P0 fixes: - platform-token-runtime: Add store.Save() after Refresh token update (P0-3) - platform-token-runtime: Add sync.RWMutex to InMemoryRuntimeStore (P0-4) - platform-token-runtime: Add bearer token auth to /audit-events endpoint (P0-5) - gateway: Fail startup in production if PASSWORD_ENCRYPTION_KEY uses default (P0-1) - gateway: Require explicit CORS_ALLOW_ORIGINS in production (P0-2) P1 fixes: - gateway: Add TrustedProxies config field + env var GATEWAY_TRUSTED_PROXIES (P1-5) - gateway: Sanitize X-Request-ID header to prevent log injection (P1-6) - gateway: Strip internal error details from error responses to clients (P1-7) - supply-api: Upgrade deriveDEK from trivial byte-rotation to HKDF-SHA256 (P1-1) - supply-api: Reject HS256/HS384/HS512 in production, require RSA (P1-2) Code quality fixes: - supply-api: Add BruteForceMaxAttempts + BruteForceLockoutDuration to AuthConfig (MED-12) - supply-api: Add TrustedProxies to token_auth_middleware (IP spoofing protection) - supply-api: Use shared pathutil.SplitPath instead of duplicate splitPath - supply-api: Fix query_key_reject_middleware call sites with trustedProxies param - gateway: Wire TrustedProxies into AuthMiddlewareConfig and extractClientIP - gateway: Add CORSAllowOrigins to AuthConfig, wire into CORSMiddleware - gateway: Fix CompletionsHandle to have context and RecordResult like ChatCompletions - gateway: Add sanitizeRequestID helper for X-Request-ID log injection prevention - gateway: Add os import for PASSWORD_ENCRYPTION_KEY check - gateway: Add strings import to handler.go for sanitizeRequestID Environment issues documented in TEST_ENVIRONMENT_ISSUES.md
52 lines
1.3 KiB
Go
52 lines
1.3 KiB
Go
package middleware
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"net/http"
|
|
"strings"
|
|
"time"
|
|
|
|
"lijiaoqiao/platform-token-runtime/internal/auth/service"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
var disallowedQueryKeys = []string{"key", "api_key", "token"}
|
|
|
|
func QueryKeyRejectMiddleware(next http.Handler, auditor service.AuditEmitter, now func() time.Time, trustedProxies []string) http.Handler {
|
|
if next == nil {
|
|
next = http.HandlerFunc(func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
|
|
}
|
|
if now == nil {
|
|
now = defaultNowFunc
|
|
}
|
|
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
_, exists := externalQueryKey(r)
|
|
if !exists {
|
|
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
requestID := ensureRequestID(r, now)
|
|
emitAuditEvent(r.Context(), auditor, service.AuditEvent{
|
|
EventName: service.EventTokenQueryKeyRejected,
|
|
RequestID: requestID,
|
|
Route: r.URL.Path,
|
|
ResultCode: service.CodeQueryKeyNotAllowed,
|
|
ClientIP: extractClientIP(r, trustedProxies),
|
|
CreatedAt: now(),
|
|
})
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, requestID, service.CodeQueryKeyNotAllowed, "query key ingress is not allowed")
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func externalQueryKey(r *http.Request) (string, bool) {
|
|
values := r.URL.Query()
|
|
for key := range values {
|
|
lowered := strings.ToLower(key)
|
|
for _, disallowed := range disallowedQueryKeys {
|
|
if lowered == disallowed {
|
|
return key, true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return "", false
|
|
}
|