxy.management_endpoints.ui_sso import (
+    get_disabled_non_admin_personal_key_creation,
+)
+from litellm.proxy.utils import PrismaClient, get_server_root_path
+from litellm.secret_managers.main import get_secret_bool
+from litellm.types.proxy.ui_sso import ReturnedUITokenObject
+
+
+def get_ui_credentials(master_key: Optional[str]) -> tuple[str, str]:
+    """
+    Get UI username and password from environment variables or master key.
+
+    Args:
+        master_key: Master key for the proxy (used as fallback for password)
+
+    Returns:
+        tuple[str, str]: A tuple containing (ui_username, ui_password)
+
+    Raises:
+        ProxyException: If neither UI_PASSWORD nor master_key is available
+    """
+    ui_username = os.getenv("UI_USERNAME", "admin")
+    ui_password = os.getenv("UI_PASSWORD", None)
+    if ui_password is None:
+        ui_password = str(master_key) if master_key is not None else None
+    if ui_password is None:
+        raise ProxyException(
+            message="set Proxy master key to use UI. https://docs.litellm.ai/docs/proxy/virtual_keys. If set, use `--detailed_debug` to debug issue.",
+            type=ProxyErrorTypes.auth_error,
+            param="UI_PASSWORD",
+            code=500,
+        )
+    return ui_username, ui_password
+
+
+class LoginResult:
+    """Result object containing authentication data from login."""
+
+    user_id: str
+    key: str
+    user_email: Optional[str]
+    user_role: str
+    login_method: Literal["sso", "username_password"]
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        user_id: str,
+        key: str,
+        user_email: Optional[str],
+        user_role: str,
+        login_method: Literal["sso", "username_password"] = "username_password",
+    ):
+        self.user_id = user_id
+        self.key = key
+        self.user_email = user_email
+        self.user_role = user_role
+        self.login_method = login_method
+
+
+async def authenticate_user(  # noqa: PLR0915
+    username: str,
+    password: str,
+    master_key: Optional[str],
+    prisma_client: Optional[PrismaClient],
+) -> LoginResult:
+    """
+    Authenticate a user and generate an API key for UI access.
+
+    This function handles two login scenarios:
+    1. Admin login using UI_USERNAME and UI_PASSWORD
+    2. User login using email and password from database
+
+    Args:
+        username: Username or email from the login form
+        password: Password from the login form
+        master_key: Master key for the proxy (required)
+        prisma_client: Prisma database client (optional)
+
+    Returns:
+        LoginResult: Object containing authentication data
+
+    Raises:
+        ProxyException: If authentication fails or required configuration is missing
+    """
+    if master_key is None:
+        raise ProxyException(
+            message="Master Key not set for Proxy. Please set Master Key to use Admin UI. Set `LITELLM_MASTER_KEY` in .env or set general_settings:master_key in config.yaml.  https://docs.litellm.ai/docs/proxy/virtual_keys. If set, use `--detailed_debug` to debug issue.",
+            type=ProxyErrorTypes.auth_error,
+            param="master_key",
+            code=500,
+        )
+
+    ui_username, ui_password = get_ui_credentials(master_key)
+
+    # Check if we can find the `username` in the db. On the UI, users can enter username=their email
+    _user_row: Optional[LiteLLM_UserTable] = None
+    user_role: Optional[
+        Literal[
+            LitellmUserRoles.PROXY_ADMIN,
+            LitellmUserRoles.PROXY_ADMIN_VIEW_ONLY,
+            LitellmUserRoles.INTERNAL_USER,
+            LitellmUserRoles.INTERNAL_USER_VIEW_ONLY,
+        ]
+    ] = None
+
+    if prisma_client is not None:
+        _user_row = cast(
+            Optional[LiteLLM_UserTable],
+            await prisma_client.db.litellm_usertable.find_first(
+                where={"user_email": {"equals": username, "mode": "insensitive"}}
+            ),
+        )
+
+    """
+    To login to Admin UI, we support the following
+    - Login with UI_USERNAME and UI_PASSWORD
+    - Login with Invite Link `user_email` and `password` combination
+    """
+    if secrets.compare_digest(
+        username.encode("utf-8"), ui_username.encode("utf-8")
+    ) and secrets.compare_digest(password.encode("utf-8"), ui_password.encode("utf-8")):
+        # Non SSO -> If user is using UI_USERNAME and UI_PASSWORD they are Proxy admin
+        user_role = LitellmUserRoles.PROXY_ADMIN
+        user_id = LITELLM_PROXY_ADMIN_NAME
+
+        # we want the key created to have PROXY_ADMIN_PERMISSIONS
+        key_user_id = LITELLM_PROXY_ADMIN_NAME
+        if (
+            os.getenv("PROXY_ADMIN_ID", None) is not None
+            and os.environ["PROXY_ADMIN_ID"] == user_id
+        ) or user_id == LITELLM_PROXY_ADMIN_NAME:
+            # checks if user is admin
+            key_user_id = os.getenv("PROXY_ADMIN_ID", LITELLM_PROXY_ADMIN_NAME)
+
+        # Admin is Authe'd in - generate key for the UI to access Proxy
+
+        # ensure this user is set as the proxy admin, in this route there is no sso, we can assume this user is only the admin
+        await user_update(
+            data=UpdateUserRequest(
+                user_id=key_user_id,
+                user_role=user_role,
+            ),
+            user_api_key_dict=UserAPIKeyAuth(
+                user_role=LitellmUserRoles.PROXY_ADMIN,
+            ),
+        )
+
+        if os.getenv("DATABASE_URL") is not None:
+            response = await generate_key_helper_fn(
+                request_type="key",
+                **{
+                    "user_role": LitellmUserRoles.PROXY_ADMIN,
+                    "duration": LITELLM_UI_SESSION_DURATION,
+                    "key_max_budget": litellm.max_ui_session_budget,
+                    "models": [],
+                    "aliases": {},
+                    "config": {},
+                    "spend": 0,
+                    "user_id": key_user_id,
+                    "team_id": "litellm-dashboard",
+                },  # type: ignore
+            )
+        else:
+            raise ProxyException(
+                message="No Database connected. Set DATABASE_URL in .env. If set, use `--detailed_debug` to debug issue.",
+                type=ProxyErrorTypes.auth_error,
+                param="DATABASE_URL",
+                code=500,
+            )
+
+        key = response["token"]  # type: ignore
+
+        if get_secret_bool("EXPERIMENTAL_UI_LOGIN"):
+            from litellm.proxy.auth.auth_checks import ExperimentalUIJWTToken
+
+            user_info: Optional[LiteLLM_UserTable] = None
+            if _user_row is not None:
+                user_info = _user_row
+            elif (
+                user_id is not None
+            ):  # if user_id is not None, we are using the UI_USERNAME and UI_PASSWORD
+                user_info = LiteLLM_UserTable(
+                    user_id=user_id,
+                    user_role=user_role,
+                    models=[],
+                    max_budget=litellm.max_ui_session_budget,
+                )
+            if user_info is None:
+                raise HTTPException(
+                    status_code=401,
+                    detail={
+                        "error": "User Information is required for experimental UI login"
+                    },
+                )
+
+            key = ExperimentalUIJWTToken.get_experimental_ui_login_jwt_auth_token(
+                user_info
+            )
+
+        return LoginResult(
+            user_id=user_id,
+            key=key,
+            user_email=None,
+            user_role=user_role,
+            login_method="username_password",
+        )
+
+    elif _user_row is not None:
+        """
+        When sharing invite links
+
+        -> if the user has no role in the DB assume they are only a viewer
+        """
+        user_id = getattr(_user_row, "user_id", "unknown")
+        user_role = getattr(
+            _user_row, "user_role", LitellmUserRoles.INTERNAL_USER_VIEW_ONLY
+        )
+        user_email = getattr(_user_row, "user_email", "unknown")
+        _password = getattr(_user_row, "password", "unknown")
+
+        if _password is None:
+            raise ProxyException(
+                message="User has no password set. Please set a password for the user via `/user/update`.",
+                type=ProxyErrorTypes.auth_error,
+                param="password",
+                code=401,
+            )
+
+        # check if password == _user_row.password
+        hash_password = hash_token(token=password)
+        if secrets.compare_digest(
+            password.encode("utf-8"), _password.encode("utf-8")
+        ) or secrets.compare_digest(
+            hash_password.encode("utf-8"), _password.encode("utf-8")
+        ):
+            if os.getenv("DATABASE_URL") is not None:
+                response = await generate_key_helper_fn(
+                    request_type="key",
+                    **{  # type: ignore
+                        "user_role": user_role,
+                        "duration": LITELLM_UI_SESSION_DURATION,
+                        "key_max_budget": litellm.max_ui_session_budget,
+                        "models": [],
+                        "aliases": {},
+                        "config": {},
+                        "spend": 0,
+                        "user_id": user_id,
+                        "team_id": "litellm-dashboard",
+                    },
+                )
+            else:
+                raise ProxyException(
+                    message="No Database connected. Set DATABASE_URL in .env. If set, use `--detailed_debug` to debug issue.",
+                    type=ProxyErrorTypes.auth_error,
+                    param="DATABASE_URL",
+                    code=500,
+                )
+
+            key = response["token"]  # type: ignore
+
+            return LoginResult(
+                user_id=user_id,
+                key=key,
+                user_email=user_email,
+                user_role=cast(str, user_role),
+                login_method="username_password",
+            )
+        else:
+            raise ProxyException(
+                message=f"Invalid credentials used to access UI.\nNot valid credentials for {username}",
+                type=ProxyErrorTypes.auth_error,
+                param="invalid_credentials",
+                code=401,
+            )
+    else:
+        raise ProxyException(
+            message="Invalid credentials used to access UI.\nCheck 'UI_USERNAME', 'UI_PASSWORD' in .env file",
+            type=ProxyErrorTypes.auth_error,
+            param="invalid_credentials",
+            code=401,
+        )
+
+
+def create_ui_token_object(
+    login_result: LoginResult,
+    general_settings: dict,
+    premium_user: bool,
+) -> ReturnedUITokenObject:
+    """
+    Create a ReturnedUITokenObject from a LoginResult.
+
+    Args:
+        login_result: The result from authenticate_user
+        general_settings: General proxy settings dictionary
+        premium_user: Whether premium features are enabled
+
+    Returns:
+        ReturnedUITokenObject: Token object ready for JWT encoding
+    """
+    disabled_non_admin_personal_key_creation = (
+        get_disabled_non_admin_personal_key_creation()
+    )
+
+    return ReturnedUITokenObject(
+        user_id=login_result.user_id,
+        key=login_result.key,
+        user_email=login_result.user_email,
+        user_role=login_result.user_role,
+        login_method=login_result.login_method,
+        premium_user=premium_user,
+        auth_header_name=general_settings.get(
+            "litellm_key_header_name", "Authorization"
+        ),
+        disabled_non_admin_personal_key_creation=disabled_non_admin_personal_key_creation,
+        server_root_path=get_server_root_path(),
+    )

llm-gateway-competitors/litellm-wheel-src/litellm/proxy/auth/model_checks.py

@@ -0,0 +1,381 @@
+# What is this?
+## Common checks for /v1/models and `/model/info`
+from typing import Dict, List, Optional, Set
+
+import litellm
+from litellm._logging import verbose_proxy_logger
+from litellm.proxy._types import SpecialModelNames, UserAPIKeyAuth
+from litellm.router import Router
+from litellm.router_utils.fallback_event_handlers import get_fallback_model_group
+from litellm.types.router import LiteLLM_Params
+from litellm.utils import get_valid_models
+
+
+def _check_wildcard_routing(model: str) -> bool:
+    """
+    Returns True if a model is a provider wildcard.
+
+    eg:
+    - anthropic/*
+    - openai/*
+    - *
+    """
+    if "*" in model:
+        return True
+    return False
+
+
+def get_provider_models(
+    provider: str, litellm_params: Optional[LiteLLM_Params] = None
+) -> Optional[List[str]]:
+    """
+    Returns the list of known models by provider
+    """
+    if provider == "*":
+        return get_valid_models(litellm_params=litellm_params)
+
+    if provider in litellm.models_by_provider:
+        provider_models = get_valid_models(
+            custom_llm_provider=provider, litellm_params=litellm_params
+        )
+        return provider_models
+    return None
+
+
+def _get_models_from_access_groups(
+    model_access_groups: Dict[str, List[str]],
+    all_models: List[str],
+    include_model_access_groups: Optional[bool] = False,
+) -> List[str]:
+    idx_to_remove = []
+    new_models = []
+    for idx, model in enumerate(all_models):
+        if model in model_access_groups:
+            if (
+                not include_model_access_groups
+            ):  # remove access group, unless requested - e.g. when creating a key
+                idx_to_remove.append(idx)
+            new_models.extend(model_access_groups[model])
+
+    for idx in sorted(idx_to_remove, reverse=True):
+        all_models.pop(idx)
+
+    all_models.extend(new_models)
+    return all_models
+
+
+async def get_mcp_server_ids(
+    user_api_key_dict: UserAPIKeyAuth,
+) -> List[str]:
+    """
+    Returns the list of MCP server ids for a given key by querying the object_permission table
+    """
+    from litellm.proxy.proxy_server import prisma_client
+
+    if prisma_client is None:
+        return []
+
+    if user_api_key_dict.object_permission_id is None:
+        return []
+
+    # Make a direct SQL query to get just the mcp_servers
+    try:
+        result = await prisma_client.db.litellm_objectpermissiontable.find_unique(
+            where={"object_permission_id": user_api_key_dict.object_permission_id},
+        )
+        if result and result.mcp_servers:
+            return result.mcp_servers
+        return []
+    except Exception:
+        return []
+
+
+def get_key_models(
+    user_api_key_dict: UserAPIKeyAuth,
+    proxy_model_list: List[str],
+    model_access_groups: Dict[str, List[str]],
+    include_model_access_groups: Optional[bool] = False,
+    only_model_access_groups: Optional[bool] = False,
+) -> List[str]:
+    """
+    Returns:
+    - List of model name strings
+    - Empty list if no models set
+    - If model_access_groups is provided, only return models that are in the access groups
+    - If include_model_access_groups is True, it includes the 'keys' of the model_access_groups
+      in the response - {"beta-models": ["gpt-4", "claude-v1"]} -> returns 'beta-models'
+    """
+    all_models: List[str] = []
+    if len(user_api_key_dict.models) > 0:
+        all_models = list(
+            user_api_key_dict.models
+        )  # copy to avoid mutating cached objects
+        if SpecialModelNames.all_team_models.value in all_models:
+            all_models = list(
+                user_api_key_dict.team_models
+            )  # copy to avoid mutating cached objects
+        if SpecialModelNames.all_proxy_models.value in all_models:
+            all_models = list(proxy_model_list)  # copy to avoid mutating caller's list
+            if include_model_access_groups:
+                all_models.extend(model_access_groups.keys())
+
+    all_models = _get_models_from_access_groups(
+        model_access_groups=model_access_groups,
+        all_models=all_models,
+        include_model_access_groups=include_model_access_groups,
+    )
+
+    # deduplicate while preserving order
+    all_models = list(dict.fromkeys(all_models))
+
+    verbose_proxy_logger.debug("ALL KEY MODELS - {}".format(len(all_models)))
+    return all_models
+
+
+def get_team_models(
+    team_models: List[str],
+    proxy_model_list: List[str],
+    model_access_groups: Dict[str, List[str]],
+    include_model_access_groups: Optional[bool] = False,
+) -> List[str]:
+    """
+    Returns:
+    - List of model name strings
+    - Empty list if no models set
+    - If model_access_groups is provided, only return models that are in the access groups
+    """
+    all_models_set: Set[str] = set()
+    if len(team_models) > 0:
+        all_models_set.update(team_models)
+        if SpecialModelNames.all_team_models.value in all_models_set:
+            all_models_set.update(team_models)
+        if SpecialModelNames.all_proxy_models.value in all_models_set:
+            all_models_set.update(proxy_model_list)
+            if include_model_access_groups:
+                all_models_set.update(model_access_groups.keys())
+
+    all_models = _get_models_from_access_groups(
+        model_access_groups=model_access_groups,
+        all_models=list(all_models_set),
+        include_model_access_groups=include_model_access_groups,
+    )
+
+    # deduplicate while preserving order
+    all_models = list(dict.fromkeys(all_models))
+
+    verbose_proxy_logger.debug("ALL TEAM MODELS - {}".format(len(all_models)))
+    return all_models
+
+
+def get_complete_model_list(
+    key_models: List[str],
+    team_models: List[str],
+    proxy_model_list: List[str],
+    user_model: Optional[str],
+    infer_model_from_keys: Optional[bool],
+    return_wildcard_routes: Optional[bool] = False,
+    llm_router: Optional[Router] = None,
+    model_access_groups: Dict[str, List[str]] = {},
+    include_model_access_groups: Optional[bool] = False,
+    only_model_access_groups: Optional[bool] = False,
+) -> List[str]:
+    """Logic for returning complete model list for a given key + team pair"""
+
+    """
+    - If key list is empty -> defer to team list
+    - If team list is empty -> defer to proxy model list
+
+    If list contains wildcard -> return known provider models
+    """
+
+    unique_models = []
+
+    def append_unique(models):
+        for model in models:
+            if model not in unique_models:
+                unique_models.append(model)
+
+    if key_models:
+        append_unique(key_models)
+    elif team_models:
+        append_unique(team_models)
+    else:
+        append_unique(proxy_model_list)
+        if include_model_access_groups:
+            append_unique(list(model_access_groups.keys()))  # TODO: keys order
+
+        if user_model:
+            append_unique([user_model])
+
+        if infer_model_from_keys:
+            valid_models = get_valid_models()
+            append_unique(valid_models)
+
+    if only_model_access_groups:
+        model_access_groups_to_return: List[str] = []
+        for model in unique_models:
+            if model in model_access_groups:
+                model_access_groups_to_return.append(model)
+        return model_access_groups_to_return
+
+    all_wildcard_models = _get_wildcard_models(
+        unique_models=unique_models,
+        return_wildcard_routes=return_wildcard_routes,
+        llm_router=llm_router,
+    )
+
+    complete_model_list = unique_models + all_wildcard_models
+
+    return complete_model_list
+
+
+def get_known_models_from_wildcard(
+    wildcard_model: str, litellm_params: Optional[LiteLLM_Params] = None
+) -> List[str]:
+    try:
+        wildcard_provider_prefix, wildcard_suffix = wildcard_model.split("/", 1)
+    except ValueError:  # safely fail
+        return []
+
+    # Use provider from litellm_params when available, otherwise from wildcard prefix
+    # (e.g., "openai" from "openai/*" - needed for BYOK where wildcard isn't in router)
+    if litellm_params is not None:
+        try:
+            provider = litellm_params.model.split("/", 1)[0]
+        except ValueError:
+            provider = wildcard_provider_prefix
+    else:
+        provider = wildcard_provider_prefix
+
+    # get all known provider models
+
+    wildcard_models = get_provider_models(
+        provider=provider, litellm_params=litellm_params
+    )
+
+    if wildcard_models is None:
+        return []
+    if wildcard_suffix != "*":
+        ## CHECK IF PARTIAL FILTER e.g. `gemini-*`
+        model_prefix = wildcard_suffix.replace("*", "")
+
+        is_partial_filter = any(
+            wc_model.startswith(model_prefix) for wc_model in wildcard_models
+        )
+        if is_partial_filter:
+            filtered_wildcard_models = [
+                wc_model
+                for wc_model in wildcard_models
+                if wc_model.startswith(model_prefix)
+            ]
+            wildcard_models = filtered_wildcard_models
+        else:
+            # add model prefix to wildcard models
+            wildcard_models = [f"{model_prefix}{model}" for model in wildcard_models]
+
+    suffix_appended_wildcard_models = []
+    for model in wildcard_models:
+        if not model.startswith(wildcard_provider_prefix):
+            model = f"{wildcard_provider_prefix}/{model}"
+        suffix_appended_wildcard_models.append(model)
+    return suffix_appended_wildcard_models or []
+
+
+def _get_wildcard_models(
+    unique_models: List[str],
+    return_wildcard_routes: Optional[bool] = False,
+    llm_router: Optional[Router] = None,
+) -> List[str]:
+    models_to_remove = set()
+    all_wildcard_models = []
+    for model in unique_models:
+        if _check_wildcard_routing(model=model):
+            if (
+                return_wildcard_routes
+            ):  # will add the wildcard route to the list eg: anthropic/*.
+                all_wildcard_models.append(model)
+
+            ## get litellm params from model
+            if llm_router is not None:
+                model_list = llm_router.get_model_list(model_name=model)
+                if model_list:
+                    for router_model in model_list:
+                        wildcard_models = get_known_models_from_wildcard(
+                            wildcard_model=model,
+                            litellm_params=LiteLLM_Params(
+                                **router_model["litellm_params"]  # type: ignore
+                            ),
+                        )
+                        all_wildcard_models.extend(wildcard_models)
+                else:
+                    # Router has no deployment for this wildcard (e.g., BYOK team models)
+                    # Fall back to expanding from known provider models
+                    wildcard_models = get_known_models_from_wildcard(
+                        wildcard_model=model, litellm_params=None
+                    )
+                    if wildcard_models:
+                        models_to_remove.add(model)
+                        all_wildcard_models.extend(wildcard_models)
+            else:
+                # get all known provider models
+                wildcard_models = get_known_models_from_wildcard(
+                    wildcard_model=model, litellm_params=None
+                )
+
+                if wildcard_models:
+                    models_to_remove.add(model)
+                    all_wildcard_models.extend(wildcard_models)
+
+    for model in models_to_remove:
+        unique_models.remove(model)
+
+    return all_wildcard_models
+
+
+def get_all_fallbacks(
+    model: str,
+    llm_router: Optional[Router] = None,
+    fallback_type: str = "general",
+) -> List[str]:
+    """
+    Get all fallbacks for a given model from the router's fallback configuration.
+
+    Args:
+        model: The model name to get fallbacks for
+        llm_router: The LiteLLM router instance
+        fallback_type: Type of fallback ("general", "context_window", "content_policy")
+
+    Returns:
+        List of fallback model names. Empty list if no fallbacks found.
+    """
+    if llm_router is None:
+        return []
+
+    # Get the appropriate fallback list based on type
+    fallbacks_config: list = []
+    if fallback_type == "general":
+        fallbacks_config = getattr(llm_router, "fallbacks", [])
+    elif fallback_type == "context_window":
+        fallbacks_config = getattr(llm_router, "context_window_fallbacks", [])
+    elif fallback_type == "content_policy":
+        fallbacks_config = getattr(llm_router, "content_policy_fallbacks", [])
+    else:
+        verbose_proxy_logger.warning(f"Unknown fallback_type: {fallback_type}")
+        return []
+
+    if not fallbacks_config:
+        return []
+
+    try:
+        # Use existing function to get fallback model group
+        fallback_model_group, _ = get_fallback_model_group(
+            fallbacks=fallbacks_config, model_group=model
+        )
+
+        if fallback_model_group is None:
+            return []
+
+        return fallback_model_group
+    except Exception as e:
+        verbose_proxy_logger.error(f"Error getting fallbacks for model {model}: {e}")
+        return []

llm-gateway-competitors/litellm-wheel-src/litellm/proxy/auth/oauth2_check.py

@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
+import base64
+import os
+from typing import Dict, Optional, Tuple, cast
+
+import httpx
+
+from litellm._logging import verbose_proxy_logger
+from litellm.llms.custom_httpx.http_handler import (
+    get_async_httpx_client,
+    httpxSpecialProvider,
+)
+from litellm.proxy._types import CommonProxyErrors, LitellmUserRoles, UserAPIKeyAuth
+
+
+class Oauth2Handler:
+    """
+    Handles OAuth2 token validation.
+    """
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _is_introspection_endpoint(
+        token_info_endpoint: str,
+        oauth_client_id: Optional[str],
+        oauth_client_secret: Optional[str],
+    ) -> bool:
+        """
+        Determine if this is an introspection endpoint (requires POST) or token info endpoint (uses GET).
+
+        Args:
+            token_info_endpoint: The OAuth2 endpoint URL
+            oauth_client_id: OAuth2 client ID
+            oauth_client_secret: OAuth2 client secret
+
+        Returns:
+            bool: True if this is an introspection endpoint
+        """
+        return (
+            "introspect" in token_info_endpoint.lower()
+            and oauth_client_id is not None
+            and oauth_client_secret is not None
+        )
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _prepare_introspection_request(
+        token: str,
+        oauth_client_id: Optional[str],
+        oauth_client_secret: Optional[str],
+    ) -> Tuple[Dict[str, str], Dict[str, str]]:
+        """
+        Prepare headers and data for OAuth2 introspection endpoint (RFC 7662).
+
+        Args:
+            token: The OAuth2 token to validate
+            oauth_client_id: OAuth2 client ID
+            oauth_client_secret: OAuth2 client secret
+
+        Returns:
+            Tuple of (headers, data) for the introspection request
+        """
+        headers = {"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"}
+        data = {"token": token}
+
+        # Add client authentication if credentials are provided
+        if oauth_client_id and oauth_client_secret:
+            # Use HTTP Basic authentication for client credentials
+            credentials = base64.b64encode(
+                f"{oauth_client_id}:{oauth_client_secret}".encode()
+            ).decode()
+            headers["Authorization"] = f"Basic {credentials}"
+        elif oauth_client_id:
+            # For public clients, include client_id in the request body
+            data["client_id"] = oauth_client_id
+
+        return headers, data
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _prepare_token_info_request(token: str) -> Dict[str, str]:
+        """
+        Prepare headers for generic token info endpoint.
+
+        Args:
+            token: The OAuth2 token to validate
+
+        Returns:
+            Dict of headers for the token info request
+        """
+        return {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}", "Content-Type": "application/json"}
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _extract_user_info(
+        response_data: Dict,
+        user_id_field_name: str,
+        user_role_field_name: str,
+        user_team_id_field_name: str,
+    ) -> Tuple[Optional[str], Optional[str], Optional[str]]:
+        """
+        Extract user information from OAuth2 response.
+
+        Args:
+            response_data: The response data from OAuth2 endpoint
+            user_id_field_name: Field name for user ID
+            user_role_field_name: Field name for user role
+            user_team_id_field_name: Field name for team ID
+
+        Returns:
+            Tuple of (user_id, user_role, user_team_id)
+        """
+        user_id = response_data.get(user_id_field_name)
+        user_team_id = response_data.get(user_team_id_field_name)
+        user_role = response_data.get(user_role_field_name)
+
+        return user_id, user_role, user_team_id
+
+    @staticmethod
+    async def check_oauth2_token(token: str) -> UserAPIKeyAuth:
+        """
+        Makes a request to the token introspection endpoint to validate the OAuth2 token.
+
+        This function implements OAuth2 token introspection according to RFC 7662.
+        It supports both generic token info endpoints (GET) and OAuth2 introspection endpoints (POST).
+
+        Args:
+            token (str): The OAuth2 token to validate.
+
+        Returns:
+            UserAPIKeyAuth: If the token is valid, containing user information.
+
+        Raises:
+            ValueError: If the token is invalid, the request fails, or the token info endpoint is not set.
+        """
+        from litellm.proxy.proxy_server import premium_user
+
+        if premium_user is not True:
+            raise ValueError(
+                "Oauth2 token validation is only available for premium users"
+                + CommonProxyErrors.not_premium_user.value
+            )
+
+        verbose_proxy_logger.debug("Oauth2 token validation for token=%s", token)
+
+        # Get the token info endpoint from environment variable
+        token_info_endpoint = os.getenv("OAUTH_TOKEN_INFO_ENDPOINT")
+        user_id_field_name = os.environ.get("OAUTH_USER_ID_FIELD_NAME", "sub")
+        user_role_field_name = os.environ.get("OAUTH_USER_ROLE_FIELD_NAME", "role")
+        user_team_id_field_name = os.environ.get(
+            "OAUTH_USER_TEAM_ID_FIELD_NAME", "team_id"
+        )
+
+        # OAuth2 client credentials for introspection endpoint authentication
+        oauth_client_id = os.environ.get("OAUTH_CLIENT_ID")
+        oauth_client_secret = os.environ.get("OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET")
+
+        if not token_info_endpoint:
+            raise ValueError(
+                "OAUTH_TOKEN_INFO_ENDPOINT environment variable is not set"
+            )
+
+        client = get_async_httpx_client(llm_provider=httpxSpecialProvider.Oauth2Check)
+
+        # Determine if this is an introspection endpoint (requires POST) or token info endpoint (uses GET)
+        is_introspection_endpoint = Oauth2Handler._is_introspection_endpoint(
+            token_info_endpoint=token_info_endpoint,
+            oauth_client_id=oauth_client_id,
+            oauth_client_secret=oauth_client_secret,
+        )
+
+        try:
+            if is_introspection_endpoint:
+                # OAuth2 Token Introspection (RFC 7662) - requires POST with form data
+                verbose_proxy_logger.debug("Using OAuth2 introspection endpoint (POST)")
+
+                headers, data = Oauth2Handler._prepare_introspection_request(
+                    token=token,
+                    oauth_client_id=oauth_client_id,
+                    oauth_client_secret=oauth_client_secret,
+                )
+
+                response = await client.post(
+                    token_info_endpoint, headers=headers, data=data
+                )
+            else:
+                # Generic token info endpoint - uses GET with Bearer token
+                verbose_proxy_logger.debug("Using generic token info endpoint (GET)")
+                headers = Oauth2Handler._prepare_token_info_request(token=token)
+                response = await client.get(token_info_endpoint, headers=headers)
+
+            # if it's a bad token we expect it to raise an HTTPStatusError
+            response.raise_for_status()
+
+            # If we get here, the request was successful
+            data = response.json()
+
+            verbose_proxy_logger.debug(
+                "Oauth2 token validation for token=%s, response from endpoint=%s",
+                token,
+                data,
+            )
+
+            # For introspection endpoints, check if token is active
+            if is_introspection_endpoint and not data.get("active", True):
+                raise ValueError("Token is not active")
+
+            # Extract user information from response
+            user_id, user_role, user_team_id = Oauth2Handler._extract_user_info(
+                response_data=data,
+                user_id_field_name=user_id_field_name,
+                user_role_field_name=user_role_field_name,
+                user_team_id_field_name=user_team_id_field_name,
+            )
+
+            return UserAPIKeyAuth(
+                api_key=token,
+                team_id=user_team_id,
+                user_id=user_id,
+                user_role=cast(LitellmUserRoles, user_role),
+            )
+        except httpx.HTTPStatusError as e:
+            # This will catch any 4xx or 5xx errors
+            raise ValueError(f"Oauth 2.0 Token validation failed: {e}")
+        except Exception as e:
+            # This will catch any other errors (like network issues)
+            raise ValueError(f"An error occurred during token validation: {e}")

llm-gateway-competitors/litellm-wheel-src/litellm/proxy/auth/oauth2_proxy_hook.py

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+from typing import Any, Dict
+
+from fastapi import Request
+
+from litellm._logging import verbose_proxy_logger
+from litellm.proxy._types import UserAPIKeyAuth
+
+
+async def handle_oauth2_proxy_request(request: Request) -> UserAPIKeyAuth:
+    """
+    Handle request from oauth2 proxy.
+    """
+    from litellm.proxy.proxy_server import general_settings
+
+    verbose_proxy_logger.debug("Handling oauth2 proxy request")
+    # Define the OAuth2 config mappings
+    oauth2_config_mappings: Dict[str, str] = (
+        general_settings.get("oauth2_config_mappings") or {}
+    )
+    verbose_proxy_logger.debug(f"Oauth2 config mappings: {oauth2_config_mappings}")
+
+    if not oauth2_config_mappings:
+        raise ValueError("Oauth2 config mappings not found in general_settings")
+    # Initialize a dictionary to store the mapped values
+    auth_data: Dict[str, Any] = {}
+
+    # Extract values from headers based on the mappings
+    for key, header in oauth2_config_mappings.items():
+        value = request.headers.get(header)
+        if value:
+            # Convert max_budget to float if present
+            if key == "max_budget":
+                auth_data[key] = float(value)
+            # Convert models to list if present
+            elif key == "models":
+                auth_data[key] = [model.strip() for model in value.split(",")]
+            else:
+                auth_data[key] = value
+    verbose_proxy_logger.debug(
+        f"Auth data before creating UserAPIKeyAuth object: {auth_data}"
+    )
+    user_api_key_auth = UserAPIKeyAuth(**auth_data)
+    verbose_proxy_logger.debug(f"UserAPIKeyAuth object created: {user_api_key_auth}")
+    # Create and return UserAPIKeyAuth object
+    return user_api_key_auth

llm-gateway-competitors/litellm-wheel-src/litellm/proxy/auth/public_key.pem

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+ -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAwcNBabWBZzrDhFAuA4Fh
+FhIcA3rF7vrLb8+1yhF2U62AghQp9nStyuJRjxMUuldWgJ1yRJ2s7UffVw5r8DeA
+dqXPD+w+3LCNwqJGaIKN08QGJXNArM3QtMaN0RTzAyQ4iibN1r6609W5muK9wGp0
+b1j5+iDUmf0ynItnhvaX6B8Xoaflc3WD/UBdrygLmsU5uR3XC86+/8ILoSZH3HtN
+6FJmWhlhjS2TR1cKZv8K5D0WuADTFf5MF8jYFR+uORPj5Pe/EJlLGN26Lfn2QnGu
+XgbPF6nCGwZ0hwH1Xkn3xzGaJ4xBEC761wqp5cHxWSDktHyFKnLbP3jVeegjVIHh
+pQIDAQAB
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----

llm-gateway-competitors/litellm-wheel-src/litellm/proxy/auth/rds_iam_token.py

@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+import os
+from typing import Any, Optional, Union
+
+import httpx
+
+
+def init_rds_client(
+    aws_access_key_id: Optional[str] = None,
+    aws_secret_access_key: Optional[str] = None,
+    aws_region_name: Optional[str] = None,
+    aws_session_name: Optional[str] = None,
+    aws_profile_name: Optional[str] = None,
+    aws_role_name: Optional[str] = None,
+    aws_web_identity_token: Optional[str] = None,
+    timeout: Optional[Union[float, httpx.Timeout]] = None,
+):
+    from litellm.secret_managers.main import get_secret
+
+    # check for custom AWS_REGION_NAME and use it if not passed to init_bedrock_client
+    litellm_aws_region_name = get_secret("AWS_REGION_NAME", None)
+    standard_aws_region_name = get_secret("AWS_REGION", None)
+    ## CHECK IS  'os.environ/' passed in
+    # Define the list of parameters to check
+    params_to_check = [
+        aws_access_key_id,
+        aws_secret_access_key,
+        aws_region_name,
+        aws_session_name,
+        aws_profile_name,
+        aws_role_name,
+        aws_web_identity_token,
+    ]
+
+    # Iterate over parameters and update if needed
+    for i, param in enumerate(params_to_check):
+        if param and param.startswith("os.environ/"):
+            params_to_check[i] = get_secret(param)  # type: ignore
+    # Assign updated values back to parameters
+    (
+        aws_access_key_id,
+        aws_secret_access_key,
+        aws_region_name,
+        aws_session_name,
+        aws_profile_name,
+        aws_role_name,
+        aws_web_identity_token,
+    ) = params_to_check
+
+    ### SET REGION NAME
+    region_name = aws_region_name
+    if aws_region_name:
+        region_name = aws_region_name
+    elif litellm_aws_region_name:
+        region_name = litellm_aws_region_name
+    elif standard_aws_region_name:
+        region_name = standard_aws_region_name
+    else:
+        raise Exception(
+            "AWS region not set: set AWS_REGION_NAME or AWS_REGION env variable or in .env file",
+        )
+
+    import boto3
+
+    if isinstance(timeout, float):
+        config = boto3.session.Config(connect_timeout=timeout, read_timeout=timeout)  # type: ignore
+    elif isinstance(timeout, httpx.Timeout):
+        config = boto3.session.Config(  # type: ignore
+            connect_timeout=timeout.connect, read_timeout=timeout.read
+        )
+    else:
+        config = boto3.session.Config()  # type: ignore
+
+    ### CHECK STS ###
+    if (
+        aws_web_identity_token is not None
+        and aws_role_name is not None
+        and aws_session_name is not None
+    ):
+        try:
+            oidc_token = open(aws_web_identity_token).read()  # check if filepath
+        except Exception:
+            oidc_token = get_secret(aws_web_identity_token)
+
+        if oidc_token is None:
+            raise Exception(
+                "OIDC token could not be retrieved from secret manager.",
+            )
+
+        sts_client = boto3.client("sts")
+
+        # https://docs.aws.amazon.com/STS/latest/APIReference/API_AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity.html
+        # https://boto3.amazonaws.com/v1/documentation/api/latest/reference/services/sts/client/assume_role_with_web_identity.html
+        sts_response = sts_client.assume_role_with_web_identity(
+            RoleArn=aws_role_name,
+            RoleSessionName=aws_session_name,
+            WebIdentityToken=oidc_token,
+            DurationSeconds=3600,
+        )
+
+        client = boto3.client(
+            service_name="rds",
+            aws_access_key_id=sts_response["Credentials"]["AccessKeyId"],
+            aws_secret_access_key=sts_response["Credentials"]["SecretAccessKey"],
+            aws_session_token=sts_response["Credentials"]["SessionToken"],
+            region_name=region_name,
+            config=config,
+        )
+
+    elif aws_role_name is not None and aws_session_name is not None:
+        # use sts if role name passed in
+        sts_client = boto3.client(
+            "sts",
+            aws_access_key_id=aws_access_key_id,
+            aws_secret_access_key=aws_secret_access_key,
+        )
+
+        sts_response = sts_client.assume_role(
+            RoleArn=aws_role_name, RoleSessionName=aws_session_name
+        )
+
+        client = boto3.client(
+            service_name="rds",
+            aws_access_key_id=sts_response["Credentials"]["AccessKeyId"],
+            aws_secret_access_key=sts_response["Credentials"]["SecretAccessKey"],
+            aws_session_token=sts_response["Credentials"]["SessionToken"],
+            region_name=region_name,
+            config=config,
+        )
+    elif aws_access_key_id is not None:
+        # uses auth params passed to completion
+        # aws_access_key_id is not None, assume user is trying to auth using litellm.completion
+
+        client = boto3.client(
+            service_name="rds",
+            aws_access_key_id=aws_access_key_id,
+            aws_secret_access_key=aws_secret_access_key,
+            region_name=region_name,
+            config=config,
+        )
+    elif aws_profile_name is not None:
+        # uses auth values from AWS profile usually stored in ~/.aws/credentials
+
+        client = boto3.Session(profile_name=aws_profile_name).client(
+            service_name="rds",
+            region_name=region_name,
+            config=config,
+        )
+
+    else:
+        # aws_access_key_id is None, assume user is trying to auth using env variables
+        # boto3 automatically reads env variables
+
+        client = boto3.client(
+            service_name="rds",
+            region_name=region_name,
+            config=config,
+        )
+
+    return client
+
+
+def generate_iam_auth_token(
+    db_host, db_port, db_user, client: Optional[Any] = None
+) -> str:
+    from urllib.parse import quote
+
+    if client is None:
+        boto_client = init_rds_client(
+            aws_region_name=os.getenv("AWS_REGION_NAME"),
+            aws_access_key_id=os.getenv("AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID"),
+            aws_secret_access_key=os.getenv("AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY"),
+            aws_session_name=os.getenv("AWS_SESSION_NAME"),
+            aws_profile_name=os.getenv("AWS_PROFILE_NAME"),
+            aws_role_name=os.getenv("AWS_ROLE_NAME", os.getenv("AWS_ROLE_ARN")),
+            aws_web_identity_token=os.getenv(
+                "AWS_WEB_IDENTITY_TOKEN", os.getenv("AWS_WEB_IDENTITY_TOKEN_FILE")
+            ),
+        )
+    else:
+        boto_client = client
+
+    token = boto_client.generate_db_auth_token(
+        DBHostname=db_host, Port=db_port, DBUsername=db_user
+    )
+    cleaned_token = quote(token, safe="")
+
+    return cleaned_token

llm-gateway-competitors/litellm-wheel-src/litellm/proxy/auth/route_checks.py

@@ -0,0 +1,669 @@
+import re
+from typing import List, Optional
+
+from fastapi import HTTPException, Request, status
+
+from litellm._logging import verbose_proxy_logger
+from litellm.proxy._types import (
+    CommonProxyErrors,
+    LiteLLM_UserTable,
+    LiteLLMRoutes,
+    LitellmUserRoles,
+    UserAPIKeyAuth,
+)
+
+from .auth_checks_organization import _user_is_org_admin
+
+
+class RouteChecks:
+    @staticmethod
+    def should_call_route(route: str, valid_token: UserAPIKeyAuth):
+        """
+        Check if management route is disabled and raise exception
+        """
+        try:
+            from litellm_enterprise.proxy.auth.route_checks import EnterpriseRouteChecks
+
+            EnterpriseRouteChecks.should_call_route(route=route)
+        except HTTPException as e:
+            raise e
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+
+        # Check if Virtual Key is allowed to call the route - Applies to all Roles
+        RouteChecks.is_virtual_key_allowed_to_call_route(
+            route=route, valid_token=valid_token
+        )
+        return True
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def is_virtual_key_allowed_to_call_route(
+        route: str, valid_token: UserAPIKeyAuth
+    ) -> bool:
+        """
+        Raises Exception if Virtual Key is not allowed to call the route
+        """
+
+        # Only check if valid_token.allowed_routes is set and is a list with at least one item
+        if valid_token.allowed_routes is None:
+            return True
+        if not isinstance(valid_token.allowed_routes, list):
+            return True
+        if len(valid_token.allowed_routes) == 0:
+            return True
+
+        # explicit check for allowed routes (exact match or prefix match)
+        for allowed_route in valid_token.allowed_routes:
+            if RouteChecks._route_matches_allowed_route(
+                route=route, allowed_route=allowed_route
+            ):
+                return True
+
+        ## check if 'allowed_route' is a field name in LiteLLMRoutes
+        if any(
+            allowed_route in LiteLLMRoutes._member_names_
+            for allowed_route in valid_token.allowed_routes
+        ):
+            for allowed_route in valid_token.allowed_routes:
+                if allowed_route in LiteLLMRoutes._member_names_:
+                    if RouteChecks.check_route_access(
+                        route=route,
+                        allowed_routes=LiteLLMRoutes._member_map_[allowed_route].value,
+                    ):
+                        return True
+
+                    ################################################
+                    #  For llm_api_routes, also check registered pass-through endpoints
+                    ################################################
+                    if allowed_route == "llm_api_routes":
+                        from litellm.proxy.pass_through_endpoints.pass_through_endpoints import (
+                            InitPassThroughEndpointHelpers,
+                        )
+
+                        if InitPassThroughEndpointHelpers.is_registered_pass_through_route(
+                            route=route
+                        ):
+                            return True
+
+        # check if wildcard pattern is allowed
+        for allowed_route in valid_token.allowed_routes:
+            if RouteChecks._route_matches_wildcard_pattern(
+                route=route, pattern=allowed_route
+            ):
+                return True
+
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
+            detail=f"Virtual key is not allowed to call this route. Only allowed to call routes: {valid_token.allowed_routes}. Tried to call route: {route}",
+        )
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _mask_user_id(user_id: str) -> str:
+        """
+        Mask user_id to prevent leaking sensitive information in error messages
+
+        Args:
+            user_id (str): The user_id to mask
+
+        Returns:
+            str: Masked user_id showing only first 2 and last 2 characters
+        """
+        from litellm.litellm_core_utils.sensitive_data_masker import SensitiveDataMasker
+
+        if not user_id or len(user_id) <= 4:
+            return "***"
+
+        # Use SensitiveDataMasker with custom configuration for user_id
+        masker = SensitiveDataMasker(visible_prefix=6, visible_suffix=2, mask_char="*")
+
+        return masker._mask_value(user_id)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _raise_admin_only_route_exception(
+        user_obj: Optional[LiteLLM_UserTable],
+        route: str,
+    ) -> None:
+        """
+        Raise exception for routes that require proxy admin access
+
+        Args:
+            user_obj (Optional[LiteLLM_UserTable]): The user object
+            route (str): The route being accessed
+
+        Raises:
+            Exception: With user role and masked user_id information
+        """
+        user_role = "unknown"
+        user_id = "unknown"
+        if user_obj is not None:
+            user_role = user_obj.user_role or "unknown"
+            user_id = user_obj.user_id or "unknown"
+
+        masked_user_id = RouteChecks._mask_user_id(user_id)
+        raise Exception(
+            f"Only proxy admin can be used to generate, delete, update info for new keys/users/teams. Route={route}. Your role={user_role}. Your user_id={masked_user_id}"
+        )
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def non_proxy_admin_allowed_routes_check(
+        user_obj: Optional[LiteLLM_UserTable],
+        _user_role: Optional[LitellmUserRoles],
+        route: str,
+        request: Request,
+        valid_token: UserAPIKeyAuth,
+        request_data: dict,
+    ):
+        """
+        Checks if Non Proxy Admin User is allowed to access the route
+        """
+
+        # Check user has defined custom admin routes
+        RouteChecks.custom_admin_only_route_check(
+            route=route,
+        )
+
+        if RouteChecks.is_llm_api_route(route=route):
+            pass
+        elif RouteChecks.is_info_route(route=route):
+            # check if user allowed to call an info route
+            if route == "/key/info":
+                # handled by function itself
+                pass
+            elif route == "/user/info":
+                # check if user can access this route
+                query_params = request.query_params
+                user_id = query_params.get("user_id")
+                verbose_proxy_logger.debug(
+                    f"user_id: {user_id} & valid_token.user_id: {valid_token.user_id}"
+                )
+                if user_id and user_id != valid_token.user_id:
+                    raise HTTPException(
+                        status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
+                        detail="key not allowed to access this user's info. user_id={}, key's user_id={}".format(
+                            user_id, valid_token.user_id
+                        ),
+                    )
+            elif route == "/model/info":
+                # /model/info just shows models user has access to
+                pass
+            elif route == "/team/info":
+                pass  # handled by function itself
+        elif (
+            route in LiteLLMRoutes.global_spend_tracking_routes.value
+            and getattr(valid_token, "permissions", None) is not None
+            and "get_spend_routes" in getattr(valid_token, "permissions", [])
+        ):
+            pass
+        elif _user_role == LitellmUserRoles.PROXY_ADMIN_VIEW_ONLY.value:
+            RouteChecks._check_proxy_admin_viewer_access(
+                route=route,
+                _user_role=_user_role,
+                request_data=request_data,
+            )
+        elif (
+            _user_role == LitellmUserRoles.INTERNAL_USER.value
+            and RouteChecks.check_route_access(
+                route=route, allowed_routes=LiteLLMRoutes.internal_user_routes.value
+            )
+        ):
+            pass
+        elif _user_is_org_admin(
+            request_data=request_data, user_object=user_obj
+        ) and RouteChecks.check_route_access(
+            route=route, allowed_routes=LiteLLMRoutes.org_admin_allowed_routes.value
+        ):
+            pass
+        elif (
+            _user_role == LitellmUserRoles.INTERNAL_USER_VIEW_ONLY.value
+            and RouteChecks.check_route_access(
+                route=route,
+                allowed_routes=LiteLLMRoutes.internal_user_view_only_routes.value,
+            )
+        ):
+            pass
+        elif RouteChecks.check_route_access(
+            route=route, allowed_routes=LiteLLMRoutes.self_managed_routes.value
+        ):  # routes that manage their own allowed/disallowed logic
+            pass
+        elif route.startswith("/v1/mcp/") or route.startswith("/mcp-rest/"):
+            pass  # authN/authZ handled by api itself
+        elif RouteChecks.check_passthrough_route_access(
+            route=route, user_api_key_dict=valid_token
+        ):
+            pass
+        elif valid_token.allowed_routes is not None:
+            # check if route is in allowed_routes (exact match or prefix match)
+            route_allowed = False
+            for allowed_route in valid_token.allowed_routes:
+                if RouteChecks._route_matches_allowed_route(
+                    route=route, allowed_route=allowed_route
+                ):
+                    route_allowed = True
+                    break
+
+                if RouteChecks._route_matches_wildcard_pattern(
+                    route=route, pattern=allowed_route
+                ):
+                    route_allowed = True
+                    break
+
+            if not route_allowed:
+                RouteChecks._raise_admin_only_route_exception(
+                    user_obj=user_obj, route=route
+                )
+        else:
+            RouteChecks._raise_admin_only_route_exception(
+                user_obj=user_obj, route=route
+            )
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def custom_admin_only_route_check(route: str):
+        from litellm.proxy.proxy_server import general_settings, premium_user
+
+        if "admin_only_routes" in general_settings:
+            if premium_user is not True:
+                verbose_proxy_logger.error(
+                    f"Trying to use 'admin_only_routes' this is an Enterprise only feature. {CommonProxyErrors.not_premium_user.value}"
+                )
+                return
+            if route in general_settings["admin_only_routes"]:
+                raise HTTPException(
+                    status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
+                    detail=f"user not allowed to access this route. Route={route} is an admin only route",
+                )
+        pass
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def is_llm_api_route(route: str) -> bool:
+        """
+        Helper to checks if provided route is an OpenAI route
+
+
+        Returns:
+            - True: if route is an OpenAI route
+            - False: if route is not an OpenAI route
+        """
+        # Ensure route is a string before performing checks
+        if not isinstance(route, str):
+            return False
+
+        if route in LiteLLMRoutes.openai_routes.value:
+            return True
+
+        if route in LiteLLMRoutes.anthropic_routes.value:
+            return True
+
+        if route in LiteLLMRoutes.google_routes.value:
+            return True
+
+        if RouteChecks.check_route_access(
+            route=route, allowed_routes=LiteLLMRoutes.mcp_routes.value
+        ):
+            return True
+
+        if RouteChecks.check_route_access(
+            route=route, allowed_routes=LiteLLMRoutes.agent_routes.value
+        ):
+            return True
+
+        if route in LiteLLMRoutes.litellm_native_routes.value:
+            return True
+
+        # fuzzy match routes like "/v1/threads/thread_49EIN5QF32s4mH20M7GFKdlZ"
+        # Check for routes with placeholders or wildcard patterns
+        for openai_route in LiteLLMRoutes.openai_routes.value:
+            # Replace placeholders with regex pattern
+            # placeholders are written as "/threads/{thread_id}"
+            if "{" in openai_route:
+                if RouteChecks._route_matches_pattern(
+                    route=route, pattern=openai_route
+                ):
+                    return True
+            # Check for wildcard patterns like "/containers/*"
+            if RouteChecks._is_wildcard_pattern(pattern=openai_route):
+                if RouteChecks._route_matches_wildcard_pattern(
+                    route=route, pattern=openai_route
+                ):
+                    return True
+
+        # Check for Google routes with placeholders like "/v1beta/models/{model_name}:generateContent"
+        for google_route in LiteLLMRoutes.google_routes.value:
+            if "{" in google_route:
+                if RouteChecks._route_matches_pattern(
+                    route=route, pattern=google_route
+                ):
+                    return True
+
+        # Check for Anthropic routes with placeholders
+        for anthropic_route in LiteLLMRoutes.anthropic_routes.value:
+            if "{" in anthropic_route:
+                if RouteChecks._route_matches_pattern(
+                    route=route, pattern=anthropic_route
+                ):
+                    return True
+
+        if RouteChecks._is_azure_openai_route(route=route):
+            return True
+
+        for _llm_passthrough_route in LiteLLMRoutes.mapped_pass_through_routes.value:
+            if _llm_passthrough_route in route:
+                return True
+        return False
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def is_management_route(route: str) -> bool:
+        """
+        Check if route is a management route
+        """
+        return route in LiteLLMRoutes.management_routes.value
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def is_info_route(route: str) -> bool:
+        """
+        Check if route is an info route
+        """
+        return route in LiteLLMRoutes.info_routes.value
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _is_azure_openai_route(route: str) -> bool:
+        """
+        Check if route is a route from AzureOpenAI SDK client
+
+        eg.
+        route='/openai/deployments/vertex_ai/gemini-1.5-flash/chat/completions'
+        """
+        # Ensure route is a string before attempting regex matching
+        if not isinstance(route, str):
+            return False
+        # Add support for deployment and engine model paths
+        deployment_pattern = r"^/openai/deployments/[^/]+/[^/]+/chat/completions$"
+        engine_pattern = r"^/engines/[^/]+/chat/completions$"
+
+        if re.match(deployment_pattern, route) or re.match(engine_pattern, route):
+            return True
+        return False
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _route_matches_pattern(route: str, pattern: str) -> bool:
+        """
+        Check if route matches the pattern placed in proxy/_types.py
+
+        Example:
+        - pattern: "/threads/{thread_id}"
+        - route: "/threads/thread_49EIN5QF32s4mH20M7GFKdlZ"
+        - returns: True
+
+
+        - pattern: "/key/{token_id}/regenerate"
+        - route: "/key/regenerate/82akk800000000jjsk"
+        - returns: False, pattern is "/key/{token_id}/regenerate"
+        """
+        # Ensure route is a string before attempting regex matching
+        if not isinstance(route, str):
+            return False
+
+        def _placeholder_to_regex(match: re.Match) -> str:
+            placeholder = match.group(0).strip("{}")
+            if placeholder.endswith(":path"):
+                # allow "/" in the placeholder value, but don't eat the route suffix after ":"
+                return r"[^:]+"
+            return r"[^/]+"
+
+        pattern = re.sub(r"\{[^}]+\}", _placeholder_to_regex, pattern)
+        # Anchor the pattern to match the entire string
+        pattern = f"^{pattern}$"
+        if re.match(pattern, route):
+            return True
+        return False
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _is_wildcard_pattern(pattern: str) -> bool:
+        """
+        Check if pattern is a wildcard pattern
+        """
+        return pattern.endswith("*")
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _route_matches_wildcard_pattern(route: str, pattern: str) -> bool:
+        """
+        Check if route matches the wildcard pattern
+
+        eg.
+
+        pattern: "/scim/v2/*"
+        route: "/scim/v2/Users"
+        - returns: True
+
+        pattern: "/scim/v2/*"
+        route: "/chat/completions"
+        - returns: False
+
+
+        pattern: "/scim/v2/*"
+        route: "/scim/v2/Users/123"
+        - returns: True
+
+        """
+        if pattern.endswith("*"):
+            # Get the prefix (everything before the wildcard)
+            prefix = pattern[:-1]
+            return route.startswith(prefix)
+        else:
+            # If there's no wildcard, the pattern and route should match exactly
+            return route == pattern
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _route_matches_allowed_route(route: str, allowed_route: str) -> bool:
+        """
+        Check if route matches the allowed_route pattern.
+        Supports both exact match and prefix match.
+
+        Examples:
+        - allowed_route="/fake-openai-proxy-6", route="/fake-openai-proxy-6" -> True (exact match)
+        - allowed_route="/fake-openai-proxy-6", route="/fake-openai-proxy-6/v1/chat/completions" -> True (prefix match)
+        - allowed_route="/fake-openai-proxy-6", route="/fake-openai-proxy-600" -> False (not a valid prefix)
+
+        Args:
+            route: The actual route being accessed
+            allowed_route: The allowed route pattern
+
+        Returns:
+            bool: True if route matches (exact or prefix), False otherwise
+        """
+        # Exact match
+        if route == allowed_route:
+            return True
+        # Prefix match - ensure we add "/" to prevent false matches like /fake-openai-proxy-600
+        if route.startswith(allowed_route + "/"):
+            return True
+        return False
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def check_route_access(route: str, allowed_routes: List[str]) -> bool:
+        """
+        Check if a route has access by checking both exact matches and patterns
+
+        Args:
+            route (str): The route to check
+            allowed_routes (list): List of allowed routes/patterns
+
+        Returns:
+            bool: True if route is allowed, False otherwise
+        """
+        #########################################################
+        # exact match route is in allowed_routes
+        #########################################################
+        if route in allowed_routes:
+            return True
+
+        #########################################################
+        # wildcard match route is in allowed_routes
+        # e.g calling /anthropic/v1/messages is allowed if allowed_routes has /anthropic/*
+        #########################################################
+        wildcard_allowed_routes = [
+            route
+            for route in allowed_routes
+            if RouteChecks._is_wildcard_pattern(pattern=route)
+        ]
+        for allowed_route in wildcard_allowed_routes:
+            if RouteChecks._route_matches_wildcard_pattern(
+                route=route, pattern=allowed_route
+            ):
+                return True
+
+        #########################################################
+        # pattern match route is in allowed_routes
+        # pattern: "/threads/{thread_id}"
+        # route: "/threads/thread_49EIN5QF32s4mH20M7GFKdlZ"
+        # returns: True
+        #########################################################
+        if any(  # Check pattern match
+            RouteChecks._route_matches_pattern(route=route, pattern=allowed_route)
+            for allowed_route in allowed_routes
+        ):
+            return True
+
+        return False
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def check_passthrough_route_access(
+        route: str, user_api_key_dict: UserAPIKeyAuth
+    ) -> bool:
+        """
+        Check if route is a passthrough route.
+        Supports both exact match and prefix match.
+        """
+        metadata = user_api_key_dict.metadata
+        team_metadata = user_api_key_dict.team_metadata or {}
+        if metadata is None and team_metadata is None:
+            return False
+        if (
+            "allowed_passthrough_routes" not in metadata
+            and "allowed_passthrough_routes" not in team_metadata
+        ):
+            return False
+        if (
+            metadata.get("allowed_passthrough_routes") is None
+            and team_metadata.get("allowed_passthrough_routes") is None
+        ):
+            return False
+
+        allowed_passthrough_routes = (
+            metadata.get("allowed_passthrough_routes")
+            or team_metadata.get("allowed_passthrough_routes")
+            or []
+        )
+
+        # Check if route matches any allowed passthrough route (exact or prefix match)
+        for allowed_route in allowed_passthrough_routes:
+            if RouteChecks._route_matches_allowed_route(
+                route=route, allowed_route=allowed_route
+            ):
+                return True
+
+        return False
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _is_assistants_api_request(request: Request) -> bool:
+        """
+        Returns True if `thread` or `assistant` is in the request path
+
+        Args:
+            request (Request): The request object
+
+        Returns:
+            bool: True if `thread` or `assistant` is in the request path, False otherwise
+        """
+        if "thread" in request.url.path or "assistant" in request.url.path:
+            return True
+        return False
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def is_generate_content_route(route: str) -> bool:
+        """
+        Returns True if this is a google generateContent or streamGenerateContent route
+
+        These routes from google allow passing key=api_key in the query params
+        """
+        if "generateContent" in route:
+            return True
+        if "streamGenerateContent" in route:
+            return True
+        return False
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _check_proxy_admin_viewer_access(
+        route: str,
+        _user_role: str,
+        request_data: dict,
+    ) -> None:
+        """
+        Check access for PROXY_ADMIN_VIEW_ONLY role
+        """
+        if RouteChecks.is_llm_api_route(route=route):
+            raise HTTPException(
+                status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
+                detail=f"user not allowed to access this OpenAI routes, role= {_user_role}",
+            )
+
+        # Check if this is a write operation on management routes
+        if RouteChecks.check_route_access(
+            route=route, allowed_routes=LiteLLMRoutes.management_routes.value
+        ):
+            # For management routes, only allow read operations or specific allowed updates
+            if route == "/user/update":
+                # Check the Request params are valid for PROXY_ADMIN_VIEW_ONLY
+                if request_data is not None and isinstance(request_data, dict):
+                    _params_updated = request_data.keys()
+                    for param in _params_updated:
+                        if param not in ["user_email", "password"]:
+                            raise HTTPException(
+                                status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
+                                detail=f"user not allowed to access this route, role= {_user_role}. Trying to access: {route} and updating invalid param: {param}. only user_email and password can be updated",
+                            )
+            elif (
+                route
+                in [
+                    "/user/new",
+                    "/user/delete",
+                    "/team/new",
+                    "/team/update",
+                    "/team/delete",
+                    "/model/new",
+                    "/model/update",
+                    "/model/delete",
+                    "/key/generate",
+                    "/key/delete",
+                    "/key/update",
+                    "/key/regenerate",
+                    "/key/service-account/generate",
+                    "/key/block",
+                    "/key/unblock",
+                ]
+                or route.startswith("/key/")
+                and route.endswith("/regenerate")
+            ):
+                # Block write operations for PROXY_ADMIN_VIEW_ONLY
+                raise HTTPException(
+                    status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
+                    detail=f"user not allowed to access this route, role= {_user_role}. Trying to access: {route}",
+                )
+            # Allow read operations on management routes (like /user/info, /team/info, /model/info)
+            return
+        elif RouteChecks.check_route_access(
+            route=route, allowed_routes=LiteLLMRoutes.admin_viewer_routes.value
+        ):
+            # Allow access to admin viewer routes (read-only admin endpoints)
+            return
+        elif RouteChecks.check_route_access(
+            route=route, allowed_routes=LiteLLMRoutes.global_spend_tracking_routes.value
+        ):
+            # Allow access to global spend tracking routes (read-only spend endpoints)
+            # proxy_admin_viewer role description: "view all keys, view all spend"
+            return
+        else:
+            # For other routes, block access
+            raise HTTPException(
+                status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
+                detail=f"user not allowed to access this route, role= {_user_role}. Trying to access: {route}",
+            )