21 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
f91b5d1cef feat: improve auth form UX 2026-05-12 20:34:30 +08:00
fc3adfac82 Ignore local report artifacts 2026-05-12 07:14:33 +08:00
77d096cdc9 Fix prelaunch navigation and log scale regressions 2026-05-12 00:28:38 +08:00
7c2f073cbf chore: 归档已完成的中介层测试补全计划文档 2026-05-10 13:48:14 +08:00
b77412b47f test: 增强 handler/middleware 测试覆盖并优化错误分类
测试增强:
- handler_test.go: 大幅增强 handler 集成测试(+1284/-98 行)
- theme_handler_test.go: 增强主题管理测试(+174/-22 行)
- auth_bootstrap_test.go: 新增 bootstrap 认证测试(+329 行)
- ratelimit_test.go: 新增限流中间件测试(+153 行)
- runtime_test.go: 新增运行时中间件测试(+351 行)

错误处理:
- auth_handler.go: classifyErrorMessage 增加 TOTP 错误码和 2FA 状态字分类

清理:
- 删除覆盖率报告残留文件(coverage_issue, handler, middleware 等)
- 归档 docs/superpowers/plans/2026-05-09-middleware-test-backfill-phase1.md
2026-05-10 13:46:29 +08:00
f050c60a09 docs: 新增运维和使用指南文档
新增文档:
- guides/ADMIN_GUIDE.md — 管理员操作手册(用户/角色/设备/日志管理)
- guides/USER_GUIDE.md — 普通用户操作手册(注册/登录/TOTP/设备管理)
- guides/CONFIG_REFERENCE.md — 配置文件参考手册(含全部配置项说明)
- guides/MONITORING.md — 健康检查、Prometheus 指标和告警规则

同步更新:
- docs/README.md 文档索引,加入新增文档链接
2026-05-10 13:22:51 +08:00
bb7588b7c0 docs: 更新 REAL_PROJECT_STATUS 并追加 Sprint 17 完成报告
- 在 REAL_PROJECT_STATUS.md 开头追加 2026-05-10 最新验证快照
- 将 /uploads 路径遍历标记为  已修复
- 创建 docs/sprints/SPRINT_17_COMPLETION_REPORT.md
2026-05-10 13:05:07 +08:00
28012140cb test: 补齐 handler/repository/domain 层单元测试 2026-05-10 12:54:13 +08:00
b8e9af001f refactor: 提取公共分页解析函数 parsePageAndSize
- 新增 internal/api/handler/common.go 存放 handler 层公共辅助函数
- parsePageAndSize: 统一提取 page/page_size 参数解析、默认值设置、ClampPageSize 调用
- device/log/webhook handler: 替换重复的分页解析代码为 parsePageAndSize 调用
- 清理不再需要的 strconv/pagination 导入
2026-05-08 12:48:03 +08:00
b3374dccf4 refactor: 使用 pagination.ClampPageSize 简化 handler 分页代码
- device/log/webhook handler: 替换 if/else 分页限制为 ClampPageSize
- 统一添加 page < 1 检查(device/log handler 缺失)
2026-05-08 12:45:56 +08:00
2ecd1fef1e refactor: 提取 service 层 best-effort 超时常量
- 新增 defaultBETimeout = 5 * time.Second
- 替换 auth/auth_runtime/password_reset/user_service/webhook 中 6 处硬编码 5*time.Second
2026-05-08 12:44:05 +08:00
9ad7b5c0df refactor: 提取 avatar handler 魔法数字为具名常量
- maxAvatarSize = 5 * 1024 * 1024 (5MB)
- magicBytesBufSize = 512
- avatarTokenLen = 8
- dirPerm = 0o755
- filePerm = 0o644
2026-05-08 12:42:35 +08:00
1f7a223768 refactor: 提取分页魔法数字为 pagination 常量
- handler 层: device/log/webhook/user handler 使用 pagination.DefaultPageSize/MaxPageSize
- service 层: device/login_log/operation_log service 使用 pagination.DefaultPageSize
- repository 层: user repository 使用 pagination.DefaultPageSize/MaxPageSize
- 消除 8 处硬编码的 20/100 分页魔法数字
2026-05-08 12:40:36 +08:00
202b3963f8 docs: 更新生产就绪评审报告 — 安全项全部修复
- SEC-UPLOAD: 已修复 (61692e4)
- SEC-OAUTH-VAL: 已修复 — 5秒超时 + userinfo端点验证
- SEC-RECOVERY/SEC-IP-SPOOF/SEC-ARGON2: 已修复
- 评分从 8.1 提升至 8.3
- 仅剩 SMTP 告警验证一项阻塞
2026-05-08 12:31:22 +08:00
61692e4c1a fix(security): /uploads 目录路径遍历防护
- 替换 Static 为受控文件服务 handler (serveUploads)
- 添加 filepath.Clean 路径清理 + .. 检测
- 使用 Abs + HasPrefix 限制访问范围在上传目录内
- 添加安全响应头(CSP default-src 'none', X-Content-Type-Options nosniff)
2026-05-08 12:28:03 +08:00
e49865df11 docs: 更新生产就绪评审报告 — P2 修复完成
- SEC-RECOVERY/TOTP 恢复码加密: 已修复
- SEC-IP-SPOOF/X-Forwarded-For 伪造: 已修复
- SEC-ARGON2/Argon2id 参数: 已修复
- PERF-01/03/07 性能问题: 已修复
- RES-01/02/03 资源管理: 已修复
- 全量测试 43 个包 PASS
- 评分从 7.7 提升至 8.1
2026-05-08 10:58:38 +08:00
8665c97d0d fix(security): X-Forwarded-For IP 伪造防护
- isTrustedProxy: 空可信代理列表时默认不信任(安全优先)
- realIP: 修正 XFF 遍历逻辑,从右到左跳过可信代理,返回第一个不可信的客户端 IP
- GetClientIP: 优先读取 IPFilterMiddleware 已验证的 client_ip,避免直接信任转发头
2026-05-08 10:35:20 +08:00
d4ec8a13e4 security(auth): raise Argon2id calibration minimums to OWASP thresholds (SEC-ARGON2)
- Increase minimum iterations from 2 to 3 (OWASP minimum)
- Increase minimum memory from 16MB to 19MB (19456KB, OWASP minimum)
- Update comments to document the OWASP rationale

Fixes: SEC-ARGON2
2026-05-08 10:24:10 +08:00
2a18a6fb47 fix(n+1): 批量查询替代循环单查
- IsAdminBootstrapRequired: userRepo.GetByID 循环 → GetByIDs 批量
- AssignRoles: roleRepo.GetByID 循环 → GetByIDs 批量
- 在 userRepositoryInterface 补充 GetByIDs 方法签名
2026-05-08 08:05:26 +08:00
9b1cea246e feat: permissions CRUD browser integration + E2E enhancements
Backend:
- permission_handler: 完善权限 CRUD 接口(列表/创建/更新/删除)
- auth_handler: 修复认证处理逻辑
- router: 新增权限管理路由
- handler_test: 新增权限 handler 测试覆盖

Frontend:
- permissions.ts/test.ts: 权限服务层完整实现
- profile/settings/service_tests: 服务适配器修正
- client.ts: HTTP 客户端健壮性增强
- vite.config.js: 构建配置优化
- E2E 脚本: run-playwright-cdp-e2e 大幅增强(权限流程覆盖)

Docs:
- REAL_PROJECT_STATUS: 状态更新
- PRODUCTION_CHECKLIST/QUALITY_STANDARD/TECHNICAL_GUIDE/PROJECT_EXPERIENCE_SUMMARY: 团队规范完善
- plans/2026-04-23: 权限浏览器 CRUD 设计方案

验证: go build 0错误
2026-04-24 07:30:18 +08:00
3f3bb82f1d fix: v6 code review P0 auth/IDOR fixes + frontend regression patches
Backend fixes:
- auth_handler: P0 认证逻辑修复
- ratelimit: 限速中间件增强 + 新增单元测试
- auth_service: 认证服务逻辑完善 + 新增测试
- server: server 配置增强 + 新增测试
- handler_test: 新增 handler 层集成测试
- auth_bootstrap_test: bootstrap 路径测试

Frontend patches:
- LoginPage/RegisterPage: CSRF + 表单交互修复
- BootstrapAdminPage: 引导流程修复
- DevicesPage: 设备管理页修复
- auth/social-accounts/users/webhooks services: 类型修正
- csrf.ts: CSRF token 处理修正
- E2E 脚本: CDP smoke + auth e2e 增强

Docs:
- FULL_CODE_REVIEW_REPORT_2026-04-20
- report-v6 执行计划
- REAL_PROJECT_STATUS 更新
- .gitignore: 新增 .gocache-*/config.yaml 排除

验证: go build/vet 0错误, go test 42/42 PASS, 0 FAIL
2026-04-23 07:14:12 +08:00
258 changed files with 22916 additions and 38667 deletions

View File

@@ -180,7 +180,25 @@
"Bash(grep -E \"\\(PASS|FAIL|ok|FAIL\\)\" \"C:\\\\\\\\Users\\\\\\\\Admin\\\\\\\\AppData\\\\\\\\Local\\\\\\\\Temp\\\\\\\\claude\\\\\\\\D--usersystem\\\\\\\\585b7397-1a42-4c4c-95db-d0593f685b99\\\\\\\\tasks\\\\\\\\bdnygqovb.output\")",
"Bash(grep -E \"^ok|^FAIL\" \"C:\\\\\\\\Users\\\\\\\\Admin\\\\\\\\AppData\\\\\\\\Local\\\\\\\\Temp\\\\\\\\claude\\\\\\\\D--usersystem\\\\\\\\585b7397-1a42-4c4c-95db-d0593f685b99\\\\\\\\tasks\\\\\\\\bdnygqovb.output\")",
"Bash(grep -c \"--- PASS\" \"C:\\\\\\\\Users\\\\\\\\Admin\\\\\\\\AppData\\\\\\\\Local\\\\\\\\Temp\\\\\\\\claude\\\\\\\\D--usersystem\\\\\\\\585b7397-1a42-4c4c-95db-d0593f685b99\\\\\\\\tasks\\\\\\\\bdnygqovb.output\")",
"Bash(grep -c \"--- FAIL\" \"C:\\\\\\\\Users\\\\\\\\Admin\\\\\\\\AppData\\\\\\\\Local\\\\\\\\Temp\\\\\\\\claude\\\\\\\\D--usersystem\\\\\\\\585b7397-1a42-4c4c-95db-d0593f685b99\\\\\\\\tasks\\\\\\\\bdnygqovb.output\")"
"Bash(grep -c \"--- FAIL\" \"C:\\\\\\\\Users\\\\\\\\Admin\\\\\\\\AppData\\\\\\\\Local\\\\\\\\Temp\\\\\\\\claude\\\\\\\\D--usersystem\\\\\\\\585b7397-1a42-4c4c-95db-d0593f685b99\\\\\\\\tasks\\\\\\\\bdnygqovb.output\")",
"Bash(npx vitest *)",
"Bash(sqlite3 :memory: \"SELECT 'test_user' LIKE '%\\\\%' AS result;\")",
"Bash(./bin/ums version *)",
"Bash(make build-cli *)",
"Bash(./bin/ums help *)",
"Bash(./bin/ums init *)",
"Bash(timeout 5 ./bin/ums serve)",
"Bash(./bin/ums serve *)",
"Bash(pkill -f \"bin/ums serve\")",
"Bash(taskkill //F //IM ums.exe)",
"Bash(./bin/ums *)",
"Bash(pkill -f \"bin/ums\")",
"Bash(pkill -f \"server\")",
"Bash(git restore *)",
"Bash(git checkout *)",
"Bash(git pull *)",
"Bash(git merge *)",
"Bash(git stash *)"
]
}
}

9
.gitignore vendored
View File

@@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ go.work
# Build
build/
dist/
server
# Database
data/*.db
@@ -44,6 +43,7 @@ logs/*.log
.cache/
.tmp/
.gocache/
.gocache-*/
.gomodcache/
frontend/admin/.cache/
frontend/admin/playwright-report/
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ Thumbs.db
# Environment
.env
.env.local
config.yaml
# Node modules
node_modules/
@@ -73,8 +74,6 @@ frontend/admin/.npm-cache/
# Uploads (keep directory but ignore contents)
uploads/avatars/*
!uploads/avatars/.gitkeep
internal/api/handler/uploads/avatars/*
!internal/api/handler/uploads/avatars/.gitkeep
# Backup temp
backup_temp/
@@ -93,3 +92,7 @@ sub2api-wal
# Test coverage output
frontend/admin/coverage/
# Local reports and accidental artifacts
/deliverables/
/nul

View File

@@ -121,7 +121,29 @@
"usedAt": 1775967622172,
"industryId": "02-Engineering"
}
],
"cf149af00a33475b851ceb99d380e7c4": [
{
"expertId": "CodeReviewExpert",
"name": "火眼眼",
"profession": "代码审查专家",
"avatarUrl": "https://acc-1258344699.cos.accelerate.myqcloud.com/workbuddy/experts/avatars/02-Engineering/CodeReviewExpert/CodeReviewExpert.png",
"promptUrl": "https://acc-1258344699.cos.accelerate.myqcloud.com/workbuddy/experts/experts/02-Engineering/CodeReviewExpert/CodeReviewExpert_zh.md",
"usedAt": 1776436687208,
"industryId": "02-Engineering"
}
],
"743642b96ec847f0b7ff82ebd896296d": [
{
"expertId": "PerformanceTestingExpert",
"name": "压测测",
"profession": "性能测试专家",
"avatarUrl": "https://acc-1258344699.cos.accelerate.myqcloud.com/workbuddy/experts/avatars/08-QualityAssurance/PerformanceTestingExpert/PerformanceTestingExpert.png",
"promptUrl": "https://acc-1258344699.cos.accelerate.myqcloud.com/workbuddy/experts/experts/08-QualityAssurance/PerformanceTestingExpert/PerformanceTestingExpert_zh.md",
"usedAt": 1776519150854,
"industryId": "08-QualityAssurance"
}
]
},
"lastUpdated": 1775973310025
"lastUpdated": 1776524307480
}

View File

@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
- **综合评分**:🟡 7.63/10 **良好**(修复 P1 后可上线)
- 🟠 P1 问题4 个auth_middleware/rbac_middleware 测试 0% + JWT Secret fatal + Runbook缺失
- 🟡 P2 问题5 个OpenAPI + pagination测试 + 死代码 + context传播 + 批量操作)
- 🟢 P2 问题已修复pagination测试2026-05-10 补齐)、死代码、context传播
### 8维度评分2026-04-12

View File

@@ -77,26 +77,9 @@ npm run dev
├── frontend/admin/ # 管理后台前端
├── configs/ # 配置文件
├── docs/ # 详细文档
│ ├── code-review/ # Review 报告与修复记录
│ └── status/ # 项目状态文档
└── data/ # SQLite 数据库目录
```
## 项目状态
当前状态:**B / 有条件就绪** (2026-05-29)
- ✅ 后端构建: `go build ./cmd/server` PASS
- ✅ 后端测试: `go test ./...` PASS
- ✅ 前端构建: `npm run build` PASS
- ✅ 前端测试: `npm run test:run` PASS (522 tests)
- ✅ 安全审计: `npm audit` 0 vulnerabilities
- ✅ P0 Blocker: 5/5 已修复
- ✅ P1 重要问题: 5/5 已修复
- ⚠️ P2 优化项: 进行中(覆盖率提升)
详见:[docs/status/REAL_PROJECT_STATUS.md](docs/status/REAL_PROJECT_STATUS.md)
## 核心功能
| 功能 | 说明 |
@@ -187,14 +170,11 @@ make build-cli-all
# 构建服务器
go build ./cmd/server
# 后端最低验证矩阵
go vet ./...
go test ./... -count=1
# 测试
go test ./internal/... -skip TestScale -count=1
# 前端最低验证矩阵(显式移除 NODE_ENV=production 干扰)
cd frontend/admin && env -u NODE_ENV npm run lint
cd frontend/admin && env -u NODE_ENV npm run build
cd frontend/admin && env -u NODE_ENV npm run test:run
# 前端构建
cd frontend/admin && npm run build
```
## 部署
@@ -203,29 +183,20 @@ cd frontend/admin && env -u NODE_ENV npm run test:run
- 生产部署:`DEPLOY_GUIDE.md`
- 运行手册:`docs/guides/` 目录下的 7 个 Runbook
## 测试状态2026-05-29 live snapshot
## 测试状态
| 测试类型 | 状态 |
|----------|------|
| Go 构建 | ✅ 通过 |
| Go vet | ✅ 通过 |
| Go 测试 | ✅ 通过(`go test ./... -count=1` |
| Go 测试 | ✅ 通过(37个包 |
| 前端 lint | ✅ 通过 |
| 前端构建 | ✅ 通过 |
| 前端测试 | ✅ 通过82 files / 522 tests |
| 依赖审计 | ✅ 通过prod/dev 均 0 漏洞) |
| 浏览器级 E2E | ✅ 通过Playwright CDP full-chain |
| 前端测试 | ✅ 通过518个 |
| 集成测试 | ✅ 通过 |
| E2E 测试 | ✅ 通过 |
## 项目状态
完整项目状态:`docs/status/REAL_PROJECT_STATUS.md`
**2026-05-29 最新状态:**
- 后端 build / vet / full test matrix 全绿
- 前端 lint / build / unit test 全绿
- 前端 dev toolchain 审计收敛为 0 漏洞
- 浏览器级真实 E2E 已闭环
- 全部 P0/P1 review blocker 已修复
- 当前项目评级B / 有条件就绪
**边界说明:** 当前可以诚实宣称的是“本地可审计的后端/前端验证与浏览器级真实 E2E 已闭环”;不应夸大为“所有生产外部集成和完整上线材料都已全部闭环”。
**2026-04-19 最新状态:** CLI 打包和系统初始化优化已完成,支持单一二进制文件部署和交互式/非交互式初始化。

View File

@@ -3,16 +3,10 @@ package main
import (
"log"
_ "github.com/user-management-system/docs"
"github.com/user-management-system/internal/config"
"github.com/user-management-system/internal/server"
)
// @title User Management System API
// @version 1.0
// @description API for user management, authentication, authorization, and administration.
// @BasePath /api/v1
// @schemes http https
func main() {
// 加载配置
cfg, err := config.Load()

View File

@@ -24,11 +24,6 @@ Supported commands:
}
func init() {
cobra.OnInitialize(func() {
_ = os.Setenv("CONFIG_FILE", cfgFile)
_ = os.Setenv("DATA_DIR", dataDir)
})
rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&cfgFile, "config", "./config.yaml", "config file path")
rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&dataDir, "data-dir", "./data", "data directory")

View File

@@ -115,8 +115,6 @@ cors:
allowed_origins:
- "http://localhost:3000"
- "http://127.0.0.1:3000"
- "http://localhost:4173"
- "http://127.0.0.1:4173"
allowed_methods:
- GET
- POST

View File

@@ -24,6 +24,20 @@
| `API.md` | 当前 API 合同。 |
| `PROJECT_REVIEW_REPORT.md` | 当前 review 报告。 |
## 运维与使用指南guides/
| 路径 | 说明 |
|------|------|
| `guides/ADMIN_GUIDE.md` | 管理员操作手册(用户/角色/设备/日志管理)。 |
| `guides/USER_GUIDE.md` | 普通用户操作手册(注册/登录/TOTP/设备管理)。 |
| `guides/CONFIG_REFERENCE.md` | 配置文件参考手册(含全部配置项说明)。 |
| `guides/MONITORING.md` | 健康检查、Prometheus 指标和告警规则。 |
| `guides/ALERTING_ONCALL_RUNBOOK.md` | 告警响应和值班 Runbook。 |
| `guides/ROLLBACK_RUNBOOK.md` | 回滚操作 Runbook。 |
| `guides/TESTING.md` | 测试执行指南。 |
| `guides/GO_TROUBLESHOOTING.md` | Go 问题排查指南。 |
| `DEPLOYMENT.md` | 部署和运维指南(容器化部署、集群方案)。 |
## 归档说明
- 已被新状态、新规则或新结论替代的历史文档,应移动到 `docs/archive/`

View File

@@ -31,8 +31,27 @@ for _, code := range codes {
## 2. social_account_repo.go 使用原生 SQL 而非 GORM
**状态**: 已于 2026-05-29 关闭
**关闭方式**: `internal/repository/social_account_repo.go` 已重构为统一使用 `*gorm.DB`Create / Update / Delete / 查询 / 分页均改为 GORM 实现,并通过仓库定向测试 + 全仓 `go test ./... -count=1` + `go vet ./...` + `go build ./cmd/server` 验证。
**严重程度**: 中危
**文件**: `internal/repository/social_account_repo.go`
**问题描述**: 该仓库实现使用原生 SQL 而非 GORM ORM与其他仓库实现不一致。
**影响**:
- 代码风格不统一
- 无法利用 GORM 的高级特性(如自动迁移、软删除、钩子等)
- 增加 SQL 注入风险(虽然当前代码使用了参数化查询,风险较低)
**修复方案**: 重写为使用 GORM 的方式:
```go
func (r *SocialAccountRepositoryImpl) Create(ctx context.Context, account *domain.SocialAccount) error {
return r.db.WithContext(ctx).Create(account).Error
}
```
**是否可快速修复**: 否,需要:
- 大规模重构仓库实现
- 确保所有查询逻辑与现有 SQL 语义一致
- 更新相关测试
- 回归测试验证
---
@@ -100,7 +119,7 @@ const effectiveUser = user ?? getCurrentUser()
| 问题 | 优先级 | 建议 |
|------|--------|------|
| TOTP 恢复码非原子 | 高 | 后续 sprint 修复 |
| social_account_repo GORM 重构 | 已关闭 | 2026-05-29 完成并验证 |
| social_account_repo GORM 重构 | 中 | 技术债务,跟踪 |
| React 双重状态管理 | 低 | 评估后决定 |
| ProfileSecurityPage 重构 | 低 | 如需维护该页面则修复 |

826
docs/architecture-design.md Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,826 @@
# 用户管理系统架构设计文档
> 版本v1.0
> 更新日期2026-05-07
> 适用范围UMS (User Management System)
---
## 1. 技术栈与框架选型
### 1.1 后端技术栈
| 层级 | 技术选型 | 版本/说明 |
|------|---------|----------|
| **开发语言** | Go | 1.21+,高性能、原生并发、低内存占用 |
| **Web 框架** | Gin | 轻量级、高性能 HTTP 路由与中间件 |
| **ORM / 数据库** | GORM | 支持 PostgreSQL / SQLite / MySQL自动迁移 |
| **缓存** | Redis (go-redis) | 可选启用,分布式会话与热点缓存 |
| **本地缓存** | 自研 LocalCache | 内存 L1 缓存TTL + 后台清理 |
| **配置管理** | Viper | YAML + 环境变量统一配置 |
| **日志** | Zap | 高性能结构化日志 |
| **JWT** | golang-jwt/jwt | RS256 签名,支持 JTI 与 Token 滚动轮换 |
| **密码哈希** | golang.org/x/crypto/argon2 | Argon2id启动时自适应校准 |
| **TOTP 2FA** | github.com/pquerna/otp | RFC 6238 兼容 |
| **监控** | Prometheus + OpenTelemetry | 指标采集与链路追踪 |
| **限流** | Uber Rate Limit / 自研 | 令牌桶 + 内存清理 |
| **容器化** | Docker | 单容器 + Docker Compose 编排 |
| **编排(可选)** | Kubernetes | 生产集群部署 |
### 1.2 前端技术栈Admin 后台)
| 层级 | 技术选型 | 说明 |
|------|---------|------|
| **框架** | React 18 + TypeScript | 类型安全、组件化开发 |
| **构建工具** | Vite | 快速冷启动与热更新 |
| **UI 组件库** | Ant Design 5 | 企业级后台组件 |
| **状态管理** | React Context会话态 | 不引入重型状态库 |
| **HTTP 客户端** | 原生 `fetch` + 统一请求客户端 | 无 Axios 依赖 |
| **路由** | React Router 6 | 受保护路由方案 |
| **样式** | CSS Modules + CSS Variables + AntD Theme Token | 无 styled-components |
### 1.3 基础设施
| 组件 | 技术选型 | 说明 |
|------|---------|------|
| **负载均衡** | Nginx | 反向代理、SSL 终止、静态资源缓存 |
| **消息队列(可选)** | Kafka / RabbitMQ | 异步事件、Webhook 投递 |
| **对象存储(可选)** | OSS / S3 | 头像与文件上传 |
| **监控大盘** | Grafana | 可视化 Prometheus 指标 |
| **日志收集** | ELK / Loki | 集中化日志检索 |
---
## 2. 目录结构与分层说明
项目采用 **Clean Architecture** 分层,依赖方向始终向内:
```
handler → service → repository → domain
```
### 2.1 目录结构
```
├── cmd/
│ ├── server/ # HTTP 服务入口
│ └── ums/ # CLI 工具入口
├── internal/
│ ├── api/
│ │ ├── handler/ # HTTP 请求处理器 (Handler 层)
│ │ ├── middleware/ # Gin 中间件认证、限流、日志、CORS 等)
│ │ └── router/ # 路由注册与分组
│ ├── auth/
│ │ └── providers/ # OAuth2 Provider 实现
│ ├── cache/ # 本地缓存 + Redis 封装
│ ├── concurrent/ # 并发工具WorkerPool、SingleFlight
│ ├── config/ # 配置结构与加载
│ ├── database/ # GORM 初始化、连接池、读写分离
│ ├── domain/ # 领域实体User、Role、Permission 等)
│ ├── e2e/ # 端到端测试
│ ├── integration/ # 集成测试
│ ├── middleware/ # 共享中间件(与 api/middleware 区分)
│ ├── monitoring/ # Prometheus 指标与链路追踪
│ ├── pagination/ # 游标分页与 OFFSET 分页封装
│ ├── performance/ # 性能测试与基准测试
│ ├── pkg/ # 内部公共包
│ │ ├── errors/ # 错误码与错误包装
│ │ ├── ip/ # IP 解析与过滤
│ │ ├── oauth/ # OAuth2 辅助工具
│ │ └── ...
│ ├── repository/ # 数据访问层Repository 层)
│ ├── robustness/ # 鲁棒性工具(熔断、重试)
│ ├── security/ # 安全工具(密码策略、加密、校验)
│ ├── server/ # HTTP Server 生命周期管理
│ ├── service/ # 业务逻辑层Service 层)
│ ├── testdb/ # 测试数据库辅助
│ ├── testutil/ # 测试工具函数
│ └── util/ # 通用工具包
├── pkg/
│ └── errors/ # 对外暴露的错误包
├── configs/
│ └── config.yaml # 默认配置文件
├── deployments/
│ ├── docker-compose.yml # 本地编排
│ └── kubernetes/ # K8s 清单
├── docs/ # 设计文档与 API 文档
├── frontend/ # React Admin 前端(独立目录)
├── migrations/ # 数据库迁移脚本
├── scripts/ # 构建与运维脚本
├── sdk/ # 客户端 SDK
├── uploads/ # 本地上传文件存储(受保护)
└── tools/ # 开发工具
```
### 2.2 分层职责
| 分层 | 目录 | 职责 | 依赖规则 |
|------|------|------|----------|
| **Handler 层** | `internal/api/handler` | HTTP 请求解析、参数校验、响应封装、调用 Service | 仅依赖 Service 层 |
| **Service 层** | `internal/service` | 业务逻辑编排、事务管理、领域事件触发 | 仅依赖 Repository 与 Domain |
| **Repository 层** | `internal/repository` | 数据持久化、查询优化、ORM 操作 | 仅依赖 Domain |
| **Domain 层** | `internal/domain` | 实体定义、值对象、领域规则、接口契约 | 不依赖任何外部层 |
| **基础设施层** | `internal/cache`, `internal/database`, `internal/config` | 技术实现(缓存、数据库、配置) | 可被上层通过接口注入 |
---
## 3. 核心模块架构图
### 3.1 整体模块交互
```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 外部客户端 │
│ (Web Admin / Mobile App / 第三方 OAuth / SDK 调用方) │
└───────────────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
┌───────────────────────────────▼─────────────────────────────────────┐
│ API 网关层 │
│ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ │
│ │ 认证中间件 │ │ 限流中间件 │ │ 日志中间件 │ │
│ │ (JWT/OAuth2) │ │ (RateLimit) │ │ (AccessLog) │ │
│ └──────────────┘ └──────────────┘ └──────────────┘ │
│ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ │
│ │ CORS 中间件 │ │ CSRF 中间件 │ │ IP 过滤中间件 │ │
│ └──────────────┘ └──────────────┘ └──────────────┘ │
└───────────────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
┌───────────────────────────────▼─────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Handler 层 │
│ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ │
│ │ Auth │ │ User │ │ Role │ │ Device │ │ Log │ │
│ │ Handler │ │ Handler │ │ Handler │ │ Handler │ │ Handler │ │
│ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ │
│ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ │
│ │ Admin │ │ Webhook │ │ 2FA │ │ OAuth │ │
│ │ Handler │ │ Handler │ │ Handler │ │ Handler │ │
│ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ │
└───────────────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
┌───────────────────────────────▼─────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Service 层 │
│ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ │
│ │ Auth │ │ User │ │ Role │ │ Device │ │ Log │ │
│ │ Service │ │ Service │ │ Service │ │ Service │ │ Service │ │
│ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ │
│ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ │
│ │ Admin │ │ Webhook │ │ 2FA │ │ OAuth │ │
│ │ Service │ │ Service │ │ Service │ │ Service │ │
│ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ │
└───────────────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
┌───────────────────────────────▼─────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Repository 层 │
│ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ │
│ │ UserRepo │ │ RoleRepo │ │ PermRepo │ │ DevRepo │ │ LogRepo │ │
│ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ │
│ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ │
│ │ Social │ │ Password │ │ Webhook │ │
│ │ Repo │ │ History │ │ Repo │ │
│ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ │
└───────────────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
┌───────────────────────────────▼─────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Domain 层 │
│ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ │
│ │ User │ │ Role │ │ Permission│ │ Device │ │ LoginLog │ │
│ │ Entity │ │ Entity │ │ Entity │ │ Entity │ │ Entity │ │
│ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ │
│ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ │
│ │ Operation│ │ Webhook │ │ Password │ │
│ │ Log │ │ Entity │ │ History │ │
│ │ Entity │ │ │ │ Entity │ │
│ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```
### 3.2 请求处理流程
| 步骤 | 组件 | 动作 |
|------|------|------|
| 1 | Nginx / Ingress | SSL 终止、静态资源缓存、反向代理 |
| 2 | Gin Router | 路由匹配、路径参数解析 |
| 3 | Middleware Chain | 限流 → IP 过滤 → CORS → CSRF → 认证 → 日志 |
| 4 | Handler | 绑定请求体、参数校验、调用 Service |
| 5 | Service | 业务逻辑、权限检查、事务封装 |
| 6 | Repository | ORM 查询 / 写入、缓存读写 |
| 7 | Database / Cache | 数据持久化或缓存命中 |
| 8 | Service | 组装领域结果、触发异步事件Webhook、日志 |
| 9 | Handler | 统一响应封装code / message / data |
| 10 | Middleware | 记录访问日志、更新 Prometheus 指标 |
### 3.3 核心模块职责表
| 模块 | 职责 | 关键文件/包 |
|------|------|------------|
| **认证 (Auth)** | 注册、登录、登出、JWT 签发与刷新、密码重置、TOTP | `internal/auth`, `internal/api/handler/auth_handler.go` |
| **用户 (User)** | CRUD、头像上传、状态管理、角色分配、导入导出 | `internal/service/user_service.go`, `internal/repository/user_repository.go` |
| **RBAC** | 角色管理、权限管理、角色继承、权限树 | `internal/domain/role.go`, `internal/service/role_service.go` |
| **设备 (Device)** | 设备注册、信任管理、多设备登出 | `internal/api/handler/device_handler.go` |
| **日志 (Log)** | 登录日志、操作日志、查询与审计 | `internal/repository/log_repository.go` |
| **OAuth2** | 第三方登录、社交账号绑定/解绑 | `internal/auth/providers/` |
| **Webhook** | 事件订阅、异步投递、重试机制 | `internal/service/webhook_service.go` |
| **Admin** | 仪表盘统计、批量导入导出 | `internal/api/handler/admin_handler.go` |
| **安全 (Security)** | 密码策略、IP 过滤、敏感数据脱敏 | `internal/security/` |
---
## 4. 数据模型
### 4.1 实体关系总览
```
users ||--o{ user_roles : "多对多"
users ||--o{ devices : "一对多"
users ||--o{ login_logs : "一对多"
users ||--o{ operation_logs : "一对多"
users ||--o{ user_social_accounts : "一对多"
users ||--o{ password_history : "一对多"
roles ||--o{ user_roles : "多对多"
roles ||--o{ role_permissions : "多对多"
roles ||--o{ roles : "自关联(继承)"
permissions ||--o{ role_permissions : "多对多"
webhooks ||--o{ webhook_deliveries : "一对多"
```
### 4.2 核心实体定义
#### User用户
| 字段 | 类型 | 约束 | 说明 |
|------|------|------|------|
| id | BIGINT | PK, AutoIncrement | 用户唯一标识 |
| username | VARCHAR(50) | UNIQUE, Index | 用户名 |
| email | VARCHAR(100) | UNIQUE, Index | 邮箱地址 |
| phone | VARCHAR(20) | UNIQUE, Index | 手机号 |
| password | VARCHAR(255) | Not Null | Argon2id 哈希密码 |
| nickname | VARCHAR(50) | Nullable | 昵称 |
| avatar | VARCHAR(255) | Nullable | 头像 URL |
| gender | TINYINT | Default 0 | 性别0-未知1-男2-女 |
| birthday | DATE | Nullable | 生日 |
| region | VARCHAR(50) | Nullable | 所在地区 |
| bio | VARCHAR(500) | Nullable | 个性签名 |
| status | TINYINT | Default 1, Index | 状态0-待激活1-正常2-锁定3-禁用 |
| totp_secret | VARCHAR(255) | Nullable | TOTP 密钥(加密存储) |
| totp_enabled | TINYINT | Default 0 | 是否启用 TOTP |
| password_changed_at | DATETIME | Nullable | 密码最后修改时间(用于 Token 失效) |
| last_login_time | DATETIME | Nullable | 最后登录时间 |
| last_login_ip | VARCHAR(50) | Nullable | 最后登录 IP |
| created_at | DATETIME | Default CURRENT_TIMESTAMP | 创建时间 |
| updated_at | DATETIME | AutoUpdate | 更新时间 |
| deleted_at | DATETIME | Nullable, Index | 软删除时间GORM 支持) |
**索引**`uk_username`, `uk_email`, `uk_phone`, `idx_status`, `idx_created_at`
#### Role角色
| 字段 | 类型 | 约束 | 说明 |
|------|------|------|------|
| id | BIGINT | PK, AutoIncrement | 角色唯一标识 |
| name | VARCHAR(50) | UNIQUE, Not Null | 角色名称 |
| code | VARCHAR(50) | UNIQUE, Not Null | 角色代码(如 `admin`, `user` |
| description | VARCHAR(200) | Nullable | 角色描述 |
| parent_id | BIGINT | FK → roles.id, Nullable | 父角色 ID继承关系 |
| level | INT | Default 1, Index | 角色层级 |
| is_system | TINYINT | Default 0 | 是否系统内置角色 |
| is_default | TINYINT | Default 0, Index | 是否新用户默认角色 |
| status | TINYINT | Default 1 | 状态0-禁用1-启用 |
| created_at | DATETIME | Default CURRENT_TIMESTAMP | 创建时间 |
| updated_at | DATETIME | AutoUpdate | 更新时间 |
**索引**`uk_name`, `uk_code`, `idx_parent_id`, `idx_level`
**初始数据**
- `id=1, code='admin', name='管理员', is_system=1` —— 系统管理员
- `id=2, code='user', name='普通用户', is_system=1, is_default=1` —— 默认用户
#### Permission权限
| 字段 | 类型 | 约束 | 说明 |
|------|------|------|------|
| id | BIGINT | PK, AutoIncrement | 权限唯一标识 |
| name | VARCHAR(50) | Not Null | 权限名称 |
| code | VARCHAR(100) | UNIQUE, Not Null | 权限代码(格式 `resource:action` |
| resource | VARCHAR(50) | Not Null, Index | 资源名称(如 `user`, `role` |
| action | VARCHAR(20) | Not Null | 操作类型:`read` / `write` / `delete` / `execute` |
| description | VARCHAR(200) | Nullable | 权限描述 |
| type | VARCHAR(20) | Not Null, Index | 权限类型:`api` / `page` / `button` |
| group_id | BIGINT | Nullable, Index | 权限分组 ID |
| status | TINYINT | Default 1 | 状态0-禁用1-启用 |
| created_at | DATETIME | Default CURRENT_TIMESTAMP | 创建时间 |
| updated_at | DATETIME | AutoUpdate | 更新时间 |
**索引**`uk_code`, `idx_resource`, `idx_group_id`
#### Device设备
| 字段 | 类型 | 约束 | 说明 |
|------|------|------|------|
| id | BIGINT | PK, AutoIncrement | 设备唯一标识 |
| user_id | BIGINT | FK → users.id, Not Null, Index | 所属用户 |
| device_id | VARCHAR(100) | UNIQUE, Not Null | 设备唯一标识字符串 |
| device_name | VARCHAR(50) | Nullable | 设备名称 |
| device_type | VARCHAR(20) | Not Null | 设备类型:`pc` / `mobile` / `tablet` |
| os | VARCHAR(50) | Nullable | 操作系统 |
| browser | VARCHAR(50) | Nullable | 浏览器 |
| ip | VARCHAR(50) | Nullable | 最近 IP |
| location | VARCHAR(100) | Nullable | 地理位置 |
| is_trusted | TINYINT | Default 0 | 是否信任设备(跳过 2FA |
| trust_expires_at | DATETIME | Nullable | 信任状态过期时间 |
| last_active_time | DATETIME | Nullable, Index | 最后活跃时间 |
| created_at | DATETIME | Default CURRENT_TIMESTAMP | 创建时间 |
**索引**`idx_user_id`, `uk_device_id`, `idx_last_active_time`
#### LoginLog登录日志
| 字段 | 类型 | 约束 | 说明 |
|------|------|------|------|
| id | BIGINT | PK, AutoIncrement | 日志唯一标识 |
| user_id | BIGINT | FK → users.id, Nullable, Index | 用户 ID匿名登录为 NULL |
| login_type | VARCHAR(20) | Not Null | 登录方式:`password` / `code` / `wechat` / `github` / ... |
| login_method | VARCHAR(20) | Nullable | 认证子方式 |
| ip | VARCHAR(50) | Nullable, Index | 登录 IP |
| location | VARCHAR(100) | Nullable | 地理位置 |
| device_id | VARCHAR(100) | Nullable | 设备标识 |
| user_agent | VARCHAR(500) | Nullable | User-Agent |
| status | TINYINT | Not Null, Index | 状态0-失败1-成功 |
| failure_reason | VARCHAR(200) | Nullable | 失败原因 |
| created_at | DATETIME | Default CURRENT_TIMESTAMP, Index | 登录时间 |
**索引**`idx_user_id`, `idx_ip`, `idx_status`, `idx_created_at`
**分区建议**MySQL/PostgreSQL按月分区保留最近 12 个月。
#### OperationLog操作日志
| 字段 | 类型 | 约束 | 说明 |
|------|------|------|------|
| id | BIGINT | PK, AutoIncrement | 日志唯一标识 |
| user_id | BIGINT | FK → users.id, Nullable, Index | 操作人 ID |
| action_type | VARCHAR(50) | Not Null | 操作类型(如 `user:create` |
| resource_type | VARCHAR(50) | Not Null, Index | 资源类型(如 `user`, `role` |
| resource_id | BIGINT | Nullable | 资源 ID |
| action | VARCHAR(20) | Not Null | 动作:`create` / `update` / `delete` |
| old_value | TEXT | Nullable | 操作前值JSON |
| new_value | TEXT | Nullable | 操作后值JSON |
| ip | VARCHAR(50) | Nullable | 操作 IP |
| user_agent | VARCHAR(500) | Nullable | User-Agent |
| created_at | DATETIME | Default CURRENT_TIMESTAMP, Index | 操作时间 |
**索引**`idx_user_id`, `idx_resource_type`, `idx_created_at`
**分区建议**MySQL/PostgreSQL按月分区保留最近 24 个月。
### 4.3 关联表
| 关联表 | 关联实体 | 说明 |
|--------|---------|------|
| `user_roles` | users ↔ roles | 多对多:用户角色分配 |
| `role_permissions` | roles ↔ permissions | 多对多:角色权限分配 |
| `user_social_accounts` | users | 一对多:第三方社交账号绑定 |
| `password_history` | users | 一对多:密码历史(防重用) |
| `webhooks` | - | Webhook 配置 |
| `webhook_deliveries` | webhooks | Webhook 投递日志 |
---
## 5. 接口设计RESTful API 分组列表)
基础路径:`/api/v1`
认证方式:`Authorization: Bearer <access_token>`
统一响应:`{ "code": 0, "message": "success", "data": {} }`
### 5.1 认证组Auth
| 方法 | 路径 | 认证 | 说明 |
|------|------|------|------|
| POST | `/auth/register` | 公开 | 用户注册 |
| POST | `/auth/bootstrap-admin` | 公开 | 初始化管理员(首次启动) |
| POST | `/auth/login` | 公开 | 账号密码登录 |
| POST | `/auth/login/email-code` | 公开 | 邮箱验证码登录 |
| POST | `/auth/login/code` | 公开 | 短信验证码登录 |
| POST | `/auth/refresh` | 公开 | 刷新 Access TokenRefresh Token |
| POST | `/auth/logout` | 需认证 | 登出 |
| GET | `/auth/userinfo` | 需认证 | 获取当前用户信息 |
| GET | `/auth/capabilities` | 公开 | 获取系统能力配置 |
| GET | `/auth/activate` | 公开 | 邮箱激活 |
| POST | `/auth/resend-activation` | 公开 | 重发激活邮件 |
| POST | `/auth/forgot-password` | 公开 | 忘记密码 |
| GET | `/auth/reset-password` | 公开 | 验证重置 Token 页面 |
| POST | `/auth/reset-password` | 公开 | 提交新密码 |
| POST | `/auth/send-email-code` | 公开 | 发送邮箱验证码 |
| POST | `/auth/send-code` | 公开 | 发送短信验证码 |
| GET | `/auth/csrf-token` | 公开 | 获取 CSRF Token |
| GET | `/auth/captcha` | 公开 | 获取验证码配置 |
| GET | `/auth/captcha/image` | 公开 | 获取图形验证码 |
| POST | `/auth/captcha/verify` | 公开 | 验证图形验证码 |
### 5.2 双因素认证组2FA / TOTP
| 方法 | 路径 | 认证 | 说明 |
|------|------|------|------|
| GET | `/auth/2fa/status` | 需认证 | 获取 2FA 状态 |
| GET | `/auth/2fa/setup` | 需认证 | 获取 TOTP 设置信息QR Code |
| POST | `/auth/2fa/enable` | 需认证 | 启用 TOTP |
| POST | `/auth/2fa/disable` | 需认证 | 禁用 TOTP |
| POST | `/auth/2fa/verify` | 需认证 | 验证 TOTP 码 |
### 5.3 OAuth2 组
| 方法 | 路径 | 认证 | 说明 |
|------|------|------|------|
| GET | `/auth/oauth/providers` | 公开 | 获取已配置的 Provider 列表 |
| GET | `/auth/oauth/:provider` | 公开 | 跳转 OAuth2 授权页 |
| GET | `/auth/oauth/:provider/callback` | 公开 | OAuth2 回调处理 |
### 5.4 用户组User
| 方法 | 路径 | 认证/权限 | 说明 |
|------|------|----------|------|
| GET | `/users` | 管理员 | 用户列表(分页、筛选、排序) |
| GET | `/users/:id` | 本人或管理员 | 获取用户详情 |
| PUT | `/users/:id` | 本人或管理员 | 更新用户信息 |
| DELETE | `/users/:id` | `user:delete` | 删除用户 |
| PUT | `/users/:id/password` | 本人 | 修改密码 |
| PUT | `/users/:id/status` | `user:manage` | 修改用户状态 |
| GET | `/users/:id/roles` | 本人或管理员 | 获取用户角色 |
| PUT | `/users/:id/roles` | `user:manage` | 分配用户角色 |
| POST | `/users/:id/avatar` | 需认证 | 上传头像 |
| GET | `/users/me/social-accounts` | 需认证 | 获取当前用户社交账号 |
| POST | `/users/me/bind-social` | 需认证 | 绑定社交账号 |
| DELETE | `/users/me/bind-social/:provider` | 需认证 | 解绑社交账号 |
### 5.5 角色与权限组RBAC
| 方法 | 路径 | 认证/权限 | 说明 |
|------|------|----------|------|
| POST | `/roles` | 管理员 | 创建角色 |
| GET | `/roles` | 管理员 | 角色列表 |
| GET | `/roles/:id` | 管理员 | 角色详情 |
| PUT | `/roles/:id` | 管理员 | 更新角色 |
| DELETE | `/roles/:id` | 管理员 | 删除角色 |
| PUT | `/roles/:id/status` | 管理员 | 修改角色状态 |
| GET | `/roles/:id/permissions` | 管理员 | 获取角色权限 |
| PUT | `/roles/:id/permissions` | 管理员 | 分配角色权限 |
| POST | `/permissions` | 管理员 | 创建权限 |
| GET | `/permissions` | 管理员 | 权限列表 |
| GET | `/permissions/tree` | 管理员 | 权限树形结构 |
| GET | `/permissions/:id` | 管理员 | 权限详情 |
| PUT | `/permissions/:id` | 管理员 | 更新权限 |
| DELETE | `/permissions/:id` | 管理员 | 删除权限 |
| PUT | `/permissions/:id/status` | 管理员 | 修改权限状态 |
### 5.6 设备组Device
| 方法 | 路径 | 认证 | 说明 |
|------|------|------|------|
| GET | `/devices` | 需认证 | 设备列表 |
| POST | `/devices` | 需认证 | 注册设备 |
| GET | `/devices/:id` | 需认证 | 设备详情 |
| PUT | `/devices/:id` | 需认证 | 更新设备 |
| DELETE | `/devices/:id` | 需认证 | 删除设备 |
| PUT | `/devices/:id/status` | 需认证 | 修改设备状态 |
| POST | `/devices/:id/trust` | 需认证 | 设置设备信任 |
| DELETE | `/devices/:id/trust` | 需认证 | 取消设备信任 |
| POST | `/devices/by-device-id/:deviceId/trust` | 需认证 | 按设备标识设置信任 |
| GET | `/devices/me/trusted` | 需认证 | 获取信任设备列表 |
| POST | `/devices/me/logout-others` | 需认证 | 登出所有其他设备 |
| GET | `/devices/users/:id` | 管理员 | 获取指定用户的设备 |
### 5.7 日志组Log
| 方法 | 路径 | 认证/权限 | 说明 |
|------|------|----------|------|
| GET | `/logs/login/me` | 需认证 | 当前用户登录日志 |
| GET | `/logs/operation/me` | 需认证 | 当前用户操作日志 |
| GET | `/logs/login` | 管理员 | 全量登录日志 |
| GET | `/logs/operation` | 管理员 | 全量操作日志 |
### 5.8 Webhook 组
| 方法 | 路径 | 认证 | 说明 |
|------|------|------|------|
| POST | `/webhooks` | 需认证 | 创建 Webhook |
| GET | `/webhooks` | 需认证 | Webhook 列表 |
| PUT | `/webhooks/:id` | 需认证 | 更新 Webhook |
| DELETE | `/webhooks/:id` | 需认证 | 删除 Webhook |
| GET | `/webhooks/:id/deliveries` | 需认证 | 投递记录 |
### 5.9 管理员扩展组Admin
| 方法 | 路径 | 认证/权限 | 说明 |
|------|------|----------|------|
| GET | `/admin/users/export` | 管理员 | 导出用户CSV/XLSX |
| POST | `/admin/users/import` | 管理员 | 导入用户 |
| GET | `/admin/users/import/template` | 管理员 | 下载导入模板 |
| GET | `/admin/stats/dashboard` | 管理员 | 仪表盘统计 |
| GET | `/admin/stats/users` | 管理员 | 用户统计 |
### 5.10 基础设施端点
| 方法 | 路径 | 认证 | 说明 |
|------|------|------|------|
| GET | `/health` | 公开 | 健康检查 |
| GET | `/health/live` | 公开 | Liveness Probe |
| GET | `/health/ready` | 公开 | Readiness Probe |
| GET | `/metrics` | 公开 | Prometheus 指标 |
| GET | `/swagger/*any` | 公开 | Swagger 文档 |
---
## 6. 安全设计
### 6.1 认证机制
| 机制 | 实现 | 说明 |
|------|------|------|
| **JWT 访问令牌** | RS256 非对称签名 | Access Token 有效期短(默认 2h携带用户 ID、角色、权限 |
| **Refresh Token** | 独立令牌,滚动轮换 | 每次刷新后旧 Refresh Token 失效,防重放 |
| **JTI 唯一标识** | timestamp(8B hex) + random(16B hex) | 防 Token 枚举,支持精确吊销 |
| **Token 黑名单** | Redis / 内存缓存 | 登出、密码修改后 Token 立即失效 |
| **密码修改失效PCE** | `password_changed_at` 字段 | 密码修改后旧 Token 自动失效 |
| **TOTP 双因素认证** | RFC 6238 | 6 位动态码,支持信任设备跳过 |
| **设备信任** | `is_trusted` + `trust_expires_at` | 信任设备在有效期内免 2FA |
| **OAuth2 第三方登录** | 标准 Authorization Code 流程 | 支持 GitHub、Google、微信等 Provider |
| **SSO 就绪** | JWT + 统一用户中心架构 | 可通过扩展支持单点登录 |
### 6.2 授权机制RBAC
| 机制 | 实现 | 说明 |
|------|------|------|
| **角色继承** | 自关联 `parent_id` + 层级 `level` | 子角色自动继承父角色权限,最大深度 20 |
| **权限代码** | `resource:action` 格式 | 如 `user:read`, `user:delete` |
| **权限类型** | `api` / `page` / `button` | 覆盖接口、页面、按钮三级权限 |
| **中间件鉴权** | `RequirePermission` / `RequireRole` | Handler 层统一拦截 |
| **数据级鉴权** | Service 层用户 ID 比对 | 如用户只能修改自己的资料 |
### 6.3 限流与防护
| 机制 | 实现 | 说明 |
|------|------|------|
| **接口限流** | 令牌桶算法 | 按 IP / 用户维度限流,防止暴力破解 |
| **限流内存清理** | 后台定期清理过期桶 | 防止内存泄漏 |
| **登录失败锁定** | 递增延迟 + 最大重试次数 | 防暴力破解 |
| **图形验证码** | 算术/字符验证码 | 注册、登录、重置密码前验证 |
| **CSRF 防护** | Double Submit Cookie + Token | POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH 自动校验 |
| **CORS 白名单** | 配置化允许域名 | 拒绝危险通配符配置 |
| **IP 过滤** | 黑白名单机制 | 支持按 IP 段拦截 |
| **上传保护** | `/uploads` 路由认证中间件 | 防止未授权访问用户文件 |
### 6.4 密码策略
| 策略 | 实现 | 说明 |
|------|------|------|
| **哈希算法** | Argon2id | 内存硬函数,抗 GPU/ASIC 破解 |
| **自适应校准** | `auth.CalibrateArgon2id` | 启动时根据 CPU 自动调整参数 |
| **默认参数** | 64MB 内存3 次迭代4 并行度 | 平衡安全性与性能 |
| **密码历史** | `password_history` 表 | 禁止重用最近 N 次密码 |
| **历史异步保存** | goroutine + `context.WithTimeout` | 不阻塞主登录流程 |
| **常数时间比较** | `subtle.ConstantTimeCompare` | 防时序攻击 |
| **弱密码检测** | 常见弱密码字典 | 注册/修改时拦截 |
### 6.5 敏感数据保护
| 数据类型 | 保护措施 |
|---------|---------|
| **密码** | Argon2id 哈希,不可逆 |
| **TOTP Secret** | AES-256-GCM 加密存储 |
| **手机号/邮箱** | 日志中部分脱敏(如 `138****1234` |
| **Token** | 仅存储 JTI不存储完整 Token |
| **备份数据** | 加密存储,异地备份 |
| **传输层** | TLS 1.2+HSTS 头部 |
### 6.6 已修复安全漏洞(关键)
| 问题 | 严重等级 | 修复要点 |
|------|----------|----------|
| LIKE 查询 SQL 注入 | P0 | 参数化查询 + 转义 |
| 登录计数竞态条件 | P0 | 原子操作 / 分布式锁 |
| Refresh Token 黑名单 fail-open | P0 | 默认拒绝策略 |
| 验证码 Replay 攻击 | P0 | 一次性使用 + 过期校验 |
| CORS 危险配置 | P0 | 白名单校验 |
| UpdateUser IDOR 越权 | P0 | 数据级权限校验 |
| Login TOTP 绕过 | P0 | 验证流程强制化 |
| 游标分页数据错乱 | P0 | 稳定排序键 |
---
## 7. 性能优化清单
### 7.1 数据库优化
| 优化项 | 状态 | 说明 |
|--------|------|------|
| 批量查询替代循环查询(`FilterExistingUsernames` | **[已实施]** | `generateUniqueUsername` 使用批量 IN 查询替代逐条循环 |
| 单一查询替代串行查询(`FindByAccount` | **[已实施]** | `findUserForLogin` 使用一次查询覆盖 username/email/phone |
| 角色继承深度限制(`maxAncestorDepth=20` | **[已实施]** | 防止递归查询栈溢出与性能退化 |
| 数据库索引优化 | 已实施 | `users` 表 uk_username/uk_email/uk_phone/idx_status`login_logs` 按时间分区 |
| 预加载关联数据GORM Preload | 已实施 | 用户列表预加载角色,避免 N+1 |
| 游标分页替代 OFFSET | 已实施 | 大数据量列表使用 ID 游标分页 |
| 连接池调优 | 已实施 | `max_open_conns=100`, `max_idle_conns=20`, 连接生命周期 30min |
| 数据库读写分离 | 待实施 | 主库写、从库读,轮询负载均衡 |
### 7.2 缓存优化
| 优化项 | 状态 | 说明 |
|--------|------|------|
| L1 本地缓存 | 已实施 | 内存缓存用户、权限、Token 黑名单TTL 5min |
| L2 Redis 缓存 | 可选 | 分布式缓存TTL 30min支持集群 |
| 缓存穿透防护 | 已实施 | 空值缓存 + 布隆过滤器 |
| 缓存击穿防护 | 已实施 | SingleFlight 互斥锁,热点 Key 只回源一次 |
| 缓存雪崩防护 | 已实施 | 随机 TTL 抖动,避免集中过期 |
### 7.3 计算与并发优化
| 优化项 | 状态 | 说明 |
|--------|------|------|
| Argon2id 启动时自适应校准 | **[已实施]** | 根据当前 CPU 能力自动选择最优参数 |
| 密码历史异步保存 | **[已实施]** | goroutine + `context.WithTimeout` 不阻塞登录主流程 |
| RateLimiter 定期清理 | **[已实施]** | 后台定时清理过期限流桶,防止内存泄漏 |
| WorkerPool 协程池 | 已实施 | 批量操作限制并发度,防止 goroutine 爆炸 |
| 异步事件处理 | 已实施 | Webhook 投递、日志写入异步化 |
### 7.4 接口与路由优化
| 优化项 | 状态 | 说明 |
|--------|------|------|
| `/uploads` 路由认证保护 | **[已实施]** | 静态文件路由增加认证中间件 |
| Gzip 压缩 | 已实施 | 响应体 > 1KB 自动压缩 |
| HTTP/2 支持 | 已实施 | Nginx / Go 1.21+ 原生支持 |
| 静态资源 CDN | 待实施 | 生产环境头像、JS/CSS 走 CDN |
| 请求体大小限制 | 已实施 | 防止大文件 DOS |
### 7.5 性能目标
| 指标 | 目标值 | 说明 |
|------|--------|------|
| 并发用户数 | 100,000 | 集群部署 + Redis 会话 |
| QPS | 100,000 | 多级缓存 + 读写分离 |
| P50 响应时间 | < 100ms | 缓存命中场景 |
| P99 响应时间 | < 500ms | 含数据库回源 |
| 缓存命中率 | > 95% | L1 + L2 综合 |
---
## 8. 部署架构建议
### 8.1 单机部署SQLite + 可选 Redis
适用场景:开发测试、小型团队、单机低并发。
```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Nginx (反向代理) │
│ SSL 终止 / 静态资源缓存 │
└──────────────────┬──────────────────────┘
┌──────────────────▼──────────────────────┐
│ UMS 应用服务 (Go/Gin) │
│ ┌─────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ Handler / Service / Repository │ │
│ │ L1 本地缓存 (内存) │ │
│ └─────────────────────────────────┘ │
│ │ │
│ ┌────────────────┼────────────────┐ │
│ ▼ ▼ ▼ │
│ ┌────────┐ ┌────────┐ ┌────────┐ │
│ │ SQLite │ │ Redis │ │ uploads│ │
│ │ (主存) │ │(可选L2)│ │ (受保护)│ │
│ └────────┘ └────────┘ └────────┘ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────┘
```
**配置要点**
- SQLite 文件存储在持久化卷
- 每日全量备份 SQLite 文件
- Redis 可选,用于分布式锁和二级缓存
- 单实例无状态,重启不影响数据
### 8.2 集群部署PostgreSQL + Redis Cluster
适用场景:生产环境、中大型应用、高可用要求。
```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 全局负载均衡 (GSLB) │
│ DNS 轮询 / 健康检查 / 故障转移 │
└──────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────────┘
┌──────────────┼──────────────┐
│ │ │
┌───────▼──────┐ ┌────▼──────┐ ┌─────▼──────┐
│ 机房 A │ │ 机房 B │ │ 机房 C │
│ (北京) │ │ (上海) │ │ (灾备) │
│ │ │ │ │ │
│ ┌──────────┐ │ │ ┌────────┐│ │ ┌────────┐ │
│ │ Nginx │ │ │ │ Nginx ││ │ │ Nginx │ │
│ │ 负载均衡 │ │ │ │负载均衡││ │ │负载均衡│ │
│ └────┬─────┘ │ │ └───┬────┘│ │ └───┬────┘ │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
│ ┌────▼─────┐ │ │ ┌───▼───┐ │ │ ┌───▼───┐ │
│ │ UMS 集群 │ │ │ │UMS 集群│ │ │ │UMS 集群│ │
│ │ (多实例) │ │ │ │(多实例)│ │ │ │(多实例)│ │
│ │ L1 缓存 │ │ │ │L1 缓存 │ │ │ │L1 缓存 │ │
│ └────┬─────┘ │ │ └───┬───┘ │ │ └───┬───┘ │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
│ ┌────▼─────┐ │ │ ┌───▼───┐ │ │ ┌───▼───┐ │
│ │Redis 集群│ │ │ │Redis │ │ │ │Redis │ │
│ │ 哨兵模式 │ │ │ │哨兵 │ │ │ │哨兵 │ │
│ └────┬─────┘ │ │ └───┬───┘ │ │ └───┬───┘ │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
│ ┌────▼─────┐ │ │ ┌───▼───┐ │ │ ┌───▼───┐ │
│ │PG 主从 │ │ │ │PG 主从│ │ │ │PG 主从│ │
│ │ 主(写) │ │ │ │ 主(写)│ │ │ │ 主(写)│ │
│ │ 从(读)×2 │ │ │ │从(读)×2│ │ │ │从(读)×2│ │
│ └──────────┘ │ │ └───────┘ │ │ └───────┘ │
└──────────────┘ └───────────┘ └────────────┘
```
**配置要点**
- PostgreSQL 主从复制,从库承担读流量
- Redis 哨兵模式,高可用缓存与会话存储
- UMS 实例无状态,支持水平扩展
- Nginx 层做限流、SSL、静态缓存
- 跨机房异步复制RPO < 1min
### 8.3 容器化部署Docker Compose
```yaml
# docker-compose.yml 核心服务
services:
ums:
image: ums:latest
ports:
- "8080:8080"
environment:
- DATABASE_TYPE=postgres
- DATABASE_DSN=postgresql://ums:pass@postgres:5432/ums
- REDIS_ADDR=redis:6379
volumes:
- ./uploads:/app/uploads
depends_on:
- postgres
- redis
deploy:
replicas: 2
postgres:
image: postgres:15-alpine
volumes:
- pgdata:/var/lib/postgresql/data
redis:
image: redis:7-alpine
volumes:
- redisdata:/data
nginx:
image: nginx:alpine
ports:
- "80:80"
- "443:443"
volumes:
- ./nginx.conf:/etc/nginx/nginx.conf
```
### 8.4 Kubernetes 部署
| 资源 | 类型 | 说明 |
|------|------|------|
| **Deployment** | `ums-api` | 3+ 副本,滚动更新 |
| **Service** | `ClusterIP` + `LoadBalancer` | 内部集群 + 外部暴露 |
| **ConfigMap** | `ums-config` | 应用配置外置 |
| **Secret** | `ums-secrets` | JWT 私钥、数据库密码 |
| **HPA** | 自动扩缩容 | CPU > 70% 或 QPS 阈值触发 |
| **PVC** | `uploads-pvc` | 共享存储(或替换为 OSS |
| **Ingress** | Nginx Ingress | 路由、SSL、限流 |
| **PodDisruptionBudget** | `minAvailable: 2` | 保证升级时可用性 |
### 8.5 监控与告警
| 层级 | 组件 | 采集指标 |
|------|------|----------|
| 基础设施 | Node Exporter | CPU、内存、磁盘、网络 |
| 中间件 | Redis Exporter / Postgres Exporter | 连接数、QPS、慢查询 |
| 应用 | Prometheus + OpenTelemetry | HTTP 延迟、错误率、缓存命中率 |
| 日志 | Grafana Loki / ELK | 结构化日志检索 |
| 告警 | Prometheus Alertmanager | P99 > 500ms、错误率 > 1%、磁盘 > 80% |
---
## 附录:文档索引
| 文档 | 路径 | 说明 |
|------|------|------|
| API 契约 | `docs/API.md` | 完整接口定义与响应示例 |
| 数据模型 | `docs/DATA_MODEL.md` | 数据库表结构、索引、ER 图 |
| 技术架构 | `docs/ARCHITECTURE.md` | 性能优化、缓存策略、监控 |
| 部署指南 | `docs/DEPLOYMENT.md` | 环境配置、升级、回滚 |
| 安全文档 | `docs/SECURITY.md` | 安全机制、漏洞修复记录 |
| PRD | `docs/PRD.md` | 产品需求文档 |
---
*本文档持续更新,如有变更请同步更新本文件及相关子文档。*

View File

@@ -33,16 +33,14 @@ cp configs/oauth_config.example.yaml configs/oauth_config.yaml
# 示例:微信配置
wechat:
enabled: true
app_id: "<wechat-app-id>"
app_secret: "<wechat-app-secret>"
app_id: "wx1234567890abcdef"
app_secret: "1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef"
# 示例Google配置
google:
enabled: true
client_id: "<google-client-id>"
client_secret: "<google-client-secret>"
client_id: "123456789-abcdef.apps.googleusercontent.com"
client_secret: "GOCSPX-abcdef123456"
```
### 3. 数据库迁移
@@ -292,13 +290,13 @@ Authorization: Bearer <access_token>
```bash
# 微信
WECHAT_OAUTH_ENABLED=true
WECHAT_APP_ID=<wechat-app-id>
WECHAT_APP_SECRET=<wechat-app-secret>
WECHAT_APP_ID=wx1234567890abcdef
WECHAT_APP_SECRET=1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef
# Google
GOOGLE_OAUTH_ENABLED=true
GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID=<google-client-id>
GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET=<google-client-secret>
GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID=123456789-abcdef.apps.googleusercontent.com
GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET=GOCSPX-abcdef123456
# Facebook
FACEBOOK_OAUTH_ENABLED=true

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@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
# Middleware Test Backfill Phase 1 Implementation Plan
> **For agentic workers:** REQUIRED SUB-SKILL: Use superpowers:subagent-driven-development (recommended) or superpowers:executing-plans to implement this plan task-by-task. Steps use checkbox (`- [ ]`) syntax for tracking.
**Goal:** Raise confidence in the backend request chain by backfilling focused unit tests for the auth, RBAC, error recovery, and trace ID middleware.
**Architecture:** Extend the existing `internal/api/middleware` test suite with `gin` + `httptest` behavior tests. Keep the tests at the middleware boundary by using lightweight stubs for auth dependencies instead of bringing in service or repository integration.
**Tech Stack:** Go, Gin, `net/http/httptest`, existing JWT manager, package-local test helpers
---
### Task 1: Add auth middleware regression tests
**Files:**
- Modify: `internal/api/middleware/auth_bootstrap_test.go`
- Test: `internal/api/middleware/auth_bootstrap_test.go`
- [ ] **Step 1: Write failing tests**
```go
func TestAuthMiddleware_RequiredRejectsMissingToken(t *testing.T) {}
func TestAuthMiddleware_RequiredRejectsInvalidToken(t *testing.T) {}
func TestAuthMiddleware_RequiredRejectsBlacklistedToken(t *testing.T) {}
func TestAuthMiddleware_RequiredRejectsInactiveUser(t *testing.T) {}
func TestAuthMiddleware_RequiredInjectsIdentityAndAuthorizations(t *testing.T) {}
func TestAuthMiddleware_OptionalAllowsAnonymousRequest(t *testing.T) {}
func TestAuthMiddleware_ExtractTokenCases(t *testing.T) {}
```
- [ ] **Step 2: Run auth middleware tests to verify red**
Run: `go test ./internal/api/middleware -run 'TestAuthMiddleware_(RequiredRejectsMissingToken|RequiredRejectsInvalidToken|RequiredRejectsBlacklistedToken|RequiredRejectsInactiveUser|RequiredInjectsIdentityAndAuthorizations|OptionalAllowsAnonymousRequest|ExtractTokenCases)' -count=1`
Expected: FAIL because the new tests do not exist yet.
- [ ] **Step 3: Add the minimal test helpers and assertions**
```go
type authStubUserRepo struct {
user *domain.User
err error
}
func (s authStubUserRepo) GetByID(_ context.Context, _ int64) (*domain.User, error) {
return s.user, s.err
}
```
- [ ] **Step 4: Run auth middleware tests to verify green**
Run: `go test ./internal/api/middleware -run 'TestAuthMiddleware_(RequiredRejectsMissingToken|RequiredRejectsInvalidToken|RequiredRejectsBlacklistedToken|RequiredRejectsInactiveUser|RequiredInjectsIdentityAndAuthorizations|OptionalAllowsAnonymousRequest|ExtractTokenCases)' -count=1`
Expected: PASS
### Task 2: Add RBAC middleware regression tests
**Files:**
- Create: `internal/api/middleware/rbac_test.go`
- Test: `internal/api/middleware/rbac_test.go`
- [ ] **Step 1: Write failing RBAC tests**
```go
func TestRequirePermissionRejectsMissingPermission(t *testing.T) {}
func TestRequirePermissionAllowsMatchingPermission(t *testing.T) {}
func TestRequireAllPermissionsRequiresEveryCode(t *testing.T) {}
func TestRequireAnyPermissionIsAliasOfRequirePermission(t *testing.T) {}
func TestRequireRoleAndAdminOnly(t *testing.T) {}
func TestRBACHelpersHandleMissingContextValues(t *testing.T) {}
```
- [ ] **Step 2: Run RBAC tests to verify red**
Run: `go test ./internal/api/middleware -run 'Test(RequirePermissionRejectsMissingPermission|RequirePermissionAllowsMatchingPermission|RequireAllPermissionsRequiresEveryCode|RequireAnyPermissionIsAliasOfRequirePermission|RequireRoleAndAdminOnly|RBACHelpersHandleMissingContextValues)' -count=1`
Expected: FAIL because the test file does not exist yet.
- [ ] **Step 3: Add the minimal behavior tests**
```go
router.Use(func(c *gin.Context) {
c.Set(ContextKeyRoleCodes, []string{"viewer"})
c.Set(ContextKeyPermissionCodes, []string{"user:read"})
c.Next()
})
```
- [ ] **Step 4: Run RBAC tests to verify green**
Run: `go test ./internal/api/middleware -run 'Test(RequirePermissionRejectsMissingPermission|RequirePermissionAllowsMatchingPermission|RequireAllPermissionsRequiresEveryCode|RequireAnyPermissionIsAliasOfRequirePermission|RequireRoleAndAdminOnly|RBACHelpersHandleMissingContextValues)' -count=1`
Expected: PASS
### Task 3: Extend runtime middleware tests for error and trace handling
**Files:**
- Modify: `internal/api/middleware/runtime_test.go`
- Test: `internal/api/middleware/runtime_test.go`
- [ ] **Step 1: Write failing tests for uncovered branches**
```go
func TestTraceID_GetTraceIDHandlesMissingAndPresentValue(t *testing.T) {}
func TestErrorHandler_ApplicationErrorPreservesStatusAndReason(t *testing.T) {}
func TestRecover_ReturnsInternalServerErrorPayload(t *testing.T) {}
```
- [ ] **Step 2: Run targeted runtime tests to verify red**
Run: `go test ./internal/api/middleware -run 'Test(TraceID_GetTraceIDHandlesMissingAndPresentValue|ErrorHandler_ApplicationErrorPreservesStatusAndReason|Recover_ReturnsInternalServerErrorPayload)' -count=1`
Expected: FAIL because the new tests do not exist yet.
- [ ] **Step 3: Add assertions around headers, JSON payloads, and panic recovery**
```go
if got := GetTraceID(c); got != expected {
t.Fatalf("GetTraceID() = %q, want %q", got, expected)
}
```
- [ ] **Step 4: Run targeted runtime tests to verify green**
Run: `go test ./internal/api/middleware -run 'Test(TraceID_GetTraceIDHandlesMissingAndPresentValue|ErrorHandler_ApplicationErrorPreservesStatusAndReason|Recover_ReturnsInternalServerErrorPayload)' -count=1`
Expected: PASS
### Task 4: Run package verification and capture the outcome
**Files:**
- Modify: `internal/api/middleware/auth_bootstrap_test.go`
- Modify: `internal/api/middleware/rbac_test.go`
- Modify: `internal/api/middleware/runtime_test.go`
- [ ] **Step 1: Run the full middleware package tests**
Run: `go test ./internal/api/middleware -count=1`
Expected: PASS
- [ ] **Step 2: Run focused coverage for the middleware package**
Run: `go test ./internal/api/middleware -cover -count=1`
Expected: PASS with higher coverage than the current baseline for auth/RBAC/error/trace paths.

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,340 @@
# UMS 项目全面代码复核报告 v6.0
**报告日期**: 2026-04-20
**审查范围**: 当前 `main` 工作区全部实现代码、旧报告未闭环问题、自动化门禁、系统化静态审查结果
**基线说明**: 本报告按日期拆分,作为 [FULL_CODE_REVIEW_REPORT_2026-04-17.md](./FULL_CODE_REVIEW_REPORT_2026-04-17.md) 的后续复核报告。凡与旧报告或旧附录冲突之处,以本报告基于 2026-04-20 新鲜命令证据和当前代码实现得到的结论为准。
---
## 一句话结论
项目在 2026-04-17 报告中的多数首轮 P0 缺陷已经被修复,但当前代码仍存在新的认证与授权断层,且旧报告中的一部分未修复问题仍未真正闭环。当前状态不适合宣称“全部问题已修完”或“可直接上线”。
---
## 2026-04-20 新鲜验证证据
| 项目 | 命令 | 结果 | 说明 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 后端构建 | `go build ./cmd/server` | PASS | 2026-04-20 23:07:51 +08:00 实跑通过 |
| 后端静态检查 | `go vet ./...` | PASS | 实跑通过 |
| 后端测试 | `go test ./... -count=1` | PASS | 全量通过,`internal/service` 仍是主要耗时段 |
| 前端 Lint | `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run lint` | PASS | 与 2026-04-18 红灯状态相比已恢复 |
| 前端构建 | `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run build` | PASS | 实跑通过 |
| 系统化静态检查 | `staticcheck ./...` | FAIL | 发现测试代码 `nil context`、潜在空指针、死代码等问题 |
| 安全静态检查 | `gosec ./internal/... ./cmd/...` | FAIL | 有真实问题,也有大量误报/高噪音结果,需要人工过滤 |
---
## 当前阻塞级问题
### P0-01: `TOTP` 二次验证链路缺少首因子绑定,形成独立登录入口
**位置**
- `internal/api/handler/auth_handler.go:151`
- `internal/service/auth.go:125`
- `internal/service/auth.go:811`
**问题**
- `/api/v1/auth/login/totp-verify` 只要求 `user_id + code + device_id`
- 服务端 `VerifyTOTPAfterPasswordLogin()` 只校验用户状态与 `TOTP` 码,然后直接签发完整 token
- 代码里虽然保留了 `TempToken` 字段,但当前登录闭环并未使用任何临时登录态或 challenge 票据
**影响**
- “密码登录后第二步验证”被降级成“知道用户 ID 且拿到有效 TOTP 即可直接登录”
- 这不是旧 P0-07 的原样复现,但本质上仍然属于 MFA 闭环未正确实现
**结论**
- 旧报告 P0-07 不能标记为“已完全修复”,应迁移为“修复方向已变化,但认证闭环仍未完成”
### P0-02: 设备接口存在成组 `IDOR`
**位置**
- `internal/api/handler/device_handler.go:114`
- `internal/api/handler/device_handler.go:147`
- `internal/api/handler/device_handler.go:183`
- `internal/api/handler/device_handler.go:214`
- `internal/api/handler/device_handler.go:392`
- `internal/api/handler/device_handler.go:474`
- `internal/service/device.go:121`
- `internal/service/device.go:158`
- `internal/service/device.go:163`
- `internal/service/device.go:181`
- `internal/service/device.go:204`
- `internal/service/device.go:236`
**问题**
- `GET/PUT/DELETE /devices/:id`
- `PUT /devices/:id/status`
- `POST/DELETE /devices/:id/trust`
这些接口的 handler 没有 owner/admin 校验service 层也没有按 `user_id` 兜底约束,只按设备主键直接读写删除。
**影响**
- 任意已登录用户只要知道设备 ID就可以读取、修改、删除、信任或取消信任他人设备
**结论**
- 这是本轮新增发现,严重程度等同发布阻塞
### P0-03: 修改密码接口缺少“本人或管理员”授权校验
**位置**
- `internal/api/handler/user_handler.go:275`
- `internal/service/user_service.go:84`
**问题**
- `PUT /api/v1/users/:id/password` 直接使用路径里的 `id`
- handler 没有 self-or-admin 校验
- service 只验证目标用户旧密码是否正确
**影响**
- 普通用户在知道目标用户旧密码时可直接修改目标用户密码
- 管理员也没有单独的安全重置路径,权限模型与接口语义混杂
**结论**
- 这是一条真实的授权缺口,应纳入 P0
### P0-04: 上下文协议漂移导致多处管理员路径失效
**位置**
- `internal/api/middleware/auth.go:90`
- `internal/api/middleware/auth.go:91`
- `internal/api/handler/user_handler.go:191`
- `internal/api/handler/user_handler.go:374`
- `internal/api/handler/avatar_handler.go:74`
**问题**
- 认证中间件当前只写入 `role_codes` / `permission_codes`
- 多个 handler 仍读取旧的 `user_roles`
**影响**
- 管理员跨用户更新资料
- 管理员查看他人角色
- 管理员代传头像
这些路径都会被错误判定为无权限。
**结论**
- 旧 P0-06 已做过一轮修复,但当前实现没有真正闭环,应以“部分修复后回归失效”迁移进新报告
### P0-05: OAuth handler 仍返回“200 假成功”占位响应
**位置**
- `internal/api/handler/auth_handler.go:316`
- `internal/api/handler/auth_handler.go:329`
- `internal/api/handler/auth_handler.go:342`
- `internal/api/handler/auth_handler.go:353`
- `internal/service/auth.go:939`
- `internal/service/auth.go:946`
- `internal/service/auth.go:1492`
**问题**
- handler 仍直接返回 `OAuth not configured` 或空 provider 列表
- service 层实际上已经存在 `OAuthLogin` / `OAuthCallback` / `GetEnabledOAuthProviders` 逻辑
**影响**
- API 层向前端暴露假成功语义
- 与仓库“禁止 fake success / fail closed”的运行时规则冲突
**结论**
- 这不是旧报告中的原编号问题,但属于当前实现真实性问题,应纳入高优先级修复
### P0-06: 游标分页与动态排序的契约仍未真正闭环
**位置**
- `internal/repository/user.go:353`
**问题**
- 当前实现只在 `sortBy == created_at` 时应用游标条件
- 其他排序字段下并不会报错,只是静默忽略游标条件
**影响**
- 前端如果带着非 `created_at` 排序继续请求下一页,得到的不是严格意义上的“下一页”
- 旧报告的“数据错乱”主因已经被收敛,但 API 契约仍然是不闭合的,容易出现重复页或错误分页预期
**结论**
- 旧 P0-08 不应从报告中移除,应以下降风险后的“残留契约缺口”形式迁移
---
## 从旧报告迁移的未闭环问题
下表只迁移“当前仍未真正闭环”的旧问题;已经明确修复完成的问题不再重复记为未完成。
| 旧编号 | 当前状态 | 新报告结论 |
|---|---|---|
| P0-06 UpdateUser IDOR | 部分修复后再次失效 | 迁移为 P0-04上下文协议漂移导致管理员授权逻辑失效 |
| P0-07 Login 绕过 TOTP | 修复方向变化,但未闭环 | 迁移为 P0-01`totp-verify` 未绑定首因子 |
| P0-08 ListCursor / sort | 风险下降但契约未闭合 | 迁移为 P0-06`created_at` 排序下游标被静默忽略 |
| P1-12 ~ P1-14 响应格式不一致 | 仍未修复 | 保留为 P1`auth_handler``password_reset_handler` 等多处仍返回非统一响应格式 |
| P2-12 `/uploads` 直接暴露 | 仍未修复 | 保留为 P2`router.Setup()` 仍静态暴露上传目录 |
---
## 已确认修复完成的旧问题
以下问题在当前代码中已具备明确修复证据,不再迁移为“未修复项”:
| 旧编号 | 当前状态 | 证据 |
|---|---|---|
| P0-01 LIKE 通配/模式注入 | 已修复 | `internal/repository/operation_log.go``internal/repository/device.go``internal/repository/user.go` 已统一使用 `escapeLikePattern()` |
| P0-02 登录失败计数竞态 | 主路径已修复 | `internal/service/auth.go:492` 已改用 `cache.Increment()`;但降级 fallback 仍保留非原子路径,见“残留风险” |
| P0-03 refresh 黑名单 fail-open | 已修复 | `internal/service/auth.go` 中黑名单写入失败已向上返回错误 |
| P0-04 手机重置 replay | 基本修复 | `internal/service/password_reset.go` 在验证码校验通过后先删除 key 再继续流程 |
| P0-05 CORS 默认危险组合 | 已修复 | `internal/api/middleware/cors.go` 默认值已改为空 origins + `AllowCredentials=false` |
| P1-01 错误处理中间件泄露内部错误 | 已修复 | `internal/api/middleware/error.go` 对未知错误返回通用消息 |
| P1-03 导出接口泄露内部错误 | 已修复 | `internal/api/handler/export_handler.go` 已改为通用错误文案 |
| P1-04 CountByResultSince 静默忽略错误 | 已修复 | `internal/repository/login_log.go` 已返回 `(int64, error)` |
| P1-07 Theme SetDefault 非原子 | 已修复 | `internal/repository/theme.go` 已改用事务 |
| P1-08 数据库连接池硬编码 | 已修复 | `internal/database/db.go` 已使用配置参数 |
| P1-15 分页参数无上限 | 大体修复 | `user_handler.go``device_handler.go``log_handler.go` 均已限制 `page_size <= 100` |
---
## 仍需保留的中高优先级问题
### P1-01: API 响应格式仍然不统一
**位置**
- `internal/api/handler/auth_handler.go`
- `internal/api/handler/password_reset_handler.go`
- `internal/api/handler/user_handler.go`
**问题**
- 同一套 API 中同时存在 `{error: ...}``{message: ...}``{code,message,data}` 等多种响应结构
- `Logout``CSRF`、认证错误分支、参数绑定错误分支的格式仍不一致
**影响**
- 前端错误处理成本高
- 自动化契约测试难写
- 文档与真实行为容易继续漂移
### P1-02: 登录失败计数器仍保留非原子降级路径
**位置**
- `internal/service/auth.go:492`
**问题**
- 主路径已使用 `cache.Increment()`
-`Increment` 出错时仍回退到 `Get + current++ + Set`
**影响**
- 在缓存不支持原子递增或运行时出错场景下,旧竞态仍可能重现
**结论**
- 不再按 P0 处理,但仍是必须收尾的 P1
### P1-03: CLI/初始化路径存在权限与类型转换告警
**系统化工具证据**
- `cmd/ums/cmd/init.go:306` `gosec G115`
- `cmd/ums/cmd/init.go:341` `gosec G301`
- `cmd/ums/cmd/init.go:446` `gosec G306`
**人工判断**
- `int(os.Stdin.Fd())` 在 Windows 常见运行路径下不一定形成真实高危,但应改成更明确的受控转换
- 初始化命令写目录/文件权限偏宽,适合作为 P1/P2 收敛项
### P2-01: 上传目录仍被直接公开暴露
**位置**
- `internal/api/router/router.go`
**问题**
- `r.engine.Static("/uploads", "./uploads")` 仍直接公开暴露上传目录
**影响**
- 上传内容默认可被匿名访问
- 一旦上传内容策略控制不足,容易扩大文件暴露面
---
## 系统化工具补充审查
### `staticcheck ./...` 结果摘要
人工过滤后,当前值得保留的信号主要有三类:
1. **测试代码错误用法**
- `internal/api/handler/captcha_handler_test.go`
- `internal/service/auth_capabilities_test.go`
存在 `SA1012`,测试里向需要 `context.Context` 的调用传了 `nil`
2. **测试代码潜在空指针**
- `internal/service/sms_provider_test.go`
- `internal/service/user_roles_test.go`
- `internal/service/webhook_service_test.go`
存在 `SA5011`,说明部分测试断言路径缺少空值保护。
3. **仓库内死代码/遗留辅助代码**
- `internal/api/middleware/auth.go`
- `internal/monitoring/slo.go`
- `internal/repository/sql_scan.go`
- `internal/repository/pagination.go`
存在 `U1000`,说明最近几轮修复后有未清理的遗留函数或字段。
### `gosec ./internal/... ./cmd/...` 结果摘要
`gosec` 本轮输出噪音较大,尤其把 OAuth URL、常量名、header 名、token URL 大量误判为“硬编码凭证”。人工过滤后,建议保留的结果如下:
1. **真实可收敛问题**
- `internal/api/handler/avatar_handler.go:147` `G301`
- `internal/api/handler/avatar_handler.go:159` `G306`
- `internal/service/password_reset.go:237`
- `internal/service/password_reset.go:252`
前者是目录/文件权限偏宽,后者是关键删除操作忽略返回错误。
2. **低风险但建议修整**
- `internal/service/captcha.go:164` `G404`
这里使用 `math/rand` 仅用于验证码图片背景色随机化,不直接影响验证码秘密值,但可以考虑改为更明确的非安全随机用途注释,或避免被安全扫描反复报警。
3. **高噪音误报,不建议直接据此立项**
- OAuth token URL / auth URL
- Header 名称
- 非凭证字符串常量
这些不应直接写进缺陷列表,否则会污染修复优先级。
---
## 当前建议修复顺序
### 第一批:立即处理
1. 修复 `totp-verify` 登录闭环,要求必须携带首因子验证后的临时态
2. 为设备接口补全 owner/admin 校验,并在 service 层增加按 `user_id` 的兜底约束
3.`/users/:id/password` 增加 self-or-admin 授权,并区分“本人修改密码”和“管理员重置密码”语义
4. 统一 handler 上下文字段,彻底移除 `user_roles` 旧协议
5. 去掉 OAuth handler 的假成功返回,改成真实能力分发或显式 fail closed
### 第二批:本周内收口
1. 统一 API 响应结构
2. 清理登录失败计数器 fallback 竞态
3. 清理 `staticcheck` 暴露的测试错误与死代码
4. 收敛 `gosec` 中目录/文件权限与关键错误忽略问题
---
## 对旧报告的处理建议
1. 保留旧报告作为历史记录,不删除
2. 明确以本报告作为后续复核基线
3. 旧报告中“2026-04-18 修复完成附录”的“全部问题已修复完成”说法不再可信,后续对外引用时应停止使用该表述
---
## 最终判断
| 维度 | 结论 |
|---|---|
| 当前是否全部修复完成 | 否 |
| 当前是否适合直接上线 | 否 |
| 是否比 2026-04-17 更接近可上线 | 是,门禁更绿,旧 P0 多数已修,但出现新的授权/认证断层 |
| 当前最真实的状态 | “旧高危问题大部分已修,当前仍有新的 P0 授权与认证问题待收口,系统化静态审查还暴露出测试与遗留代码清理不足” |

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@@ -1,561 +0,0 @@
# user-system 全面 Review 报告
**审查日期**2026-05-30
**审查范围**`/home/long/project/user-system`
**审查模式**:严格、系统、全面
**审查方式**:源码审阅 + 实际构建/测试/静态检查验证 + 第二轮契约一致性对账
**结论等级****B- / 有条件可运行,不可宣称“已全面收口”**
---
## 一、执行摘要
该项目不是不可用项目。后端、前端、测试主链路均可运行,说明系统已经具备较高完成度;但它距离“高可靠、可审计、严格闭环”的标准仍有明显差距,主要集中在以下五类问题:
1. **SSO/OAuth 协议正确性存在关键缺口**
2. **Swagger / 路由 / 文档之间存在系统性契约漂移**
3. **测试数量很多,但契约强度不足,且掩盖了真实路由/鉴权问题**
4. **质量门禁对外表述与实际状态不一致**
5. **缓存失效、参数校验、上传实现等边界质量仍不够严谨**
一句话结论:
> 当前项目可以诚实表述为“主体功能可运行、可测试,但仍存在高价值安全与契约治理缺口”;不能诚实表述为“严格闭环、全面审计通过”。
---
## 二、审查范围与方法
### 2.1 重点审查模块
- 启动与配置链路
- `cmd/server/main.go`
- `internal/server/server.go`
- `internal/config/config.go`
- 认证 / 授权 / 会话
- `internal/api/middleware/auth.go`
- `internal/service/auth.go`
- `internal/service/user_service.go`
- `internal/auth/sso.go`
- `internal/api/handler/sso_handler.go`
- 核心 Handler 与 API 暴露
- `internal/api/handler/user_handler.go`
- `internal/api/handler/export_handler.go`
- `internal/api/handler/avatar_handler.go`
- `internal/api/router/router.go`
- 仓储层
- `internal/repository/user.go`
- `internal/repository/operation_log.go`
- 前端契约与测试
- `frontend/admin/src/services/*`
- `frontend/admin/src/pages/admin/ImportExportPage/*`
- `internal/api/handler/*_test.go`
- `internal/e2e/*`
- 文档与 Swagger
- `docs/swagger.go`
- `docs/docs.go`
- `docs/API.md`
- `docs/archive/OAUTH_INTEGRATION.md`
### 2.2 第二轮差异化审查方法
除第一轮常规源码审阅外,第二轮增加了以下“不同方式”的 review
1. **路由注册 vs Swagger 注释逐项对账**
-`internal/api/router/router.go` 为真实路由基准
- 对照 `internal/api/handler/*.go` 中所有 `@Router` 注释
2. **协议路径 vs 鉴权模型对账**
- 重点检查 SSO `/authorize``/token``/introspect``/revoke``/userinfo`
- 核对它们是否被挂在了正确的 middleware / route group 下
3. **测试行为 vs 真实路由语义对账**
- 检查测试是否在错误的前提下仍“允许通过”
4. **文档路径 vs 前端调用路径对账**
- 对照 Swagger 注释、路由、前端 service、API 文档的四方一致性
第二轮发现了**新的系统性问题**,已补充到本报告和修复计划中。
---
## 三、实际执行的验证
以下命令已实际执行。
### 3.1 通过项
```bash
go test ./... -count=1
go build ./cmd/server
cd frontend/admin && env -u NODE_ENV npm run test:run
cd frontend/admin && env -u NODE_ENV npm run build
```
结果:
- `go test ./... -count=1`**通过**
- `go build ./cmd/server`**通过**
- 前端 `npm run test:run`**通过**
- `82 files / 525 tests`
- 前端 `npm run build`**通过**
### 3.2 失败项
```bash
go vet ./...
```
结果:**失败**
失败位置:
- `internal/api/handler/avatar_handler_test.go:204`
- `internal/api/handler/export_handler_test.go:174`
- `internal/api/handler/export_handler_test.go:202`
- `internal/api/handler/export_handler_test.go:229`
失败信息:
- `using resp before checking for errors`
这说明当前仓库不能继续对外宣称 `go vet` 已通过。
---
## 四、主要发现
---
## P0必须优先修复的问题
### P0-1Swagger 文档实际为空壳,当前不能算有效 API 文档
**证据**
`docs/swagger.go` 中:
```json
"paths": {}
```
同时 `internal/api/router/router.go` 公开暴露了:
- `/swagger/*any`
**影响**
- Swagger UI 可能可访问
- 但 API spec 本身没有有效路径
- “Swagger 已完成”是错误表述
**结论**:高优先级治理缺陷。
---
### P0-2Swagger 注释与真实路由存在系统性漂移,不是单点问题
第一轮只确认了导入导出接口漂移;第二轮确认:**这不是局部问题,而是全局契约漂移**。
**明确证据示例**
1. **导入导出接口**
- 注释:`/api/v1/exports/users``/api/v1/exports/template`
- 实际:`/api/v1/admin/users/export``/api/v1/admin/users/import``/api/v1/admin/users/import/template`
2. **刷新令牌接口**
- 注释:`/api/v1/auth/refresh-token`
- 实际:`/api/v1/auth/refresh`
3. **邮箱验证码登录接口**
- 注释:`/api/v1/auth/login-by-email-code`
- 实际:`/api/v1/auth/login/email-code`
4. **重发激活邮件接口**
- 注释:`/api/v1/auth/resend-activation-email`
- 实际:`/api/v1/auth/resend-activation`
5. **TOTP / 2FA 接口**
- 注释:`/api/v1/auth/totp/*`
- 实际:`/api/v1/auth/2fa/*`
-`SetupTOTP` 注释是 `POST`,实际路由是 `GET`
6. **Captcha 接口**
- 注释:`/api/v1/captcha/*`
- 实际:`/api/v1/auth/captcha*`
7. **密码重置接口**
- 注释:`/api/v1/auth/password/forgot``/reset`
- 实际:`/api/v1/auth/forgot-password``/reset-password``/forgot-password/phone`
8. **自定义字段接口**
- 注释:`/api/v1/fields/*`
- 实际:`/api/v1/custom-fields/*`
9. **日志接口**
- 注释:`/api/v1/users/me/login-logs``/operation-logs`
- 实际:`/api/v1/logs/login/me``/api/v1/logs/operation/me`
10. **管理员接口**
- 注释:`/api/v1/users/admins`
- 实际:`/api/v1/admin/admins`
11. **方法不一致**
- `AssignRoles` 注释为 `POST /api/v1/users/{id}/roles`,实际是 `PUT`
- `AssignPermissions` 注释为 `POST /api/v1/roles/{id}/permissions`,实际是 `PUT`
**影响**
- 当前 Swagger 注释整体**不可信**
- 不能基于其生成正确 SDK 或自动化客户端
- 文档、前端、后端、测试之间存在多套契约
- 即使把 Swagger 重新生成,也仍会生成错误契约,除非先修注释
**结论**:严重契约一致性问题。
---
### P0-3SSO 授权码没有绑定 redirect_uritoken 兑换阶段未校验 redirect_uri / code / client 三元绑定
**证据**
`internal/auth/sso.go``SSOSession` 结构体不包含 `RedirectURI` 字段。
`GenerateAuthorizationCode(clientID, redirectURI, scope, ...)` 虽接收 `redirectURI`,但没有保存到 session。
`internal/api/handler/sso_handler.go``Token` 流程中:
- 校验了 `grant_type`
- 校验了 `client_secret`
- 校验了 `code` 是否存在
- **未校验** `req.RedirectURI == session.RedirectURI`
- **未做严格的 code-client-redirect 三元绑定**
**影响**
- 授权码模式协议实现不完整
- 授权码被截获或混用时,服务端缺少关键约束
- 不满足高可靠安全要求
**结论**:严重安全问题。
---
### P0-4SSO implicit flow 仍被支持,并通过 URL fragment 返回 access token
**证据**
`internal/api/handler/sso_handler.go` 中,当 `response_type == "token"` 时:
```go
redirectURL := req.RedirectURI + "#access_token=" + token + "&expires_in=7200"
```
**影响**
- access token 暴露给前端地址片段
- 不适合高安全系统
- 与现代 OAuth 推荐实践不一致
**结论**:严重安全设计问题。
---
### P0-5SSO `/token`、`/introspect`、`/revoke`、`/userinfo` 被挂在错误的鉴权模型下,协议语义与访问控制同时出错
这是第二轮新增的关键发现。
**证据**
`internal/api/router/router.go` 中:
- SSO 整组被挂在:
- `protected := v1.Group("")`
- `protected.Use(r.authMiddleware.Required())`
- 然后:
- `sso := protected.Group("/sso")`
- `sso.POST("/token", r.ssoHandler.Token)`
- `sso.POST("/introspect", r.ssoHandler.Introspect)`
- `sso.POST("/revoke", r.ssoHandler.Revoke)`
- `sso.GET("/userinfo", r.ssoHandler.UserInfo)`
而对应 handler 语义是:
- `Token`:使用 `grant_type + code + client_id + client_secret` 兑换 token不依赖当前登录用户
- `Introspect`:只收 `token` / `client_id`
- `Revoke`:只收 `token`
- `UserInfo`:当前实现反而直接读 app auth middleware 注入的 `user_id` / `username`
**影响**
1. **OAuth 客户端无法按协议直接兑换授权码**
- 因为 `/token` 被错误地要求先通过平台 BearerAuth
2. **`/introspect``/revoke` 不是 client-auth 模型,而是 app-user-auth 模型**
- 任意已登录平台用户如果拿到 token 字符串,就可能执行 introspect / revoke
3. **`/userinfo` 返回的是平台 JWT 上下文中的用户,而不是 SSO access token 的 subject**
- 协议语义错误
4. **现有测试已经在掩盖这个问题**
- 测试里直接不带认证访问 `/api/v1/sso/token``/introspect``/revoke`
- 但断言允许 200/400/401 多种状态混过
**结论**:严重的协议与访问控制双重错误,必须优先修复。
---
## P1应尽快修复的问题
### P1-1测试大量使用“宽松状态码断言”无法守住真实接口契约
**证据**
`internal/api/handler/export_handler_test.go``internal/api/handler/sso_handler_test.go` 中大量断言允许:
- 200
- 302
- 400
- 401
- 403
- 500
中的多个同时通过。
**第二轮补充证据**
- `sso_handler_test.go` 中多处直接对 `/api/v1/sso/token``/introspect``/revoke` 发起**无认证请求**
- 但测试依旧允许 `401``400``200` 等多个互斥结果
- 这恰好掩盖了 `router.go` 中 SSO route group 被错误挂到 `protected` 下的问题
**影响**
- 测试数量多但行为约束弱
- 路由语义漂移、鉴权模型错误时测试仍可能全绿
- 会制造“测试全绿”的假象
**结论**:高优先级测试质量问题。
---
### P1-2`go vet ./...` 实际不通过,项目对外表述与真实状态不一致
**证据**
本次实际执行 `go vet ./...` 失败,失败点见第三节。
**影响**
- README 与状态文档中若继续宣称 `go vet PASS`,属于事实不符
- 静态分析未真正成为质量门禁
**结论**:高优先级工程质量问题。
---
### P1-3JWT secret 治理与项目自我标准不完全一致
**证据**
`cmd/server/main.go` 使用 `config.Load()`,不是 `LoadForBootstrap()`,这点是好的;但 `internal/config/config.go` 中对弱 JWT secret 仅见 `warn` 级处理证据,而未见 release 模式弱值硬失败证据。
仓库多份 review / 标准文档则明确要求:
- 生产环境通过环境变量注入 `JWT_SECRET`
- 缺失 / 弱值应 fatal
**影响**
- 代码行为与治理标准之间存在差距
- 高可靠环境下,弱密钥仅告警不足够
**结论**:重要安全治理问题。
---
### P1-4用户状态 / 权限缓存失效接口存在,但未见业务路径接入证据
**证据**
`internal/api/middleware/auth.go` 暴露了:
- `InvalidateUserStateCache(userID)`
- `InvalidateUserPermCache(userID)`
但在 service / handler / server 调用链中未找到这些失效方法的业务接入证据。
同时缓存 TTL 为:
- 用户状态5s
- 权限缓存5min
**影响**
- 密码修改、状态修改、角色修改、权限调整后可能短时继续沿用旧授权结果
- 在高敏感场景中不够严格
**结论**:重要一致性问题。
---
### P1-5归档文档中存在拟真 OAuth secret 示例,文档边界不干净
**证据**
`docs/archive/OAUTH_INTEGRATION.md` 中存在:
```yaml
client_secret: "GOCSPX-abcdef123456"
```
**影响**
- 容易被误判为真实 secret
- 不符合敏感信息示例占位规范
**结论**:文档安全卫生问题。
---
## P2建议优化的问题
### P2-1`strconvAtoi` 非法输入返回 `(0, nil)`,会吞掉参数错误
**证据**
`internal/api/handler/export_handler.go` 中:
```go
if c < '0' || c > '9' {
return 0, nil
}
```
这会把非法 `status=abc` 静默转换成 `0`
**影响**
- 参数错误被吞掉
- 查询语义可能被扭曲
**结论**:中优先级正确性问题。
---
### P2-2头像上传一次性读入整个文件不必要
**证据**
`internal/api/handler/avatar_handler.go`
```go
data := make([]byte, file.Size)
src.Read(data)
os.WriteFile(dstPath, data, 0o644)
```
**影响**
- 不必要的整块内存分配
- 虽当前 5MB 限制可控,但实现不够稳健
**结论**:中优先级实现质量问题。
---
### P2-3头像上传成功响应使用匿名 `gin.H`,接口 schema 易漂移
**证据**
`internal/api/handler/avatar_handler.go` 返回:
```go
"data": gin.H{
"avatar_url": avatarURL,
"thumbnail": avatarURL,
}
```
但注释中宣称的是 `AvatarResponse`
**影响**
- 文档与实现松耦合
- 前端类型契约不稳
**结论**:中优先级可维护性问题。
---
## 五、值得保留的正面设计
### 5.1 头像上传做了扩展名 + Magic Bytes 双校验
位置:`internal/api/handler/avatar_handler.go`
这是正确的防伪装上传设计。
### 5.2 LIKE 搜索做了特殊字符转义
位置:
- `internal/repository/user.go`
- `internal/repository/operation_log.go`
说明对模式匹配误用和干扰有明确防御意识。
### 5.3 权限查询做了合并查询 + 缓存
位置:`internal/api/middleware/auth.go`
方向正确,说明系统已考虑权限查询成本。
### 5.4 密码修改事务中避免重复 Argon2id 计算
位置:`internal/service/user_service.go`
这体现了不错的成本意识与事务处理意识。
### 5.5 前端对原生弹窗做了 guard
位置:`frontend/admin/src/app/bootstrap/installWindowGuards.ts`
与仓库“禁止原生 alert/confirm/prompt/open”的规则一致。
---
## 六、测试体系评估
### 6.1 测试“很多”,但不等于“严格”
当前问题不是缺测试,而是:
- 测试覆盖面不算窄
- 但很多 handler 测试不对行为做强约束
- 真实接口契约未被有效锁定
### 6.2 E2E 有价值,但仍偏“可访问性验证”
`internal/e2e/e2e_advanced_test.go` 已对真实 admin 导出路由做访问限制验证,这是正面项;但协议严谨性、返回结构一致性、错误语义边界仍缺少强验证。
### 6.3 第二轮确认:测试还在掩盖路由/鉴权模型错误
SSO 相关测试已经直接暴露出一个事实:
- 被测接口在路由层要求平台 BearerAuth
- 测试却在无认证前提下继续跑
- 断言又接受 200/400/401 多种结果
这类测试不是“有弹性”,而是**无法担任回归保护**。
### 6.4 `go vet` 尚未纳入真实闭环
当前最直接证据就是:`go vet ./...` 失败,而项目文档却可能继续声称通过。
---
## 七、最终结论
该项目:
- **可以运行**
- **可以构建**
- **大部分测试可以通过**
- **但仍不能宣称“严格闭环、全面收口、可全面审计通过”**
最关键的阻塞点不是“功能没做完”,而是:
1. **SSO/OAuth 协议与路由鉴权模型不够严谨**
2. **Swagger / 路由 / 文档契约漂移是系统性的,不是局部的**
3. **测试绿但不够硬,且会掩盖真实问题**
4. **静态检查门禁未真正闭环**
建议下一步按修复计划先处理 P0再收紧测试与门禁最后同步更新状态文档与对外表述。

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@@ -1,414 +0,0 @@
# Hermes Full Review — 2026-05-27
- 仓库:`/home/long/project/user-system`
- 分支:`main`
- 基线提交:`82109ec Merge branch 'fix/status-review-sync-20260409'`
- 审查方式:文档对齐 + 代码静态复核 + 本地构建/测试/审计实测 + 二次复核补查
- 结论:**❌ Not Ready / 当前不建议发布**
---
## 1. Executive Summary
当前仓库不是“完全不可运行”,但**不满足诚实发布条件**。阻断原因主要有三类:
1. **安全 / 权限 P0 问题**
- 普通登录用户可枚举全部用户并读取任意用户详情
- TOTP 二次验证被降级成可单独换取登录态的入口
- 多个“未配置”认证/绑定接口返回 `200 + code:0`,形成假成功
2. **后端 clean-state 基线不绿**
- `go build ./cmd/server`
- `go vet ./...`
- `go test ./... -count=1`
- 三者在当前提交态均失败,并提示 `go mod tidy`
3. **文档状态比代码现实更乐观**
- README / 状态文档存在“已闭环 / 已完成”表述
- 但实际仍有主链路契约漂移、假成功与 clean-state 基线不干净问题
---
## 2. 审查范围与方法
### 2.1 读取的关键文件
- `AGENTS.md`
- `README.md`
- `docs/PRD.md`
- `docs/status/REAL_PROJECT_STATUS.md`
- `go.mod`
- `frontend/admin/package.json`
### 2.2 执行的关键命令
后端:
- `go version`
- `go build ./cmd/server`
- `go vet ./...`
- `go test ./... -count=1`
- `go test -mod=mod ./internal/repository -count=1`
- `go test -mod=mod ./... -count=1`
- `go test ./... -coverprofile=/tmp/user-system-cover.out -count=1`
- `go tool cover -func=/tmp/user-system-cover.out`
前端:
- `npm ci`
- `env -u NODE_ENV npm ci`
- `env -u NODE_ENV npm run lint`
- `env -u NODE_ENV npm run build`
- `env -u NODE_ENV npm run test:run`
- `env -u NODE_ENV npm run test:coverage`
- `env -u NODE_ENV npm audit --omit=dev --json`
- `env -u NODE_ENV npm audit --json`
---
## 3. 验证快照
### 3.1 环境事实
- Go`go1.26.3 linux/amd64`
- Node`v22.22.0`
- npm`10.9.4`
- 观察到默认 shell 存在:`NODE_ENV=production`
### 3.2 环境风险
默认 `NODE_ENV=production` 会导致第一次 `npm ci` 只安装生产依赖,进而出现:
- `eslint: not found`
- `tsc: not found`
- `@vitejs/plugin-react` not found
这说明 runbook / CI 若不显式控制环境变量,前端验证容易误判。
### 3.3 后端实测
#### 当前提交态 / clean-state
以下命令均失败:
- `go build ./cmd/server`
- `go vet ./...`
- `go test ./... -count=1`
统一报错:
```text
go: updates to go.mod needed; to update it:
go mod tidy
```
#### 探索性验证
为了区分“代码问题”与“模块清单漂移问题”,额外执行:
- `go test -mod=mod ./internal/repository -count=1`**PASS**
- `go test -mod=mod ./... -count=1`**PASS**
说明:核心代码不是全部跑不起来,但**提交态本身不干净**。
#### 覆盖率
- `go tool cover -func=/tmp/user-system-cover.out`
- 总覆盖率:**52.4%**
### 3.4 前端实测
在显式移除 `NODE_ENV=production` 影响后:
- `env -u NODE_ENV npm ci`**PASS**
- `env -u NODE_ENV npm run lint`**PASS**
- `env -u NODE_ENV npm run build`**PASS**
- `env -u NODE_ENV npm run test:run`**PASS**
- `82` 个 test files
- `518` 个 tests
- `env -u NODE_ENV npm run test:coverage`**PASS**
前端 coverage
- Statements: **89.83%**
- Branch: **80.38%**
- Funcs: **88.24%**
- Lines: **90.36%**
### 3.5 前端依赖审计
- `env -u NODE_ENV npm audit --omit=dev --json`**0 漏洞**
- `env -u NODE_ENV npm audit --json`**5 漏洞**
-**1 个 high**`vite 8.0.3`
---
## 4. Blockers必须修复
### P0-1 普通登录用户可枚举全部用户并读取任意用户详情
**证据**
- `internal/api/router/router.go:206-215`
- `internal/api/handler/user_handler.go:90-165`
**问题**
- `GET /api/v1/users`
- `GET /api/v1/users/:id`
当前仅挂在 `protected.Use(r.authMiddleware.Required())` 下,未加:
- `AdminOnly`
- `RequirePermission`
- 本人访问约束
**影响**
普通用户可读取其他用户列表 / 详情 / 邮箱等信息,属于明确数据越权。
---
### P0-2 TOTP 验证接口可单独换取登录态,二次验证被降级为单因子登录
**证据**
- `internal/api/handler/auth_handler.go:151-172`
- `internal/service/auth.go:811-831`
**问题**
`POST /api/v1/auth/login/totp-verify` 只依赖:
- `user_id`
- `code`
- `device_id`
没有要求:
- 已完成密码登录
- 临时 challenge ticket
- 短期 server-side login session
**影响**
拿到 TOTP / 恢复码即可直接换取完整 token安全模型错误。
---
### P0-3 未实现的绑定 / OAuth 接口使用 `200 + code:0` 伪装成功
**证据**
- `internal/api/handler/auth_handler.go:316-355`
- `internal/api/handler/auth_handler.go:563-660`
- `frontend/admin/src/lib/http/client.ts:274-279`
- `frontend/admin/src/pages/admin/ProfileSecurityPage/ContactBindingsSection.tsx:141-216`
**问题**
后端在以下场景仍返回成功语义:
- OAuth not configured
- email bind not configured
- phone bind not configured
- social binding not configured
前端只要 `code===0` 就按成功处理。
**影响**
用户会看到“已绑定 / 已解绑 / 已发送验证码”等成功反馈,但实际无状态变化。
---
### P0-4 Bootstrap Admin 前后端契约冲突,首个管理员初始化默认不可用
**证据**
前端:
- `frontend/admin/src/pages/auth/BootstrapAdminPage/BootstrapAdminPage.tsx:24-30,68-76`
- `frontend/admin/src/services/auth.ts:61-63`
后端:
- `internal/api/handler/auth_handler.go:504-527`
**问题**
前端未满足后端强制契约:
- 缺少 `X-Bootstrap-Secret`
- `email` 前端可为空,但后端必填
**影响**
首次部署时最关键的 bootstrap 链路可能直接失败。
---
### P0-5 clean-state 后端构建基线不绿
**证据**
- `go build ./cmd/server` → fail
- `go vet ./...` → fail
- `go test ./... -count=1` → fail
- 统一要求 `go mod tidy`
**影响**
当前 `main` 不满足仓库 AGENTS 要求的最低验证矩阵,不能诚实宣称“始终可构建、可测试通过”。
---
## 5. High / Important Issues
### P1-1 Logout fail-opentoken 失效失败也返回成功
**证据**
- `internal/service/auth.go:897-925`
- `internal/api/handler/auth_handler.go:185-209`
**问题**
黑名单写入错误被忽略handler 仍返回 `200 logged out`
---
### P1-2 多个 handler 的管理员判断读错 context key
**证据**
middleware 写入:
- `internal/api/middleware/auth.go:85-91`
- 写入 `role_codes`, `permission_codes`
handler 读取:
- `internal/api/handler/user_handler.go:188-200`
- `internal/api/handler/user_handler.go:374-383`
- `internal/api/handler/avatar_handler.go:72-85`
- 读取的是 `user_roles`
**影响**
管理员代操作逻辑可能失效,权限模型与实际行为漂移。
---
### P1-3 修改密码接口与注释声明不一致
**证据**
- `internal/api/router/router.go:211-213`
- `internal/api/handler/user_handler.go:275-297`
**问题**
注释写“仅管理员或本人”,但 handler 没有显式按该规则做校验。
---
### P1-4 密码历史记录异步写入,事务不完整
**证据**
- `internal/service/user_service.go:128-145`
**问题**
密码更新同步写库,但密码历史在 goroutine 中异步写入且错误吞掉。
---
### P1-5 Avatar token 随机源错误未 fail-closed
**证据**
- `internal/api/handler/avatar_handler.go:35-39`
**问题**
`rand.Read(bytes)` 错误被忽略。
---
## 6. 二次复核补充(第一次遗漏后补查)
### 6.1 前端测试绿,但没挡住真实 API 契约漂移
- 前端测试:`518 passed`
- 但 bootstrap-admin、contact bindings、OAuth 与真实后端契约仍不一致
**判断**
这是测试体系盲点,不是“测试通过即可放心”。
### 6.2 前端开发依赖存在 1 个 high 漏洞
- `vite 8.0.3` high
- 另有 moderate 级别依赖漏洞
### 6.3 `NODE_ENV=production` 造成验证误判风险
- 未显式控制环境变量时devDependencies 可能缺失
- 容易把环境问题误判为代码问题
### 6.4 后端总覆盖率仅 52.4%
在当前已有多条认证 / 权限高风险链路下,后端覆盖率偏低会放大回归风险。
### 6.5 测试 warning 噪音较多
实测出现:
- `act(...)` warning
- React Router future flag warning
- `danger` 非布尔 attribute warning
- `addonAfter` deprecated warning
- React list key warning
虽然不阻断当前前端测试通过,但说明测试基线不够干净。
---
## 7. 文档真相审查
### 结论:❌ 未闭环
当前 README 与 `docs/status/REAL_PROJECT_STATUS.md` 存在“闭环 / 已完成 / 当前绿色”等偏乐观表述,但 live review 证明:
- 后端 clean-state 不绿
- bootstrap-admin 主链路漂移
- 绑定 / OAuth 存在假成功
- 权限模型存在 P0
建议文档至少降级为:
> 前端 lint/build/test 当前可通过;后端代码在 `-mod=mod` 探索性测试下大体可运行,但 clean-state 构建基线未绿;认证 / 权限 / 绑定链路仍有 P0 阻断,不可宣称发布闭环。
---
## 8. 四类闭环判断
### 8.1 实现闭环
**状态:❌**
- 权限越权未解决
- TOTP 流程模型错误
- bootstrap-admin 契约漂移
- binding / OAuth 实际未闭环
### 8.2 证据闭环
**状态:✅/⚠️ 部分成立**
- 前端构建 / 测试证据充分
- 后端 clean-state 失败证据明确
- 但这些事实尚未同步进主状态文档
### 8.3 文档真相闭环
**状态:❌**
- 当前对外状态文档比代码现实更乐观
### 8.4 防复发闭环
**状态:❌**
尚未看到系统性防线去约束:
- binding / OAuth 禁止 200 假成功
- bootstrap 前后端契约对齐校验
- `/users``/:id` 权限回归测试
- clean-state `go build/vet/test` gate
- 真实 API contract 联调验证
---
## 9. 最终评级
| 维度 | 评级 | 说明 |
|---|---|---|
| 需求 / 实现一致性 | C | 多条主链路契约漂移 |
| 安全基线 | D | 存在 P0 权限 / 认证问题 |
| 构建与测试基线 | C | 前端绿,后端 clean-state 红 |
| 可维护性 | B- | 结构尚可,但存在 context key 漂移 / fail-open / 异步事务问题 |
| 文档真相 | C- | 文档明显乐观于代码现实 |
| 发布就绪度 | D | 当前不建议发布 |
**综合评级D / Not Ready**
---
## 10. 修复优先级建议
### P0先修
1. 修复 `/api/v1/users``/:id` 越权
2. 重构 `totp-verify`,必须绑定密码登录 challenge
3. 所有未实现的 binding / OAuth 接口改为 fail-closed并同步前端处理
4. 修复 bootstrap-admin 前后端契约
5. 清理 `go.mod/go.sum` 漂移,恢复 clean-state build/vet/test 绿灯
### P1紧随其后
6. 修复 logout fail-open
7. 修复 `user_roles` / `role_codes` context key 漂移
8. 修复 password history 异步写入的事务缺口
9. 修复 avatar token 生成未检查错误
10. 升级前端 dev toolchain 漏洞(至少 vite
### P2收口
11. 清理测试 warning 噪音
12. 补真实 API contract 集成测试
13. 更新 README / `docs/status/REAL_PROJECT_STATUS.md`
---
## 11. 本次二次 Review 的新增补充摘要
相较第一次结论,本次额外明确了以下问题:
1. 前端测试体系没有挡住真实 API 契约漂移
2. 前端 dev toolchain 存在 1 个 high 漏洞Vite
3. `NODE_ENV=production` 会导致 devDependencies 缺失runbook / CI 易误判
4. 后端总覆盖率仅 52.4%
5. 测试输出 warning 噪音较多,质量门禁不够干净
---
## 12. 最终结论
**当前建议:不要发布;先修两个 high blocker 类问题,再推进剩余 P0 / P1。**
其中最先收口的方向应是:
- 认证 / 权限真安全
- clean-state 构建真绿色
- 文档真相与代码现实一致

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@@ -1,436 +0,0 @@
# user-system 修复执行计划(按 P0 / P1 / P2 排序)
**计划日期**2026-05-30
**输入依据**`docs/code-review/FULL_REVIEW_2026-05-30.md`
**目标**:修复本轮 review 暴露出的安全、正确性、测试与文档一致性问题,并形成新的可审计验证证据。
---
## 一、执行原则
1. **先修协议与契约,再修测试与文档**
- 先修 SSO / Swagger / 路由契约错误
- 再收敛测试与静态检查
2. **每一类问题修完都必须立即验证**
3. **文档只能反映已验证事实,不能提前宣称完成**
4. **对外可见契约必须单点真实**
- 路由
- Swagger
- 前端调用
- 测试断言
- 状态文档
5. **修复计划必须覆盖 review 报告中的全部问题**
- 不能只修“代表性问题”
- 必须处理系统性问题源头
---
## 二、P0 修复计划(必须最优先)
### P0-1把空壳 Swagger 修成真实有效文档
#### 目标
`/swagger/*any` 对应的不是空 `paths`,而是真实可用 OpenAPI 文档。
#### 具体动作
1. 梳理 Swagger 生成入口与当前生成流程
2. 确认 `swag init` 或项目既定生成方式
3. 生成有效 `docs/swagger.go` / `docs/docs.go`
4. 校验 `paths` 非空
5. 校验至少以下路径存在:
- `/api/v1/auth/login`
- `/api/v1/auth/register`
- `/api/v1/admin/users/export`
- `/api/v1/users/{id}`
#### 验证
- 生成 Swagger
- 检查 `docs/swagger.go``paths` 非空
- 如可本地启动,验证 `/swagger/index.html``/swagger/doc.json` 可用
---
### P0-2系统性修正 Swagger 注释与真实路由的漂移
> 这是对报告中“系统性契约漂移”的完整修复,不再只处理导入导出接口。
#### 目标
统一以下来源的 API 契约:
- `internal/api/router/router.go`
- `internal/api/handler/*.go` 中全部 `@Router`
- `docs/API.md`
- 前端调用与测试
- 生成后的 Swagger 文档
#### 具体动作
1. 全量审计并修复以下类别的 `@Router` 漂移:
- export/importadmin 路径
- refresh`/refresh-token``/refresh`
- email-code login`/login-by-email-code``/login/email-code`
- resend activation`/resend-activation-email``/resend-activation`
- TOTP`/auth/totp/*``/auth/2fa/*`
- captcha`/captcha/*``/auth/captcha*`
- password reset`/auth/password/*``/forgot-password` / `/reset-password` / phone 变体
- custom fields`/fields/*``/custom-fields/*`
- logs`/users/me/*logs``/logs/*/me`
- admins`/users/admins``/admin/admins`
- users/me 绑定类接口bind-email / bind-phone / social accounts
2. 修复 HTTP method 漂移:
- `AssignRoles``POST``PUT`
- `AssignPermissions``POST``PUT`
- `SetupTOTP`:注释 method 与真实 method 对齐
3. 对照 `router.go` 做一次全量注释-路由对账,直到关键差异清零
4. 更新 `docs/API.md` 中对应路径
5. 重新生成 Swagger 文档
#### 验证
- `go test ./internal/api/handler ./internal/api/router -count=1`
- 生成 Swagger 后检查关键路径与 method 全部正确
- 使用脚本或审查清单确认:关键业务路由不再存在注释/注册漂移
---
### P0-3修复 SSO 授权码模式未绑定 `redirect_uri` 的问题
#### 目标
让 authorization code 与 client / redirect URI 形成强绑定。
#### 具体动作
1.`internal/auth/sso.go``SSOSession` 中加入 `RedirectURI`
2. `GenerateAuthorizationCode(...)` 保存该字段
3. `Token(...)` 兑换令牌时校验:
- `session.ClientID == req.ClientID`
- `session.RedirectURI == req.RedirectURI`
4. 对不匹配场景返回明确错误
5. 为此补回归测试
#### 验证
- `go test ./internal/auth ./internal/api/handler -count=1`
- 增加测试覆盖:
- 正确 client + redirect_uri 成功
- 错误 redirect_uri 失败
- 错误 client_id 失败
---
### P0-4禁用 implicit flow
#### 目标
系统只支持更安全的授权码模式,不再通过 fragment 返回 access token。
#### 具体动作
1. 修改 `internal/api/handler/sso_handler.go`
2.`response_type=token`
- 返回 `400 unsupported response_type`
- 或仅允许 `code`
3. 清理相应的宽松测试
4. 同步文档说明只支持 code flow
#### 验证
- `response_type=token` 应明确失败
- `response_type=code` 正常工作
---
### P0-5重构 SSO 路由分组与鉴权模型,使 `/token`、`/introspect`、`/revoke`、`/userinfo` 语义正确
> 这是第二轮新增问题若不修P0-3/P0-4 仍不完整。
#### 目标
让 SSO/OAuth 相关端点符合正确的访问控制模型,而不是错误复用平台用户 BearerAuth。
#### 具体动作
1. 将 SSO 路由按语义拆分,不再整体挂在 `protected`
2. 至少区分:
- `/authorize`:需要当前平台登录用户完成授权
- `/token`:客户端凭证 + 授权码模型,不依赖当前平台 BearerAuth
- `/introspect`:客户端认证模型
- `/revoke`:客户端认证模型或 token-owner 受控模型,必须明确
- `/userinfo`:基于 SSO access token而不是平台 JWT 上下文
3.`/token``/introspect``/revoke` 设计明确的 client auth 机制
4. 修正 `UserInfo` 的 token 解析来源,不能继续直接读平台 auth middleware 的 `user_id`
5. 同步更新测试与文档
#### 验证
- `/token` 在无平台 BearerAuth、仅有正确 client/code 条件下可成功
- `/introspect` / `/revoke` 不接受任意平台登录用户代操作
- `/userinfo` 返回的是 SSO token subject而不是平台当前 session user
---
## 三、P1 修复计划(紧随 P0
### P1-1修复 `go vet ./...` 失败并收口静态分析门禁
#### 目标
让项目重新具备诚实宣称 `go vet` 通过的资格。
#### 具体动作
1. 修复:
- `internal/api/handler/avatar_handler_test.go`
- `internal/api/handler/export_handler_test.go`
2. 所有 `resp` 使用前先检查 `err`
3. 扫描同类 helper/测试模式,避免只修报错行
#### 验证
- `go vet ./...`
- `go test ./... -count=1`
---
### P1-2把宽松状态码测试改成严格契约测试
#### 目标
让测试真正约束行为,而不是“什么都算通过”。
#### 具体动作
1. 优先重写以下测试文件:
- `internal/api/handler/export_handler_test.go`
- `internal/api/handler/sso_handler_test.go`
2. 逐场景收紧断言:
- 未认证 → 401
- 未授权 → 403
- 参数错误 → 400
- 成功 → 200 / 302
3. 删除允许 `500` 的正常断言路径
4. 对有环境差异的场景,先修被测逻辑,再收紧测试
5. 针对 SSO 补充协议级回归测试:
- `/token` 不再被平台 BearerAuth 门禁误拦
- `/introspect` / `/revoke` 权限模型正确
- `/userinfo` 基于 SSO token而不是平台 session
6. 对关键契约类 handler 增加“路由/方法/状态码固定断言”
#### 验证
- 受影响包 `go test -count=1`
- 必须确保断言收紧后仍稳定通过
---
### P1-3强化 JWT secret 治理为启动硬门禁
#### 目标
让 release 模式下的 JWT 配置符合项目自身文档标准。
#### 具体动作
1. 明确 `config.Load()` 下的正常启动规则
2. 在 release/standard 服务路径中强制:
- secret 缺失 → fail fast
- weak secret → fail fast
3. 保留 `LoadForBootstrap()` 仅用于初始化场景
4. 增加配置单元测试
#### 验证
- `go test ./internal/config -count=1`
- 缺失/弱 secret 场景必须失败
---
### P1-4接通用户状态 / 权限变更后的缓存失效链路
#### 目标
避免密码、状态、角色、权限变更后继续使用陈旧缓存。
#### 具体动作
1. 梳理以下写路径:
- `ChangePassword`
- `UpdateStatus`
- `BatchUpdateStatus`
- `AssignRoles`
- `DeleteAdmin`
- `AssignPermissions`
2. 设计缓存失效注入方式
- 推荐通过依赖注入引入失效能力
- 不要让 service 直接依赖具体 middleware 实现细节
3. 在写路径完成后主动失效:
- user_state
- user_perms
- 受影响角色下的用户权限缓存
#### 验证
- 增加回归测试:
- 改密码后旧 token / 旧状态缓存失效
- 改角色/权限后权限即时生效
---
### P1-5清理拟真 secret 示例
#### 目标
恢复文档敏感边界清洁度。
#### 具体动作
1. 清理 `docs/archive/OAUTH_INTEGRATION.md` 中拟真值
2. 全仓搜索其它类似格式示例
3. 统一替换为显式占位符
#### 验证
- 搜索确认无拟真 secret 示例残留
---
## 四、P2 修复计划(在 P0/P1 收口后处理)
### P2-1修复 `strconvAtoi` 吞错问题
#### 目标
非法 status 参数返回显式错误,而不是静默当作 0。
#### 动作
1. 修改 `internal/api/handler/export_handler.go``strconvAtoi`
2. 非数字输入返回 error
3. `ExportUsers` 中对非法 `status` 返回 400
4. 增加回归测试
#### 验证
- `status=abc` → 400
---
### P2-2头像上传改为流式写盘
#### 目标
消除不必要的整块内存分配。
#### 动作
1.`os.Create` + `io.Copy` 代替 `Read + WriteFile`
2. 保持现有 magic bytes 校验逻辑
3. 确保失败时清理半成品文件
#### 验证
- 头像上传相关测试通过
- 文件写入失败场景仍能回滚
---
### P2-3头像上传响应改为明确 struct
#### 目标
让返回 schema 与注释一致。
#### 动作
1. 引入明确响应 struct
2. 更新 Swagger 注释 / handler 返回值
3. 同步前端类型
#### 验证
- 相关 handler test
- 前端编译通过
---
### P2-4前端构建大 chunk 警告优化
#### 目标
降低主包体积,改善生产可维护性。
#### 动作
1. 识别大 chunk 页面
2. 做路由级动态拆分
3. 必要时拆分 antd 重型页面模块
#### 验证
- `npm run build`
- 观察 chunk 体积变化
---
## 五、修复计划完整性审核
本节用于确认:**计划是否覆盖 review 报告中的全部问题**。
| Review 问题 | 计划覆盖项 | 覆盖状态 |
|---|---|---|
| Swagger 空壳 | P0-1 | 已覆盖 |
| Swagger 注释与真实路由系统性漂移 | P0-2 | 已覆盖 |
| SSO code 未绑定 redirect_uri | P0-3 | 已覆盖 |
| SSO implicit flow | P0-4 | 已覆盖 |
| SSO `/token` `/introspect` `/revoke` `/userinfo` 鉴权模型错误 | P0-5 | 已覆盖 |
| 宽松状态码测试掩盖问题 | P1-2 | 已覆盖 |
| `go vet` 不通过 | P1-1 | 已覆盖 |
| JWT secret 硬门禁不足 | P1-3 | 已覆盖 |
| 状态 / 权限缓存失效未接入 | P1-4 | 已覆盖 |
| 拟真 secret 示例 | P1-5 | 已覆盖 |
| `strconvAtoi` 吞错 | P2-1 | 已覆盖 |
| 头像整块读入内存 | P2-2 | 已覆盖 |
| 头像响应 schema 漂移 | P2-3 | 已覆盖 |
### 审核结论
当前修复计划已经覆盖 review 报告中的**全部问题项**。
其中最关键的改进是:
- 不再把“Swagger 路由错误”视为单点问题,而是按**系统性契约漂移**处理
- 新增 P0-5明确修复 SSO route group / auth model 的结构性错误
这两点补齐后,计划才具备“能够完整修复 review 报告问题”的条件。
---
## 六、推荐执行顺序
### 阶段 1协议与契约止血
1. P0-5 修 SSO route group / auth model
2. P0-3 修 SSO code / redirect_uri 绑定
3. P0-4 禁 implicit flow
4. P0-2 系统性修正 Swagger 注释与真实路由漂移
5. P0-1 生成有效 Swagger
### 阶段 2质量门禁与测试收口
6. P1-1 修复 `go vet`
7. P1-2 收紧 export / sso / 契约类 handler 测试
8. P1-3 强化 JWT secret 启动门禁
### 阶段 3一致性与边界治理
9. P1-4 接通缓存失效链路
10. P1-5 清理拟真 secret 示例
### 阶段 4实现质量优化
11. P2-1 修 status 参数吞错
12. P2-2 头像流式写盘
13. P2-3 头像响应 struct 化
14. P2-4 前端 chunk 优化
---
## 七、每阶段完成后的最小验证矩阵
### P0 阶段后
```bash
go test ./internal/auth ./internal/api/handler ./internal/api/router -count=1
go build ./cmd/server
```
并检查 Swagger 生成结果。
### P1 阶段后
```bash
go vet ./...
go test ./... -count=1
go build ./cmd/server
cd frontend/admin && env -u NODE_ENV npm run test:run
cd frontend/admin && env -u NODE_ENV npm run build
```
### P2 阶段后
按受影响范围重跑:
```bash
go test ./internal/api/handler ./internal/service ./internal/repository -count=1
cd frontend/admin && env -u NODE_ENV npm run build
```
---
## 八、完成标准
只有同时满足以下条件,才能把本轮问题标记为“已收口”:
1. SSO code flow 绑定完整implicit flow 已禁用
2. SSO `/token``/introspect``/revoke``/userinfo` 的访问控制模型正确
3. Swagger 文档非空且关键路径正确
4. 注释 / 路由 / 文档 / 前端 / 测试中的 API 契约一致
5. `go vet ./...` 通过
6. handler 关键测试不再接受互斥状态码混过
7. JWT secret 治理与项目文档标准一致
8. 缓存失效链路有真实接入与回归测试
9. 状态文档与 README 只保留已验证事实

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@@ -1,169 +0,0 @@
# user-system review 修复收口2026-05-29
**更新日期**: 2026-05-29
**关联报告**: [HERMES_FULL_REVIEW_2026-05-27.md](./HERMES_FULL_REVIEW_2026-05-27.md)
**上次收口**: [review-fix-closure-2026-05-28.md](./review-fix-closure-2026-05-28.md)
---
## 结论
本轮完成 HERMES_FULL_REVIEW_2026-05-27.md 中剩余 **全部 P0 blocker 问题** 以及 **全部 P1 重要问题** 的修复验证。
当前状态:
-**全部 P0 blocker5项**:已修复
-**全部 P1 重要问题5项**:已修复
-**Go 全量测试**:通过
-**构建基线**`go build` / `go vet` / `go test` 全绿
-**覆盖率**53.2%(较上次 52.4% 略有提升)
---
## 本轮修复项(续)
### 14. TOTP 原子验证路径DisableTOTP
**问题分类**: P1 → 升级为安全强化
**对应报告项**: HERMES_FULL_REVIEW 6.4(二次复核补充)
**问题描述**:
`DisableTOTP` 操作涉及"验证 TOTP/恢复码"和"清除 TOTP 状态"两个步骤,非原子执行存在竞态窗口。
**修复方案**:
- 添加 `atomicTOTPVerifier` 接口,提供事务隔离的验证方法
- 实现 `VerifyTOTPOrRecoveryCode` 原子验证(只验证不消费)
- `DisableTOTP` 优先使用原子路径,降级兼容非原子路径
**涉及文件**:
- `internal/service/totp.go` - 添加接口定义和降级逻辑
- `internal/repository/user.go` - 实现原子验证方法
- `internal/service/totp_internal_test.go` - 新增单元测试
**验证结果**:
```bash
go test ./internal/service -run 'TestTOTPService_Disable' -v # PASS (6 tests)
go test ./internal/... # PASS (全量)
```
---
## P0 Blocker 修复状态(汇总)
| 问题ID | 问题描述 | 状态 | 验证方式 |
|--------|----------|------|----------|
| P0-1 | 普通登录用户可枚举全部用户并读取任意用户详情 | ✅ 已修复 | `router.go:208-210` 已加 `RequirePermission("user:manage")` |
| P0-2 | TOTP 验证接口可单独换取登录态 | ✅ 已修复 | `totp-verify` 需要 `temp_token`(密码登录后颁发) |
| P0-3 | 未实现的 binding/OAuth 接口返回 200 假成功 | ✅ 已修复 | 返回 `503 Service Unavailable` |
| P0-4 | Bootstrap Admin 前后端契约冲突 | ✅ 已修复 | 需要 `X-Bootstrap-Secret` + `email` required |
| P0-5 | clean-state 后端构建基线不绿 | ✅ 已修复 | `go build/vet/test` 全通过 |
---
## P1 重要问题修复状态(汇总)
| 问题ID | 问题描述 | 状态 | 验证方式 |
|--------|----------|------|----------|
| P1-1 | Logout fail-opentoken 失效失败也返回成功 | ✅ 已修复 | `Logout` 返回 `blacklistTokenClaims` 错误 |
| P1-2 | 多个 handler 的管理员判断读错 context key | ✅ 已修复 | 统一使用 `role_codes` 而非 `user_roles` |
| P1-3 | 修改密码接口与注释声明不一致 | ✅ 已修复 | `UpdatePassword``currentUserID != id && !IsAdmin` 检查 |
| P1-4 | 密码历史记录异步写入,事务不完整 | ✅ 已修复 | 改为同步事务内写入,错误回滚 |
| P1-5 | Avatar token 随机源错误未 fail-closed | ✅ 已修复 | `rand.Read` 错误已检查处理 |
---
## 验证结果(本轮)
### 后端构建基线
```bash
$ go build ./cmd/server
# exit 0 ✅
$ go vet ./...
# exit 0 ✅
$ go test ./... -count=1
# ok (全量通过) ✅
```
### 覆盖率
```bash
$ go test -coverprofile=/tmp/cover.out ./...
$ go tool cover -func=/tmp/cover.out | grep total
# total: 53.2% ✅ (较 52.4% 提升)
```
### 代码检查
- `go fmt`:通过
- `go mod tidy`:无漂移
---
## 四类闭环判断(更新)
### 8.1 实现闭环
**状态:✅ 已完成**
- 全部 P0 blocker 已修复
- 全部 P1 重要问题已修复
- TOTP 原子验证路径已补强
### 8.2 证据闭环
**状态:✅ 已完成**
- clean-state 构建基线全绿
- 后端测试全量通过
- 覆盖率有提升
### 8.3 文档真相闭环
**状态:✅ 已完成**
- 本文件记录了修复状态
- 关联 review 报告已归档
### 8.4 防复发闭环
**状态:⚠️ 部分完成**
- ✅ 关键权限路由已加 `RequirePermission` middleware
- ✅ TOTP 验证已绑定 password login challenge
- ✅ 未实现接口已改为 fail-closed (503)
- ✅ Bootstrap secret 已加恒定时间比较
- ✅ 密码历史已改为同步事务写入
- ⚠️ 建议:添加 `/users/:id` 权限回归测试到 CI
- ⚠️ 建议:添加 `temp_token` 过期/重用检测测试
---
## 最终评级(更新)
| 维度 | 原评级 | 当前评级 | 变化 |
|------|--------|----------|------|
| 需求 / 实现一致性 | C | B | ⬆️ |
| 安全基线 | D | B | ⬆️⬆️ |
| 构建与测试基线 | C | A | ⬆️⬆️ |
| 可维护性 | B- | B+ | ⬆️ |
| 文档真相 | C- | B | ⬆️⬆️ |
| **发布就绪度** | **D** | **B** | ⬆️⬆️ |
**综合评级B / 有条件就绪**
> 注:当前已达到"有条件就绪"状态,主要剩余工作为 P2 级别优化和测试覆盖率提升。
---
## 剩余工作(可选)
### P2 收口建议
1. 清理测试 warning 噪音
2. 补真实 API contract 集成测试
3. 更新 README / `docs/status/REAL_PROJECT_STATUS.md`
4. 覆盖率提升至 60%+
5. 前端 dev toolchain 漏洞升级vite
---
## 关联文档
- [review-fix-closure-2026-05-28.md](./review-fix-closure-2026-05-28.md) - 前两轮修复收口
- [HERMES_FULL_REVIEW_2026-05-27.md](./HERMES_FULL_REVIEW_2026-05-27.md) - 原始 review 报告
- [REVIEW_CONSOLIDATION_REPORT.md](../reviews/REVIEW_CONSOLIDATION_REPORT.md) - 专家 review 汇总
---
*文档生成时间2026-05-29*
*验证提交363c77d "feat: atomic TOTP verification for DisableTOTP"*

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# 管理员操作手册
本文档面向系统管理员,描述用户管理系统的日常运维操作。
---
## 1. 管理员账号
### 1.1 默认管理员
系统初始化后,通过以下方式创建第一个管理员:
```bash
# 调用 bootstrap 接口创建管理员
curl -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/auth/bootstrap-admin \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"username": "admin",
"password": "Admin@123456",
"email": "admin@example.com"
}'
```
**注意**:首次启动后必须立即修改默认密码。
### 1.2 管理员角色
管理员拥有系统所有权限:
- 用户管理(创建、编辑、删除、启用/禁用)
- 角色与权限管理
- 设备管理
- 登录日志查看
- 操作日志查看
- Webhook 管理
- 主题设置
---
## 2. 用户管理
### 2.1 用户列表
**路径**`GET /api/v1/users`
| 参数 | 类型 | 说明 |
|------|------|------|
| page | int | 页码(默认 1 |
| page_size | int | 每页数量(默认 20最大 100 |
| keyword | string | 按用户名/邮箱/手机号搜索 |
| status | int | 状态筛选1=正常0=禁用) |
### 2.2 创建用户
**路径**`POST /api/v1/users`
```json
{
"username": "john",
"email": "john@example.com",
"password": "SecurePass123!",
"nickname": "John Doe",
"phone": "13800138000"
}
```
### 2.3 编辑用户
**路径**`PUT /api/v1/users/:id`
可更新字段:`nickname``phone``status``email`
### 2.4 重置用户密码
**路径**`PUT /api/v1/users/:id/password`
```json
{
"new_password": "NewSecurePass123!"
}
```
管理员重置密码不需要原密码。
### 2.5 删除用户
**路径**`DELETE /api/v1/users/:id`
用户删除后不可恢复。
---
## 3. 角色与权限管理
### 3.1 预定义角色
系统预定义了以下角色:
| 角色代码 | 说明 |
|----------|------|
| admin | 系统管理员,拥有全部权限 |
| user | 普通用户,仅有基础权限 |
| operator | 运营人员,可管理用户和查看日志 |
### 3.2 创建自定义角色
**路径**`POST /api/v1/roles`
```json
{
"name": "内容审核员",
"code": "content_moderator",
"description": "负责内容审核",
"permissions": ["user:read", "user:update", "content:moderate"]
}
```
### 3.3 赋权
**路径**`POST /api/v1/users/:id/roles`
```json
{
"role_ids": [3, 5]
}
```
---
## 4. 设备管理
### 4.1 查看设备列表
**路径**`GET /api/v1/admin/devices`
| 参数 | 类型 | 说明 |
|------|------|------|
| page | int | 页码 |
| page_size | int | 每页数量 |
| user_id | int | 按用户筛选 |
| status | int | 设备状态0=禁用1=启用) |
### 4.2 设备信任管理
管理员可为用户信任设备:
- 信任设备在有效期内免二次验证TOTP
- 可设置信任时长30d / 90d / 180d
**路径**`POST /api/v1/devices/:id/trust`
```json
{
"trust_duration": "30d"
}
```
### 4.3 登出用户设备
**路径**`POST /api/v1/devices/logout-others`
通过 `X-Device-ID` header 指定当前设备,其他设备全部登出。
---
## 5. 日志查看
### 5.1 登录日志
**路径**`GET /api/v1/logs/login`
| 参数 | 类型 | 说明 |
|------|------|------|
| page | int | 页码 |
| page_size | int | 每页数量 |
| user_id | int | 筛选用户 |
| start_time | string | 开始时间RFC3339 |
| end_time | string | 结束时间RFC3339 |
### 5.2 操作日志
**路径**`GET /api/v1/logs/operations`
记录所有变更操作的审计日志。
---
## 6. 系统安全配置
### 6.1 密码策略
可通过 `PUT /api/v1/admin/settings` 修改:
| 配置项 | 说明 | 默认值 |
|--------|------|--------|
| password_min_length | 最小长度 | 8 |
| password_require_uppercase | 必须包含大写 | true |
| password_require_lowercase | 必须包含小写 | true |
| password_require_digit | 必须包含数字 | true |
| password_require_special | 必须包含特殊字符 | true |
### 6.2 登录安全
| 配置项 | 说明 | 默认值 |
|--------|------|--------|
| max_login_attempts | 连续失败锁定次数 | 5 |
| lockout_duration | 锁定时长(分钟) | 30 |
| session_timeout | 会话超时(小时) | 24 |
### 6.3 TOTP 两步验证
系统支持 TOTP 方式的二次验证Google Authenticator 等)。
管理员可强制要求用户启用 TOTP。
---
## 7. 常见运维操作
### 7.1 禁用用户登录
```bash
# 禁用用户
curl -X PUT http://localhost:8080/api/v1/users/123 \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <admin_token>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"status": 0}'
```
### 7.2 查看系统健康状态
```bash
# 健康检查
curl http://localhost:8080/health
# 就绪检查
curl http://localhost:8080/health/ready
# 存活检查
curl http://localhost:8080/health/live
```
### 7.3 强制登出用户
删除用户的会话令牌,使其中断当前会话。
---
## 8. 监控指标
系统暴露以下 Prometheus 格式指标:
| 指标名 | 说明 |
|--------|------|
| `http_requests_total` | HTTP 请求总数 |
| `http_request_duration_seconds` | 请求延迟分布 |
| `login_attempts_total` | 登录尝试次数 |
| `active_sessions_total` | 当前活跃会话数 |
| `db_query_duration_seconds` | 数据库查询延迟 |
---
## 9. 备份策略
参考 Runbook`docs/runbooks/05-备份恢复.md`
---
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# 配置参考手册
本文档描述 `configs/config.yaml` 各配置项的含义、默认值和生产环境建议。
---
## 1. server — 服务配置
| 配置项 | 类型 | 默认值 | 说明 |
|--------|------|--------|------|
| `port` | int | 8080 | HTTP 服务监听端口 |
| `mode` | string | release | 运行模式:`debug` / `release` |
| `read_timeout` | duration | 30s | 读取请求体的超时 |
| `read_header_timeout` | duration | 10s | 读取请求头的超时 |
| `write_timeout` | duration | 30s | 写入响应的超时 |
| `idle_timeout` | duration | 60s | 空闲连接保持时间 |
| `shutdown_timeout` | duration | 15s | 优雅停机的最大等待时间 |
| `max_header_bytes` | int | 1048576 | 请求头最大字节数 |
**生产建议**:若前端 CDN 缓存较多,可将 `cache-control` 等头设置较长,减少回源。
---
## 2. database — 数据库配置
### 2.1 通用
| 配置项 | 类型 | 默认值 | 说明 |
|--------|------|--------|------|
| `type` | string | sqlite | 数据库类型:`sqlite` / `postgresql` / `mysql` |
> ⚠️ 当前生产环境推荐使用 `postgresql`SQLite 仅适用于开发和小规模部署。
### 2.2 SQLite
| 配置项 | 类型 | 默认值 | 说明 |
|--------|------|--------|------|
| `path` | string | ./data/user_management.db | 数据库文件路径(相对于工作目录) |
### 2.3 PostgreSQL
| 配置项 | 类型 | 默认值 | 说明 |
|--------|------|--------|------|
| `host` | string | localhost | 数据库主机 |
| `port` | int | 5432 | 数据库端口 |
| `database` | string | user_management | 数据库名 |
| `username` | string | postgres | 用户名 |
| `password` | string | "" | 密码(生产必须通过环境变量设置) |
| `ssl_mode` | string | disable | SSL 模式:`disable` / `require` / `verify-ca` / `verify-full` |
| `max_open_conns` | int | 100 | 最大打开连接数 |
| `max_idle_conns` | int | 10 | 最大空闲连接数 |
**生产建议**
- `ssl_mode` 至少设为 `require`
- 生产密码必须通过 `DB_PASSWORD` 环境变量注入,不要写在配置文件中
- 高并发场景建议 `max_open_conns = 200~500`
### 2.4 MySQL
| 配置项 | 类型 | 默认值 | 说明 |
|--------|------|--------|------|
| `host` | string | localhost | 数据库主机 |
| `port` | int | 3306 | 数据库端口 |
| `database` | string | user_management | 数据库名 |
| `username` | string | root | 用户名 |
| `password` | string | "" | 密码(生产必须通过环境变量) |
| `charset` | string | utf8mb4 | 字符集(必须使用 utf8mb4 |
| `max_open_conns` | int | 100 | 最大打开连接数 |
| `max_idle_conns` | int | 10 | 最大空闲连接数 |
---
## 3. cache — 缓存配置
### 3.1 L1 缓存(内存)
| 配置项 | 类型 | 默认值 | 说明 |
|--------|------|--------|------|
| `enabled` | bool | true | 是否启用 L1 缓存 |
| `max_size` | int | 10000 | 最大缓存条目数 |
| `ttl` | duration | 5m | 缓存条目 TTL |
### 3.2 L2 缓存Redis
| 配置项 | 类型 | 默认值 | 说明 |
|--------|------|--------|------|
| `enabled` | bool | false | 是否启用 Redis L2 缓存 |
| `type` | string | redis | 缓存类型(仅支持 redis |
| `redis.addr` | string | localhost:6379 | Redis 地址 |
| `redis.password` | string | "" | Redis 密码 |
| `redis.db` | int | 0 | Redis DB 编号 |
| `redis.pool_size` | int | 50 | 连接池大小 |
| `redis.ttl` | duration | 30m | 缓存 TTL |
**生产建议**:高并发场景建议启用 Redis L2 缓存,并设置合理的 `pool_size`
---
## 4. jwt — JWT 配置
| 配置项 | 类型 | 默认值 | 说明 |
|--------|------|--------|------|
| `algorithm` | string | HS256 | 签名算法:`HS256`debug/ `RS256`(生产推荐) |
| `secret` | string | "" | HMAC 签名密钥(生产必须设置) |
| `access_token_expire_minutes` | int | 120 | Access Token 有效期(分钟) |
| `refresh_token_expire_days` | int | 7 | Refresh Token 有效期(天) |
**生产建议**
- 生产环境建议使用 `RS256`RSA 密钥对),不要使用共享密钥
- `JWT_SECRET` 环境变量必须设置强随机字符串(至少 32 字节)
- Access Token 建议 30~120 分钟
- Refresh Token 建议 7~30 天
---
## 5. security — 安全配置
| 配置项 | 类型 | 默认值 | 说明 |
|--------|------|--------|------|
| `password_min_length` | int | 8 | 密码最小长度 |
| `password_require_special` | bool | true | 必须包含特殊字符 |
| `password_require_number` | bool | true | 必须包含数字 |
| `login_max_attempts` | int | 5 | 连续登录失败锁定次数 |
| `login_lock_duration` | duration | 30m | 账户锁定时长 |
---
## 6. ratelimit — 限流配置
所有限流均可独立开启/关闭。算法说明:
- `token_bucket`:令牌桶,适合突发流量
- `leaky_bucket`:漏桶,输出速率恒定
- `sliding_window`:滑动窗口,统计最平滑
### 6.1 登录限流
| 配置项 | 类型 | 默认值 | 说明 |
|--------|------|--------|------|
| `enabled` | bool | true | 是否启用 |
| `algorithm` | string | token_bucket | 限流算法 |
| `capacity` | int | 5 | 令牌桶容量(即 burst 上限) |
| `rate` | int | 1 | 每窗口补充令牌数 |
| `window` | duration | 1m | 统计窗口 |
### 6.2 注册限流
| 配置项 | 类型 | 默认值 | 说明 |
|--------|------|--------|------|
| `enabled` | bool | true | 是否启用 |
| `algorithm` | string | leaky_bucket | 限流算法 |
| `capacity` | int | 3 | 桶容量 |
| `rate` | int | 1 | 输出速率 |
| `window` | duration | 1h | 统计窗口 |
### 6.3 API 通用限流
| 配置项 | 类型 | 默认值 | 说明 |
|--------|------|--------|------|
| `enabled` | bool | true | 是否启用 |
| `algorithm` | string | sliding_window | 限流算法 |
| `capacity` | int | 1000 | 窗口内最大请求数 |
| `window` | duration | 1m | 统计窗口 |
---
## 7. monitoring — 监控配置
### 7.1 Prometheus 指标
| 配置项 | 类型 | 默认值 | 说明 |
|--------|------|--------|------|
| `enabled` | bool | true | 是否启用 Prometheus 指标 |
| `path` | string | /metrics | 指标暴露路径 |
### 7.2 分布式追踪
| 配置项 | 类型 | 默认值 | 说明 |
|--------|------|--------|------|
| `enabled` | bool | false | 是否启用追踪 |
| `endpoint` | string | localhost:4318 | OTLP gRPC 接收端点 |
| `service_name` | string | user-management-system | 服务名(用于链路关联) |
**生产建议**:接入 Jaeger 或 Zipkin 时启用追踪。
---
## 8. logging — 日志配置
| 配置项 | 类型 | 默认值 | 说明 |
|--------|------|--------|------|
| `level` | string | info | 日志级别:`debug` / `info` / `warn` / `error` |
| `format` | string | json | 日志格式:`json`(生产)/ `text`(开发) |
| `output` | []string | stdout, ./logs/app.log | 日志输出目标 |
| `rotation.max_size` | int | 100 | 单文件最大 MB |
| `rotation.max_age` | int | 30 | 保留天数 |
| `rotation.max_backups` | int | 10 | 保留文件数 |
---
## 9. cors — 跨域配置
| 配置项 | 类型 | 默认值 | 说明 |
|--------|------|--------|------|
| `enabled` | bool | true | 是否启用 CORS |
| `allowed_origins` | []string | localhost:3000 | 允许的来源(生产必须精确配置) |
| `allowed_methods` | []string | GET,POST,PUT,DELETE,OPTIONS | 允许的方法 |
| `allowed_headers` | []string | 见 config.yaml | 允许的请求头 |
| `allow_credentials` | bool | true | 是否允许携带凭证 |
| `max_age` | int | 3600 | 预检请求缓存时间(秒) |
> ⚠️ **生产禁止**将 `*` 与 `allow_credentials: true` 同时使用CORS 规范不允许,会被浏览器拒绝)。
---
## 10. email — 邮件配置
| 配置项 | 类型 | 默认值 | 说明 |
|--------|------|--------|------|
| `host` | string | "" | SMTP 主机 |
| `port` | int | 587 | SMTP 端口TLS587SSL465 |
| `username` | string | "" | 用户名 |
| `password` | string | "" | 密码(生产通过环境变量) |
| `from_email` | string | "" | 发件人地址 |
| `from_name` | string | 用户管理系统 | 发件人名称 |
**生产建议**:使用企业邮箱(如 SendGrid、Mailgun或自建 SMTP。
---
## 11. sms — 短信配置
| 配置项 | 类型 | 默认值 | 说明 |
|--------|------|--------|------|
| `enabled` | bool | false | 是否启用短信功能 |
| `provider` | string | "" | 提供商:`aliyun` / `tencent`,留空禁用 |
| `code_ttl` | duration | 5m | 验证码有效期 |
| `resend_cooldown` | duration | 1m | 再次发送的冷却时间 |
| `max_daily_limit` | int | 10 | 单号码每日发送上限 |
### 11.1 阿里云
| 配置项 | 说明 |
|--------|------|
| `access_key_id` | 阿里云 AccessKey ID |
| `access_key_secret` | 阿里云 AccessKey Secret |
| `sign_name` | 短信签名 |
| `template_code` | 短信模板 CODE |
### 11.2 腾讯云
| 配置项 | 说明 |
|--------|------|
| `secret_id` | 腾讯云 Secret ID |
| `secret_key` | 腾讯云 Secret Key |
| `app_id` | 短信 SDK App ID |
| `sign_name` | 短信签名 |
| `template_id` | 模板 ID |
---
## 12. oauth — 社交登录配置
| Provider | 配置项 | 说明 |
|----------|--------|------|
| 通用 | `client_id` | 应用 Client ID |
| 通用 | `client_secret` | 应用 Client Secret生产通过环境变量 |
| 通用 | `redirect_url` | OAuth 回调地址(生产必须使用 HTTPS |
| Google | — | 支持 Google 账号登录 |
| GitHub | — | 支持 GitHub 账号登录 |
| WeChat | — | 支持微信账号登录 |
| QQ | — | 支持 QQ 账号登录 |
| 支付宝 | — | 支持支付宝账号登录 |
| 抖音 | — | 支持抖音账号登录 |
> ⚠️ 所有 OAuth 回调地址必须使用 HTTPS禁止在生产环境使用 HTTP。
---
## 13. webhook — Webhook 配置
| 配置项 | 类型 | 默认值 | 说明 |
|--------|------|--------|------|
| `enabled` | bool | true | 是否启用 Webhook |
| `secret_header` | string | X-Webhook-Signature | 签名验证 Header 名 |
| `timeout_sec` | int | 30 | 单次投递超时(秒) |
| `max_retries` | int | 3 | 最大重试次数 |
| `retry_backoff` | string | exponential | 退避策略:`exponential` / `fixed` |
| `worker_count` | int | 4 | 后台投递协程数 |
| `queue_size` | int | 1000 | 投递队列大小 |
---
## 14. ip_security — IP 安全配置
| 配置项 | 类型 | 默认值 | 说明 |
|--------|------|--------|------|
| `auto_block_enabled` | bool | true | 是否启用自动封禁 |
| `auto_block_duration` | duration | 30m | 封禁时长 |
| `brute_force_threshold` | int | 10 | 暴力破解判定阈值(窗口内失败次数) |
| `detection_window` | duration | 15m | 检测时间窗口 |
---
## 15. password_reset — 密码重置配置
| 配置项 | 类型 | 默认值 | 说明 |
|--------|------|--------|------|
| `token_ttl` | duration | 15m | 重置令牌有效期 |
| `site_url` | string | http://localhost:8080 | 前端站点 URL用于构造邮件链接 |
---
## 环境变量优先级
配置项中包含敏感信息的字段,支持通过环境变量覆盖:
| 配置项 | 环境变量 |
|--------|----------|
| `jwt.secret` | `JWT_SECRET` |
| `database.postgresql.password` | `DB_PASSWORD` |
| `database.mysql.password` | `DB_PASSWORD` |
| `redis.password` | `REDIS_PASSWORD` |
| `email.password` | `SMTP_PASSWORD` |
| `jwt.algorithm`(生产) | `JWT_ALGORITHM` |
| `oauth.*.client_secret` | 各 Provider 的 `CLIENT_SECRET` |
> 环境变量优先级高于配置文件,用于生产密钥注入。
---
*最后更新2026-05-10*

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# 健康检查与监控指南
本文档描述系统健康检查端点、Prometheus 监控指标和告警规则。
---
## 1. 健康检查端点
系统提供三个健康检查端点,适用于不同场景:
| 端点 | 路径 | 说明 | 使用场景 |
|------|------|------|----------|
| 存活探针 | `/health/live` | 确认进程存活 | Kubernetes `livenessProbe` |
| 就绪探针 | `/health/ready` | 确认服务就绪 | Kubernetes `readinessProbe` |
| 健康检查 | `/health` | 综合健康状态 | 负载均衡器、健康检查脚本 |
### 1.1 响应格式
```json
{
"status": "ok",
"timestamp": "2026-05-10T13:00:00Z",
"version": "1.0.0"
}
```
### 1.2 响应码
| 状态 | HTTP 响应码 | 说明 |
|------|-------------|------|
| ok | 200 | 服务正常 |
| degraded | 200 | 服务降级(部分依赖不可用,如 Redis |
| unhealthy | 503 | 服务不健康(如数据库不可达) |
---
## 2. Prometheus 监控指标
### 2.1 暴露方式
指标端点:`GET /metrics`
返回 Prometheus 格式文本。
### 2.2 核心指标
#### HTTP 指标
| 指标名 | 类型 | 标签 | 说明 |
|--------|------|------|------|
| `http_requests_total` | Counter | method, path, status | HTTP 请求总数 |
| `http_request_duration_seconds` | Histogram | method, path | 请求延迟分布 |
#### 认证指标
| 指标名 | 类型 | 标签 | 说明 |
|--------|------|------|------|
| `login_attempts_total` | Counter | result, method | 登录尝试次数(成功/失败) |
| `active_sessions_total` | Gauge | — | 当前活跃会话数 |
| `refresh_tokens_total` | Counter | — | Token 刷新次数 |
#### 数据库指标
| 指标名 | 类型 | 标签 | 说明 |
|--------|------|------|------|
| `db_query_duration_seconds` | Histogram | operation, table | 数据库查询延迟 |
| `db_connections_open` | Gauge | type | 当前打开的连接数 |
| `db_connections_in_use` | Gauge | type | 使用中的连接数 |
#### 缓存指标
| 指标名 | 类型 | 标签 | 说明 |
|--------|------|------|------|
| `cache_hits_total` | Counter | cache_level | 缓存命中次数 |
| `cache_misses_total` | Counter | cache_level | 缓存未命中次数 |
| `cache_operations_total` | Counter | operation | 缓存操作总数 |
#### 限流指标
| 指标名 | 类型 | 标签 | 说明 |
|--------|------|------|------|
| `ratelimit_rejections_total` | Counter | endpoint, algorithm | 限流拦截次数 |
### 2.3 查看当前指标
```bash
curl http://localhost:8080/metrics
```
---
## 3. 告警规则
### 3.1 建议的告警规则Prometheus / Alertmanager 格式)
```yaml
groups:
- name: user-management
rules:
# 服务不可用
- alert: ServiceDown
expr: up{job="user-management"} == 0
for: 1m
labels:
severity: critical
annotations:
summary: "用户管理服务不可用"
# 错误率过高
- alert: HighErrorRate
expr: |
rate(http_requests_total{status=~"5.."}[5m]) /
rate(http_requests_total[5m]) > 0.05
for: 5m
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: "HTTP 5xx 错误率超过 5%"
# 登录失败率过高(可能暴力破解)
- alert: HighLoginFailureRate
expr: |
rate(login_attempts_total{result="fail"}[5m]) /
rate(login_attempts_total[5m]) > 0.8
for: 5m
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: "登录失败率超过 80%,可能存在暴力破解"
# 响应延迟过高
- alert: HighLatency
expr: |
histogram_quantile(0.99,
rate(http_request_duration_seconds_bucket[5m])) > 1
for: 5m
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: "P99 响应延迟超过 1 秒"
# 数据库连接池耗尽
- alert: DatabaseConnectionPoolExhausted
expr: db_connections_in_use / db_connections_open > 0.9
for: 5m
labels:
severity: critical
annotations:
summary: "数据库连接池使用率超过 90%"
# 活跃会话数异常下降
- alert: ActiveSessionsDropped
expr: |
active_sessions_total < 10
and
delta(active_sessions_total[10m]) < -5
for: 5m
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: "活跃会话数急剧下降"
# 限流拦截频繁
- alert: RateLimitRejectionsHigh
expr: |
rate(ratelimit_rejections_total[5m]) > 10
for: 5m
labels:
severity: warning
annotations:
summary: "限流拦截频率过高"
```
---
## 4. Grafana 看板
建议导入以下看板配置:
### 4.1 核心看板指标
**Overview 看板**
- 请求率QPS
- P50/P90/P99 延迟
- 错误率
- 活跃会话数
**Auth 看板**
- 登录尝试(成功/失败)
- Token 刷新次数
- 活跃会话趋势
- TOTP 启用率
**Database 看板**
- 查询延迟 P99
- 连接池使用率
- 慢查询数量
**Cache 看板**
- 命中率
- 未命中率
- L1/L2 缓存对比
---
## 5. 日志关键字监控
建议在日志收集系统(如 Loki/ELK中配置以下关键字告警
| 关键字 | 严重程度 | 说明 |
|--------|----------|------|
| `auth: increment login attempts failed` | warning | Redis/L1 缓存不可用 |
| `goroutine leak` | critical | 潜在的 goroutine 泄漏 |
| `token blacklisted but refresh failed` | critical | Token 黑名单写入失败 |
| `password reset code replay` | warning | 可能存在验证码重放 |
| `temporary login token cleanup failed` | warning | 临时令牌清理失败 |
| `cache.Set failed` | warning | 缓存写入失败 |
| `failed to send email` | warning | 邮件发送失败 |
---
## 6. 健康检查脚本示例
```bash
#!/bin/bash
# health_check.sh — 服务健康检查脚本
HEALTH_URL="http://localhost:8080/health"
READY_URL="http://localhost:8080/health/ready"
METRICS_URL="http://localhost:8080/metrics"
check_endpoint() {
local url=$1
local name=$2
local status=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "$url")
if [ "$status" -eq 200 ]; then
echo "[OK] $name: $status"
return 0
else
echo "[FAIL] $name: $status"
return 1
fi
}
# 执行检查
failed=0
check_endpoint "$HEALTH_URL" "Health" || failed=$((failed + 1))
check_endpoint "$READY_URL" "Ready" || failed=$((failed + 1))
# 检查 Prometheus 指标端点
status=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "$METRICS_URL")
if [ "$status" -eq 200 ]; then
echo "[OK] Metrics: $status"
else
echo "[WARN] Metrics: $status"
fi
# 检查数据库连接(通过日志)
if grep -q "database opened" logs/app.log 2>/dev/null; then
echo "[OK] Database: connected"
else
echo "[FAIL] Database: not connected"
failed=$((failed + 1))
fi
exit $failed
```
---
## 7. Kubernetes 部署配置示例
```yaml
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
spec:
template:
spec:
containers:
- name: user-management
livenessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /health/live
port: 8080
initialDelaySeconds: 10
periodSeconds: 15
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 3
readinessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /health/ready
port: 8080
initialDelaySeconds: 5
periodSeconds: 10
timeoutSeconds: 3
failureThreshold: 3
ports:
- name: http
containerPort: 8080
- name: metrics
containerPort: 9090
resources:
requests:
memory: "256Mi"
cpu: "200m"
limits:
memory: "1Gi"
cpu: "1000m"
```
---
*最后更新2026-05-10*

View File

@@ -99,8 +99,6 @@ cd D:\project\frontend\admin
npm.cmd run e2e:full:win
```
> 若本机 `3000` 端口并非当前 admin Vite dev server例如被 Gitea、Grafana 等其他服务占用),请显式设置 `E2E_BASE_URL` 指向真实前端地址。`run-playwright-cdp-e2e.mjs` 默认假设前端运行在 `http://127.0.0.1:3000`,并会在命中错误站点时 fail-fast 给出提示。
当前覆盖:
- `login-surface`

253
docs/guides/USER_GUIDE.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,253 @@
# 用户操作手册
本文档面向普通用户,描述用户管理系统的使用方法。
---
## 1. 注册与登录
### 1.1 注册账号
**路径**`POST /api/v1/auth/register`
```json
{
"username": "yourname",
"password": "SecurePass123!",
"email": "you@example.com"
}
```
**密码要求**
- 最少 8 位
- 必须包含大写字母
- 必须包含小写字母
- 必须包含数字
- 必须包含特殊字符(`!@#$%^&*` 等)
### 1.2 登录
**路径**`POST /api/v1/auth/login`
```json
{
"account": "yourname",
"password": "SecurePass123!",
"device_id": "your-device-id"
}
```
返回的响应中包含:
- `access_token` — API 访问令牌(内存存储,不要持久化)
- `refresh_token` — 刷新令牌(用于续期 access_token
- `expires_in` — access_token 有效期(秒)
### 1.3 登录安全验证
如果账户开启了 TOTP 两步验证,登录后会返回:
```json
{
"requires_totp": true,
"temp_token": "xxx",
"user_id": 123
}
```
此时需要完成 TOTP 验证:
**路径**`POST /api/v1/auth/login/totp-verify`
```json
{
"user_id": 123,
"code": "123456",
"device_id": "your-device-id",
"temp_token": "xxx"
}
```
---
## 2. 账户安全
### 2.1 修改密码
**路径**`PUT /api/v1/auth/password`
```json
{
"old_password": "OldPass123!",
"new_password": "NewPass456!"
}
```
**注意**:修改密码会使除当前设备外的所有会话失效。
### 2.2 忘记密码
**路径**`POST /api/v1/auth/password/forgot`
```json
{
"email": "you@example.com"
}
```
系统会向邮箱发送重置链接。
### 2.3 设置 TOTP 两步验证
**步骤 1**:请求 TOTP 绑定信息
**路径**`POST /api/v1/auth/totp/setup`
返回二维码和密钥。使用 Google Authenticator 或其他 TOTP 应用扫描。
**步骤 2**:启用 TOTP
**路径**`POST /api/v1/auth/totp/enable`
```json
{
"code": "123456"
}
```
启用后,下次登录需要输入 TOTP 验证码。
### 2.4 禁用 TOTP
**路径**`POST /api/v1/auth/totp/disable`
```json
{
"code": "123456"
}
```
### 2.5 恢复码
首次启用 TOPT 时,系统会提供一组恢复码。
**用途**:当 TOTP 设备丢失时,使用恢复码恢复登录。
**保存建议**:将恢复码打印或手写保存到安全位置,切勿截图或保存到云端。
---
## 3. 设备管理
### 3.1 查看我的设备
**路径**`GET /api/v1/devices`
返回当前账户下所有已登录设备列表。
### 3.2 查看信任设备
**路径**`GET /api/v1/devices/trusted`
返回已标记为信任的设备列表。信任设备在有效期内免 TOTP 验证。
### 3.3 信任当前设备
**路径**`POST /api/v1/devices/trust`
将当前设备标记为信任设备。
**注意**:需要在设备详情中查看设备 ID。
### 3.4 取消设备信任
**路径**`DELETE /api/v1/devices/:id/trust`
### 3.5 登出其他设备
**路径**`POST /api/v1/devices/logout-others`
将除当前设备外的所有其他设备登出。
Header 中需要指定当前设备:`X-Device-ID: your-device-id`
---
## 4. 个人资料
### 4.1 查看个人资料
**路径**`GET /api/v1/auth/userinfo`
### 4.2 更新个人资料
**路径**`PUT /api/v1/users/profile`
```json
{
"nickname": "Your Name",
"phone": "13800138000"
}
```
### 4.3 上传头像
**路径**`POST /api/v1/users/:id/avatar`
支持的格式JPEG、PNG、GIF、WebP
最大文件大小5MB
---
## 5. Token 刷新
Access Token 有效期较短,过期后需要使用 Refresh Token 续期:
**路径**`POST /api/v1/auth/refresh`
```json
{
"refresh_token": "your_refresh_token"
}
```
返回新的 access_token 和 refresh_token。
---
## 6. 账户注销
**路径**`DELETE /api/v1/users/account`
注销后所有数据将被永久删除,不可恢复。
---
## 7. API 认证
所有需要认证的 API在请求 Header 中添加:
```
Authorization: Bearer <access_token>
```
示例:
```bash
curl http://localhost:8080/api/v1/auth/userinfo \
-H "Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9..."
```
---
## 8. 错误代码
| 代码 | 说明 |
|------|------|
| 400 | 请求参数错误 |
| 401 | 未认证或 Token 已过期 |
| 403 | 无权限 |
| 404 | 资源不存在 |
| 429 | 请求过于频繁(触发限流) |
| 500 | 服务器内部错误 |
---
*最后更新2026-05-10*

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@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
# Report v6 Blocking Fixes Implementation Plan
> **For agentic workers:** REQUIRED SUB-SKILL: Use superpowers:subagent-driven-development (recommended) or superpowers:executing-plans to implement this plan task-by-task. Steps use checkbox (`- [ ]`) syntax for tracking.
**Goal:** 修复 `FULL_CODE_REVIEW_REPORT_2026-04-20.md` 中当前阻塞上线的认证、授权和假成功问题,并为每项修复补齐回归验证。
**Architecture:** 以后端授权和认证闭环为主,优先通过测试锁定期望行为,再做最小实现修改。每个批次修复后运行受影响测试集,最后跑完整后端/前端门禁。
**Tech Stack:** Go, Gin, GORM, React, Vitest, PowerShell, Git
---
### Task 1: 锁定 TOTP 二阶段登录闭环
**Files:**
- Modify: `internal/service/auth.go`
- Modify: `internal/api/handler/auth_handler.go`
- Modify: `frontend/admin/src/services/auth.ts`
- Modify: `frontend/admin/src/types/auth.ts`
- Test: `internal/service/auth_social_test.go`
- Test: `internal/api/handler/auth_handler_test.go`
- [ ] **Step 1: 写服务层失败测试**
- [ ] **Step 2: 运行服务层测试确认当前允许无首因子直接换 token**
- [ ] **Step 3: 实现临时登录态或 challenge 约束**
- [ ] **Step 4: 写 handler/前端契约测试**
- [ ] **Step 5: 运行受影响测试并确认通过**
### Task 2: 修复设备接口 IDOR
**Files:**
- Modify: `internal/api/handler/device_handler.go`
- Modify: `internal/service/device.go`
- Test: `internal/api/handler/device_handler_test.go`
- Test: `internal/service/device_service_test.go`
- [ ] **Step 1: 写失败测试覆盖跨用户读取/修改/删除/信任设备**
- [ ] **Step 2: 运行测试确认当前越权成立**
- [ ] **Step 3: 在 handler 和 service 层补 owner/admin 双层校验**
- [ ] **Step 4: 运行受影响测试并确认通过**
### Task 3: 修复修改密码接口授权模型
**Files:**
- Modify: `internal/api/handler/user_handler.go`
- Modify: `internal/service/user_service.go`
- Test: `internal/api/handler/user_handler_test.go`
- [ ] **Step 1: 写失败测试覆盖非本人访问 `/users/:id/password`**
- [ ] **Step 2: 运行测试确认当前缺口存在**
- [ ] **Step 3: 增加 self-or-admin 校验并明确管理员重置策略**
- [ ] **Step 4: 运行受影响测试并确认通过**
### Task 4: 清理 `user_roles` 到 `role_codes` 协议漂移
**Files:**
- Modify: `internal/api/handler/user_handler.go`
- Modify: `internal/api/handler/avatar_handler.go`
- Test: `internal/api/handler/user_handler_test.go`
- Test: `internal/api/handler/avatar_handler_test.go`
- [ ] **Step 1: 写失败测试覆盖管理员跨用户操作被误拒绝**
- [ ] **Step 2: 运行测试确认当前回归存在**
- [ ] **Step 3: 统一读取 `role_codes` 或复用 RBAC helper**
- [ ] **Step 4: 运行受影响测试并确认通过**
### Task 5: 去掉 OAuth 假成功响应
**Files:**
- Modify: `internal/api/handler/auth_handler.go`
- Test: `internal/api/handler/auth_handler_test.go`
- [ ] **Step 1: 写失败测试覆盖 OAuth provider 列表与入口行为**
- [ ] **Step 2: 运行测试确认 handler 当前没有调用 service**
- [ ] **Step 3: 改成真实 service 分发或显式错误返回**
- [ ] **Step 4: 运行受影响测试并确认通过**
### Task 6: 全量回归与提交流程
**Files:**
- Modify: `docs/code-review/FULL_CODE_REVIEW_REPORT_2026-04-20.md`
- Modify: `docs/status/REAL_PROJECT_STATUS.md`
- [ ] **Step 1: 更新报告中已修复项和剩余风险**
- [ ] **Step 2: 运行完整后端/前端门禁**
- [ ] **Step 3: 检查 git diff 与工作区状态**
- [ ] **Step 4: 按逻辑批次提交**
- [ ] **Step 5: 推送远程分支**

View File

@@ -1,198 +0,0 @@
# user-system review 修复收口2026-05-28
## 结论
本轮已完成 review 报告相关最高优先级前端/E2E blocker 修复并完成后端、前端、E2E 三层验证。
当前状态:
- 最高优先级 blocker已修复
- Go 全量测试:通过
- 前端全量测试通过82 files, 522 tests
- Playwright CDP 全链路 E2E通过
## 本轮修复项
### 1. 会话恢复 / refresh 竞态
- 问题:`AuthProvider` 初始恢复会话与 HTTP client 401 重试路径会并发触发 `/auth/refresh`,在 refresh token 轮换模型下导致 `401`
- 修复:前端改为共享 single-flight refresh。
- 涉及文件:
- `frontend/admin/src/lib/http/client.ts`
- `frontend/admin/src/services/auth.ts`
- `frontend/admin/src/services/auth.test.ts`
### 2. 用户列表响应结构漂移
- 问题:后端 `/users` 返回 `{ users, total, limit, offset }`,前端只按 `items` 读取,导致页面空表。
- 修复:增加 users 列表 normalize兼容 `items/users``page_size/limit/offset`
- 涉及文件:
- `frontend/admin/src/services/users.ts`
- `frontend/admin/src/services/users.test.ts`
### 3. Webhooks 列表响应结构漂移
- 问题Webhooks 页加载时报 `Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'map')`
- 修复:兼容 `data/items/webhooks` 多种列表包裹形状。
- 涉及文件:
- `frontend/admin/src/services/webhooks.ts`
- `frontend/admin/src/services/webhooks.test.ts`
### 4. Social accounts 响应结构漂移
- 问题ProfileSecurityPage 报 `socialAccounts.map is not a function`
- 修复:兼容 `array/items/accounts/social_accounts` 形状。
- 涉及文件:
- `frontend/admin/src/services/social-accounts.ts`
- `frontend/admin/src/services/social-accounts.test.ts`
### 5. Playwright CDP E2E harness 漂移
- 修复点包括:
- refresh token 断言从可读 cookie 改为 HttpOnly cookie / session presence 真相
- `创建用员` 文案 typo
- responsive 场景后 viewport 未恢复
- drawer 选择器 strict mode 冲突
- delete confirm 由 modal 漂移为 popconfirm
- 菜单分组/路由漂移设备、审计日志、Webhooks、profile/security
- 多处页面断言从宽文本改为更稳定选择器
- 涉及文件:
- `frontend/admin/scripts/run-playwright-cdp-e2e.mjs`
- `frontend/admin/scripts/run-playwright-auth-e2e.sh`
### 6. E2E 限流误伤
- 问题:测试流量触发 API rate limit导致后续场景误报。
- 修复:为 E2E backend 增加 `DISABLE_RATE_LIMIT=1` 开关,仅用于测试启动脚本。
- 涉及文件:
- `internal/api/middleware/ratelimit.go`
- `frontend/admin/scripts/run-playwright-auth-e2e.sh`
### 7. 内存限流器全局误伤与条目泄漏风险
- 问题:`internal/api/middleware/ratelimit.go` 之前按 endpoint 只创建单一 limiter导致同一接口上的所有用户共享一个桶同时缺少空闲条目清理策略无法对历史 client key 做收敛。
- 修复:改为按 `endpoint + user_id/IP` 分桶,并在访问路径上按 TTL 清理长期空闲的 limiter 条目。
- 回归测试:
- 不同 IP 的登录限流相互独立
- 共享 IP 下不同 `user_id` 的 API 限流相互独立
- 空闲 limiter 会被清理,不再无限累积
- 涉及文件:
- `internal/api/middleware/ratelimit.go`
- `internal/api/middleware/ratelimit_test.go`
### 8. handler context 类型断言补强
- 问题:`SSOHandler``WebhookHandler` 仍存在 `user_id.(int64)` / `username.(string)` 直接断言,若 middleware 注入异常类型会触发 panic。
- 修复:统一复用 `getUserIDFromContext` / `getUsernameFromContext`,类型不匹配时返回 `401 unauthorized`,避免 handler panic。
- 回归测试:
- `SSOHandler.Authorize` 非法 context 类型返回 `401`
- `SSOHandler.UserInfo` 非法 context 类型返回 `401`
- `WebhookHandler.CreateWebhook/ListWebhooks` 非法 context 类型返回 `401`
- 涉及文件:
- `internal/api/handler/auth_handler.go`
- `internal/api/handler/sso_handler.go`
- `internal/api/handler/webhook_handler.go`
- `internal/api/handler/context_guard_test.go`
### 9. 密码强度 + 静默错误补强
- 问题review 报告中指出两类尾部问题:
- 默认密码校验对刚好达到最小长度的短密码过于宽松
- TOTP / 操作日志链路存在 `_ = err``_ = json.Unmarshal(...)``_ = repo.Create(...)` 这类静默吞错
- 修复:
- `validatePasswordStrength` 改为对“刚好达到最小长度”的密码要求至少 3 种字符类型;较长密码仍保留 2 种类型可过的兼容行为
- `TOTPService` 对恢复码摘要、JSON 编解码、`UpdateTOTP` 持久化失败全部显式返回错误,不再静默忽略
- `OperationLogMiddleware` 对 nil repo fail-safe 返回;异步落库失败改为写日志,不再无声吞错
- 回归测试:
- 8 位两类字符密码被拒绝8 位三类字符密码通过,较长两类字符密码仍通过
- 损坏的恢复码 JSON 会返回解析错误
- 恢复码消费后持久化失败会显式返回更新错误
- operation log 在 nil repo 情况下不会 panic参数脱敏/非 JSON fallback 继续受测
- 涉及文件:
- `internal/service/auth.go`
- `internal/service/auth_service_test.go`
- `internal/service/auth_password_internal_test.go`
- `internal/service/totp.go`
- `internal/service/totp_internal_test.go`
- `internal/api/middleware/operation_log.go`
- `internal/api/middleware/operation_log_test.go`
### 10. review 报告真相校准 + avatar 路径硬化
- 真相校准:`PROJECT_REVIEW_REPORT.md` 中一批条目已不再代表当前仓库真相,至少包括:
- `uploadAvatar` 字段名错误:前后端当前都使用 `avatar`,该条为陈旧误报
- `StateManager` 无法停止、`L1Cache` 无容量限制、密码强度过宽松、操作日志未转义、Webhooks 客户端全量分页、`ContactBindingsSection` 未复用:均已在后续提交中关闭
- 本轮额外修复:
- 将头像上传目录从运行时相对路径解析改为绝对路径归一化,避免 cwd 漂移导致文件落盘位置不稳定
- 扩展名校验统一转小写,避免 `.JPG/.PNG` 这类常见文件名被误拒
- 回归测试:
- `resolveAvatarUploadDir("")` 返回绝对路径且收敛到 `/uploads/avatars`
- 自定义根目录会被保留并归一化到 `<root>/avatars`
- 涉及文件:
- `internal/api/handler/avatar_handler.go`
- `internal/api/handler/avatar_handler_path_test.go`
### 11. ApiResponse 空值建模校准
- 问题:`frontend/admin/src/types/http.ts` 之前把 `ApiResponse.data` 固定定义为 `T`,但真实后端在成功/失败分支都可能返回 `data: null`,导致类型真相偏乐观。
- 修复:
-`ApiResponse<T>.data` 调整为 `T | null`
- 增加编译期契约文件,锁定“成功响应也允许 `data: null`”这一事实
- 保持 HTTP client 对现有 service 调用面的兼容,不扩大本轮到全仓空值治理
- 回归验证:
- 新增成功响应 `data: null` 的 client 单测
- `npm run build` 编译通过,证明类型契约与实现一致
- 涉及文件:
- `frontend/admin/src/types/http.ts`
- `frontend/admin/src/types/http.typecheck.ts`
- `frontend/admin/src/lib/http/client.ts`
- `frontend/admin/src/lib/http/client.test.ts`
### 12. AuthProvider 状态收敛
- 问题:`AuthProvider` 之前同时依赖 React state 和 `auth-session` 模块读路径;当 `roles` 本地 state 为空时,会在 render 期间回退读取模块态,导致 provider 显示结果会被外部 store 漂移污染。
- 修复:
- 移除 render 阶段对 `getCurrentUser()/getCurrentRoles()` 的回退读取,改为以 provider 本地 state 为唯一展示真相
- 抽出 `applyAuthState / clearLocalAuthState / persistSessionUser / persistSessionRoles / loadRolesForUser`,收敛重复的登录、刷新、恢复逻辑
- `refreshUser` 失败时不再清空当前已登录视图状态,避免短暂 `/auth/userinfo` 失败导致 UI 假登出
- 回归验证:
- 新增用例:挂载后模块 store 变更不会再漂移污染 provider 的 `roles`
- `AuthProvider` 定向测试全绿
- 前端 full test 与真实浏览器 E2E 全绿,证明会话/导航主链路未回归
- 涉及文件:
- `frontend/admin/src/app/providers/AuthProvider.tsx`
- `frontend/admin/src/app/providers/AuthProvider.test.tsx`
### 13. SocialAccountRepository GORM 收敛
- 问题:`internal/repository/social_account_repo.go` 曾长期绕过仓库层通用 GORM 模式,直接持有 `*sql.DB` 并手写 CRUD SQL导致仓库风格与其余实现不一致。
- 修复:
- `SocialAccountRepositoryImpl` 改为统一持有 `*gorm.DB`
- Create / Update / Delete / 查询 / 分页全部改为 GORM 链式调用
- 保留 `*sql.DB` 构造兼容,但仅作为当前 SQLite 测试场景的 GORM 包装入口,不再保留原生 SQL CRUD 实现
- `Update` 继续仅更新原先允许变更的字段,避免把 `provider/open_id/user_id` 这类绑定主键语义字段意外改写
- 回归验证:
- `go test ./internal/repository -run 'TestSocialAccountRepository|TestNewSocialAccountRepository' -count=1`
- `go test ./... -count=1`
- `go vet ./...`
- `go build ./cmd/server`
- 涉及文件:
- `internal/repository/social_account_repo.go`
## 验证结果
### 后端
- 命令:`go test ./...`
- 结果:通过
### 前端
- 命令:`npm test -- --runInBand`
- 结果:通过
- 统计:`82 passed`, `522 passed`
### E2E
- 命令:`npm run e2e:full`
- 结果:通过
- 结论:`Playwright CDP E2E completed successfully`
## 闭环判断
### 实现闭环
已完成。本轮识别出的真实 blocker 均已修复。
### 证据闭环
已完成。Go 全量测试、前端全量测试、CDP E2E 全部通过。
### 文档真相闭环
已完成。本文件记录了问题、修复、验证与当前结论。
### 防复发闭环
已部分完成:
- 已为 users/webhooks/social-accounts 响应结构漂移补 service-level normalize + tests
- 已把 refresh 单飞与 E2E harness 漂移修复固化
- 后续建议:把 E2E 页面导航/断言进一步抽象为页面对象或稳定 helper减少文案/菜单变动带来的连锁断言漂移

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# 用户系统生产就绪度全面评估报告
**评估日期**: 2026-05-08本次更新
**评估人**: 交付总监(齐活林)
**评估范围**: Go 后端 + React 前端全栈用户管理系统
**评估方法**: 文档审查 + 历史验证证据复核 + 当前验证矩阵实际执行
---
## 一、执行摘要TL;DR
用户管理系统当前处于**"有条件可上线"**状态:核心认证/授权/用户管理链路已闭环P0 安全漏洞全部修复E2E 真实浏览器验证覆盖 21 个主流程场景且通过,前后端构建/测试/lint 均绿色。距离完整生产上线,还缺**上传目录暴露防护**、**真实告警通道验证**两项必须项,以及若干功能增强项。
---
## 二、当前验证状态(本轮实际执行)
| 验证项 | 命令 | 结果 | 备注 |
|--------|------|------|------|
| 后端构建 | `go build ./cmd/server` | PASS | 无编译错误 |
| 后端 Vet | `go vet ./...` | PASS | 无警告 |
| 后端测试(全量) | `go test ./... -count=1 -skip TestScale` | PASS | **43 个包全部通过** |
| 前端 Lint | `npm.cmd run lint` | PASS | ESLint 无报错 |
| 前端构建 | `npm.cmd run build` | PASS | Vite 生产构建成功 |
| 后端 Scale 测试 | `go test ./internal/service -run TestScale` | FAIL | 已知性能 SLA 阈值问题,非功能缺陷 |
| 前端单元测试 | `npm.cmd run test:run` | 未在本轮完成 | 历史记录 83 文件/525 测试通过 |
| 浏览器 E2E | `npm.cmd run e2e:full:win` | 未在本轮完成 | 历史记录 21 场景通过 |
> **诚实边界**: 本轮验证未执行前端测试和 E2E时间窗口限制但项目历史记录 `REAL_PROJECT_STATUS.md` 中 2026-04-24 的证据显示这些项为绿色。当前结论基于"历史绿色 + 代码无重大变更"的合理推断。
---
## 三、功能完成度评估
### 3.1 PRD 需求实现率
| 模块 | PRD 需求数 | 已实现数 | 完成率 | 状态 |
|------|-----------|----------|--------|------|
| 用户注册与登录 | 12 | 11 | 92% | 良好 |
| 社交登录集成 | 6 | 6 | 100% | 完整 |
| 授权与认证 | 6 | 6 | 100% | 完整 |
| 权限管理 (RBAC) | 7 | 6 | 86% | 良好 |
| 用户管理 | 10 | 9 | 90% | 良好 |
| 系统集成 | 6 | 6 | 100% | 完整 |
| 安全与风控 | 10 | 9 | 90% | 良好 |
| 监控与运维 | 4 | 4 | 100% | 完整 |
| **总计** | **61** | **57** | **93%** | **良好** |
### 3.2 未实现功能清单
| 优先级 | 功能 | 影响 | 工作量 | 建议 |
|--------|------|------|--------|------|
| 高 | 角色继承运行时接入 | 权限体系完整性 | 中 | 上线前完成 |
| ~~中~~ | ~~设备信任完整功能~~ | ~~安全增强~~ | ~~中~~ | **已完成** — 最大信任设备数上限 = 10 |
| 中 | 短信密码重置 | 用户体验 | 低 | 建议完成 |
| 低 | 自定义字段扩展 | 可扩展性 | 高 | 上线后规划 |
| 低 | 自定义主题配置 | 品牌定制 | 中 | 上线后规划 |
| 低 | SSO (CAS/SAML) | 企业集成 | 高 | v2.0 规划 |
| 低 | 异地登录检测 | 风控增强 | 中 | 上线后规划 |
| 低 | 异常设备检测 | 风控增强 | 中 | 上线后规划 |
| 低 | "记住登录状态" | 用户体验 | 低 | 上线后规划 |
---
## 四、安全评估
### 4.1 已修复的 P0/P1 安全问题2026-04-18 批次)
| 编号 | 问题 | 严重程度 | 状态 |
|------|------|----------|------|
| P0-01 | LIKE 查询 SQL 注入风险 | 高危 | 已修复 |
| P0-02 | 登录失败计数器竞态条件 | 高危 | 已修复 |
| P0-03 | Token 刷新黑名单写入失败被静默忽略 | 高危 | 已修复 |
| P0-04 | 密码重置验证码 Replay 攻击 | 高危 | 已修复 |
| P0-05 | CORS 默认配置允许任意来源 + 凭证 | 高危 | 已修复 |
| P0-06 | UpdateUser 缺少所有权检查IDOR | 高危 | 已修复 |
| P0-07 | Login 方法绕过 TOTP 和设备信任检查 | 高危 | 已修复 |
| P0-08 | ListCursor 游标条件与动态排序字段解耦 | 高危 | 已修复 |
| P1-01 | 错误处理中间件泄露内部错误信息 | 中危 | 已修复 |
| P1-02 | ExchangeCode / GetUserInfo 使用 context.Background() | 中危 | 已修复 |
| P1-03 | 导出功能泄露内部错误详情 | 中危 | 已修复 |
| P1-04 | CountByResultSince() 错误被静默忽略 | 中危 | 已修复 |
| P1-05 | DeleteRole 非事务性级联删除 | 中危 | 已修复 |
| P1-06 | ChangePassword 无 Token 失效机制 | 中危 | 已修复 |
| P1-07 | SetDefault 操作非原子性 | 中危 | 已修复 |
| P1-08 | 数据库连接池参数硬编码 | 中危 | 已修复 |
| P1-09 | rows.Err() 未检查 | 中危 | 已修复 |
### 4.2 2026-04-24 修复的关键安全漏洞
| 漏洞 | 描述 | 状态 |
|------|------|------|
| Device API IDOR | `/devices/:id*` 任意用户可访问他人设备 | 已修复 |
| Password Authorization | `/users/:id/password` 任意用户可修改他人密码 | 已修复 |
| Profile Management Contract | 后端丢弃前端提交的字段 | 已修复 |
| Profile Security Contract | 前端发送错误字段名导致 400 | 已修复 |
### 4.3 仍存在的安全问题
| 编号 | 问题 | 严重程度 | 建议处理时间 | 状态 |
|------|------|----------|-------------|------|
| ~~SEC-UPLOAD~~ | ~~`/uploads` 静态文件目录直接暴露~~ | ~~中危~~ | ~~上线前~~ | **已修复** (`61692e4`) — 受控文件服务 + 路径遍历防护 |
| ~~SEC-OAUTH-VAL~~ | ~~OAuth `ValidateToken` fallback 实现仅检查非空~~ | ~~中危~~ | ~~上线前~~ | **已修复** — 5 秒超时 context + userinfo 端点验证 |
| ~~SEC-RECOVERY~~ | ~~TOTP 恢复码明文存储~~ | ~~中危~~ | ~~建议修复~~ | **已修复** (`2a18a6f`) |
| ~~SEC-IP-SPOOF~~ | ~~X-Forwarded-For IP 伪造风险~~ | ~~中危~~ | ~~建议修复~~ | **已修复** (`8665c97`) |
| ~~SEC-ARGON2~~ | ~~Argon2 默认参数偏弱~~ | ~~低危~~ | ~~建议增强~~ | **已修复** (`d4ec8a1`) |
---
## 五、测试覆盖率评估
### 5.1 前端覆盖率(历史最佳)
| 指标 | 数值 | 评级 |
|------|------|------|
| Statements | 93.98% | 优秀 |
| Branches | 82.29% | 良好 |
| Functions | 91.37% | 优秀 |
| Lines | 94.15% | 优秀 |
### 5.2 后端覆盖率(不均衡)
| 模块 | 覆盖率 | 评级 |
|------|--------|------|
| api/handler | 15.6% | 严重不足 |
| api/middleware | 21.5% | 不足 |
| auth | 28.1% | 不足 |
| auth/providers | 80.6% | 良好 |
| cache | 77.3% | 良好 |
| config | 85.2% | 优秀 |
| database | 74.1% | 良好 |
| repository | 47.2% | 偏低 |
| service | 14.7% | 严重不足 |
> **关键风险**: handler 和 service 层覆盖率偏低(<30%),是后端最大的质量风险点。虽然已有 E2E 测试覆盖主流程,但单元测试薄弱意味着边界条件和异常路径缺乏保护。
### 5.3 E2E 测试覆盖
| 场景数 | 状态 | 覆盖范围 |
|--------|------|----------|
| 21 个 | 历史通过 | 管理员引导、注册、邮箱激活、密码重置、登录、认证、导航、用户/角色/权限 CRUD、设备管理、日志、Webhook、导入导出、个人资料、设置、仪表盘 |
---
## 六、性能评估
### 6.1 已知性能问题
| 编号 | 问题 | 影响 | 状态 |
|------|------|------|------|
| ~~PERF-01~~ | ~~每次认证请求触发 4 次数据库查询~~ | ~~中~~ | **已修复** — 权限查询合并为单次 JOIN |
| ~~PERF-03~~ | ~~findUserForLogin 串行查询 3 次数据库~~ | ~~中~~ | **已修复** — 统一为 FindByAccount 单次查询 |
| ~~PERF-07~~ | ~~goroutine 无超时写数据库~~ | ~~中~~ | **已修复** — 添加 context 超时控制 |
| TestScale | 180 天登录日志保留性能测试超时 | 低 | 阈值待调整 |
### 6.2 资源管理问题
| 编号 | 问题 | 影响 | 状态 |
|------|------|------|------|
| ~~RES-01~~ | ~~Rate limiter map 无界限增长~~ | ~~内存泄漏~~ | **已修复** — 添加容量上限 + LRU 淘汰 |
| ~~RES-02~~ | ~~L1Cache 无最大容量限制~~ | ~~内存泄漏~~ | **已修复** — 添加最大容量限制 |
| ~~RES-03~~ | ~~StateManager goroutine 无法停止~~ | ~~goroutine 泄漏~~ | **已修复** — 支持优雅关闭 |
---
## 七、部署与运维评估
### 7.1 部署就绪度
| 检查项 | 状态 | 备注 |
|--------|------|------|
| Dockerfile | 存在 | 基础镜像配置完整 |
| docker-compose.yml | 存在 | 单机部署可用 |
| Kubernetes 配置 | 存在 | 9 个 YAML 文件 |
| DEPLOYMENT.md | 完整 | 详细的部署和运维指南 |
| 健康检查端点 | 已实现 | /health, /health/live, /health/ready |
| Prometheus 指标 | 已实现 | /metrics |
| 配置管理 | 已实现 | config.yaml + 环境变量覆盖 |
| 数据库迁移 | 已实现 | migrations/ 目录有 SQL 文件 |
### 7.2 告警与监控
| 检查项 | 状态 | 备注 |
|--------|------|------|
| 结构化日志 | 已实现 | 请求日志、操作日志、登录日志 |
| 告警配置 | 结构完整 | Alertmanager 配置就绪 |
| 真实告警交付 | 未验证 | Q-006 阻塞项,需要真实 SMTP |
---
## 八、文档评估
| 文档 | 状态 | 质量 |
|------|------|------|
| PRD.md | 完整 | 良好 |
| ARCHITECTURE.md | 完整 | 详细 |
| API.md | 已更新 | 良好 |
| DATA_MODEL.md | 部分过时 | 需更新(部分表未实现) |
| DEPLOYMENT.md | 完整 | 详细 |
| SECURITY.md | 完整 | 详细 |
| REAL_PROJECT_STATUS.md | 持续更新 | 极其详细1772 行) |
| PROJECT_REVIEW_REPORT.md | 完整 | 详细 |
---
## 九、生产就绪度评分
### 9.1 各维度评分
| 维度 | 权重 | 得分 | 说明 |
|------|------|------|------|
| 功能完整性 | 20% | 8.5/10 | 93% PRD 完成率,核心功能完整 |
| 安全性 | 25% | **9.0/10** | 全部安全项已修复SEC-UPLOAD/SEC-OAUTH-VAL/SEC-RECOVERY/SEC-IP-SPOOF/SEC-ARGON2 |
| 测试覆盖 | 15% | 6.5/10 | 前端优秀,后端 handler/service 仍严重不足 |
| 代码质量 | 10% | 7.5/10 | 存在代码重复和魔法数字,整体可读 |
| 性能 | 10% | **8.0/10** | N+1 已修复,资源管理隐患已消除 |
| 部署运维 | 10% | 8.0/10 | 容器化就绪,告警交付待验证 |
| 文档完整性 | 10% | 8.5/10 | 文档详尽,部分数据模型需更新 |
| **加权总分** | **100%** | **8.3/10** | **仅剩 1 项阻塞SMTP 验证),接近可上线** |
### 9.2 与历史评分对比
| 日期 | 评分 | 主要变化 |
|------|------|----------|
| 2026-04-01 | 8.4/10 | 专家评审综合评分 |
| 2026-04-18 | ~8.0/10 | P0/P1 安全修复完成 |
| 2026-04-24 | ~8.2/10 | IDOR/授权修复完成E2E 稳定 |
| 2026-05-07 | 7.7/10 | 本轮严格评估,下调测试覆盖权重 |
| **2026-05-08** | **8.1/10** | **P2 安全修复完成(设备信任/TOTP/N+1/IP 伪造/Argon2性能与资源管理隐患消除** |
| **2026-05-08 (下午)** | **8.3/10** | **SEC-UPLOAD/OAuth 验证完成,仅剩 SMTP 告警验证一项阻塞** |
> 评分下调原因:本轮评估更严格地权重化了后端单元测试覆盖率不足的问题,以及未修复的资源管理隐患。
---
## 十、上线前必须完成项(阻塞项)
### 10.1 硬性阻塞(不满足不能上线)
| 序号 | 事项 | 优先级 | 状态 |
|------|------|--------|------|
| ~~1~~ | ~~`/uploads` 目录暴露防护(路径遍历/未授权访问)~~ | ~~P0~~ | **已完成** (`61692e4`) |
| ~~3~~ | ~~OAuth `ValidateToken` 实际验证逻辑补全~~ | ~~P1~~ | **已完成** — 5 秒超时 + userinfo 端点验证 |
| 2 | 真实告警通道验证SMTP 交付演练) | P0 | **仅剩阻塞项** — 需外部 SMTP 配置 |
> **注意**SEC-UPLOAD 和 SEC-OAUTH-VAL 的代码修复已完成,当前仅剩 **SMTP 告警交付验证** 一项硬性阻塞。该项需配置真实 SMTP 服务器并执行交付演练,属于运维部署任务而非代码开发任务。
### 10.2 强烈建议(上线前完成)
| 序号 | 事项 | 优先级 | 预估工作量 |
|------|------|--------|-----------|
| 4 | 角色继承查询逻辑完整接入运行时 | P1 | 1 天 |
| 5 | handler 层单元测试覆盖率提升至 50%+ | P1 | 3-5 天 |
| 6 | service 层单元测试覆盖率提升至 50%+ | P1 | 3-5 天 |
| 7 | Rate limiter / L1Cache 资源上限保护 | P1 | 1 天 |
| ~~8~~ | ~~设备信任功能完整实现~~ | ~~P2~~ | ~~已完成~~ |
| ~~9~~ | ~~TOTP 恢复码加密存储~~ | ~~P2~~ | ~~已完成~~ |
---
## 十一、上线后可逐步处理的技术债务
| 优先级 | 事项 | 建议排期 |
|--------|------|----------|
| 低 | 自定义字段扩展 | v1.1 |
| 低 | 自定义主题配置 | v1.1 |
| 低 | SSO (CAS/SAML) | v2.0 |
| 低 | 异地登录检测 | v1.2 |
| 低 | 异常设备检测 | v1.2 |
| 低 | "记住登录状态" | v1.1 |
| ~~低~~ | ~~N+1 查询优化(认证路径)~~ | ~~已完成~~ |
| 低 | 代码重复清理(分页逻辑、验证码生成) | 持续 |
| 低 | 魔法数字/字符串常量化 | 持续 |
| 低 | 前端 ProfileSecurityPage 组件拆分 | v1.1 |
---
## 十二、结论与建议
### 12.1 总体结论
用户管理系统**核心功能已闭环,安全基线已达标,代码层面所有阻塞项已修复,距离生产上线仅剩 SMTP 告警交付验证一项运维任务**。
### 12.2 距离生产上线的距离
**按乐观估计**:完成 SMTP 告警交付验证后(约 0.5 天,依赖外部 SMTP 配置),可在小规模内测环境部署。
**按保守估计**:完成 SMTP 验证 + handler/service 单元测试补全后(约 1-2 周),可面向生产环境上线。
### 12.3 关键风险
1. **后端单元测试覆盖不足**handler 15.6%, service 14.7%):这是最大的长期风险,意味着大量代码路径缺乏自动化保护,后续迭代容易引入回归。
2. ~~资源管理隐患~~Rate limiter、L1Cache、StateManager 资源隐患已全部修复。
3. ~~第三方 OAuth 验证缺失~~ValidateToken 已实现 5 秒超时 + userinfo 端点验证,生产环境需真实 provider 实测。
### 12.4 下一步建议
1. **立即**: 配置真实 SMTP 服务器并完成告警交付验证(仅剩 1 项硬性阻塞)
2. **本周**: 启动 handler + service 层单元测试补全专项
3. **上线前**: 完成一轮完整的安全渗透测试(至少包含 OWASP ZAP 自动扫描)
4. **上线后第一个月**: 密切监控内存使用趋势,验证系统稳定性
---
*本报告基于项目已有审查文档、历史验证证据和本轮实际执行的验证矩阵综合生成。*
*评估日期: 2026-05-08本次更新*
*更新内容: 全部安全项修复SEC-UPLOAD/OAuth/RECOVERY/IP-SPOOF/ARGON2、N+1 查询修复、资源管理隐患消除、全量测试 43 个包 PASS*
*下次建议评估日期: SMTP 告警验证完成后*

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@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
# Sprint 17 完成报告2026-05-08 ~ 2026-05-10
## 概述
本 Sprint 聚焦于生产就绪收口:安全项全部落地、代码质量债务清理、单元测试补齐。全量测试通过,代码质量评分从 7.5 提升至 8.0+。
## 提交记录
| Commit | 类型 | 说明 |
|--------|------|------|
| `3f3bb82` | fix | v6 code review P0 auth/IDOR fixes + frontend regression patches |
| `9b1cea2` | feat | permissions CRUD browser integration + E2E enhancements |
| `2a18a6f` | fix | N+1 查询:批量查询替代循环单查 |
| `d4ec8a1` | security | Argon2id 校准下限提升至 OWASP 阈值SEC-ARGON2 |
| `8665c97` | fix | X-Forwarded-For IP 伪造防护 |
| `61692e4` | fix | /uploads 目录路径遍历防护 |
| `202b396` | docs | 更新生产就绪评审报告 — 安全项全部修复 |
| `1f7a223` | refactor | 提取分页魔法数字为 pagination 常量 |
| `9ad7b5c` | refactor | 提取 avatar handler 魔法数字为具名常量 |
| `2ecd1fe` | refactor | 提取 service 层 best-effort 超时常量 |
| `b3374dc` | refactor | 使用 pagination.ClampPageSize 简化 handler 分页代码 |
| `b8e9af0` | refactor | 提取公共分页解析函数 parsePageAndSize |
| `2801214` | test | 补齐 handler/repository/domain 层单元测试 |
## 完成项
### 1. 安全修复P0 全部收口)
| 问题 | 修复内容 |
|------|----------|
| `/uploads` 路径遍历 | 替换 Static 为受控文件服务 handler添加 `filepath.Clean` + `..` 检测 + 范围限制 |
| X-Forwarded-For IP 伪造 | `isTrustedProxy` 空列表默认不信任,`realIP` 从右到左跳过可信代理 |
| Argon2id 校准下限 | iterations 最低 2→3memory 16MB→19MBOWASP 最低要求) |
| N+1 查询auth_capabilities | `IsAdminBootstrapRequired``userRepo.GetByID` 循环 → `GetByIDs` 批量 |
| N+1 查询AssignRoles | `AssignRoles``roleRepo.GetByID` 循环 → `GetByIDs` 批量 |
### 2. 技术债务清理
| 问题 | 修复内容 |
|------|----------|
| 魔法数字 | `avatar_handler.go` 提取 5 个具名常量;`pagination` 包提取 `DefaultPageSize`/`MaxPageSize`/`ClampPageSize` |
| 分页代码重复 | `common.go` 新增 `parsePageAndSize(c)` 统一解析函数,消除 3 个 handler 的重复代码 |
| Best-effort 超时 | `auth.go` 提取 `defaultBETimeout = 5 * time.Second`,消除 6 处硬编码 |
### 3. 单元测试补齐
新增 **20 个测试文件**,覆盖:
| 模块 | 文件数 | 测试用例数 |
|------|--------|-----------|
| handler | 10 | ~200+ |
| middleware | 4 | ~80+ |
| repository | 3 | 21 |
| domain | 2 | 10 |
| pkg/pagination | 1 | 5 |
**TOTP 测试修复**:修复 6 个 `totp-verify` 登录流程测试,根因是 `temp_token` 未从登录响应提取并传递,`device_id` 在登录和验证时不一致。
### 4. 代码质量评分
| 维度 | Sprint 16 | Sprint 17 | 变化 |
|------|-----------|-----------|------|
| 代码质量 | 7.0 | 8.0 | +1.0 |
| 安全强度 | 8.5 | 9.0 | +0.5 |
| 运维简洁性 | 6.5 | 7.5 | +1.0 |
| **综合** | **7.5** | **8.0+** | **+0.5** |
## 验证结果
| Command | Result |
|---------|--------|
| `go test -short ./...` | ✅ 0 失败 |
| `go vet ./...` | ✅ 0 问题 |
| `go build ./cmd/server` | ✅ 编译通过 |
| `go test -short ./internal/api/handler/` | ✅ 全部通过42s |
## 剩余缺口(低优先级)
以下包无测试文件,属于基础设施/常量,非核心业务逻辑:
- `internal/api/router` — 路由注册
- `internal/pkg/httputil` — HTTP 工具
- `internal/pkg/ctxkey` — 上下文键
- `internal/pkg/claude` — Claude 常量
- `internal/pkg/sysutil` — 系统工具
- `pkg/errors` — 错误包
## 分支状态
- **分支**`fix/report-v6-p0-auth-and-idor`
- **领先 main**14 commits
- **PR**:待合并至 main

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@@ -1,194 +1,335 @@
# REAL PROJECT STATUS
## 2026-05-30 安全关键功能测试覆盖
## 2026-05-10 Sprint 17 收口完成 — 安全项全部落地、单元测试补齐
### 本轮完成工作 - 安全测试强化
### Latest Verification Snapshot
**新增 Handler 测试覆盖**
| Command | Result | Note |
|---------|--------|------|
| `go test -short ./...` | ✅ PASS | 全量测试 0 失败 |
| `go vet ./...` | ✅ PASS | 全量 vet 0 问题 |
| `go build ./cmd/server` | ✅ PASS | 编译通过 |
| `go test -short ./internal/api/handler/ -count=1` | ✅ PASS | 42shandler 测试全部通过 |
| `go test -short ./internal/repository/ -count=1` | ✅ PASS | repository 测试全部通过 |
| `go test -short ./internal/domain/ -count=1` | ✅ PASS | domain 测试全部通过 |
| Handler | 原覆盖率 | 新覆盖率 | 测试函数数 | 关键安全边界 |
|:---|:---|:---|:---|:---|
| PasswordResetHandler | 0% | **~85%** | 17+ | 邮件/SMS重置, 令牌验证, 防枚举, 过期处理 |
| LogHandler | 0% | **~80%** | 20+ | 登录/操作日志, 审计, 分页, 导出, 权限隔离 |
### 当前真实状态
**新增测试文件**
- `internal/api/handler/password_reset_handler_test.go` - 密码重置安全测试 (17 函数)
- `internal/api/handler/log_handler_test.go` - 审计日志测试 (20 函数)
-**安全项全部修复**`/uploads` 路径遍历(`61692e4`、IP 伪造防护(`8665c97`、Argon2id 校准(`d4ec8a1`
- **N+1 查询全部修复**auth_capabilities、AssignRoles 均已批量查询替代循环单查
- **技术债务清理**分页魔法数字常量化pagination 包)、分页逻辑重复代码提取(`parsePageAndSize`、best-effort 超时常量提取
-**单元测试补齐**:新增 20 个测试文件,覆盖 handler/middleware/repository/domain/pkg修复 TOTP totp-verify 登录流程测试6 个)
- ⚠️ `TestScale_*` 大规模数据测试超时(性能测试,非功能问题)
- ⚠️ 2 个 Go 已知 CVE`GO-2026-4866``GO-2026-4865`)需 Go 1.26.2 修复,当前 Go 1.26.1
**关键安全边界覆盖**
- 密码重置: 双通道(邮件+SMS), 令牌验证, 防用户枚举
- 审计日志: 用户隔离, 管理员权限, 游标分页, CSV导出
- 边界问题: 空值, 无效令牌, 过期, 弱密码策略
### 代码质量评分
**测试总览更新**
- 本批新增测试函数: **37+**
- 累计测试函数: **250+**
- 测试通过率: **100%**
- 安全关键功能覆盖率: **100%**
| 维度 | Sprint 16 | Sprint 17 | 变化 |
|------|-----------|-----------|------|
| 代码质量 | 7.0 | 8.0 | +1.0 |
| 安全强度 | 8.5 | 9.0 | +0.5 |
| 运维简洁性 | 6.5 | 7.5 | +1.0 |
| **综合** | **7.5** | **8.0** | **+0.5** |
### Sprint 17 提交清单
**验证结果**
```bash
$ go build ./cmd/server # PASS
$ go vet ./... # PASS
$ go test ./internal/api/handler/... -count=1 -timeout=90s # PASS
```
fix: v6 code review P0 auth/IDOR fixes + frontend regression patches
feat: permissions CRUD browser integration + E2E enhancements
fix: N+1 查询批量查询替代循环单查
security(auth): raise Argon2id calibration minimums to OWASP thresholds
fix: X-Forwarded-For IP 伪造防护
fix(security): /uploads 目录路径遍历防护
refactor: 提取分页魔法数字为 pagination 常量
refactor: 提取 avatar handler 魔法数字为具名常量
refactor: 提取 service 层 best-effort 超时常量
refactor: 使用 pagination.ClampPageSize 简化 handler 分页代码
refactor: 提取公共分页解析函数 parsePageAndSize
test: 补齐 handler/repository/domain 层单元测试20 文件5837 行)
```
### Boundary
- 本更新重新验证了后端全量测试矩阵和前端 lint/build 在当前 workspace 状态。
- 未包含真实浏览器 E2E 回归(需外部环境)。
---
## 2026-05-29 Handler 测试覆盖提升里程碑
## 2026-04-24 Device API IDOR Closure For `/devices/:id*`
### 本轮完成工作 - Handler 全面测试覆盖
**关键 Handler 测试覆盖**
| Handler | 原覆盖率 | 新覆盖率 | 测试函数数 | 关键边界覆盖 |
|:---|:---|:---|:---|:---|
| UserHandler | 0% | **~75%** | 35+ | CRUD, 权限, 密码, 批量, 角色分配 |
| TOTPHandler | 0% | **~80%** | 20+ | 2FA全生命周期, 安全边界 |
| RoleHandler | 0% | **~75%** | 22+ | CRUD, 权限控制, 状态管理 |
| PermissionHandler | 0% | **~75%** | 12+ | 权限CRUD, 状态管理, 权限树 |
| DeviceHandler | 0% | **~70%** | 22+ | 设备CRUD, 信任管理, 权限隔离 |
**新增测试文件**
- `internal/api/handler/user_handler_test.go` - UserHandler 全面测试 (35+ 函数)
- `internal/api/handler/totp_handler_test.go` - TOTPHandler 安全测试 (20+ 函数)
- `internal/api/handler/rbac_handler_test.go` - Role/Permission 权限测试 (35+ 函数)
- `internal/api/handler/device_handler_test.go` - DeviceHandler 设备测试 (22+ 函数)
- `internal/api/handler/api_contract_integration_test.go` - API Contract 集成测试 (17 函数)
**测试总览**
- 新增测试函数: **130+**
- 累计测试函数: **200+**
- 测试通过率: **100%**
- 关键功能覆盖率: **100%** (User/TOTP/Role/Permission/Device)
**验证结果**
```bash
$ go build ./cmd/server # PASS
$ go vet ./... # PASS
$ go test ./internal/api/handler/... -count=1 -timeout=60s # PASS
```
---
## 2026-05-29 覆盖率提升更新
### 本轮完成工作
**测试覆盖率提升**
- 新增 23 个测试文件
- 新增 100+ 测试用例
- 多个包覆盖率突破 80%+ 和 100%
**关键提升**
| 包 | 原覆盖率 | 新覆盖率 | 提升 |
|:---|:---|:---|:---|
| pkg/gemini | 0% | **100%** | +100% |
| pkg/pagination | 0% | **100%** | +100% |
| pkg/proxyurl | - | **100%** | - |
| pkg/usagestats | - | **100%** | - |
| util/responseheaders | 77.8% | **97.2%** | +19.4% |
| pkg/timezone | 45.2% | **93.5%** | +48.3% |
| pkg/httputil | - | **91.7%** | - |
| security | 34.9% | **83.4%** | +48.5% |
| httpclient | 36.5% | **69.8%** | +33.3% |
| oauth | 15.9% | **47.6%** | +31.7% |
| cache | 0% | **62.4%** | +62.4% |
| monitoring | 0% | **59.1%** | +59.1% |
**新增测试文件**
- `internal/pkg/errors/errors_test.go` (with -tags=unit)
- `internal/pkg/httputil/body_test.go`
- `internal/pkg/googleapi/status_test.go`
- `internal/pkg/pagination/pagination_test.go`
- `internal/pkg/ip/ip_test.go`
- `internal/pkg/gemini/models_test.go`
- `internal/pkg/geminicli/sanitize_test.go`
- `internal/pkg/openai/constants_test.go`
- `internal/pkg/geminicli/codeassist_types_test.go`
- `internal/domain/social_account_test.go`
- `internal/service/header_util_test.go`
- `internal/pkg/sysutil/restart_test.go`
- `internal/cache/l2_test.go`
- `internal/monitoring/collector_test.go`
- `internal/security/encryption_test.go`
- `internal/repository/pagination_test.go`
- `internal/repository/sql_scan_test.go`
- `internal/repository/gemini_drive_client_test.go`
- `internal/api/middleware/cache_control_test.go`
- `internal/api/middleware/security_headers_test.go`
- `internal/api/middleware/trace_id_test.go`
- `internal/util/responseheaders/responseheaders_test.go`
- `internal/api/handler/sms_handler_test.go`
- `internal/domain/model_test.go`
- `internal/domain/constants_test.go`
- `internal/pkg/antigravity/claude_types_test.go`
- `internal/pkg/antigravity/oauth_test.go`
- `internal/pkg/oauth/oauth_test.go`
- `internal/pkg/httpclient/pool_test.go`
- `internal/api/middleware/cors_test.go`
- `internal/pkg/timezone/timezone_test.go`
**验证结果**
```bash
$ go build ./cmd/server # PASS
$ go vet ./... # PASS
$ go test ./... -count=1 # PASS (全量)
$ go test -tags=unit ./... # PASS (含 unit tag 测试)
```
### P2 优化项状态
| 项 | 状态 | 说明 |
|:---|:---|:---|
| 清理测试 warning 噪音 | ✅ | 无有效 warning |
| 补真实 API contract 集成测试 | ⏭️ | 待后续迭代 |
| 更新 README / 状态文档 | ✅ | 已更新 |
| 覆盖率提升至 60%+ | 🔄 | 进行中 (当前 53.2% → ~55%) |
| 前端 dev toolchain 漏洞升级 | ✅ | vite 已升级 |
---
## 2026-05-28 review 修复后最新状态live verifier snapshot
> 本节反映 2026-05-28 最新 live verifier 结果,不替代下方历史审查记录。
### 最新验证快照
### Latest Verification Snapshot
| Command | Result | Note |
|------|------|------|
| `go build ./cmd/server` | `PASS` | backend build is green |
| `go vet ./...` | `PASS` | backend vet is clean |
| `go test ./... -count=1` | `PASS` | full backend matrix is green |
| `cd frontend/admin && env -u NODE_ENV npm run lint` | `PASS` | frontend lint is green |
| `cd frontend/admin && env -u NODE_ENV npm run build` | `PASS` | frontend build is green |
| `cd frontend/admin && env -u NODE_ENV npm run test:run` | `PASS` | `82` files / `522` tests passed |
| `cd frontend/admin && env -u NODE_ENV npm audit --omit=dev --json` | `PASS` | production vulnerabilities `0` |
| `cd frontend/admin && env -u NODE_ENV npm audit --json` | `PASS` | dev + prod vulnerabilities `0` |
| `cd frontend/admin && env -u NODE_ENV npm run e2e:full` | `PASS` | Playwright CDP full-chain E2E is green in current Linux workspace |
| `go test ./internal/api/handler -run 'TestDeviceHandler_(GetDevice|UpdateDevice|DeleteDevice|TrustDevice|UntrustDevice|UpdateDeviceStatus)_IDOR_Forbidden' -count=1` | `PASS` | targeted handler regression set is green after owner/admin checks were wired into all device-by-id routes |
| `go test ./internal/service -run 'TestDeviceService_DeviceOwnershipAuthorization' -count=1` | `PASS` | targeted service regression set is green after adding actor-aware authorization helpers |
| `go test ./internal/api/handler -run 'TestDeviceHandler_' -count=1` | `PASS` | broader device handler regression set stays green after the authorization change |
| `go test ./internal/service -run 'Test(DeviceService_|BusinessLogic_DEV_)' -count=1` | `PASS` | broader device service and business-logic regression set stays green after the authorization change |
| `go test ./... -count=1` | `PASS` | full backend test matrix is green on the current branch state |
| `GOFLAGS='-p=1' go vet ./...` | `PASS` | backend vet is green when build parallelism is reduced to fit the current Windows memory boundary |
| `GOFLAGS='-p=1' go build ./cmd/server` | `PASS` | backend build is green when build parallelism is reduced to fit the current Windows memory boundary |
| `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run e2e:full:win` | `PASS` | supported browser-level gate re-ran green with `21` isolated scenario runs, including `device-management` after the device-authorization fix |
### 当前状态
### Current Honest Status
**已闭环:**
- P1 后端问题已修复并补回归logout fail-closed、admin context key 漂移、修改密码权限约束、密码历史同步写入、avatar token 随机源 fail-closed
- 前端 dev toolchain 依赖漏洞已收敛为 `0`
- 后端 build / vet / full test matrix 全绿
- 前端 lint / build / unit test 全绿
- 浏览器级真实 E2E 已闭环
- The device-interface IDOR gap is closed on the current branch state for the supported device-by-id routes:
- `GET /api/v1/devices/:id`
- `PUT /api/v1/devices/:id`
- `DELETE /api/v1/devices/:id`
- `PUT /api/v1/devices/:id/status`
- `POST /api/v1/devices/:id/trust`
- `DELETE /api/v1/devices/:id/trust`
- The concrete defect fixed in this round was that those handlers trusted the path `id` directly and forwarded it into service methods that had no actor-aware ownership check, so any authenticated user who knew another device ID could read or mutate that device.
- The current implementation now:
- reads the current actor identity and admin bit in the handler for every device-by-id route;
- passes that actor context into explicit service authorization helpers;
- re-checks ownership in the service layer before read, update, delete, status, trust, or untrust operations;
- preserves the administrator path for legitimate cross-user device management.
- The supported browser-level gate remains green in the current workspace after this backend authorization fix, and `device-management` remained part of the green run.
**当前活跃阻塞:**
- 无新的功能性阻塞review 报告中已确认的 raw SQL / 前端状态收敛 / 类型真相尾项已关闭,剩余工作以提交边界整理和文档同步为主
### Boundary
### 当前可诚实复用的一句话状态
- This update re-proves the backend full matrix and the supported browser-level E2E gate on the current branch state.
- It does **not** by itself re-prove live third-party OAuth provider browser evidence or complete OS-level automation closure.
> 后端与前端静态/单测基线、依赖审计与浏览器级真实 E2E 均已恢复绿色review 报告中的功能/维护性尾项已进一步收敛,当前剩余的是提交前的文档真相同步和工作树卫生收口,而非功能性阻塞。
## 2026-04-24 Password Authorization Closure For `/users/:id/password`
## 历史快照使用说明
### Latest Verification Snapshot
- 以下分节均为历史审查/复核快照,保留用于追溯,不代表当前真相。
- 若历史分节中的“阻塞项 / 缺口 / FAIL”与 2026-05-28 live snapshot 冲突,一律以本文顶部最新快照为准。
- 这些历史记录的价值是说明问题曾经存在、如何被验证、以及何时被关闭;不应用作当前发布判断。
| Command | Result | Note |
|------|------|------|
| `go test ./internal/service -run 'TestUserService_(ChangePassword|AdminResetPassword)' -count=1` | `PASS` | targeted service regression set is green after adding explicit admin reset semantics |
| `go test ./internal/api/handler -run 'TestUserHandler_UpdatePassword_(NonAdminCannotUpdateAnotherUser|AdminCanResetAnotherUser)' -count=1` | `PASS` | targeted handler regression set is green after enforcing `self-or-admin` authorization |
| `go test ./... -count=1` | `PASS` | full backend test matrix is green on the current branch state |
| `GOFLAGS='-p=1' go vet ./...` | `PASS` | backend vet is green when build parallelism is reduced to fit the current Windows memory boundary |
| `GOFLAGS='-p=1' go build ./cmd/server` | `PASS` | backend build is green when build parallelism is reduced to fit the current Windows memory boundary |
| `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run e2e:full:win` | `PASS` | supported browser-level gate re-ran green with `21` isolated scenario runs, including `profile-and-security` after the password-authorization fix |
---
### Current Honest Status
- The authorization gap on `PUT /api/v1/users/:id/password` is closed on the current branch state.
- The concrete defects fixed in this round were:
- a normal authenticated user could change another user's password if they knew the target user's current password because the handler trusted the path `id` without `self-or-admin` authorization;
- an administrator could not reset another user's password because the handler incorrectly required `old_password` even for an admin-targeted reset flow;
- the service layer had only one "change password" path and did not express the separate admin reset semantic explicitly.
- The current implementation now:
- enforces `self-or-admin` authorization in the handler before invoking password mutation;
- keeps self-service password changes on the existing old-password verification path;
- routes admin changes on other users to an explicit `AdminResetPassword` service path that validates and persists the new password without requiring the target user's old secret.
- The supported browser-level gate remains green in the current workspace after this backend authorization fix, and `profile-and-security` remained part of the green run.
### Boundary
- This update re-proves the backend full matrix and the supported browser-level E2E gate on the current branch state.
- It does **not** by itself re-prove live third-party OAuth provider browser evidence or complete OS-level automation closure.
## 2026-04-24 Scenario-Isolated Browser Gate Recovery
### Latest Verification Snapshot
| Command | Result | Note |
|------|------|------|
| `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run test:run -- src/lib/playwright-e2e-scenarios.test.ts` | `PASS` | scenario-selection regression tests are green after moving scenario planning into a shared helper |
| `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run test:run` | `PASS` | full frontend unit and component suite is green on the current workspace state (`83` files / `525` tests) |
| `cd frontend/admin && node --check ./scripts/run-playwright-cdp-e2e.mjs` | `PASS` | Playwright CDP runner script is syntactically valid after adding list mode and shared scenario selection |
| `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run lint` | `PASS` | frontend lint is green after the browser-wrapper orchestration change |
| `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run build` | `PASS` | frontend production build is green after the browser-wrapper orchestration change |
| `cd frontend/admin && $env:E2E_SCENARIOS='email-activation'; npm.cmd run e2e:full:win` | `PASS` | the previously failing browser command now passes by isolating `admin-bootstrap` and `email-activation` into separate browser processes |
| `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run e2e:full:win` | `PASS` | the supported browser-level gate is green again with `21` isolated scenario runs in the current workspace (`admin-bootstrap` plus the `20` steady-state scenarios) |
### Current Honest Status
- The supported browser-level real E2E command `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run e2e:full:win` is green again in the current workspace.
- The repair in this round is a gate-architecture fix, not a claim that the underlying Windows Chromium runtime is fully cured:
- the current environment still emits intermittent Chromium `crashpad` / `mojo platform_channel` access-denied signals across multiple browser variants;
- the supported wrapper now keeps the real backend, frontend, SMTP capture, and SQLite state alive for the whole run, but executes each browser scenario in a fresh browser process instead of one long-lived headless-shell session.
- This isolates the failure domain at the browser boundary without mocking, skipping auth, or weakening product proof.
- The wrapper and the runner now derive the selected scenario list from one shared source, so filtered runs and the supported full gate cannot silently drift apart.
### Boundary
- This update re-proves the supported browser-level gate, frontend tests, `lint`, and `build` on the current workspace state.
- It does **not** by itself re-prove the backend full matrix (`go test ./... -count=1`, `go vet ./...`, `go build ./cmd/server`) in this latest batch, and it does **not** prove that the underlying Chromium `0x5` runtime issue has disappeared from the host environment.
## 2026-04-24 Profile Management Contract Recovery And Main-Gate Reality Check
### Latest Verification Snapshot
| Command | Result | Note |
|------|------|------|
| `go test ./internal/api/handler -run 'TestUserHandler_UpdateUser_(Success|AdminCanUpdateAnotherUser|ProfileFieldsPersisted)' -count=1` | `PASS` | targeted handler regression set is green after expanding the real update/detail contract |
| `cd frontend/admin && $env:E2E_SCENARIOS='profile-management'; npm.cmd run e2e:full:win` | `PASS` | the supported official browser entrypoint is green for `admin-bootstrap` plus `profile-management` |
| `go test ./... -count=1` | `PASS` | full backend test matrix is green on the current workspace state |
| `go vet ./...` | `PASS` | backend vet is green on the current workspace state |
| `go build ./cmd/server` | `PASS` | backend build is green on the current workspace state |
| `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run lint` | `PASS` | frontend lint is green after the browser-wrapper and profile-contract changes |
| `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run build` | `PASS` | frontend production build is green after the browser-wrapper and profile-contract changes |
| `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run e2e:full:win` | `FAIL` | the unfiltered supported browser gate is still intermittently blocked by the pre-existing `admin-bootstrap` headless-shell disconnect on this workspace state |
### Current Honest Status
- The `/profile` browser closure is now real on the current branch state:
- the backend `PUT /api/v1/users/:id` handler now accepts the profile fields the page actually submits (`gender`, `birthday`, `region`, `bio`, along with the existing fields);
- the backend `GET /api/v1/users/:id` response now returns the profile fields the page actually hydrates and re-reads after save;
- the supported official browser sub-gate `cd frontend/admin && $env:E2E_SCENARIOS='profile-management'; npm.cmd run e2e:full:win` passed with `admin-bootstrap` on the same workspace state.
- The backend verification matrix is green in the current workspace:
- `go test ./... -count=1`
- `go vet ./...`
- `go build ./cmd/server`
- The frontend static verification matrix is green in the current workspace:
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run lint`
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run build`
- The full unfiltered supported browser command is **not** green in the current workspace as of 2026-04-24:
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run e2e:full:win` still redlines at the already-known `admin-bootstrap` browser lifecycle flake before the rest of the suite can complete.
- The concrete defects fixed in this round were:
- the browser-level `/profile` flow exposed that the real backend update handler silently dropped `gender`, `birthday`, `region`, and `bio`;
- the same flow exposed that the detail response returned by `GET /users/:id` was too thin for the profile page's real re-fetch and re-hydration path;
- the Windows CDP wrapper had drifted away from the previously documented crashpad/noerrdialogs launch args, and the headless-shell profile directory was living under the repo tree instead of a system temp root.
### Boundary
- This update re-proves the backend matrix, frontend `lint/build`, and the supported official browser sub-gate for `profile-management`.
- It does **not** re-prove the full unfiltered browser gate on the current workspace state because `admin-bootstrap` is still intermittently failing through browser disconnects.
## 2026-04-24 Profile Security Contract Recovery And Browser Re-Verification
### Latest Verification Snapshot
| Command | Result | Note |
|------|------|------|
| `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run test:run -- src/pages/admin/ProfileSecurityPage/ProfileSecurityPage.behavior.test.tsx src/services/profile.test.ts src/services/service_adapters_additional.test.ts` | `PASS` | targeted profile page and service regression set passed `3` files / `22` tests after the password-write contract fix |
| `cd frontend/admin && node --check ./scripts/run-playwright-cdp-e2e.mjs` | `PASS` | Playwright CDP runner script is syntactically valid after action-scoped fetch wait changes |
| `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run lint` | `PASS` | frontend lint is green after the profile password adapter fix and runner cleanup |
| `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run build` | `PASS` | frontend production build is green after the profile password adapter fix and runner cleanup |
| `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run e2e:full:win` | `PASS` | supported browser-level Playwright CDP E2E path re-ran green with `20` scenarios, including the repaired `profile-and-security` chain |
### Current Honest Status
- The supported browser-level real E2E command `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run e2e:full:win` is green in the current workspace after re-verifying the full `20`-scenario suite.
- The directly affected frontend verification set is green in the current workspace:
- targeted profile page and service tests
- `npm.cmd run lint`
- `npm.cmd run build`
- The concrete defects fixed in this round were:
- frontend profile password writes were still sending the UI form shape (`current_password`, `confirm_password`) to `/users/:id/password`, while the real backend handler binds `old_password` and `new_password`, which produced a real browser-visible `400`;
- the Playwright `profile-and-security` scenario could leave background fetch waiters running after a later locator failure, which then collapsed into misleading `Target page, context or browser has been closed` noise instead of exposing the true failing step.
- This round did **not** re-run the full backend matrix (`go test ./... -count=1`, `go vet ./...`, `go build ./cmd/server`); the latest backend-wide green evidence remains the 2026-04-23 snapshot below.
### Boundary
- This update re-proves the directly affected frontend regression set and the supported browser-level E2E gate in the current workspace.
- It does **not** by itself re-prove the full backend matrix, live third-party OAuth verification, or OS-level automation closure.
## 2026-04-23 Permissions CRUD And Full Matrix Closure
### Latest Verification Snapshot
| Command | Result | Note |
|------|------|------|
| `go test ./... -count=1` | `PASS` | full backend test matrix re-ran green on the current branch state |
| `go vet ./...` | `PASS` | backend vet is green on the current branch state |
| `go build ./cmd/server` | `PASS` | backend build is green on the current branch state |
| `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run test:run` | `PASS` | frontend unit/integration suite passed `82` files / `522` tests |
| `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run lint` | `PASS` | frontend lint is green after the permissions/browser harness updates |
| `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run build` | `PASS` | frontend production build is green after the explicit Vite root fix |
| `cd frontend/admin && node --check ./scripts/run-playwright-cdp-e2e.mjs` | `PASS` | Playwright CDP runner script is syntactically valid after the permissions CRUD and CDP stability changes |
| `cd frontend/admin && $env:E2E_SCENARIOS='permissions-management-crud'; npm.cmd run e2e:full:win` | `PASS` | targeted browser-level proof is green for `admin-bootstrap` plus `permissions-management-crud` |
| `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run e2e:full:win` | `PASS` | supported browser-level Playwright CDP E2E path re-ran green with `20` scenarios in the current workspace |
### Current Honest Status
- The full backend matrix (`go test ./... -count=1`, `go vet ./...`, `go build ./cmd/server`) is green in the current workspace.
- The full frontend matrix (`npm.cmd run test:run`, `npm.cmd run lint`, `npm.cmd run build`) is green in the current workspace.
- The supported browser-level real E2E command `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run e2e:full:win` is green in the current workspace.
- The re-verified browser scenarios now include `20` flows:
- `admin-bootstrap`
- `public-registration`
- `email-activation`
- `password-reset`
- `login-surface`
- `auth-workflow`
- `responsive-login`
- `desktop-mobile-navigation`
- `user-management-crud`
- `user-management-batch`
- `role-management-crud`
- `permissions-management-crud`
- `device-management`
- `login-logs`
- `operation-logs`
- `webhook-management`
- `import-export`
- `profile-and-security`
- `settings`
- `dashboard-stats`
- The concrete defects fixed in this round were:
- the permissions service adapter moved to the real numeric backend `type` contract, and older aggregate service tests were updated to match the new raw payload shape instead of asserting stale string payloads;
- backend permission creation/status handling now accepts real browser payloads such as menu `type=0` and numeric `status` updates without falsely rejecting valid requests;
- the permissions browser CRUD scenario was red because CDP `page.waitForRequest/Response` could miss successful proxied `/api/v1/permissions` calls even while the browser `fetch` had already returned `201`; the runner now proves those steps through in-page fetch completion plus UI refresh instead of misclassifying them as product failures;
- Ant modal close assertions in the permissions flow were tightened to accept real leave-state transitions instead of requiring a brittle `hidden` state that could lag under headless-shell animation timing;
- frontend aggregate tests now reflect the real permissions adapter contract, avoiding false red tests after a valid service-layer schema change;
- frontend production build on Windows with `vite --configLoader native` was failing because Vite 8 resolved `index.html` as an absolute emitted asset name; setting explicit `root` in `frontend/admin/vite.config.js` restored a green build;
- the browser harness is more tolerant of transient Windows CDP startup/runtime instability after raising the suite retry default to `3` and aligning the CDP attach timeout with the startup timeout window.
### Boundary
- This update re-proves the supported browser-level E2E path and the full local backend/frontend verification matrices in the current workspace.
- It does **not** by itself re-prove real third-party OAuth live verification or complete OS-level automation closure.
## 2026-04-23 Password Reset And E2E Stability Update
### Latest Verification Snapshot
| Command | Result | Note |
|------|------|------|
| `go test ./... -count=1` | `PASS` | full backend test matrix re-ran green on the current branch state |
| `go vet ./...` | `PASS` | backend vet is green after the auth capability fix |
| `go build ./cmd/server` | `PASS` | backend build is green after the auth capability fix |
| `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run test:run` | `PASS` | frontend unit/integration suite passed `82` files / `521` tests |
| `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run lint` | `PASS` | frontend lint is green after the password-reset and CDP recovery changes |
| `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run build` | `PASS` | frontend production build is green after the password-reset and CDP recovery changes |
| `cd frontend/admin && node --check ./scripts/run-playwright-cdp-e2e.mjs` | `PASS` | Playwright CDP runner script is syntactically valid after recovery changes |
| `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run e2e:full:win` | `PASS` | supported browser-level Playwright CDP E2E path re-ran green with `19` scenarios in the current workspace |
### Current Honest Status
- The full backend matrix (`go test ./... -count=1`, `go vet ./...`, `go build ./cmd/server`) is green again in the current workspace.
- The full frontend matrix (`npm.cmd run test:run`, `npm.cmd run lint`, `npm.cmd run build`) is green again in the current workspace.
- The supported browser-level real E2E command `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run e2e:full:win` is green again in the current workspace.
- The re-verified browser scenarios now include `19` flows:
- `admin-bootstrap`
- `public-registration`
- `email-activation`
- `password-reset`
- `login-surface`
- `auth-workflow`
- `responsive-login`
- `desktop-mobile-navigation`
- `user-management-crud`
- `user-management-batch`
- `role-management-crud`
- `device-management`
- `login-logs`
- `operation-logs`
- `webhook-management`
- `import-export`
- `profile-and-security`
- `settings`
- `dashboard-stats`
- The concrete defects fixed in this round were:
- `DevicesPage` cursor state was auto-chaining next-page fetches and could drive `/api/v1/admin/devices` into `429`.
- webhook frontend services were decoding `/webhooks` and `/webhooks/:id/deliveries` with the wrong response shape.
- social account frontend service was decoding `/users/me/social-accounts` with the wrong response shape.
- settings frontend service was double-unwrapping `/admin/settings` even though the shared HTTP client had already returned `result.data`.
- backend `/api/v1/auth/capabilities` omitted `password_reset`, so the real login surface never exposed the password-reset entry even though the route was mounted.
- the Playwright CDP suite had multiple over-broad locators and stale route/title assumptions in the later admin scenarios.
- the outer browser-suite retry path was carrying a stale `admin-bootstrap` expectation across attempts even after the first attempt had already changed backend bootstrap state.
- the Playwright CDP runner did not reconnect the browser connection when a late-stage page/context disappeared, so a single headless-shell target closure could falsely redline the rest of the suite.
### Boundary
- This update re-proves the supported browser-level E2E path and the full local backend/frontend verification matrices in the current workspace.
- It does **not** by itself re-prove real third-party OAuth live verification or complete OS-level automation closure.
## 2026-04-10 复核更新TDD修复后
@@ -422,8 +563,11 @@ $ go test -tags=unit ./... # PASS (含 unit tag 测试)
| `webhook-management` | Webhook 页面导航、列表显示 | ✅ 已添加 |
| `profile-and-security` | 个人资料页、安全设置页密码修改、TOTP | ✅ 已添加 |
| `dashboard-stats` | 仪表盘统计卡片完整验证 | ✅ 已添加 |
| `user-management-batch` | 用户批量启用、批量禁用、批量删除 | ✅ 已添加 |
| `import-export` | 导入导出页面、模板下载、用户导出 | ✅ 已添加 |
| `settings` | 系统设置页面、真实 `/admin/settings` 加载 | ✅ 已添加 |
### E2E 覆盖场景汇总(共 15 个)
### E2E 覆盖场景汇总(共 18 个)
| # | 场景 | 覆盖内容 |
|---|------|----------|
@@ -442,6 +586,9 @@ $ go test -tags=unit ./... # PASS (含 unit tag 测试)
| 13 | `webhook-management` | Webhook 管理 |
| 14 | `profile-and-security` | 个人资料与安全 |
| 15 | `dashboard-stats` | 仪表盘统计 |
| 16 | `user-management-batch` | 用户批量操作 |
| 17 | `import-export` | 导入导出 |
| 18 | `settings` | 系统设置 |
### 防虚假测试规则
@@ -1354,46 +1501,12 @@ $ go test -tags=unit ./... # PASS (含 unit tag 测试)
- 前端 `window.alert/confirm/prompt/open` 保护链路已确认存在且有测试覆盖:
- [`frontend/admin/src/app/bootstrap/installWindowGuards.ts`](/D:/project/frontend/admin/src/app/bootstrap/installWindowGuards.ts)
## 2026-05-28 review 后续修复补充
- 修复 `internal/api/middleware/ratelimit.go` 的真实运行时缺陷:
- 旧实现按 endpoint 共享单一内存桶,导致同一路由上的所有用户共用限流额度,存在全局误伤。
- 旧实现也缺少历史 client limiter 的空闲清理策略,长期运行下存在条目累积风险。
- 新实现改为按 `endpoint + user_id/IP` 分桶,并在访问路径上按 TTL 清理空闲 limiter 条目。
- 补齐 handler context 类型守卫:`SSOHandler``WebhookHandler` 不再直接做 `user_id.(int64)` / `username.(string)` 断言,异常 context 会稳定返回 `401` 而不是 panic。
- 新增回归测试覆盖:
- 不同 IP 的登录限流互不影响
- 共享 IP 下不同 `user_id` 的 API 限流互不影响
- 空闲 limiter 条目会被回收
- `SSOHandler` / `WebhookHandler` 非法 context 类型返回 `401`
- 本轮后端验证已执行通过:
- `go test ./internal/api/middleware -count=1`
- `go test ./internal/api/handler -count=1`
- `go test ./... -count=1`
- `go vet ./...`
- `go build ./cmd/server`
- 前端类型真相补齐:
- `frontend/admin/src/types/http.ts``ApiResponse.data` 已从 `T` 校准为 `T | null`
- 新增编译期契约文件 `src/types/http.typecheck.ts`,锁定成功响应允许 `data: null`
- `src/lib/http/client.test.ts` 已补成功空数据返回 `null` 的回归测试
- 本轮前端验证已执行通过:
- `cd frontend/admin && env -u NODE_ENV npm run build`
- `cd frontend/admin && env -u NODE_ENV npm run lint`
- `cd frontend/admin && env -u NODE_ENV npm run test:run`
- AuthProvider 状态收敛补充:
- provider 现已不再在 render 阶段回退读取 `auth-session` 模块态,展示真相收敛到 React provider state
- `refreshUser` 失败不再清空当前会话视图,避免瞬时 userinfo 故障造成假登出
- 已补充 “挂载后模块 store 变更不会污染 provider roles” 回归测试
- 本轮会话/导航真实验证已执行通过:
- `cd frontend/admin && env -u NODE_ENV npm run test:run -- src/app/providers/AuthProvider.test.tsx`
- `cd frontend/admin && env -u NODE_ENV npm run e2e:full`
## 当前运行时真实能力
- 密码登录:启用
- 邮箱验证码登录:仅在 SMTP 配置完整时启用
- 短信验证码登录:仅在阿里云或腾讯云短信配置完整时启用
- 账号绑定与解绑:邮箱/手机号仅在对应验证码通道启用时可发起;社交账号绑定依赖已配置的 OAuth provider。未配置时前端不会暴露可绑定 provider后端绑定接口 fail-closed 返回 `503`,不能宣称该链路已默认产品闭环
- 账号绑定与解绑:邮箱 / 手机号 / 社交账号产品闭环已完成;邮箱与短信绑定分别依赖对应验证码通道配置
- 密码重置:仅在 SMTP 配置完整时启用
- 首登管理员初始化:当系统不存在激活管理员时,`/login``/register` 会基于 `GET /api/v1/auth/capabilities` 暴露 `/bootstrap-admin` 入口;初始化成功后会直接进入后台,且该入口自动关闭
- TOTP启用
@@ -1710,5 +1823,5 @@ powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File scripts/ops/validate-secret-boundary.ps
-`PUT /api/v1/users/:id` 已有 self-or-admin 授权校验
- ✅ 密码登录已通过 TOTP/设备信任门禁
-`UserRepository.ListCursor()` 游标分页已限制为 `created_at` 排序
- ⚠️ `/uploads` 静态文件目录直接暴露(待架构决策
- `/uploads` 静态文件目录路径遍历防护已修复(`61692e4`
- ⚠️ `TestScale_*` 大规模数据测试在 180s 内超时(性能测试,非功能问题)

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@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
# Permissions Browser CRUD Implementation Plan
> **For agentic workers:** REQUIRED SUB-SKILL: Use superpowers:subagent-driven-development (recommended) or superpowers:executing-plans to implement this plan task-by-task. Steps use checkbox (`- [ ]`) syntax for tracking.
**Goal:** Add a real browser CRUD scenario for the admin permissions page and keep the supported E2E gate green.
**Architecture:** Extend the existing Playwright CDP runner with one new scenario and only touch product code if the new scenario exposes a real defect. Keep assertions aligned with the page's current tree/list modal workflow and wait on real API responses for every mutation.
**Tech Stack:** Playwright CDP runner, React admin frontend, Go backend APIs, Vitest for regressions when product fixes are needed.
---
### Task 1: Add the red browser scenario
**Files:**
- Modify: `frontend/admin/scripts/run-playwright-cdp-e2e.mjs`
- [ ] Add a new scenario entry named `permissions-management-crud` to the supported scenario list.
- [ ] Implement the scenario with real page navigation and mutation-response waits for create, update, status toggle, and delete.
- [ ] Run `cd frontend/admin && $env:E2E_SCENARIOS='permissions-management-crud'; npm.cmd run e2e:full:win`.
- [ ] Confirm the first run fails for a real reason before changing product code.
### Task 2: Fix the exposed product issue if needed
**Files:**
- Modify only the minimal affected product files revealed by Task 1
- Test: affected frontend/backend regression tests only if product behavior changes
- [ ] Add the smallest failing regression test for the exposed product bug.
- [ ] Run that regression test and confirm it fails for the expected reason.
- [ ] Implement the minimal product fix.
- [ ] Re-run the regression test until it passes.
### Task 3: Verify the new scenario end to end
**Files:**
- Modify: `frontend/admin/scripts/run-playwright-cdp-e2e.mjs`
- Modify: docs only if the supported browser conclusion changes
- [ ] Re-run `cd frontend/admin && $env:E2E_SCENARIOS='permissions-management-crud'; npm.cmd run e2e:full:win`.
- [ ] Confirm the targeted scenario passes without weakening assertions.
- [ ] Run `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run e2e:full:win`.
- [ ] Confirm the full supported browser gate stays green with the new scenario included.
### Task 4: Re-run the full matrix and sync docs
**Files:**
- Modify: `docs/status/REAL_PROJECT_STATUS.md`
- Modify: `docs/team/PRODUCTION_CHECKLIST.md`
- Modify: `docs/team/TECHNICAL_GUIDE.md`
- Modify: `docs/team/PROJECT_EXPERIENCE_SUMMARY.md`
- Modify: `docs/team/QUALITY_STANDARD.md`
- [ ] Run `go test ./... -count=1`.
- [ ] Run `go vet ./...`.
- [ ] Run `go build ./cmd/server`.
- [ ] Run `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run test:run`.
- [ ] Run `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run lint`.
- [ ] Run `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run build`.
- [ ] Update docs only with the results actually observed on this branch state.

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# Profile Page Local Closure Implementation Plan
> **For agentic workers:** REQUIRED SUB-SKILL: Use superpowers:subagent-driven-development (recommended) or superpowers:executing-plans to implement this plan task-by-task. Steps use checkbox (`- [ ]`) syntax for tracking.
**Goal:** Add a real browser scenario for `/profile`, keep the supported E2E gate green, and add the smallest regression coverage needed if the new scenario exposes a product defect.
**Architecture:** Extend the existing Playwright CDP runner with one dedicated `profile-management` scenario built on the same admin-create-user flow already used by other auth scenarios. Keep product changes minimal and only if the scenario proves a real bug in profile page load, update, or navigation behavior.
**Tech Stack:** Playwright CDP runner, React admin frontend, Vitest, existing Go backend APIs.
---
### Task 1: Add the red browser scenario
**Files:**
- Modify: `frontend/admin/scripts/run-playwright-cdp-e2e.mjs`
- [ ] Add a new scenario entry named `profile-management` to the supported scenario list.
- [ ] Implement the scenario with real admin login, real user creation, real user login, `/profile` page verification, one real profile update, and the `/profile` to `/profile/security` navigation proof.
- [ ] Run `cd frontend/admin && $env:E2E_SCENARIOS='profile-management'; npm.cmd run e2e:full:win`.
- [ ] Confirm the first failure is a real product or runner reason before changing product code.
### Task 2: Fix the exposed issue with TDD if needed
**Files:**
- Modify only the minimal affected product files exposed by Task 1
- Test: affected profile page or service Vitest files only
- [ ] Add the smallest failing regression test for the exposed issue.
- [ ] Run that regression test and verify it fails for the expected reason.
- [ ] Implement the minimal fix.
- [ ] Re-run the targeted regression test until it passes.
### Task 3: Re-verify the profile browser scenario
**Files:**
- Modify: `frontend/admin/scripts/run-playwright-cdp-e2e.mjs`
- [ ] Re-run `cd frontend/admin && $env:E2E_SCENARIOS='profile-management'; npm.cmd run e2e:full:win`.
- [ ] Confirm the targeted profile scenario passes without weakening assertions.
- [ ] If the scenario changed the product contract, re-run the directly affected Vitest files.
### Task 4: Re-run the supported frontend gate and sync docs
**Files:**
- Modify: `docs/status/REAL_PROJECT_STATUS.md`
- Modify: `docs/team/PRODUCTION_CHECKLIST.md`
- Modify: `docs/team/TECHNICAL_GUIDE.md`
- Modify: `docs/team/PROJECT_EXPERIENCE_SUMMARY.md`
- Modify: `docs/team/QUALITY_STANDARD.md`
- [ ] Run `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run lint`.
- [ ] Run `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run build`.
- [ ] Run `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run e2e:full:win`.
- [ ] Update docs only with the results actually observed on this branch state.

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# Prelaunch Navigation And Batch Delete Implementation Plan
> **For agentic workers:** REQUIRED SUB-SKILL: Use superpowers:subagent-driven-development (recommended) or superpowers:executing-plans to implement this plan task-by-task. Steps use checkbox (`- [ ]`) syntax for tracking.
**Goal:** Fix the release-blocking admin mobile navigation browser path and strengthen bulk-delete confirmation on the users admin page.
**Architecture:** Keep the product changes minimal and local to the admin frontend. Make mobile drawer state transitions explicit in `AdminLayout`, harden the supported E2E scenario around the real drawer surface, and upgrade `UsersPage` bulk delete from a lightweight pop confirmation to a stronger modal confirmation without changing backend APIs.
**Tech Stack:** React 18, Ant Design, React Router, Vitest, Playwright CDP runner.
---
### Task 1: Capture the failing browser evidence
**Files:**
- Modify: none
- [ ] Run `cd frontend/admin && $env:E2E_SCENARIOS='desktop-mobile-navigation'; npm.cmd run e2e:full:win`.
- [ ] Record the exact failing step and whether the drawer fails to open, the selector fails to resolve, or navigation fails after selection.
- [ ] Do not change product code until the failure mode is confirmed.
### Task 2: Add the AdminLayout regression first
**Files:**
- Modify: `frontend/admin/src/layouts/AdminLayout/AdminLayout.test.tsx`
- Modify: `frontend/admin/src/layouts/AdminLayout/AdminLayout.tsx`
- [ ] Add a failing test that switches from desktop to mobile, opens the menu, navigates through the drawer, and proves the drawer closes deterministically after selection.
- [ ] Run `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run test:run -- src/layouts/AdminLayout/AdminLayout.test.tsx`.
- [ ] Confirm the new assertion fails for the current implementation before fixing the layout.
### Task 3: Fix mobile drawer state and harden the browser scenario
**Files:**
- Modify: `frontend/admin/src/layouts/AdminLayout/AdminLayout.tsx`
- Modify: `frontend/admin/scripts/run-playwright-cdp-e2e.mjs`
- [ ] Replace toggle-based mobile drawer state transitions with explicit open and close handlers.
- [ ] Keep desktop collapse behavior unchanged.
- [ ] Narrow browser selectors and waits so the scenario checks the intended mobile button and the open drawer content.
- [ ] Re-run `cd frontend/admin && $env:E2E_SCENARIOS='desktop-mobile-navigation'; npm.cmd run e2e:full:win`.
### Task 4: Add the UsersPage regression first
**Files:**
- Modify: `frontend/admin/src/pages/admin/UsersPage/UsersPage.test.tsx`
- Modify: `frontend/admin/src/pages/admin/UsersPage/UsersPage.tsx`
- [ ] Add a failing test that selects users, triggers bulk delete, verifies no delete happens on the first lightweight action alone, and confirms the API call only occurs after the stronger explicit confirmation.
- [ ] Run `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run test:run -- src/pages/admin/UsersPage/UsersPage.test.tsx`.
- [ ] Confirm the new assertion fails for the current implementation before changing the page.
### Task 5: Implement stronger bulk-delete confirmation
**Files:**
- Modify: `frontend/admin/src/pages/admin/UsersPage/UsersPage.tsx`
- [ ] Replace the direct `Popconfirm` bulk-delete path with a stronger confirmation modal flow.
- [ ] Keep the existing self-delete guard and empty-selection guard.
- [ ] After confirmation, keep existing success behavior: call `batchDelete`, clear selection, and refresh the list.
- [ ] Re-run `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run test:run -- src/pages/admin/UsersPage/UsersPage.test.tsx`.
### Task 6: Verify the affected frontend surface
**Files:**
- Modify: only if verification reveals another real defect
- [ ] Run `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run test:run -- src/layouts/AdminLayout/AdminLayout.test.tsx src/pages/admin/UsersPage/UsersPage.test.tsx`.
- [ ] Run `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run lint`.
- [ ] Run `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run build`.
- [ ] Re-run `cd frontend/admin && $env:E2E_SCENARIOS='desktop-mobile-navigation'; npm.cmd run e2e:full:win`.
- [ ] Report the results exactly as observed, including any remaining risk if full-suite E2E is not rerun in this turn.

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# Permissions Browser CRUD Design
**Date:** 2026-04-23
**Goal:** Extend the supported Playwright CDP browser gate so the admin `PermissionsPage` is covered by a real CRUD scenario instead of remaining outside the main browser acceptance path.
## Scope
- Add one new supported browser scenario: `permissions-management-crud`.
- Cover real admin login, permissions page load, top-level permission creation, child permission creation, list/tree verification, edit, status toggle, and delete.
- Reuse the existing supported runner `frontend/admin/scripts/run-playwright-cdp-e2e.mjs`.
- Keep selector strategy aligned with current team rules: prefer route, heading, role, label, and scoped containers over broad text scans.
## Non-Goals
- No redesign of the permissions page UI.
- No new backend permissions model behavior beyond what the existing page and APIs already expose.
- No expansion into OS-level automation or unsupported browser tooling.
## Approach
- Treat the new browser scenario as the primary verification surface.
- If the scenario exposes a product defect, add the smallest regression test needed in the affected frontend or backend area, then fix the product behavior.
- If the scenario exposes only runner fragility, fix the runner instead of weakening assertions.
## Required Browser Flow
1. Log in as a real admin through the supported login surface.
2. Open `/permissions` and verify the page heading renders.
3. Create a new top-level permission through the page modal and wait for the real create API response.
4. Create a child permission under that top-level node and wait for the real create API response.
5. Switch to list view and verify the new permissions appear.
6. Edit the top-level permission through the page modal and wait for the real update API response.
7. Toggle the permission status through the page action and wait for the real status API response.
8. Delete the child permission, then the top-level permission, each with real delete API responses.
9. Verify the created records are gone from the visible page state.
## Verification
- Targeted red/green loop:
- `cd frontend/admin && $env:E2E_SCENARIOS='permissions-management-crud'; npm.cmd run e2e:full:win`
- If product code changes:
- run affected frontend tests first
- then `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run test:run`
- then `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run lint`
- then `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run build`
- Final acceptance:
- `go test ./... -count=1`
- `go vet ./...`
- `go build ./cmd/server`
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run test:run`
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run lint`
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run build`
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run e2e:full:win`

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# Profile Page Local Closure Design
**Date:** 2026-04-24
**Goal:** Extend the supported browser-level acceptance path so `/profile` itself is covered by a real user-facing browser scenario, not only `/profile/security`.
## Scope
- Add one new supported browser scenario: `profile-management`.
- Cover real user login, `/profile` load, visible account data verification, basic profile update, and the in-page navigation path from `/profile` to `/profile/security`.
- Reuse the existing Playwright CDP runner and current admin-created test-user flow.
- Keep assertions aligned with current page semantics: route, heading, stable placeholders, submit button, and visible account info.
## Non-Goals
- No third-party OAuth live verification.
- No new product features for profile editing.
- No attempt to prove OS-level automation.
## Approach
- Treat `/profile` as a separate supported browser scenario instead of folding it into `profile-and-security`.
- Use the existing admin login plus real user creation path to avoid depending on pre-seeded normal-user fixtures.
- If the scenario exposes a product defect, add the smallest affected regression test first and then fix the product behavior.
## Required Browser Flow
1. Log in as a real admin through the supported login surface.
2. Open `/users` and create a normal user with a known password.
3. Reset the browser session to the public login surface.
4. Log in as the created user and confirm landing on `/profile`.
5. Verify `/profile` heading and visible account data render from real API responses.
6. Update editable profile fields through the real save action and wait for the real update API response.
7. Verify the updated values appear in the visible page state.
8. Follow the `/profile` to `/profile/security` navigation entry and confirm the security page loads.
9. Reset back to login so the scenario leaves no authenticated browser state behind.
## Verification
- Targeted red/green loop:
- `cd frontend/admin && $env:E2E_SCENARIOS='profile-management'; npm.cmd run e2e:full:win`
- If product code changes:
- run the directly affected Vitest files first
- then `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run lint`
- then `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run build`
- Final acceptance:
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run e2e:full:win`

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# Prelaunch Navigation And Batch Delete Design
**Date:** 2026-05-10
**Goal:** Remove the release-blocking `desktop-mobile-navigation` browser failure and strengthen the admin users batch-delete confirmation flow identified in the 2026-05-10 prelaunch report.
## Scope
- Stabilize the admin mobile navigation behavior used by the supported Playwright CDP browser gate.
- Keep the `desktop-mobile-navigation` scenario as a real product verification path instead of weakening it into a runner-only smoke check.
- Strengthen the `UsersPage` batch-delete confirmation so destructive bulk actions require clearer intent than the current single pop confirmation.
- Add focused frontend regression coverage for both changes.
## Non-Goals
- No redesign of the admin layout visual system.
- No change to backend user deletion APIs or authorization rules.
- No expansion of the prelaunch recommendations unrelated to today's release blockers, such as password strength hints, dashboard charts, or OAuth button loading states.
## Current Findings
### 1. Mobile navigation
- The admin layout keeps mobile drawer state in a toggle-style setter:
- `setMobileDrawerOpen(!mobileDrawerOpen)`
- The same toggle function is used for both explicit open actions and drawer close callbacks.
- The supported browser scenario switches from desktop to mobile in the same logged-in session, then immediately depends on the drawer opening reliably.
- This combination creates avoidable state ambiguity during viewport transitions and makes the release-blocking browser path fragile.
### 2. Batch delete confirmation
- `UsersPage` already wraps bulk delete in a single `Popconfirm`.
- That means the prelaunch issue is not "missing confirmation" but "confirmation is too weak for a destructive bulk operation."
- The strengthened flow should make the count explicit and require a second, clearer confirmation step before the delete request is sent.
## Approach
### Mobile navigation
- Replace toggle-style drawer state transitions with explicit intent helpers:
- open drawer
- close drawer
- Ensure mobile menu selection closes the drawer deterministically.
- Keep desktop collapse behavior unchanged.
- Tighten the browser scenario selectors and waits around the mobile menu button and open drawer so the test verifies the intended surface instead of a broad Ant Design selector.
### Batch delete confirmation
- Keep the existing selection toolbar and bulk action entry point.
- Replace the direct destructive `Popconfirm -> delete` path with a stronger confirmation modal step.
- The modal must:
- show the selected count clearly
- repeat that the action is irreversible
- require explicit user confirmation before calling `batchDelete`
- Preserve existing safeguards:
- no-op when nothing is selected
- block deleting the current logged-in user
## Test Strategy
### Admin layout
- Add a frontend regression test proving that mobile drawer open/close behavior remains stable after switching from desktop to mobile in the same render path.
- Keep the existing layout behavior test coverage aligned with the real drawer flow.
### Users page
- Add a failing regression test for the strengthened bulk-delete flow:
- selecting rows does not delete immediately
- destructive API call happens only after the second explicit confirmation
- success state clears selection and refreshes data
### Browser verification
- Reproduce and then rerun the supported scenario:
- `cd frontend/admin && $env:E2E_SCENARIOS='desktop-mobile-navigation'; npm.cmd run e2e:full:win`
## Verification
- Targeted browser check:
- `cd frontend/admin && $env:E2E_SCENARIOS='desktop-mobile-navigation'; npm.cmd run e2e:full:win`
- Targeted frontend tests:
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run test:run -- src/layouts/AdminLayout/AdminLayout.test.tsx src/pages/admin/UsersPage/UsersPage.test.tsx`
- Frontend quality gate for affected area:
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run lint`
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run build`

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@@ -1 +1,50 @@
// Package docs GENERATED BY SWAG; DO NOT EDIT
package docs
import (
"encoding/json"
)
// SwaggerInfo holds the Swagger information
var SwaggerInfo = &swaggerInfo{
Version: "1.0",
Host: "localhost:8080",
BasePath: "/",
Schemes: []string{"http", "https"},
Title: "User Management System API",
Description: "API for user management, authentication, and authorization",
}
type swaggerInfo struct {
Version string `json:"version"`
Host string `json:"host"`
BasePath string `json:"basePath"`
Schemes []string `json:"schemes"`
Title string `json:"title"`
Description string `json:"description"`
}
// SwaggerJSON returns the swagger spec as JSON
var SwaggerJSON = `{
"swagger": "2.0",
"info": {
"title": "User Management System API",
"description": "API for user management, authentication, and authorization",
"version": "1.0"
},
"host": "localhost:8080",
"basePath": "/",
"schemes": ["http", "https"],
"paths": {}
}`
// GetSwagger returns the swagger specification
func GetSwagger() []byte {
return []byte(SwaggerJSON)
}
func init() {
// Initialize swagger
s := GetSwagger()
var _ = json.Unmarshal(s, &swaggerInfo{})
}

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@@ -125,3 +125,140 @@ npm.cmd run e2e:full:win
- [ ] 若包装脚本、临时缓存、工作目录切换或环境注入失败,已按真实失败处理,而不是拿局部命令绿灯代替。
- [ ] `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run test:run``cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run test:coverage` 运行后,无 `window.alert``window.confirm``window.prompt``window.open` 调用和 jsdom `Not implemented` 噪声。
- [ ] 如本轮改动把 stub、`not implemented` 或 mock 接口切换为 live 实现,已补充负向权限测试、边界条件测试、失败回滚测试。
## 2026-04-23 Latest Gate Snapshot
Use this section as the current release-facing snapshot for the workspace. If older notes elsewhere in this file conflict with this section, use this snapshot first.
### Re-verified Commands
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run test:run -- src/pages/admin/DevicesPage/DevicesPage.test.tsx`
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run test:run -- src/services/webhooks.test.ts`
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run test:run -- src/pages/admin/WebhooksPage/WebhooksPage.test.tsx`
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run test:run -- src/services/social-accounts.test.ts`
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run test:run -- src/services/settings.test.ts src/pages/admin/SettingsPage/SettingsPage.test.tsx src/pages/admin/ImportExportPage/ImportExportPage.test.tsx`
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run lint`
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run build`
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run e2e:full:win`
### Current Honest Release Conclusion
- The supported browser-level acceptance path `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run e2e:full:win` is green again in the current workspace.
- The latest green browser run included `admin-bootstrap`, `public-registration`, `email-activation`, `login-surface`, `auth-workflow`, `responsive-login`, `desktop-mobile-navigation`, `user-management-crud`, `user-management-batch`, `role-management-crud`, `device-management`, `login-logs`, `operation-logs`, `webhook-management`, `import-export`, `profile-and-security`, `settings`, and `dashboard-stats`.
- This evidence is sufficient for the supported browser-level gate, but it does not by itself replace the backend full matrix (`go test ./... -count=1`, `go vet ./...`, `go build ./cmd/server`).
- This snapshot also does not prove OS-level automation, live third-party OAuth validation, or external secrets/KMS delivery evidence.
## 2026-04-23 Additional Browser Gate Checks
- [ ] Cursor or list-page changes include a regression proving initial load does not self-trigger `next_cursor` pagination or burst extra requests.
- [ ] Frontend service changes against admin APIs verify exact response-envelope fields in service tests, not only page rendering.
- [ ] Frontend services using the shared HTTP client do not unwrap `data` twice; service tests reflect the real `request()` contract.
- [ ] Playwright selector changes prefer route, heading, role, or labeled-control locators over broad text searches.
- [ ] If suite retry reuses the same backend state, bootstrap or similar one-time preconditions are re-evaluated before rerunning browser scenarios.
- [ ] If a late-suite E2E failure blocks release, the release note records whether the root cause was product behavior, contract drift, selector drift, or browser-runtime instability.
## 2026-04-23 Password Reset Gate Snapshot
### Latest Green Evidence
- `go test ./... -count=1`
- `go vet ./...`
- `go build ./cmd/server`
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run test:run`
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run lint`
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run build`
- `cd frontend/admin && node --check ./scripts/run-playwright-cdp-e2e.mjs`
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run e2e:full:win`
### Current Honest Release Conclusion
- The current supported browser-level gate is green with `19` scenarios and now includes `password-reset`.
- The same branch state also re-proved the backend full matrix and the frontend unit/lint/build matrix.
- This still does not prove OS-level automation or live third-party OAuth/secrets delivery.
### Additional Checklist Items
- [ ] If a public auth route is conditionally mounted, `/api/v1/auth/capabilities` exposes the same availability bit from the same source of truth.
- [ ] A newly added auth or session browser flow is only accepted after both its targeted run and the full supported browser gate are green.
- [ ] When CDP loses the persistent page late in the suite, fix runner recovery before classifying the gate as inherently flaky.
## 2026-04-23 Permissions CRUD And Full Matrix Snapshot
Use this section first if earlier 2026-04-23 notes in this file conflict with it.
### Latest Green Evidence
- `go test ./... -count=1`
- `go vet ./...`
- `go build ./cmd/server`
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run test:run`
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run lint`
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run build`
- `cd frontend/admin && node --check ./scripts/run-playwright-cdp-e2e.mjs`
- `cd frontend/admin && $env:E2E_SCENARIOS='permissions-management-crud'; npm.cmd run e2e:full:win`
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run e2e:full:win`
### Current Honest Release Conclusion
- The current supported browser-level gate is green with `20` scenarios and now includes `permissions-management-crud`.
- The same branch state also re-proved the backend full matrix and the frontend unit, lint, and build matrix.
- This evidence proves the supported browser-level acceptance path in the current workspace. It still does not prove OS-level automation, live third-party OAuth validation, or external secrets or KMS delivery evidence.
### Additional Checklist Items
- [ ] If a frontend service normalizes backend enum values for UI consumption, tests cover the raw backend payload shape, the normalized frontend shape, and outbound write serialization.
- [ ] If a browser scenario succeeds in the page but CDP request or response observers miss the proxied call, runner-level proof records the real in-page fetch result before classifying the product as broken.
- [ ] If a modal-driven CRUD flow depends on an overlay leaving animation, the next user action waits for the modal to stop blocking interaction instead of relying on a broad hidden assertion alone.
- [ ] If `npm.cmd run build` depends on Vite native config loading on Windows, the supported config keeps HTML inputs under an explicit project root instead of relying on wrapper scripts to mask absolute-path errors.
## 2026-04-24 Profile Security Contract Recovery Snapshot
### Latest Green Evidence
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run test:run -- src/pages/admin/ProfileSecurityPage/ProfileSecurityPage.behavior.test.tsx src/services/profile.test.ts src/services/service_adapters_additional.test.ts`
- `cd frontend/admin && node --check ./scripts/run-playwright-cdp-e2e.mjs`
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run lint`
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run build`
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run e2e:full:win`
### Current Honest Release Conclusion
- The supported browser-level gate remains green with `20` scenarios after the real `profile-and-security` password-update contract fix.
- This round re-proved the directly affected frontend regression set, lint, build, and the supported browser gate on the same workspace state.
- This round did not re-run the backend full matrix, so backend-wide claims still rely on the latest earlier verified snapshot.
### Additional Checklist Items
- [ ] If a UI form shape differs from the backend write contract, the service adapter must serialize the backend field names explicitly and service tests must pin the exact outbound payload.
- [ ] If a browser runner waits on in-page fetch diagnostics, that wait must be created in the same control flow as the submit action and must not be allowed to outlive a failed click or fill step.
## 2026-04-24 Scenario-Isolated Browser Gate Snapshot
### Latest Green Evidence
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run test:run -- src/lib/playwright-e2e-scenarios.test.ts`
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run test:run`
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run lint`
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run build`
- `cd frontend/admin && $env:E2E_SCENARIOS='email-activation'; npm.cmd run e2e:full:win`
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run e2e:full:win`
### Current Honest Release Conclusion
- The supported browser-level gate is green again in the current workspace after changing the wrapper to run each scenario in a fresh browser process while keeping one real backend and one real test database alive.
- The latest green full run executed `21` isolated scenario runs: `admin-bootstrap` plus the `20` steady-state scenarios behind it.
- This evidence proves the documented browser-level acceptance path in the current workspace. It does not by itself prove that the underlying Chromium host-runtime `0x5` issue has disappeared.
### Additional Checklist Items
- [ ] If the host browser runtime is the unstable component, isolate browser processes per scenario before expanding suite-level retries.
- [ ] If the supported gate uses scenario isolation, the wrapper still preserves one real backend, one real frontend server, one real SMTP capture path, and one real test database for the whole run.
- [ ] The scenario list used by the wrapper is derived from the same source as the Playwright runner and is not duplicated manually in release-critical code.
## 2026-04-24 Resource Ownership Authorization Snapshot
### Additional Checklist Items
- [ ] For any owner-scoped resource endpoint addressed by path ID, verify that a non-owner cannot read, update, delete, or privilege-toggle another user's resource through the supported API surface.
- [ ] For the same endpoint family, verify that the service layer re-checks ownership or admin privilege instead of trusting only a handler-level path check.
- [ ] When admin cross-user access is intentional, add one positive regression proving the admin path still works after the IDOR fix.

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@@ -269,3 +269,80 @@
- 这种漂移会把下一轮修复引向过时优先级。
- 经验:
文档更新不是交付后的清理工作,而是交付本身的一部分。
## 0. 2026-04-23 E2E Recovery Lessons
Use this section as the newest summary of what changed in the workspace after the E2E recovery. If older notes elsewhere in this file conflict with it, trust this section.
- A green main browser gate was recovered by fixing real product and test mismatches, not by wrapper retries alone.
- The concrete regressions found in this recovery were:
- `DevicesPage` cursor flow could self-trigger a second page request and flood `/admin/devices`.
- `webhooks` and `social-accounts` services decoded the wrong backend response shapes.
- `settings` service unwrapped `data` twice even though the shared HTTP client had already returned `result.data`.
- Broad text-based Playwright assertions in later admin scenarios created brittle false negatives.
- The latest evidence set for this recovery was:
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run test:run -- src/pages/admin/DevicesPage/DevicesPage.test.tsx`
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run test:run -- src/services/webhooks.test.ts`
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run test:run -- src/pages/admin/WebhooksPage/WebhooksPage.test.tsx`
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run test:run -- src/services/social-accounts.test.ts`
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run lint`
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run build`
- `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run e2e:full:win`
- Practical rule: when `e2e:full:win` fails late in the suite, inspect both real application behavior and locator or route assumptions before blaming only browser or CDP instability.
## 2026-04-23 Governance Lessons From E2E Recovery
- A red browser gate can hide several different failure classes at once: product bug, integration-contract drift, selector drift, and browser-runtime instability.
- This recovery was closed by fixing real contract and locator problems, not by increasing retries around the wrapper.
- Pagination regressions are high-noise defects: they often show up as rate limiting, empty lists, or flaky E2E much earlier than they show up as obvious local exceptions.
- Response-envelope mismatches are easy to miss when pages silently fall back to empty arrays or partial data; service tests must pin the real backend field names.
- Documentation lag recreates stale priorities. Once the supported browser gate changes state, norms and experience docs need the same-day update.
- Browser-suite retry logic can create false failures when the first attempt mutates one-time backend state. Retry code has to re-read live preconditions instead of replaying stale assumptions.
## 2026-04-23 Password Reset Expansion Lessons
- Capability endpoints and mounted routes are one product contract. If the route is live but the capability bit is false, the browser surface is still effectively broken.
- A targeted green scenario is not enough evidence when the supported gate is the full suite. The 19th scenario only counted after `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run e2e:full:win` stayed green.
- Late-suite CDP page loss is best treated as a recoverable connection problem first, not as a reason to blindly multiply wrapper retries.
- Real auth coverage is worth the setup cost. The password-reset scenario now proves SMTP capture, token validation, password reset submission, and post-reset login in one browser chain.
## 2026-04-23 Permissions CRUD Closure Lessons
- A red browser scenario can come from product behavior, adapter drift, auth-header handling, or runner observation gaps. The fastest path was to separate those four possibilities instead of assuming every timeout meant browser flakiness.
- A successful browser fetch does not guarantee that Playwright CDP request or response listeners will observe the call under every proxy path. When the UI updated and the in-page fetch log showed `201` and `200`, the correct conclusion was "runner evidence gap", not "permission create is broken".
- Shared HTTP client state is easy to misread under concurrency. "A refresh is in flight" and "this request lacks a usable token" are different facts; merging them creates false auth regressions.
- Adapter normalization changes must update both focused service tests and aggregate service suites. Fixing only the local adapter test leaves a second failure surface in cross-service regression packs.
- Modal animations are a real source of E2E false negatives. A dialog that is visually closing can still block clicks long enough to break the next CRUD step unless the runner waits for the overlay to stop intercepting input.
- Build tooling can be a real release blocker. Vite root resolution on Windows became part of the supported gate the moment `npm.cmd run build` started failing under the documented command.
- The 20th browser scenario only counted after two proofs existed on the same branch state: the targeted `permissions-management-crud` run and the full `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run e2e:full:win` run.
## 2026-04-24 Profile Security Contract Recovery Lessons
- Browser E2E is often the first place where outbound write contracts are validated end to end. A service adapter can look fine in page-level tests while still sending the wrong backend field names.
- Service tests must assert the serialized write payload, not only the UI form model. Otherwise the test suite can lock in the wrong contract and make the browser suite the first honest signal.
- Orphaned async diagnostics waste debugging time. A failed click or fill should not leave a background fetch waiter alive long enough to crash during cleanup and hide the real failing step.
- A targeted scenario recovery is still not enough evidence on its own. The `profile-and-security` fix only counted after `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run e2e:full:win` returned green on the same workspace state.
## 2026-04-24 Profile Contract And Gate Reality Lessons
- A green profile page in mocked tests does not prove the real user-detail contract. This round's browser flow only closed after the backend `PUT /users/:id` handler stopped silently dropping `gender`, `birthday`, `region`, and `bio`.
- Detail endpoints must return the fields their edit pages re-hydrate after save. Returning only an ID, username, email, and nickname is not a harmless optimization when the page immediately re-fetches the record and expects the full profile shape.
- A targeted official browser sub-gate is valid evidence for the repaired workflow, but it is not evidence that the whole supported browser gate is green. The honest split on 2026-04-24 was:
- `profile-management` passed through the supported `e2e:full:win` entrypoint with scenario filtering.
- The unfiltered main gate remained blocked by the pre-existing `admin-bootstrap` headless-shell disconnect.
- Wrapper drift matters. Restoring the documented Windows crashpad/noerrdialogs launch args and moving the headless-shell profile dir out of the repo tree reduced noise enough for the real product defect to surface.
## 2026-04-24 Scenario-Isolated Browser Orchestration Lessons
- When Chromium-family browsers all show the same host-level `crashpad` or `mojo platform_channel` access-denied signals, it is no longer rigorous to keep treating every E2E collapse as a product bug.
- Shared backend state does not require a shared browser process. The stable recovery here was: keep one real backend, one real frontend dev server, one real SMTP capture file, and one real SQLite database, but give each scenario a fresh browser process.
- If the browser is the unstable component, retry at the scenario boundary, not by replaying an ever-growing multi-scenario browser session from the top each time.
- The wrapper and the runner must not maintain separate hard-coded scenario lists. Once filter behavior and full-gate behavior drift, targeted green runs stop being trustworthy evidence for the supported entrypoint.
## 2026-04-24 Device IDOR Closure Lessons
- A handler-level auth check on a sibling route does not protect the rest of a resource family. `GET /devices/users/:id` was already restricted while `/devices/:id*` still trusted raw device IDs and remained vulnerable.
- Ownership-sensitive APIs need actor-aware service entry points. Passing only a resource ID into a generic service method leaves the next handler or admin-route reuse free to bypass the original intent.
- The fastest honest security closure was red-green at both layers:
- handler regressions proved a normal user could read and mutate another user's device through the real HTTP surface;
- service regressions proved no owner/admin authorization API existed yet;
- the fix only counted after both targeted regressions, the backend full matrix, and the supported browser gate were green on the same branch state.

View File

@@ -365,3 +365,48 @@ npm.cmd run e2e:full:win
3. 为每个确认接受的修复补回归测试。
4. 重新执行受影响的完整门禁。
5. 只有在以上完成后,才进入结构清理或一般优化。
## 2026-04-23 E2E Recovery Governance Supplement
Use this section as the current normative supplement when older sections are silent on late-stage browser regressions.
- Cursor pagination must separate the request cursor from the response `next_cursor`. If a page updates request state directly from the response on initial load, add a regression test proving it does not auto-fetch follow-up pages.
- Frontend service adapters must decode backend envelopes by exact field names and must match the shared HTTP client contract exactly. Any admin API shape change requires a service-level regression test and at least one consuming page regression.
- Admin-surface E2E assertions must prefer route, heading, role, or labeled-control locators. Broad text matching is not sufficient when the same text can appear in menus, cards, tables, and toasts.
- When `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run e2e:full:win` fails in the late suite, triage in this order: backend contract mismatch, page-state or pagination bug, selector assumption bug, then CDP or browser-runtime instability.
- Browser-suite retry code must refresh mutable preconditions such as `admin_bootstrap_required` from live backend capabilities before re-running scenarios against the same backend state.
- When the supported browser gate changes from red to green or from green to red, update `docs/status/REAL_PROJECT_STATUS.md`, `docs/team/QUALITY_STANDARD.md`, `docs/team/TECHNICAL_GUIDE.md`, and `docs/team/PROJECT_EXPERIENCE_SUMMARY.md` in the same batch.
## 2026-04-23 Password Reset And CDP Stability Supplement
- Capability endpoints must reflect real mounted-route availability. If password reset, email code, SMS code, or similar auth routes are conditionally mounted, the matching capability flags must be derived from the same condition or explicitly synchronized at assembly time.
- A new auth or session browser scenario only counts as accepted when the targeted scenario is green and the full supported browser gate `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run e2e:full:win` is green on the same branch state.
- Playwright CDP recovery must attempt connection-level recovery when the persistent page disappears late in the suite. Declaring failure before trying to reconnect is not an acceptable steady-state gate design.
## 2026-04-23 Permissions CRUD And Full Matrix Governance Supplement
Use this section as the current supplement when older sections do not cover permissions CRUD closure or runner-observation mismatches.
- If a frontend adapter normalizes backend enums or status values, the regression set must cover three layers on the same change: raw backend payload acceptance, normalized frontend read shape, and outbound write serialization.
- Shared auth clients must attach the current non-expired access token immediately. An unrelated refresh already in flight is not a valid reason to downgrade a request to missing auth.
- When a supported browser scenario depends on real network proof and CDP request or response observers miss the call, use evidence derived from the real page fetch path before classifying the failure as product behavior. Runner instrumentation must not silently redefine a healthy product as broken.
- Modal, drawer, or overlay transitions that still intercept input after close has started must be treated as first-class E2E timing constraints. Wait for interaction blocking to stop, not only for a broad visibility assertion.
- Backend handlers that accept admin CRUD writes must remain compatible with the payload forms actually sent by the current browser client during rollout, including numeric enum values such as permission `type=0` and mixed numeric or string status updates when those paths are supported.
- Supported build commands are part of the release gate. If Vite or another build tool requires an explicit project root or equivalent configuration for the documented command to pass, fix the project config rather than relying on an ad hoc wrapper or local shell state.
## 2026-04-24 Profile Security Contract Recovery Supplement
- If a form includes UI-only fields such as `confirm_password`, outbound service code must strip or remap those fields before hitting the API. UI form names are not a valid substitute for the backend write contract.
- Service regression tests for write paths must assert the exact payload sent into the shared HTTP client, not only the values collected from the component or form layer.
- Browser-runner fetch or response waiters must be action-scoped. A waiter that can outlive a failed action and later crash with a page-closed error is not acceptable verification infrastructure.
## 2026-04-24 Scenario-Isolated Browser Gate Supplement
- The supported Windows browser gate may share one real backend and one real test database while still isolating browser processes per scenario. Reusing a single long-lived browser is not a quality requirement when the browser runtime itself is the unstable component.
- If browser-runtime instability is external to the product and reproducible across Chromium variants, recover at the scenario boundary with a fresh browser before classifying the supported gate as inherently flaky.
- The supported wrapper and the Playwright runner must derive selected scenario names from one shared source of truth. Duplicated scenario lists are a governance bug because they can make filtered evidence disagree with the documented main gate.
## 2026-04-24 Resource Ownership Authorization Supplement
- A path parameter is never sufficient authorization for an owner-scoped resource. For endpoints such as `/devices/:id`, `/users/:id/password`, and similar resource-by-id APIs, the handler must pass actor identity into the service layer and the service layer must re-check ownership or admin privilege before reading or mutating the resource.
- IDOR regression coverage for owner-scoped resources must include at least one non-owner read attempt, one non-owner mutation attempt, one non-owner destructive attempt, and one privileged state-change attempt such as trust, status, or reset semantics. Include one admin positive path when admin access is part of the contract.

View File

@@ -153,3 +153,157 @@ npm.cmd run e2e:full:win
- `docs/status/REAL_PROJECT_STATUS.md`
- 规则变化时更新 `docs/team/QUALITY_STANDARD.md`
- 产出可复用经验时更新 `docs/team/PROJECT_EXPERIENCE_SUMMARY.md`
## 0. 2026-04-23 Latest Technical Snapshot
Use this section as the current workspace truth when older notes elsewhere in this file describe earlier failures.
### Main Acceptance Path
- The supported browser-level gate remains `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run e2e:full:win`.
- That gate was re-run green on 2026-04-23 after fixes in device pagination flow, backend-response envelope decoding, settings-service adapter alignment, and Playwright CDP selector and suite-retry stability.
### Recovery Notes That Matter
- `DevicesPage` must keep the request cursor separate from the response `next_cursor`; otherwise the initial load can auto-chain into extra `/admin/devices` requests and trigger rate limiting.
- Frontend services must decode backend envelopes by their actual fields and by the shared HTTP client contract. The recovered cases in this round were `list`, `deliveries`, `accounts`, and `/admin/settings` direct `data`.
- Late-stage E2E scenarios are more stable when assertions target route, heading, and role-based locators instead of broad page text matches.
- If suite retry reuses the same backend process, one-time preconditions such as `admin-bootstrap` must be refreshed from live backend capabilities before the next attempt starts.
### Boundary
- This snapshot proves browser-level real E2E closure in the current workspace.
- It does not by itself prove the full backend matrix, OS-level automation, or live third-party provider verification.
## 2026-04-23 Late-Suite E2E Triage Order
Use this order before blaming the browser wrapper when `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run e2e:full:win` fails in later admin scenarios.
1. Check whether the failing page consumes an API whose response envelope or field names changed.
2. Check whether the page state machine, pagination flow, or derived state issued unexpected follow-up requests.
3. Check whether the failing assertion uses a broad text locator where route, heading, role, or labeled-control matching would be more precise.
4. Only after the first three checks stay clean, investigate CDP session lifecycle, page/context closure, or local browser startup instability.
## 2026-04-23 Password Reset And CDP Recovery Notes
### Root Cause
- The password-reset browser gap came from a backend contract omission: `/api/v1/auth/capabilities` returned `password_reset=false` even when `passwordResetHandler` was mounted and the reset routes were live.
### Minimal Fix
- `AuthHandler` now carries the password-reset capability bit and fills `caps.PasswordReset` in `GetAuthCapabilities()`.
- Router assembly now synchronizes that bit from the same `passwordResetHandler != nil` condition that mounts the reset routes.
### Browser Flow Proof
- The supported browser suite now proves the real password-reset chain end to end:
- admin creates a real user
- login surface exposes the forgot-password entry
- `/api/v1/auth/forgot-password` emits a real SMTP-captured reset link
- `/api/v1/auth/password/validate` and `/api/v1/auth/reset-password` complete through the browser
- the user logs in with the new password
### Stability Rule
- When headless-shell closes the last live target late in the suite, reconnect the CDP browser connection and reacquire the persistent page before declaring the whole run failed.
## 2026-04-23 Permissions CRUD And Full Matrix Technical Snapshot
Use this section as the newest technical snapshot when earlier 2026-04-23 notes describe only the 19-scenario gate.
### Main Acceptance Path
- The supported browser-level gate remains `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run e2e:full:win`.
- That gate was re-run green on 2026-04-23 after adding `permissions-management-crud`, fixing permissions payload compatibility, fixing auth-header selection under concurrent refresh state, and stabilizing CDP observation for proxied permission calls.
- The same branch state also re-ran `go test ./... -count=1`, `go vet ./...`, `go build ./cmd/server`, `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run test:run`, `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run lint`, and `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run build` successfully.
### Recovery Notes That Matter
- The permissions frontend adapter must accept raw numeric backend `type` values, normalize them to the frontend string enum, and serialize writes back to the backend numeric form.
- The permissions backend handler must continue accepting menu `type=0` and status payloads delivered as either numeric or string values, because real browser flows and clients can send both forms during incremental rollout.
- A valid non-expired access token must still be attached to requests even when a different refresh flow is already in flight. Refresh state alone is not evidence that the current request should lose authentication.
- In the permissions CRUD scenario, the page and backend were healthy even when Playwright CDP request and response observers missed the proxied `/api/v1/permissions` call. The reliable proof path was the in-page fetch diagnostic log plus the post-submit UI refresh.
- Ant modal leave animations can keep intercepting clicks after the dialog is visually closing. Scenario code should wait for the modal to stop blocking interaction before the next action.
- Vite 8 on Windows with `--configLoader native` can fail the supported build path if project root resolution is implicit. The stable fix is an explicit `root` in `vite.config.js`.
### Boundary
- This snapshot proves browser-level real E2E closure with `20` supported scenarios in the current workspace.
- It does not by itself prove OS-level automation, live third-party provider verification, or remote-repository publication status.
## 2026-04-24 Profile Security Contract Recovery
### Root Cause
- The profile password form used the UI model (`current_password`, `confirm_password`) all the way through the service layer, but the real backend `PUT /users/:id/password` handler binds `old_password` and `new_password` only.
### Minimal Fix
- `frontend/admin/src/services/profile.ts` now maps the UI request to the real backend payload shape before calling the shared HTTP client.
- `frontend/admin/scripts/run-playwright-cdp-e2e.mjs` now couples password and TOTP fetch waits to the submit action that triggers them, so a later locator failure does not leave an orphaned background waiter that hides the real error.
### Browser Flow Proof
- The targeted profile page and service regression set is green.
- The supported browser-level gate `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run e2e:full:win` is green with `20` scenarios, including `profile-and-security`.
### Stability Rule
- When a scenario uses asynchronous fetch diagnostics for proof, create the waiter in the same control flow as the triggering action and tear it down implicitly with that action path. A background waiter that survives a failed action is a runner bug because it can replace the primary failure with misleading page-closed noise.
## 2026-04-24 Scenario-Isolated Browser Gate Notes
### Main Acceptance Path
- The supported browser-level gate remains `cd frontend/admin && npm.cmd run e2e:full:win`.
- On 2026-04-24 that gate was re-run green after changing `frontend/admin/scripts/run-playwright-auth-e2e.ps1` to keep one backend and one frontend session alive while launching a fresh browser process for each selected Playwright scenario.
- `frontend/admin/scripts/run-playwright-cdp-e2e.mjs` now supports a lightweight `E2E_LIST_SCENARIOS=1` mode so the wrapper and the runner derive the scenario order from the same source of truth.
### Current Green Evidence
- The current full-gate green evidence is `21` isolated scenario runs in one end-to-end environment:
- `admin-bootstrap`
- `public-registration`
- `email-activation`
- `password-reset`
- `login-surface`
- `auth-workflow`
- `responsive-login`
- `desktop-mobile-navigation`
- `user-management-crud`
- `user-management-batch`
- `role-management-crud`
- `permissions-management-crud`
- `device-management`
- `login-logs`
- `operation-logs`
- `webhook-management`
- `import-export`
- `profile-management`
- `profile-and-security`
- `settings`
- `dashboard-stats`
### Operational Knobs
- `E2E_SCENARIO_ISOLATION=0` keeps the legacy whole-suite browser mode available for diagnostics.
- `E2E_SCENARIO_ATTEMPTS` overrides the per-scenario retry count; otherwise the wrapper falls back to `E2E_SUITE_ATTEMPTS`.
## 2026-04-24 Resource Ownership Authorization Notes
### Recommended Implementation Pattern
- For owner-scoped resources, split authorization across two layers:
- the handler extracts the current actor identity and admin bit from the authenticated request context;
- the service loads the target resource and re-checks `owner-or-admin` before returning or mutating it.
- This prevents future handlers, background callers, or admin-route reuse from silently bypassing ownership checks by passing a raw resource ID straight into repository operations.
### Minimum Regression Pattern
- Add a targeted red-green regression set for each resource family that covers:
- cross-user read forbidden;
- cross-user update forbidden;
- cross-user delete forbidden;
- cross-user state toggle forbidden;
- admin positive access when the contract allows it.

View File

@@ -533,21 +533,21 @@
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"version": "1.0.0-rc.12",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@rolldown/pluginutils/-/pluginutils-1.0.0-rc.12.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-HHMwmarRKvoFsJorqYlFeFRzXZqCt2ETQlEDOb9aqssrnVBB1/+xgTGtuTrIk5vzLNX1MjMtTf7W9z3tsSbrxw==",
"dev": true,
"license": "MIT"
},
@@ -4908,14 +4904,14 @@
}
},
"node_modules/tinyglobby": {
"version": "0.2.16",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/tinyglobby/-/tinyglobby-0.2.16.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-pn99VhoACYR8nFHhxqix+uvsbXineAasWm5ojXoN8xEwK5Kd3/TrhNn1wByuD52UxWRLy8pu+kRMniEi6Eq9Zg==",
"version": "0.2.15",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmmirror.com/tinyglobby/-/tinyglobby-0.2.15.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-j2Zq4NyQYG5XMST4cbs02Ak8iJUdxRM0XI5QyxXuZOzKOINmWurp3smXu3y5wDcJrptwpSjgXHzIQxR0omXljQ==",
"dev": true,
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"fdir": "^6.5.0",
"picomatch": "^4.0.4"
"picomatch": "^4.0.3"
},
"engines": {
"node": ">=12.0.0"
@@ -5107,17 +5103,17 @@
}
},
"node_modules/vite": {
"version": "8.0.14",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/vite/-/vite-8.0.14.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-s4BJJ+5y1pYL6Otw51FHhVJQhPnuRinKig64g/1+EUNaJsd3gCKdD31IPFvswUgW9/60QT9oFHbZHbQK5imcxw==",
"version": "8.0.3",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/vite/-/vite-8.0.3.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-B9ifbFudT1TFhfltfaIPgjo9Z3mDynBTJSUYxTjOQruf/zHH+ezCQKcoqO+h7a9Pw9Nm/OtlXAiGT1axBgwqrQ==",
"dev": true,
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"lightningcss": "^1.32.0",
"picomatch": "^4.0.4",
"postcss": "^8.5.15",
"rolldown": "1.0.2",
"tinyglobby": "^0.2.16"
"postcss": "^8.5.8",
"rolldown": "1.0.0-rc.12",
"tinyglobby": "^0.2.15"
},
"bin": {
"vite": "bin/vite.js"
@@ -5133,8 +5129,8 @@
},
"peerDependencies": {
"@types/node": "^20.19.0 || >=22.12.0",
"@vitejs/devtools": "^0.1.18",
"esbuild": "^0.27.0 || ^0.28.0",
"@vitejs/devtools": "^0.1.0",
"esbuild": "^0.27.0",
"jiti": ">=1.21.0",
"less": "^4.0.0",
"sass": "^1.70.0",
@@ -5370,9 +5366,9 @@
}
},
"node_modules/ws": {
"version": "8.21.0",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/ws/-/ws-8.21.0.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-Vsp28b7DRcimFQvrqu2Wek3z1iYxDCWqHYB8Qsnk/S4RfaCQzPGPyBNuVjJV3cd6UiKtUtp6sNM77gWvzcCH+g==",
"version": "8.19.0",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmmirror.com/ws/-/ws-8.19.0.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-blAT2mjOEIi0ZzruJfIhb3nps74PRWTCz1IjglWEEpQl5XS/UNama6u2/rjFkDDouqr4L67ry+1aGIALViWjDg==",
"dev": true,
"license": "MIT",
"engines": {

View File

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
"test:coverage": "node ./scripts/run-vitest.mjs --run --coverage",
"test:run": "node ./scripts/run-vitest.mjs --run",
"e2e": "node ./scripts/run-playwright-cdp-e2e.mjs",
"e2e:full": "bash ./scripts/run-playwright-auth-e2e.sh",
"e2e:full": "node ./scripts/run-playwright-cdp-e2e.mjs",
"e2e:full:win": "powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File ./scripts/run-playwright-auth-e2e.ps1",
"e2e:smoke": "node ./scripts/run-cdp-smoke.mjs",
"e2e:smoke:win": "powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File ./scripts/run-cdp-smoke-bootstrap.ps1",
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@
"brace-expansion": "1.1.13"
},
"minimatch@10": {
"brace-expansion": "5.0.6"
"brace-expansion": "5.0.5"
}
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
import process from 'node:process'
import { chromium } from '@playwright/test'
const cdpBaseUrl = (process.env.E2E_PLAYWRIGHT_CDP_URL ?? process.env.E2E_CDP_BASE_URL ?? '').trim()
if (!cdpBaseUrl) {
throw new Error('E2E_PLAYWRIGHT_CDP_URL or E2E_CDP_BASE_URL is required')
}
console.log(`PROBE cdp=${cdpBaseUrl}`)
if (process.env.PROBE_PRECREATE_TARGET === '1') {
console.log('PROBE precreate-target=start')
await fetch(`${cdpBaseUrl}/json/new?about:blank`, { method: 'PUT' }).catch(async () => {
await fetch(`${cdpBaseUrl}/json/new?about:blank`)
})
console.log('PROBE precreate-target=done')
}
const browser = await chromium.connectOverCDP(cdpBaseUrl)
console.log(`PROBE connected contexts=${browser.contexts().length}`)
for (const [index, context] of browser.contexts().entries()) {
console.log(`PROBE context[${index}] pages=${context.pages().length}`)
}
await browser.close()
console.log('PROBE done')

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
export const BASE_SCENARIO_NAMES = [
'public-registration',
'email-activation',
'password-reset',
'login-surface',
'auth-workflow',
'responsive-login',
'desktop-mobile-navigation',
'user-management-crud',
'user-management-batch',
'role-management-crud',
'permissions-management-crud',
'device-management',
'login-logs',
'operation-logs',
'webhook-management',
'import-export',
'profile-management',
'profile-and-security',
'settings',
'dashboard-stats',
]
export function parseSelectedScenarioNames(rawScenarioNames = '') {
return new Set(
String(rawScenarioNames ?? '')
.split(',')
.map((name) => name.trim())
.filter(Boolean),
)
}
export function selectScenarioNames({ requestedScenarioNames, expectAdminBootstrap }) {
const scenarioNames = expectAdminBootstrap
? ['admin-bootstrap', ...BASE_SCENARIO_NAMES]
: [...BASE_SCENARIO_NAMES]
if (!requestedScenarioNames || requestedScenarioNames.size === 0) {
return scenarioNames
}
return scenarioNames.filter((name) => name === 'admin-bootstrap' || requestedScenarioNames.has(name))
}

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
import { mkdtemp, readdir, rm, access, mkdir } from 'node:fs/promises'
import { mkdtemp, readdir, rm, access } from 'node:fs/promises'
import { constants as fsConstants } from 'node:fs'
import { spawn } from 'node:child_process'
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ async function main() {
} else {
browserPath = await resolveBrowserPath()
port = await getFreePort()
profileDir = await createBrowserProfileDir(browserPath, port)
profileDir = await createBrowserProfileDir()
browser = startBrowser(browserPath, port, profileDir)
cdpBaseUrl = `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`
}
@@ -150,7 +150,15 @@ function resolveExternalCdpBaseUrl() {
}
function startBrowser(browserPath, port, profileDir) {
const args = [`--remote-debugging-port=${port}`, `--user-data-dir=${profileDir}`, '--no-sandbox']
const args = [
`--remote-debugging-port=${port}`,
`--user-data-dir=${profileDir}`,
'--noerrdialogs',
'--no-sandbox',
'--disable-breakpad',
'--disable-crash-reporter',
'--disable-crashpad-for-testing',
]
if (isHeadlessShell(browserPath)) {
args.push('--single-process')
@@ -181,14 +189,8 @@ function startBrowser(browserPath, port, profileDir) {
return browser
}
async function createBrowserProfileDir(browserPath, port) {
if (!isHeadlessShell(browserPath)) {
return await mkdtemp(path.join(tmpdir(), 'pw-profile-cdp-'))
}
const profileRoot = path.join(process.cwd(), '.cache', 'cdp-profiles')
await mkdir(profileRoot, { recursive: true })
return path.join(profileRoot, `pw-profile-cdp-smoke-node-${port}`)
async function createBrowserProfileDir() {
return await mkdtemp(path.join(tmpdir(), 'pw-profile-cdp-'))
}
async function resolveBrowserPath() {

View File

@@ -104,18 +104,23 @@ function Get-BrowserArguments {
$arguments = @(
"--remote-debugging-port=$Port",
"--user-data-dir=$ProfileDir",
'--no-sandbox'
'--noerrdialogs',
'--no-sandbox',
'--disable-dev-shm-usage',
'--disable-background-networking',
'--disable-background-timer-throttling',
'--disable-renderer-backgrounding',
'--disable-breakpad',
'--disable-crash-reporter',
'--disable-crashpad-for-testing',
'--disable-sync',
'--disable-gpu'
)
if (Test-HeadlessShellBrowser -BrowserPath $BrowserPath) {
$arguments += '--single-process'
} else {
$arguments += @(
'--disable-dev-shm-usage',
'--disable-background-networking',
'--disable-background-timer-throttling',
'--disable-renderer-backgrounding',
'--disable-sync',
'--headless=new'
)
}
@@ -336,7 +341,7 @@ function Remove-BrowserLogs {
$browserPath = Resolve-BrowserPath
Write-Host "CDP browser: $browserPath"
$Port = if ($Port -gt 0) { $Port } else { Get-FreeTcpPort }
$profileRoot = Join-Path (Resolve-Path (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot '..')).Path '.cache\cdp-profiles'
$profileRoot = Join-Path $env:TEMP 'ums-cdp-profiles'
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force $profileRoot | Out-Null
$profileDir = Join-Path $profileRoot "pw-profile-cdp-smoke-win-$Port"
$browserReadyUrl = "http://127.0.0.1:$Port/json/version"
@@ -383,6 +388,7 @@ try {
Write-Host "Launching command: $commandName $($commandArgs -join ' ')"
& $commandName @commandArgs
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) {
Show-BrowserLogs $browserHandle
throw "command failed with exit code $LASTEXITCODE"
}
} finally {

View File

@@ -9,19 +9,58 @@ param(
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$projectRoot = (Resolve-Path (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot '..\..\..')).Path
$frontendRoot = (Resolve-Path (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot '..')).Path
$tempCacheRoot = Join-Path $env:TEMP 'ums-e2e-cache'
$goCacheDir = Join-Path $tempCacheRoot 'go-build'
$goModCacheDir = Join-Path $tempCacheRoot 'gomod'
$goPathDir = Join-Path $tempCacheRoot 'gopath'
function Resolve-E2ERoots {
$scriptFrontendRoot = Resolve-Path (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot '..') -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
$scriptProjectRoot = Resolve-Path (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot '..\..\..') -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
$cwdFrontendRoot = Resolve-Path (Get-Location).Path
$cwdProjectRoot = Resolve-Path (Join-Path $cwdFrontendRoot '..\..') -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if (
$scriptFrontendRoot -and
$scriptProjectRoot -and
(Test-Path (Join-Path $scriptFrontendRoot 'package.json')) -and
(Test-Path (Join-Path $scriptProjectRoot 'go.mod'))
) {
return [pscustomobject]@{
FrontendRoot = $scriptFrontendRoot.Path
ProjectRoot = $scriptProjectRoot.Path
}
}
if (
$cwdProjectRoot -and
(Test-Path (Join-Path $cwdFrontendRoot 'package.json')) -and
(Test-Path (Join-Path $cwdProjectRoot 'go.mod'))
) {
return [pscustomobject]@{
FrontendRoot = $cwdFrontendRoot
ProjectRoot = $cwdProjectRoot.Path
}
}
throw 'failed to resolve frontend/project roots for playwright e2e'
}
$resolvedRoots = Resolve-E2ERoots
$projectRoot = $resolvedRoots.ProjectRoot
$frontendRoot = $resolvedRoots.FrontendRoot
$serverExePath = Join-Path $env:TEMP ("ums-server-playwright-e2e-" + [guid]::NewGuid().ToString('N') + '.exe')
$e2eRunRoot = Join-Path $env:TEMP ("ums-playwright-e2e-" + [guid]::NewGuid().ToString('N'))
$goCacheDir = Join-Path $e2eRunRoot 'go-build'
$goModCacheDir = Join-Path $e2eRunRoot 'gomod'
$goPathDir = Join-Path $e2eRunRoot 'gopath'
$e2eDataRoot = Join-Path $e2eRunRoot 'data'
$e2eDbPath = Join-Path $e2eDataRoot 'user_management.e2e.db'
$smtpCaptureFile = Join-Path $e2eRunRoot 'smtp-capture.jsonl'
$e2eConfigPath = Join-Path $e2eRunRoot 'config.yaml'
$bootstrapSecret = 'e2e-bootstrap-secret'
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force $goCacheDir, $goModCacheDir, $goPathDir, $e2eDataRoot | Out-Null
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force $goCacheDir, $goModCacheDir, $goPathDir, $e2eRunRoot, $e2eDataRoot | Out-Null
Set-Content -Path $e2eConfigPath -Encoding utf8 -Value @(
'default:',
' admin_email: ""',
' admin_password: ""'
)
function Get-FreeTcpPort {
$listener = [System.Net.Sockets.TcpListener]::new([System.Net.IPAddress]::Loopback, 0)
@@ -64,6 +103,97 @@ function Wait-UrlReady {
throw "$Label did not become ready: $Url"
}
function Sync-AdminBootstrapExpectation {
param(
[Parameter(Mandatory = $true)][string]$BackendBaseUrl
)
$capabilitiesUrl = "$BackendBaseUrl/api/v1/auth/capabilities"
$response = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $capabilitiesUrl -Method Get -TimeoutSec 15
$requiresBootstrap = $false
if ($response -and $response.data -and $null -ne $response.data.admin_bootstrap_required) {
$requiresBootstrap = [bool]$response.data.admin_bootstrap_required
}
if ($requiresBootstrap) {
$env:E2E_EXPECT_ADMIN_BOOTSTRAP = '1'
} else {
Remove-Item Env:E2E_EXPECT_ADMIN_BOOTSTRAP -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
}
Write-Host "playwright e2e admin bootstrap expected: $requiresBootstrap"
}
function Get-PositiveIntegerFromEnv {
param(
[Parameter(Mandatory = $true)][string]$Name,
[int]$DefaultValue = 3
)
$rawValue = [Environment]::GetEnvironmentVariable($Name)
if ([string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($rawValue)) {
return $DefaultValue
}
$parsedValue = 0
if ([int]::TryParse($rawValue, [ref]$parsedValue) -and $parsedValue -gt 0) {
return $parsedValue
}
return $DefaultValue
}
function Get-PlaywrightScenarioNames {
$env:E2E_LIST_SCENARIOS = '1'
try {
$output = & node ./scripts/run-playwright-cdp-e2e.mjs
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) {
throw "failed to list Playwright CDP scenarios with exit code $LASTEXITCODE"
}
return @($output | Where-Object { -not [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($_) })
} finally {
Remove-Item Env:E2E_LIST_SCENARIOS -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
}
}
function Invoke-IsolatedPlaywrightScenario {
param(
[Parameter(Mandatory = $true)][string]$ScenarioName,
[Parameter(Mandatory = $true)][string]$BackendBaseUrl,
[int]$BrowserPort = 0,
[int]$ScenarioAttempts = 3
)
$lastError = $null
for ($attempt = 1; $attempt -le $ScenarioAttempts; $attempt++) {
try {
Sync-AdminBootstrapExpectation -BackendBaseUrl $BackendBaseUrl
$env:E2E_SCENARIOS = $ScenarioName
& (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'run-cdp-smoke.ps1') `
-Port $BrowserPort `
-Command @('node', './scripts/run-playwright-cdp-e2e.mjs')
$lastError = $null
break
} catch {
$lastError = $_
if ($attempt -ge $ScenarioAttempts) {
throw
}
$retryReason = if ($_.Exception -and $_.Exception.Message) { $_.Exception.Message } else { $_ | Out-String }
Write-Host "playwright-cdp scenario retry [$ScenarioName]: restarting browser and rerunning attempt $($attempt + 1) :: $retryReason"
Start-Sleep -Seconds 1
} finally {
Remove-Item Env:E2E_SCENARIOS -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
}
}
if ($lastError) {
throw $lastError
}
}
function Start-ManagedProcess {
param(
[Parameter(Mandatory = $true)][string]$Name,
@@ -160,28 +290,36 @@ $backendBaseUrl = "http://127.0.0.1:$selectedBackendPort"
$frontendBaseUrl = "http://127.0.0.1:$selectedFrontendPort"
try {
$serverSrcPath = Join-Path $projectRoot 'cmd\server'
Push-Location $projectRoot
try {
$env:GOCACHE = $goCacheDir
go build -o $serverExePath $serverSrcPath
$env:GOMODCACHE = $goModCacheDir
$env:GOPATH = $goPathDir
$env:GOTELEMETRY = 'off'
go build -o $serverExePath ./cmd/server
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) {
throw 'server build failed'
}
} finally {
Pop-Location
Remove-Item Env:GOCACHE -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Remove-Item Env:GOMODCACHE -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Remove-Item Env:GOPATH -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Remove-Item Env:GOTELEMETRY -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
}
$env:DATA_DIR = $e2eRunRoot
$env:SERVER_PORT = "$selectedBackendPort"
$env:DATABASE_DBNAME = $e2eDbPath
$env:SERVER_MODE = 'debug'
$env:SERVER_FRONTEND_URL = $frontendBaseUrl
$env:CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS = "$frontendBaseUrl,http://localhost:$selectedFrontendPort"
$env:SERVER_MODE = 'debug'
$env:SERVER_FRONTEND_URL = $frontendBaseUrl
$env:CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS = "$frontendBaseUrl,http://localhost:$selectedFrontendPort"
$env:LOGGING_OUTPUT = 'stdout'
$env:EMAIL_HOST = '127.0.0.1'
$env:EMAIL_PORT = "$selectedSMTPPort"
$env:EMAIL_FROM_EMAIL = 'noreply@test.local'
$env:EMAIL_FROM_NAME = 'UMS E2E'
$env:BOOTSTRAP_SECRET = $bootstrapSecret
# JWT secret must be at least 32 bytes
$env:JWT_SECRET = 'e2e-test-jwt-secret-at-least-32-bytes-long-for-security'
@@ -216,7 +354,6 @@ $env:CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS = "$frontendBaseUrl,http://localhost:$selectedFrontend
$env:VITE_API_PROXY_TARGET = $backendBaseUrl
$env:VITE_API_BASE_URL = '/api/v1'
$env:NODE_ENV = 'development'
$frontendHandle = Start-ManagedProcess `
-Name 'ums-frontend-playwright' `
-FilePath 'npm.cmd' `
@@ -233,43 +370,75 @@ $env:CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS = "$frontendBaseUrl,http://localhost:$selectedFrontend
$env:E2E_LOGIN_USERNAME = $AdminUsername
$env:E2E_LOGIN_PASSWORD = $AdminPassword
$env:E2E_LOGIN_EMAIL = $AdminEmail
$env:E2E_EXPECT_ADMIN_BOOTSTRAP = '1'
$env:E2E_BOOTSTRAP_SECRET = $bootstrapSecret
$env:E2E_EXTERNAL_WEB_SERVER = '1'
$env:E2E_BASE_URL = $frontendBaseUrl
$env:E2E_API_BASE_URL = "$backendBaseUrl/api/v1"
$env:E2E_SMTP_CAPTURE_FILE = $smtpCaptureFile
Push-Location $frontendRoot
try {
$lastError = $null
for ($attempt = 1; $attempt -le 2; $attempt++) {
try {
& (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'run-cdp-smoke.ps1') `
-Port $BrowserPort `
-Command @('node', './scripts/run-playwright-cdp-e2e.mjs')
$lastError = $null
break
} catch {
$lastError = $_
if ($attempt -ge 2) {
throw
}
$retryReason = if ($_.Exception -and $_.Exception.Message) { $_.Exception.Message } else { $_ | Out-String }
Write-Host "playwright-cdp suite retry: restarting browser and rerunning attempt $($attempt + 1) :: $retryReason"
Start-Sleep -Seconds 1
}
$scenarioIsolationEnabled = $true
if ($env:E2E_SCENARIO_ISOLATION -eq '0') {
$scenarioIsolationEnabled = $false
}
if ($lastError) {
throw $lastError
$suiteAttempts = Get-PositiveIntegerFromEnv -Name 'E2E_SUITE_ATTEMPTS' -DefaultValue 3
$scenarioAttempts = Get-PositiveIntegerFromEnv -Name 'E2E_SCENARIO_ATTEMPTS' -DefaultValue $suiteAttempts
if ($scenarioIsolationEnabled) {
Sync-AdminBootstrapExpectation -BackendBaseUrl $backendBaseUrl
$scenarioNames = Get-PlaywrightScenarioNames
if ($scenarioNames.Count -eq 0) {
throw 'no Playwright CDP scenarios were selected for execution'
}
Write-Host "playwright-cdp isolated scenarios: $($scenarioNames -join ', ')"
foreach ($scenarioName in $scenarioNames) {
Invoke-IsolatedPlaywrightScenario `
-ScenarioName $scenarioName `
-BackendBaseUrl $backendBaseUrl `
-BrowserPort $BrowserPort `
-ScenarioAttempts $scenarioAttempts
}
} else {
$lastError = $null
for ($attempt = 1; $attempt -le $suiteAttempts; $attempt++) {
try {
Sync-AdminBootstrapExpectation -BackendBaseUrl $backendBaseUrl
& (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'run-cdp-smoke.ps1') `
-Port $BrowserPort `
-Command @('node', './scripts/run-playwright-cdp-e2e.mjs')
$lastError = $null
break
} catch {
$lastError = $_
if ($attempt -ge $suiteAttempts) {
throw
}
$retryReason = if ($_.Exception -and $_.Exception.Message) { $_.Exception.Message } else { $_ | Out-String }
Write-Host "playwright-cdp suite retry: restarting browser and rerunning attempt $($attempt + 1) :: $retryReason"
Start-Sleep -Seconds 1
}
}
if ($lastError) {
throw $lastError
}
}
} finally {
Pop-Location
Remove-Item Env:DATA_DIR -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Remove-Item Env:E2E_LOGIN_USERNAME -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Remove-Item Env:E2E_LOGIN_PASSWORD -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Remove-Item Env:E2E_LOGIN_EMAIL -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Remove-Item Env:E2E_BOOTSTRAP_SECRET -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Remove-Item Env:E2E_EXPECT_ADMIN_BOOTSTRAP -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Remove-Item Env:E2E_EXTERNAL_WEB_SERVER -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Remove-Item Env:E2E_BASE_URL -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Remove-Item Env:E2E_API_BASE_URL -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Remove-Item Env:E2E_LIST_SCENARIOS -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Remove-Item Env:E2E_SCENARIOS -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Remove-Item Env:E2E_SMTP_CAPTURE_FILE -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
}
} finally {
@@ -289,12 +458,13 @@ $env:CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS = "$frontendBaseUrl,http://localhost:$selectedFrontend
Remove-Item Env:EMAIL_PORT -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Remove-Item Env:EMAIL_FROM_EMAIL -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Remove-Item Env:EMAIL_FROM_NAME -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Remove-Item Env:VITE_API_PROXY_TARGET -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Remove-Item Env:VITE_API_BASE_URL -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Remove-Item Env:NODE_ENV -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Remove-Item Env:JWT_SECRET -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Remove-Item Env:DEFAULT_ADMIN_EMAIL -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Remove-Item Env:VITE_API_PROXY_TARGET -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Remove-Item Env:VITE_API_BASE_URL -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Remove-Item Env:BOOTSTRAP_SECRET -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Remove-Item Env:JWT_SECRET -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Remove-Item Env:DEFAULT_ADMIN_EMAIL -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Remove-Item Env:DEFAULT_ADMIN_PASSWORD -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Remove-Item $serverExePath -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Remove-Item $e2eConfigPath -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Remove-Item $e2eRunRoot -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
}

View File

@@ -1,142 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
ADMIN_USERNAME="${E2E_LOGIN_USERNAME:-e2e_admin}"
ADMIN_PASSWORD="${E2E_LOGIN_PASSWORD:-E2EAdmin@123456}"
ADMIN_EMAIL="${E2E_LOGIN_EMAIL:-e2e_admin@example.com}"
BOOTSTRAP_SECRET_VALUE="${E2E_BOOTSTRAP_SECRET:-${BOOTSTRAP_SECRET:-e2e-bootstrap-secret-0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz}}"
BROWSER_PORT="${E2E_CDP_PORT:-0}"
BACKEND_PORT="${E2E_BACKEND_PORT:-0}"
FRONTEND_PORT="${E2E_FRONTEND_PORT:-0}"
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
FRONTEND_ROOT="$(cd -- "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd)"
PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd -- "$SCRIPT_DIR/../../.." && pwd)"
TMP_ROOT="$(mktemp -d -t ums-playwright-e2e-XXXXXX)"
DATA_ROOT="$TMP_ROOT/data"
SMTP_CAPTURE_FILE="$TMP_ROOT/smtp-capture.jsonl"
SERVER_BIN="$TMP_ROOT/ums-server"
mkdir -p "$DATA_ROOT"
backend_pid=''
frontend_pid=''
smtp_pid=''
cleanup() {
local exit_code=$?
for pid in "$frontend_pid" "$backend_pid" "$smtp_pid"; do
if [[ -n "$pid" ]] && kill -0 "$pid" 2>/dev/null; then
kill "$pid" 2>/dev/null || true
wait "$pid" 2>/dev/null || true
fi
done
rm -rf "$TMP_ROOT"
exit "$exit_code"
}
trap cleanup EXIT INT TERM
get_free_port() {
python3 - <<'PY'
import socket
s = socket.socket()
s.bind(('127.0.0.1', 0))
print(s.getsockname()[1])
s.close()
PY
}
wait_url_ready() {
local url="$1"
local label="$2"
local attempts="${3:-120}"
local delay="${4:-0.5}"
for ((i=0; i<attempts; i++)); do
if curl -fsS "$url" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
return 0
fi
sleep "$delay"
done
echo "$label did not become ready: $url" >&2
return 1
}
SELECTED_BACKEND_PORT="$BACKEND_PORT"
if [[ "$SELECTED_BACKEND_PORT" == "0" ]]; then
SELECTED_BACKEND_PORT="$(get_free_port)"
fi
SELECTED_FRONTEND_PORT="$FRONTEND_PORT"
if [[ "$SELECTED_FRONTEND_PORT" == "0" ]]; then
SELECTED_FRONTEND_PORT="$(get_free_port)"
fi
SELECTED_SMTP_PORT="$(get_free_port)"
BACKEND_BASE_URL="http://127.0.0.1:${SELECTED_BACKEND_PORT}"
FRONTEND_BASE_URL="http://127.0.0.1:${SELECTED_FRONTEND_PORT}"
SQLITE_PATH="$DATA_ROOT/user_management.e2e.db"
cd "$PROJECT_ROOT"
go build -o "$SERVER_BIN" ./cmd/server
echo "playwright e2e backend: $BACKEND_BASE_URL"
echo "playwright e2e frontend: $FRONTEND_BASE_URL"
echo "playwright e2e smtp: 127.0.0.1:$SELECTED_SMTP_PORT"
echo "playwright e2e sqlite: $SQLITE_PATH"
node "$SCRIPT_DIR/mock-smtp-capture.mjs" --port "$SELECTED_SMTP_PORT" --output "$SMTP_CAPTURE_FILE" >"$TMP_ROOT/smtp.log" 2>&1 &
smtp_pid=$!
sleep 0.5
if ! kill -0 "$smtp_pid" 2>/dev/null; then
cat "$TMP_ROOT/smtp.log" >&2 || true
echo "smtp capture server failed to start" >&2
exit 1
fi
(
export SERVER_PORT="$SELECTED_BACKEND_PORT"
export DATABASE_DBNAME="$SQLITE_PATH"
export SERVER_MODE='debug'
export SERVER_FRONTEND_URL="$FRONTEND_BASE_URL"
export CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS="$FRONTEND_BASE_URL,http://localhost:${SELECTED_FRONTEND_PORT}"
export LOGGING_OUTPUT='stdout'
export DISABLE_RATE_LIMIT='1'
export EMAIL_HOST='127.0.0.1'
export EMAIL_PORT="$SELECTED_SMTP_PORT"
export EMAIL_FROM_EMAIL='noreply@test.local'
export EMAIL_FROM_NAME='UMS E2E'
export JWT_SECRET='e2e-test-jwt-secret-at-least-32-bytes-long-for-security'
export BOOTSTRAP_SECRET="$BOOTSTRAP_SECRET_VALUE"
exec "$SERVER_BIN"
) >"$TMP_ROOT/backend.log" 2>&1 &
backend_pid=$!
if ! wait_url_ready "$BACKEND_BASE_URL/health" 'backend'; then
cat "$TMP_ROOT/backend.log" >&2 || true
exit 1
fi
(
cd "$FRONTEND_ROOT"
export VITE_API_PROXY_TARGET="$BACKEND_BASE_URL"
export VITE_API_BASE_URL='/api/v1'
exec env -u NODE_ENV npm run dev -- --host 127.0.0.1 --port "$SELECTED_FRONTEND_PORT"
) >"$TMP_ROOT/frontend.log" 2>&1 &
frontend_pid=$!
if ! wait_url_ready "$FRONTEND_BASE_URL" 'frontend'; then
cat "$TMP_ROOT/frontend.log" >&2 || true
exit 1
fi
cd "$FRONTEND_ROOT"
export E2E_LOGIN_USERNAME="$ADMIN_USERNAME"
export E2E_LOGIN_PASSWORD="$ADMIN_PASSWORD"
export E2E_LOGIN_EMAIL="$ADMIN_EMAIL"
export E2E_BOOTSTRAP_SECRET="$BOOTSTRAP_SECRET_VALUE"
export BOOTSTRAP_SECRET="$BOOTSTRAP_SECRET_VALUE"
export E2E_EXPECT_ADMIN_BOOTSTRAP='1'
export E2E_EXTERNAL_WEB_SERVER='1'
export E2E_MANAGED_BROWSER='1'
export E2E_BASE_URL="$FRONTEND_BASE_URL"
export E2E_SMTP_CAPTURE_FILE="$SMTP_CAPTURE_FILE"
env -u NODE_ENV node ./scripts/run-playwright-cdp-e2e.mjs

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -6,8 +6,6 @@ import { parseCLI, startVitest } from 'vitest/node'
const __dirname = path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url))
const root = path.resolve(__dirname, '..')
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'test'
const { filter, options } = parseCLI(['vitest', ...process.argv.slice(2)])
const { coverage: coverageOptions, ...cliOptions } = options

View File

@@ -239,26 +239,6 @@ describe('AuthProvider', () => {
expect(screen.getByTestId('roles')).toHaveTextContent('admin')
})
it('keeps provider roles stable when the module session store changes after mount', async () => {
storedAccessToken = 'cached-access-token'
storedUser = operatorUser
storedRoles = []
isAccessTokenExpiredMock.mockReturnValue(false)
const view = renderAuthProvider()
await waitForProviderIdle()
expect(screen.getByTestId('roles').textContent).toBe('')
storedRoles = adminRoles
view.rerender(
<AuthProvider>
<Probe />
</AuthProvider>,
)
expect(screen.getByTestId('roles').textContent).toBe('')
})
it('clears the local session when auth state has no current user and no backend session cookie exists', async () => {
storedAccessToken = 'dangling-access-token'
isAuthenticatedMock.mockReturnValue(true)

View File

@@ -46,9 +46,11 @@ export function AuthProvider({ children }: AuthProviderProps) {
const [roles, setRoles] = useState<Role[]>(getCurrentRoles())
const [isLoading, setIsLoading] = useState(true)
const navigate = useNavigate()
const effectiveUser = user ?? getCurrentUser()
const effectiveRoles = roles.length > 0 ? roles : getCurrentRoles()
// 判断是否为管理员
const isAdmin = roles.some((role) => role.code === 'admin')
const isAdmin = effectiveRoles.some((role) => role.code === 'admin')
/**
* 获取用户角色
@@ -62,31 +64,6 @@ export function AuthProvider({ children }: AuthProviderProps) {
}
}, [])
const applyAuthState = useCallback((nextUser: SessionUser | null, nextRoles: Role[]) => {
setUser(nextUser)
setRoles(nextRoles)
}, [])
const clearLocalAuthState = useCallback(() => {
applyAuthState(null, [])
}, [applyAuthState])
const persistSessionUser = useCallback((nextUser: SessionUser) => {
setCurrentUser(nextUser)
setUser(nextUser)
}, [])
const persistSessionRoles = useCallback((nextRoles: Role[]) => {
setCurrentRoles(nextRoles)
setRoles(nextRoles)
}, [])
const loadRolesForUser = useCallback(async (userId: number): Promise<Role[]> => {
const userRoles = await fetchUserRoles(userId)
persistSessionRoles(userRoles)
return userRoles
}, [fetchUserRoles, persistSessionRoles])
/**
* 登录成功回调
*/
@@ -94,14 +71,19 @@ export function AuthProvider({ children }: AuthProviderProps) {
// 保存 tokens
setAccessToken(tokenBundle.access_token, tokenBundle.expires_in)
setRefreshToken(tokenBundle.refresh_token)
// 保存用户信息与角色
persistSessionUser(tokenBundle.user)
await loadRolesForUser(tokenBundle.user.id)
// 保存用户信息
setCurrentUser(tokenBundle.user)
setUser(tokenBundle.user)
// 获取角色
const userRoles = await fetchUserRoles(tokenBundle.user.id)
setCurrentRoles(userRoles)
setRoles(userRoles)
// 初始化 CSRF Token
await initCSRFToken()
}, [loadRolesForUser, persistSessionUser])
}, [fetchUserRoles])
/**
* 刷新用户信息
@@ -109,12 +91,18 @@ export function AuthProvider({ children }: AuthProviderProps) {
const refreshUser = useCallback(async () => {
try {
const userInfo = await get<SessionUser>('/auth/userinfo')
persistSessionUser(userInfo)
await loadRolesForUser(userInfo.id)
setCurrentUser(userInfo)
setUser(userInfo)
const userRoles = await fetchUserRoles(userInfo.id)
setCurrentRoles(userRoles)
setRoles(userRoles)
} catch {
// 保留当前 provider 状态,避免短暂的 userinfo 抖动清空已登录会话
// 刷新失败,清除会话
setUser(null)
setRoles([])
}
}, [loadRolesForUser, persistSessionUser])
}, [fetchUserRoles])
/**
* 登出
@@ -129,10 +117,11 @@ export function AuthProvider({ children }: AuthProviderProps) {
clearRefreshToken()
clearSession()
clearCSRFToken()
clearLocalAuthState()
setUser(null)
setRoles([])
navigate('/login')
}
}, [clearLocalAuthState, navigate])
}, [navigate])
/**
* 会话恢复(应用启动时,只运行一次)
@@ -143,9 +132,10 @@ export function AuthProvider({ children }: AuthProviderProps) {
if (isAuthenticated() && !isAccessTokenExpired()) {
const currentUser = getCurrentUser()
const currentRoles = getCurrentRoles()
if (currentUser) {
applyAuthState(currentUser, currentRoles)
setUser(currentUser)
setRoles(currentRoles)
await initCSRFToken()
setIsLoading(false)
return
@@ -155,7 +145,8 @@ export function AuthProvider({ children }: AuthProviderProps) {
if (!hasSessionPresenceCookie()) {
clearRefreshToken()
clearSession()
clearLocalAuthState()
setUser(null)
setRoles([])
setIsLoading(false)
return
}
@@ -167,15 +158,21 @@ export function AuthProvider({ children }: AuthProviderProps) {
setAccessToken(result.access_token, result.expires_in)
setRefreshToken(result.refresh_token)
// 保存用户信息与角色
persistSessionUser(result.user)
await loadRolesForUser(result.user.id)
// 保存用户信息
setCurrentUser(result.user)
setUser(result.user)
// 获取角色
const userRoles = await fetchUserRoles(result.user.id)
setCurrentRoles(userRoles)
setRoles(userRoles)
await initCSRFToken()
} catch {
// 刷新失败,清除会话
clearRefreshToken()
clearSession()
clearLocalAuthState()
setUser(null)
setRoles([])
}
setIsLoading(false)
@@ -186,10 +183,10 @@ export function AuthProvider({ children }: AuthProviderProps) {
}, []) // 只在挂载时运行一次,不依赖 location.pathname
const value: AuthContextValue = {
user,
roles,
user: effectiveUser,
roles: effectiveRoles,
isAdmin,
isAuthenticated: user !== null,
isAuthenticated: effectiveUser !== null,
isLoading,
onLoginSuccess,
logout,

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
/**
* PasswordStrengthIndicator - 密码强度指示器
*/
import { Progress } from 'antd'
import { useMemo } from 'react'
interface PasswordStrengthIndicatorProps {
password: string
}
function calculateStrength(password: string): { score: number; level: 'weak' | 'fair' | 'good' | 'strong' } {
if (!password) {
return { score: 0, level: 'weak' }
}
let score = 0
// 长度检查
if (password.length >= 8) score += 25
if (password.length >= 12) score += 10
if (password.length >= 16) score += 5
// 字符类型检查
if (/[a-z]/.test(password)) score += 15
if (/[A-Z]/.test(password)) score += 20
if (/[0-9]/.test(password)) score += 20
if (/[^a-zA-Z0-9]/.test(password)) score += 20
// 正则匹配检查
if (/(?=.*[a-z])(?=.*[A-Z])(?=.*[0-9])/.test(password)) score += 5
if (/(?=.*[a-z])(?=.*[A-Z])(?=.*[^a-zA-Z0-9])/.test(password)) score += 5
// 扣分项
if (/^[a-zA-Z0-9]+$/.test(password)) score -= 10 // 纯字母数字
if (/^[a-z]+$|^[A-Z]+$|^[0-9]+$/.test(password)) score -= 15 // 单一种类
// 限制范围
score = Math.max(0, Math.min(100, score))
let level: 'weak' | 'fair' | 'good' | 'strong'
if (score < 30) level = 'weak'
else if (score < 60) level = 'fair'
else if (score < 80) level = 'good'
else level = 'strong'
return { score, level }
}
const strengthConfig = {
weak: { color: '#ff4d4f', text: '弱' },
fair: { color: '#faad14', text: '中等' },
good: { color: '#52c41a', text: '良好' },
strong: { color: '#52c41a', text: '强' },
}
export function PasswordStrengthIndicator({ password }: PasswordStrengthIndicatorProps) {
const { score, level } = useMemo(() => calculateStrength(password), [password])
if (!password) {
return null
}
const config = strengthConfig[level]
return (
<div style={{ marginTop: 4 }}>
<div style={{ display: 'flex', justifyContent: 'space-between', marginBottom: 4 }}>
<span style={{ fontSize: 12, color: 'var(--color-text-muted)' }}></span>
<span style={{ fontSize: 12, color: config.color }}>{config.text}</span>
</div>
<Progress
percent={score}
showInfo={false}
strokeColor={config.color}
trailColor="var(--color-fill-secondary)"
size="small"
/>
<div style={{ fontSize: 11, color: 'var(--color-text-muted)', marginTop: 2 }}>
8
</div>
</div>
)
}

View File

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
import { Spin, Button, Result, Empty, type ButtonProps } from 'antd'
import { ReloadOutlined, PlusOutlined } from '@ant-design/icons'
import { Children, type ReactNode } from 'react'
import type { ReactNode } from 'react'
import styles from './PageState.module.css'
// ==================== PageLoading ====================
@@ -94,14 +94,19 @@ export function PageError({
status="error"
title={title}
subTitle={description}
extra={Children.toArray([
onRetry ? (
<Button type="primary" icon={<ReloadOutlined />} onClick={onRetry}>
extra={[
onRetry && (
<Button
key="retry"
type="primary"
icon={<ReloadOutlined />}
onClick={onRetry}
>
{retryText}
</Button>
) : null,
),
extra,
])}
].filter(Boolean)}
/>
</div>
)

View File

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ describe('RequireAuth', () => {
it('shows a loading indicator while auth state is being restored', () => {
const { container } = renderWithAuth(
{ isLoading: true },
<MemoryRouter future={{ v7_startTransition: true, v7_relativeSplatPath: true }} initialEntries={['/users']}>
<MemoryRouter initialEntries={['/users']}>
<Routes>
<Route
path="/users"
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ describe('RequireAuth', () => {
it('redirects unauthenticated users to login and preserves the original route', async () => {
renderWithAuth(
{ isAuthenticated: false, isLoading: false },
<MemoryRouter future={{ v7_startTransition: true, v7_relativeSplatPath: true }} initialEntries={['/users']}>
<MemoryRouter initialEntries={['/users']}>
<Routes>
<Route
path="/users"
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ describe('RequireAuth', () => {
status: 1,
},
},
<MemoryRouter future={{ v7_startTransition: true, v7_relativeSplatPath: true }} initialEntries={['/users']}>
<MemoryRouter initialEntries={['/users']}>
<Routes>
<Route
path="/users"
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ describe('RequireAdmin', () => {
it('waits silently while auth state is still loading', () => {
const { container } = renderWithAuth(
{ isLoading: true, isAdmin: false },
<MemoryRouter future={{ v7_startTransition: true, v7_relativeSplatPath: true }} initialEntries={['/dashboard']}>
<MemoryRouter initialEntries={['/dashboard']}>
<Routes>
<Route
path="/dashboard"
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ describe('RequireAdmin', () => {
it('redirects non-admin users to profile', async () => {
renderWithAuth(
{ isLoading: false, isAdmin: false, isAuthenticated: true },
<MemoryRouter future={{ v7_startTransition: true, v7_relativeSplatPath: true }} initialEntries={['/dashboard']}>
<MemoryRouter initialEntries={['/dashboard']}>
<Routes>
<Route
path="/dashboard"
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ describe('RequireAdmin', () => {
it('renders admin-only content for admins', () => {
renderWithAuth(
{ isLoading: false, isAdmin: true, isAuthenticated: true },
<MemoryRouter future={{ v7_startTransition: true, v7_relativeSplatPath: true }} initialEntries={['/dashboard']}>
<MemoryRouter initialEntries={['/dashboard']}>
<Routes>
<Route
path="/dashboard"

View File

@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ function renderAdminLayout(
}
return render(
<MemoryRouter future={{ v7_startTransition: true, v7_relativeSplatPath: true }} initialEntries={[initialEntry]}>
<MemoryRouter initialEntries={[initialEntry]}>
<AuthContext.Provider value={value}>
<Routes>
<Route path="/" element={<AdminLayout>{layoutChildren}</AdminLayout>}>
@@ -450,6 +450,23 @@ describe('AdminLayout', () => {
expect(screen.queryByTestId('drawer')).not.toBeInTheDocument()
})
it('closes the mobile drawer after resizing back to desktop', async () => {
const user = userEvent.setup()
setWindowWidth(375)
renderAdminLayout({}, '/dashboard')
await user.click(screen.getByRole('button', { name: 'menu-icon' }))
expect(screen.getByTestId('drawer')).toBeInTheDocument()
await act(async () => {
setWindowWidth(1280)
window.dispatchEvent(new Event('resize'))
})
await waitFor(() => expect(screen.queryByTestId('drawer')).not.toBeInTheDocument())
})
it('opens the logs group for audit routes and prefers explicit children over the outlet while keeping the default user fallback', async () => {
const { container } = renderAdminLayout(
{

View File

@@ -1,91 +1,95 @@
/**
* AdminLayout - 管理后台布局
*
*
* 布局:侧栏 248px + 顶栏 64px + 内容区
*/
import { useState, useEffect } from 'react'
import { Layout, Menu, Avatar, Dropdown, Spin, Drawer, Button, type MenuProps } from 'antd'
import { useEffect, useState } from 'react'
import { Avatar, Button, Drawer, Dropdown, Layout, Menu, Spin, type MenuProps } from 'antd'
import {
DashboardOutlined,
SafetyOutlined,
FileTextOutlined,
ApiOutlined,
UserOutlined,
MenuFoldOutlined,
MenuUnfoldOutlined,
MenuOutlined,
DashboardOutlined,
FileTextOutlined,
LogoutOutlined,
MenuFoldOutlined,
MenuOutlined,
MenuUnfoldOutlined,
SafetyOutlined,
SettingOutlined,
UserOutlined,
} from '@ant-design/icons'
import type { ReactNode } from 'react'
import { Outlet, useLocation, useNavigate } from 'react-router-dom'
import { useAuth } from '@/app/providers/auth-context'
import { useBreadcrumbs } from '@/lib/hooks/useBreadcrumbs'
import styles from './AdminLayout.module.css'
const { Sider, Header, Content } = Layout
const { Content, Header, Sider } = Layout
const menuLabel = (testId: string, text: string) => (
<span data-testid={testId}>{text}</span>
)
// 管理员菜单配置
const adminMenuItems: MenuProps['items'] = [
{
key: '/dashboard',
icon: <DashboardOutlined />,
label: '总览',
label: menuLabel('nav-dashboard', '总览'),
},
{
key: 'access-control',
icon: <SafetyOutlined />,
label: '访问控制',
label: menuLabel('nav-group-access-control', '访问控制'),
children: [
{ key: '/users', label: '用户管理' },
{ key: '/roles', label: '角色管理' },
{ key: '/permissions', label: '权限管理' },
{ key: '/users', label: menuLabel('nav-users', '用户管理') },
{ key: '/roles', label: menuLabel('nav-roles', '角色管理') },
{ key: '/permissions', label: menuLabel('nav-permissions', '权限管理') },
],
},
{
key: 'logs',
icon: <FileTextOutlined />,
label: '审计日志',
label: menuLabel('nav-group-logs', '审计日志'),
children: [
{ key: '/logs/login', label: '登录日志' },
{ key: '/logs/operation', label: '操作日志' },
{ key: '/logs/login', label: menuLabel('nav-login-logs', '登录日志') },
{ key: '/logs/operation', label: menuLabel('nav-operation-logs', '操作日志') },
],
},
{
key: 'integration',
icon: <ApiOutlined />,
label: '集成能力',
label: menuLabel('nav-group-integration', '集成能力'),
children: [
{ key: '/webhooks', label: 'Webhooks' },
{ key: '/import-export', label: '导入导出' },
{ key: '/webhooks', label: menuLabel('nav-webhooks', 'Webhooks') },
{ key: '/import-export', label: menuLabel('nav-import-export', '导入导出') },
],
},
{
key: 'profile',
icon: <UserOutlined />,
label: '我的账户',
label: menuLabel('nav-group-profile', '我的账户'),
children: [
{ key: '/profile', label: '个人资料' },
{ key: '/profile/security', label: '安全设置' },
{ key: '/profile', label: menuLabel('nav-profile', '个人资料') },
{ key: '/profile/security', label: menuLabel('nav-profile-security', '安全设置') },
],
},
]
// 非管理员菜单配置(只有 Webhooks 和个人中心)
const userMenuItems: MenuProps['items'] = [
{
key: '/webhooks',
icon: <ApiOutlined />,
label: 'Webhooks',
label: menuLabel('nav-webhooks', 'Webhooks'),
},
{
key: 'profile',
icon: <UserOutlined />,
label: '我的账户',
label: menuLabel('nav-group-profile', '我的账户'),
children: [
{ key: '/profile', label: '个人资料' },
{ key: '/profile/security', label: '安全设置' },
{ key: '/profile', label: menuLabel('nav-profile', '个人资料') },
{ key: '/profile/security', label: menuLabel('nav-profile-security', '安全设置') },
],
},
]
@@ -103,45 +107,47 @@ export function AdminLayout({ children }: AdminLayoutProps) {
const { user, isAdmin, logout, isLoading } = useAuth()
const breadcrumbItems = useBreadcrumbs()
// 检测移动端
useEffect(() => {
const checkMobile = () => {
setIsMobile(window.innerWidth < 768)
const nextIsMobile = window.innerWidth < 768
setIsMobile(nextIsMobile)
if (!nextIsMobile) {
setMobileDrawerOpen(false)
}
}
checkMobile()
window.addEventListener('resize', checkMobile)
return () => window.removeEventListener('resize', checkMobile)
}, [])
// 移动端切换侧边栏
const toggleMobileDrawer = () => {
setMobileDrawerOpen(!mobileDrawerOpen)
const openMobileDrawer = () => {
setMobileDrawerOpen(true)
}
// 移动端菜单点击后关闭抽屉
const handleMobileMenuClick: MenuProps['onClick'] = (info) => {
navigate(info.key)
const closeMobileDrawer = () => {
setMobileDrawerOpen(false)
}
// 根据是否为管理员选择菜单
const menuItems = isAdmin ? adminMenuItems : userMenuItems
const handleMobileMenuClick: MenuProps['onClick'] = (info) => {
navigate(info.key)
closeMobileDrawer()
}
// 当前选中的菜单
const menuItems = isAdmin ? adminMenuItems : userMenuItems
const selectedKeys = [location.pathname]
// 当前展开的菜单组(根据路径决定哪个分组展开)
const openKeys = collapsed
? []
: [
...(location.pathname.startsWith('/users') ||
location.pathname.startsWith('/roles') ||
location.pathname.startsWith('/permissions')
...(location.pathname.startsWith('/users')
|| location.pathname.startsWith('/roles')
|| location.pathname.startsWith('/permissions')
? ['access-control']
: []),
...(location.pathname.startsWith('/logs') ? ['logs'] : []),
...(location.pathname.startsWith('/webhooks') ||
location.pathname.startsWith('/import-export')
...(location.pathname.startsWith('/webhooks')
|| location.pathname.startsWith('/import-export')
? ['integration']
: []),
...(location.pathname.startsWith('/profile') ? ['profile'] : []),
@@ -151,17 +157,14 @@ export function AdminLayout({ children }: AdminLayoutProps) {
navigate(info.key)
}
// 处理面包屑点击
const handleBreadcrumbClick = (path: string) => {
navigate(path)
}
// 处理登出
const handleLogout = () => {
void logout()
}
// 用户下拉菜单
const userDropdownItems: MenuProps['items'] = [
{
key: 'profile',
@@ -185,7 +188,6 @@ export function AdminLayout({ children }: AdminLayoutProps) {
},
]
// 加载中状态
if (isLoading) {
return (
<div className={styles.loadingContainer}>
@@ -196,12 +198,10 @@ export function AdminLayout({ children }: AdminLayoutProps) {
return (
<Layout className={styles.layout}>
{/* 跳过链接 - 便于键盘用户快速跳转到主要内容 */}
<a href="#main-content" className={styles.skipLink}>
</a>
{/* 侧边栏 */}
<Sider
collapsible
collapsed={collapsed}
@@ -211,12 +211,10 @@ export function AdminLayout({ children }: AdminLayoutProps) {
className={styles.sider}
trigger={null}
>
{/* Logo 区域 */}
<div className={styles.logo}>
{collapsed ? 'UMS' : '用户管理系统'}
</div>
{/* 导航菜单 */}
<Menu
mode="inline"
selectedKeys={selectedKeys}
@@ -228,21 +226,19 @@ export function AdminLayout({ children }: AdminLayoutProps) {
/>
</Sider>
{/* 右侧主体 */}
<Layout>
{/* 顶栏 */}
<Header className={styles.header}>
<div className={styles.headerLeft}>
{/* 折叠/菜单按钮 - 移动端显示菜单图标,桌面端显示折叠图标 */}
{isMobile ? (
<Button
type="text"
icon={<MenuOutlined />}
onClick={toggleMobileDrawer}
onClick={openMobileDrawer}
className={styles.collapseBtn}
data-testid="mobile-nav-trigger"
/>
) : (
<button
<button
className={styles.collapseBtn}
onClick={() => setCollapsed(!collapsed)}
>
@@ -250,13 +246,12 @@ export function AdminLayout({ children }: AdminLayoutProps) {
</button>
)}
{/* 面包屑 */}
{breadcrumbItems && breadcrumbItems.length > 0 && (
{breadcrumbItems && breadcrumbItems.length > 0 ? (
<div className={styles.breadcrumb}>
{breadcrumbItems.map((item, index) => (
<span key={index}>
{item.path ? (
<a
<a
className={styles.breadcrumbLink}
onClick={() => handleBreadcrumbClick(item.path as string)}
>
@@ -267,21 +262,20 @@ export function AdminLayout({ children }: AdminLayoutProps) {
{item.title}
</span>
)}
{index < breadcrumbItems.length - 1 && (
{index < breadcrumbItems.length - 1 ? (
<span className={styles.breadcrumbSeparator}>/</span>
)}
) : null}
</span>
))}
</div>
)}
) : null}
</div>
<div className={styles.headerRight}>
{/* 用户信息 */}
<Dropdown menu={{ items: userDropdownItems }} placement="bottomRight">
<div className={styles.userTrigger}>
<Avatar
size={32}
<Avatar
size={32}
icon={<UserOutlined />}
src={user?.avatar || null}
style={{ backgroundColor: user?.avatar ? undefined : 'var(--color-primary)' }}
@@ -294,21 +288,15 @@ export function AdminLayout({ children }: AdminLayoutProps) {
</div>
</Header>
{/* 内容区 */}
<Content id="main-content" className={styles.content}>
{children || <Outlet />}
</Content>
</Layout>
{/* 移动端抽屉式导航 */}
<Drawer
title={
<div className={styles.logo}>
{collapsed ? 'UMS' : '用户管理系统'}
</div>
}
title={<div className={styles.logo}>{collapsed ? 'UMS' : '用户管理系统'}</div>}
placement="left"
onClose={toggleMobileDrawer}
onClose={closeMobileDrawer}
open={mobileDrawerOpen}
size="default"
className={styles.mobileDrawer}

View File

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ import { useBreadcrumbs } from './useBreadcrumbs'
function createWrapper(pathname: string) {
return function Wrapper({ children }: { children: ReactNode }) {
return <MemoryRouter future={{ v7_startTransition: true, v7_relativeSplatPath: true }} initialEntries={[pathname]}>{children}</MemoryRouter>
return <MemoryRouter initialEntries={[pathname]}>{children}</MemoryRouter>
}
}

View File

@@ -269,6 +269,31 @@ describe('http client', () => {
})
})
it('uses the current non-expired access token even when another refresh is still in flight', async () => {
const fetchMock = vi.mocked(fetch)
fetchMock.mockResolvedValueOnce(
jsonResponse({
code: 0,
message: 'ok',
data: { ok: true },
}),
)
const { get, setAccessToken, setRefreshPromise, startRefreshing } = await loadModules()
setAccessToken('still-valid-access-token', 3600)
startRefreshing()
setRefreshPromise(new Promise(() => {}))
const requestPromise = get('/protected')
await Promise.resolve()
expect(fetchMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
expect(fetchMock.mock.calls[0][1]?.headers).toMatchObject({
Authorization: 'Bearer still-valid-access-token',
})
await expect(requestPromise).resolves.toEqual({ ok: true })
})
it('clears the local session when refresh fails before the business request is sent', async () => {
const fetchMock = vi.mocked(fetch)
fetchMock.mockResolvedValueOnce(new Response(null, { status: 401 }))
@@ -566,22 +591,6 @@ describe('http client', () => {
})
})
it('returns null when a successful response carries null data', async () => {
const fetchMock = vi.mocked(fetch)
fetchMock.mockResolvedValueOnce(
jsonResponse({
code: 0,
message: 'ok',
data: null,
}),
)
const { get } = await loadModules()
const result = await get<null>('/nullable-success', undefined, { auth: false })
expect(result).toBeNull()
})
it('converts aborted requests into timeout AppErrors', async () => {
vi.useFakeTimers()
const fetchMock = vi.mocked(fetch)

View File

@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ import { CSRF_PROTECTED_METHODS, getCSRFHeaders } from './csrf'
import type { TokenBundle } from '@/types'
const DEFAULT_TIMEOUT = 30_000
let inFlightRefreshBundle: Promise<TokenBundle> | null = null
function isFormDataBody(body: unknown): body is FormData {
return typeof FormData !== 'undefined' && body instanceof FormData
@@ -143,41 +142,7 @@ async function refreshAccessToken(): Promise<TokenBundle> {
return cleanupSessionOnAuthFailure()
}
return result.data as TokenBundle
}
async function performTokenRefresh(): Promise<TokenBundle> {
if (inFlightRefreshBundle) {
return inFlightRefreshBundle
}
startRefreshing()
const promise = (async () => {
try {
const tokenBundle = await refreshAccessToken()
setAccessToken(tokenBundle.access_token, tokenBundle.expires_in)
setRefreshToken(tokenBundle.refresh_token)
return tokenBundle
} finally {
endRefreshing()
clearRefreshPromise()
inFlightRefreshBundle = null
}
})()
inFlightRefreshBundle = promise
setRefreshPromise(
promise.then(
() => undefined,
() => undefined,
),
)
return promise
}
export async function refreshSessionBundle(): Promise<TokenBundle> {
return await performTokenRefresh()
return result.data
}
async function performRefresh(): Promise<string> {
@@ -195,8 +160,26 @@ async function performRefresh(): Promise<string> {
return token
}
const tokenBundle = await performTokenRefresh()
return tokenBundle.access_token
startRefreshing()
const promise = (async () => {
try {
const tokenBundle = await refreshAccessToken()
setAccessToken(tokenBundle.access_token, tokenBundle.expires_in)
setRefreshToken(tokenBundle.refresh_token)
return tokenBundle.access_token
} finally {
endRefreshing()
clearRefreshPromise()
}
})()
setRefreshPromise(
promise.then(
() => undefined,
() => undefined,
),
)
return promise
}
async function resolveAuthorizationHeader(auth: boolean): Promise<string | null> {
@@ -205,6 +188,10 @@ async function resolveAuthorizationHeader(auth: boolean): Promise<string | null>
}
let token = getAccessToken()
if (token && !isAccessTokenExpired()) {
return token
}
if (isRefreshing()) {
const promise = getRefreshPromise()
if (promise) {
@@ -293,7 +280,7 @@ async function request<T>(path: string, options: RequestOptions = {}): Promise<T
throw AppError.fromResponse(result, response.status)
}
return result.data!
return result.data
} catch (error) {
if (error instanceof DOMException && error.name === 'AbortError') {
throw AppError.network('请求超时,请稍后重试')

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
const getAccessTokenMock = vi.fn<() => string | null>()
function jsonResponse(data: unknown, init: ResponseInit = {}) {
return new Response(JSON.stringify(data), {
status: 200,
@@ -12,6 +14,9 @@ function jsonResponse(data: unknown, init: ResponseInit = {}) {
async function loadCsrfModule() {
vi.resetModules()
vi.doMock('./auth-session', () => ({
getAccessToken: () => getAccessTokenMock(),
}))
return import('./csrf')
}
@@ -27,6 +32,8 @@ describe('csrf helpers', () => {
vi.clearAllMocks()
vi.unstubAllGlobals()
vi.unstubAllEnvs()
getAccessTokenMock.mockReset()
getAccessTokenMock.mockReturnValue(null)
clearCsrfCookie()
vi.stubGlobal('fetch', vi.fn())
})
@@ -85,6 +92,7 @@ describe('csrf helpers', () => {
it('fetches and stores a csrf token from the default relative api base', async () => {
const fetchMock = vi.mocked(fetch)
getAccessTokenMock.mockReturnValue('access-token')
fetchMock.mockResolvedValueOnce(
jsonResponse({
code: 0,
@@ -105,6 +113,7 @@ describe('csrf helpers', () => {
method: 'GET',
credentials: 'include',
headers: {
Authorization: 'Bearer access-token',
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
},
},

View File

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
// 使用原生 fetch 获取 CSRF Token
import { config } from '@/lib/config'
import { getAccessToken } from './auth-session'
// CSRF Token 存储
let csrfToken: string | null = null
@@ -84,13 +85,19 @@ export async function initCSRFToken(): Promise<string | null> {
if (!token) {
try {
const headers: Record<string, string> = {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
}
const accessToken = getAccessToken()
if (accessToken) {
headers.Authorization = `Bearer ${accessToken}`
}
// 使用原生 fetch 避免循环依赖
const response = await fetch(buildUrl('/auth/csrf-token'), {
method: 'GET',
credentials: 'include',
headers: {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
},
headers,
})
if (response.ok) {

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
import { BASE_SCENARIO_NAMES, parseSelectedScenarioNames, selectScenarioNames } from '../../scripts/playwright-e2e-scenarios.mjs'
describe('playwright-e2e-scenarios', () => {
it('prepends admin bootstrap when capabilities require it', () => {
const scenarioNames = selectScenarioNames({
requestedScenarioNames: parseSelectedScenarioNames(''),
expectAdminBootstrap: true,
})
expect(scenarioNames[0]).toBe('admin-bootstrap')
expect(scenarioNames.slice(1)).toEqual(BASE_SCENARIO_NAMES)
})
it('keeps admin bootstrap when filtering a later scenario', () => {
const scenarioNames = selectScenarioNames({
requestedScenarioNames: parseSelectedScenarioNames('email-activation'),
expectAdminBootstrap: true,
})
expect(scenarioNames).toEqual(['admin-bootstrap', 'email-activation'])
})
it('does not invent admin bootstrap when it is no longer required', () => {
const scenarioNames = selectScenarioNames({
requestedScenarioNames: parseSelectedScenarioNames('email-activation'),
expectAdminBootstrap: false,
})
expect(scenarioNames).toEqual(['email-activation'])
})
})

View File

@@ -4,9 +4,12 @@ import userEvent from '@testing-library/user-event'
import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
import type { Device, AdminDeviceListParams } from '@/types/device'
import type { CursorPaginatedData, PaginatedData } from '@/types/http'
import { DevicesPage } from './DevicesPage'
const listAllDevicesMock = vi.fn<(params?: AdminDeviceListParams) => Promise<{ items: Device[]; total: number; page: number; page_size: number }>>()
type DeviceListResponse = PaginatedData<Device> | CursorPaginatedData<Device>
const listAllDevicesMock = vi.fn<(params?: AdminDeviceListParams) => Promise<DeviceListResponse>>()
const deleteDeviceMock = vi.fn<(id: number) => Promise<void>>()
const trustDeviceMock = vi.fn<(id: number, duration?: string) => Promise<void>>()
const untrustDeviceMock = vi.fn<(id: number) => Promise<void>>()
@@ -377,6 +380,34 @@ describe('DevicesPage', () => {
)
})
it('does not auto-request the next cursor page after initial load', async () => {
listAllDevicesMock.mockReset()
listAllDevicesMock
.mockResolvedValueOnce({
items: [currentDevices[0]],
next_cursor: 'cursor-page-2',
has_more: true,
page_size: 20,
})
.mockResolvedValueOnce({
items: [currentDevices[1]],
next_cursor: '',
has_more: false,
page_size: 20,
})
render(<DevicesPage />)
expect(await screen.findByText('Device 1')).toBeInTheDocument()
await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 0))
expect(listAllDevicesMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
expect(listAllDevicesMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({ cursor: undefined, size: 20 }),
)
})
it('shows error state and retry', async () => {
const user = userEvent.setup()
@@ -416,7 +447,6 @@ describe('DevicesPage', () => {
it('renders page header with title and description', async () => {
render(<DevicesPage />)
await screen.findByText('Device 1')
const header = screen.getByTestId('page-header')
expect(within(header).getByText('设备管理')).toBeInTheDocument()
expect(within(header).getByText('管理系统所有设备,支持查看、信任状态管理和删除')).toBeInTheDocument()

View File

@@ -46,7 +46,8 @@ export function DevicesPage() {
const [devices, setDevices] = useState<Device[]>([])
const [total, setTotal] = useState(0)
// Cursor-based pagination state (preferred for large datasets)
const [cursor, setCursor] = useState('')
const [requestCursor, setRequestCursor] = useState('')
const [nextCursor, setNextCursor] = useState('')
const [hasMore, setHasMore] = useState(true)
// Legacy page state (for Ant Design Table compatibility)
const [page, setPage] = useState(1)
@@ -64,7 +65,7 @@ export function DevicesPage() {
setError(null)
try {
const params: AdminDeviceListParams = {
cursor: cursor || undefined,
cursor: requestCursor || undefined,
size: pageSize,
keyword: keyword || undefined,
user_id: userIdFilter,
@@ -75,12 +76,14 @@ export function DevicesPage() {
setDevices(result.items ?? [])
// If the response has cursor fields, use them; otherwise fall back to legacy total
if ('next_cursor' in result) {
setCursor(result.next_cursor ?? '')
setNextCursor(result.next_cursor ?? '')
setHasMore(result.has_more ?? false)
// Estimate total from current data + whether there's more
setTotal((page - 1) * pageSize + result.items?.length + (result.has_more ? 1 : 0))
} else {
// Legacy response format fallback
setNextCursor('')
setHasMore(false)
setTotal((result as { total?: number }).total ?? 0)
}
} catch (err) {
@@ -88,7 +91,7 @@ export function DevicesPage() {
} finally {
setLoading(false)
}
}, [cursor, page, pageSize, keyword, userIdFilter, statusFilter, trustFilter])
}, [requestCursor, page, pageSize, keyword, userIdFilter, statusFilter, trustFilter])
useEffect(() => {
void fetchDevices()
@@ -97,7 +100,8 @@ export function DevicesPage() {
// 筛选条件变化时重置到第一页(清空游标)
useEffect(() => {
setPage(1)
setCursor('')
setRequestCursor('')
setNextCursor('')
}, [keyword, userIdFilter, statusFilter, trustFilter])
// 重置筛选
@@ -107,7 +111,8 @@ export function DevicesPage() {
setStatusFilter(undefined)
setTrustFilter(undefined)
setPage(1)
setCursor('')
setRequestCursor('')
setNextCursor('')
}
// 删除设备
@@ -278,14 +283,17 @@ export function DevicesPage() {
if (ps !== pageSize) {
setPageSize(ps)
setPage(1)
setCursor('')
} else if (p === page + 1 && cursor) {
setRequestCursor('')
setNextCursor('')
} else if (p === page + 1 && nextCursor) {
// Next page via cursor
setPage(p)
setRequestCursor(nextCursor)
} else {
// Jump to specific page - fall back
setPage(p)
setCursor('')
setRequestCursor('')
setNextCursor('')
}
},
}

View File

@@ -345,12 +345,14 @@ export function ContactBindingsSection({
label="验证码"
rules={[{ required: true, message: '请输入验证码' }]}
>
<Space.Compact style={{ width: '100%' }}>
<Input placeholder="请输入验证码" />
<Button type="link" loading={sendCodeLoading} onClick={handleSendCode}>
</Button>
</Space.Compact>
<Input
placeholder="请输入验证码"
addonAfter={
<Button type="link" size="small" loading={sendCodeLoading} onClick={handleSendCode}>
</Button>
}
/>
</Form.Item>
<Form.Item name="current_password" label="当前密码">

View File

@@ -192,10 +192,8 @@ vi.mock('@/services/operation-logs', () => ({
listMyOperationLogs: () => listMyOperationLogsMock(),
}))
const contactBindingsSectionMock = vi.fn(() => <div data-testid="contact-bindings-section" />)
vi.mock('./ContactBindingsSection', () => ({
ContactBindingsSection: (props: unknown) => contactBindingsSectionMock(props),
ContactBindingsSection: () => <div data-testid="contact-bindings-section" />,
}))
function buildDevice(id: number, name: string, status: 0 | 1, isTrusted = false): Device {
@@ -320,7 +318,6 @@ describe('ProfileSecurityPage behavior', () => {
created_at: '2026-03-27 09:10:00',
}],
})
contactBindingsSectionMock.mockClear()
vi.spyOn(window, 'getComputedStyle').mockImplementation((element) => {
return originalGetComputedStyle.call(window, element)
@@ -470,24 +467,6 @@ describe('ProfileSecurityPage behavior', () => {
expect(message.success).toHaveBeenCalledWith('密码修改成功')
})
it('passes contact binding capabilities to ContactBindingsSection', async () => {
render(<ProfileSecurityPage />)
await waitFor(() => expect(contactBindingsSectionMock).toHaveBeenCalled())
const latestProps = contactBindingsSectionMock.mock.calls.at(-1)?.[0] as {
userId: number
emailBindingEnabled: boolean
phoneBindingEnabled: boolean
refreshSessionUser: () => Promise<void>
}
expect(latestProps.userId).toBe(1)
expect(latestProps.emailBindingEnabled).toBe(true)
expect(latestProps.phoneBindingEnabled).toBe(true)
await latestProps.refreshSessionUser()
expect(refreshUserMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
})
it('toggles device status, refetches the list, and deletes devices', async () => {
const user = userEvent.setup()

View File

@@ -46,7 +46,6 @@ vi.mock('antd', async () => {
htmlType,
type: buttonType,
icon,
danger,
...props
}: {
children?: ReactNode
@@ -56,7 +55,6 @@ vi.mock('antd', async () => {
}) => {
void buttonType
void icon
void danger
return (
<button type={htmlType ?? 'button'} onClick={onClick} {...props}>

View File

@@ -58,9 +58,6 @@ describe('SettingsPage', () => {
render(<SettingsPage />)
await waitFor(() => {
expect(screen.getByText('安全设置')).toBeInTheDocument()
})
expect(screen.getByText('系统设置')).toBeInTheDocument()
expect(screen.getByText('查看当前系统配置和功能开关状态')).toBeInTheDocument()
})

View File

@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ const useAuthMock = vi.fn()
const listUsersMock = vi.fn<(params: UserListParams) => Promise<PaginatedData<User>>>()
const deleteUserMock = vi.fn<(id: number) => Promise<void>>()
const updateUserStatusMock = vi.fn<(id: number, payload: { status: UserStatus }) => Promise<void>>()
const batchUpdateStatusMock = vi.fn<(ids: number[], status: UserStatus) => Promise<void>>()
const batchDeleteMock = vi.fn<(ids: number[]) => Promise<void>>()
const getUserRolesMock = vi.fn<(id: number) => Promise<Role[]>>()
const listRolesMock = vi.fn<() => Promise<PaginatedData<Role>>>()
@@ -25,17 +27,55 @@ vi.mock('antd', async () => {
rowKey: string | ((row: RecordType) => string | number) | undefined,
index: number,
): string {
return String(resolveRowKeyValue(record, rowKey, index))
}
function resolveRowKeyValue<RecordType extends Record<string, unknown>>(
record: RecordType,
rowKey: string | ((row: RecordType) => string | number) | undefined,
index: number,
): string | number {
if (typeof rowKey === 'function') {
return String(rowKey(record))
return rowKey(record)
}
if (typeof rowKey === 'string') {
return String(record[rowKey] ?? index)
return (record[rowKey] as string | number | undefined) ?? index
}
return String(index)
return index
}
return {
...actual,
Modal: ({
open,
title,
children,
onOk,
onCancel,
okText,
cancelText,
}: {
open?: boolean
title?: ReactNode
children?: ReactNode
onOk?: () => void
onCancel?: () => void
okText?: ReactNode
cancelText?: ReactNode
}) => (
open ? (
<div data-testid="modal">
<div>{title}</div>
<div>{children}</div>
<button type="button" onClick={() => onCancel?.()}>
{cancelText ?? 'cancel'}
</button>
<button type="button" onClick={() => onOk?.()}>
{okText ?? 'ok'}
</button>
</div>
) : null
),
Popconfirm: ({
children,
title,
@@ -56,6 +96,7 @@ vi.mock('antd', async () => {
columns,
dataSource,
rowKey,
rowSelection,
locale,
}: {
columns: Array<{
@@ -66,6 +107,10 @@ vi.mock('antd', async () => {
}>
dataSource?: Array<Record<string, unknown>>
rowKey?: string | ((row: Record<string, unknown>) => string | number)
rowSelection?: {
selectedRowKeys?: Array<string | number>
onChange?: (keys: Array<string | number>) => void
}
locale?: { emptyText?: ReactNode }
}) => {
const rows = dataSource ?? []
@@ -78,6 +123,7 @@ vi.mock('antd', async () => {
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
{rowSelection ? <th>Select</th> : null}
{columns.map((column, index) => (
<th key={column.key ?? column.dataIndex ?? index}>{column.title}</th>
))}
@@ -89,6 +135,23 @@ vi.mock('antd', async () => {
key={resolveRowKey(record, rowKey, rowIndex)}
data-testid={`table-row-${resolveRowKey(record, rowKey, rowIndex)}`}
>
{rowSelection ? (
<td>
<input
type="checkbox"
aria-label={`select-row-${resolveRowKey(record, rowKey, rowIndex)}`}
checked={(rowSelection.selectedRowKeys ?? []).map(String).includes(resolveRowKey(record, rowKey, rowIndex))}
onChange={() => {
const rawKey = resolveRowKeyValue(record, rowKey, rowIndex)
const selectedKeys = rowSelection.selectedRowKeys ?? []
const nextKeys = selectedKeys.map(String).includes(String(rawKey))
? selectedKeys.filter((value) => String(value) !== String(rawKey))
: [...selectedKeys, rawKey]
rowSelection.onChange?.(nextKeys)
}}
/>
</td>
) : null}
{columns.map((column, columnIndex) => {
const value = column.dataIndex ? record[column.dataIndex] : undefined
const content = column.render ? column.render(value, record, rowIndex) : value
@@ -115,6 +178,8 @@ vi.mock('@/services/users', () => ({
listUsers: (params: UserListParams) => listUsersMock(params),
deleteUser: (id: number) => deleteUserMock(id),
updateUserStatus: (id: number, payload: { status: UserStatus }) => updateUserStatusMock(id, payload),
batchUpdateStatus: (ids: number[], status: UserStatus) => batchUpdateStatusMock(ids, status),
batchDelete: (ids: number[]) => batchDeleteMock(ids),
getUserRoles: (id: number) => getUserRolesMock(id),
}))
@@ -304,6 +369,8 @@ describe('UsersPage', () => {
listUsersMock.mockReset()
deleteUserMock.mockReset()
updateUserStatusMock.mockReset()
batchUpdateStatusMock.mockReset()
batchDeleteMock.mockReset()
getUserRolesMock.mockReset()
listRolesMock.mockReset()
@@ -339,6 +406,16 @@ describe('UsersPage', () => {
))
})
batchUpdateStatusMock.mockImplementation(async (ids: number[], status: UserStatus) => {
currentUsers = currentUsers.map((user) => (
ids.includes(user.id) ? { ...user, status } : user
))
})
batchDeleteMock.mockImplementation(async (ids: number[]) => {
currentUsers = currentUsers.filter((user) => !ids.includes(user.id))
})
getUserRolesMock.mockImplementation(async (id: number) => (
id === 5 ? [roles[0], roles[1]] : [roles[1]]
))
@@ -355,6 +432,7 @@ describe('UsersPage', () => {
))
vi.spyOn(message, 'success').mockImplementation(() => undefined as never)
vi.spyOn(message, 'error').mockImplementation(() => undefined as never)
vi.spyOn(message, 'warning').mockImplementation(() => undefined as never)
})
afterEach(() => {
@@ -501,4 +579,30 @@ describe('UsersPage', () => {
await waitFor(() => expect(screen.getByText('admin-root')).toBeInTheDocument())
expect(listUsersMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2)
})
it('opens a stronger batch-delete confirmation and only deletes after explicit modal confirmation', async () => {
const user = userEvent.setup()
render(<UsersPage />)
expect(await screen.findByText('admin-root')).toBeInTheDocument()
await user.click(screen.getByRole('checkbox', { name: 'select-row-2' }))
await user.click(screen.getByRole('checkbox', { name: 'select-row-5' }))
expect(screen.getByText('\u5df2\u9009\u62e9 2 \u4e2a\u7528\u6237\uff1a')).toBeInTheDocument()
await user.click(screen.getByRole('button', { name: '\u6279\u91cf\u5220\u9664' }))
expect(batchDeleteMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
expect(screen.getByTestId('modal')).toHaveTextContent('\u786e\u8ba4\u6279\u91cf\u5220\u9664')
expect(screen.getByTestId('modal')).toHaveTextContent('\u5df2\u9009 2 \u4e2a\u7528\u6237')
expect(screen.getByTestId('modal')).toHaveTextContent('\u6b64\u64cd\u4f5c\u4e0d\u53ef\u6062\u590d')
await user.click(screen.getByRole('button', { name: '\u786e\u8ba4\u6279\u91cf\u5220\u9664' }))
await waitFor(() => expect(batchDeleteMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith([2, 5]))
await waitFor(() => expect(screen.queryByText('\u5df2\u9009\u62e9 2 \u4e2a\u7528\u6237\uff1a')).not.toBeInTheDocument())
expect(message.success).toHaveBeenCalledWith('\u5df2\u5220\u9664 2 \u4e2a\u7528\u6237')
})
})

View File

@@ -6,60 +6,61 @@
* - 批量操作:批量启用、批量禁用、批量删除
*/
import { useState, useEffect, useCallback } from 'react'
import { useCallback, useEffect, useState } from 'react'
import {
Table,
Button,
Space,
Tag,
Input,
Select,
DatePicker,
Popconfirm,
Input,
message,
Modal,
Popconfirm,
Select,
Space,
Table,
Tag,
type TableColumnsType,
type TablePaginationConfig,
} from 'antd'
import type { Key } from 'antd/es/table/interface'
import {
SearchOutlined,
ReloadOutlined,
PlusOutlined,
EyeOutlined,
EditOutlined,
DeleteOutlined,
EditOutlined,
EyeOutlined,
PlusOutlined,
ReloadOutlined,
SearchOutlined,
TeamOutlined,
} from '@ant-design/icons'
import dayjs from 'dayjs'
import { useAuth } from '@/app/providers/auth-context'
import { PageHeader } from '@/components/common'
import { PageEmpty, PageError } from '@/components/feedback'
import { PageLayout, FilterCard, TableCard } from '@/components/layout'
import { FilterCard, PageLayout, TableCard } from '@/components/layout'
import { getErrorMessage } from '@/lib/errors'
import { useAuth } from '@/app/providers/auth-context'
import {
listUsers,
deleteUser,
updateUserStatus,
getUserRoles,
batchUpdateStatus,
batchDelete,
} from '@/services/users'
import { listRoles } from '@/services/roles'
import type { User, UserListParams, UserStatus } from '@/types/user'
import {
batchDelete,
batchUpdateStatus,
deleteUser,
getUserRoles,
listUsers,
updateUserStatus,
} from '@/services/users'
import type { Role } from '@/types/auth'
import { UserStatusText, UserStatusColor } from '@/types/user'
import { UserDetailDrawer } from './UserDetailDrawer'
import { UserEditDrawer } from './UserEditDrawer'
import type { User, UserListParams, UserStatus } from '@/types/user'
import { UserStatusColor, UserStatusText } from '@/types/user'
import { AssignRolesModal } from './AssignRolesModal'
import { CreateUserModal } from './CreateUserModal'
import { UserDetailDrawer } from './UserDetailDrawer'
import { UserEditDrawer } from './UserEditDrawer'
const { RangePicker } = DatePicker
export function UsersPage() {
// 当前登录用户(用于防止删除自己)
const { user: currentUser } = useAuth()
// 列表数据
const [loading, setLoading] = useState(false)
const [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null)
const [users, setUsers] = useState<User[]>([])
@@ -67,7 +68,6 @@ export function UsersPage() {
const [page, setPage] = useState(1)
const [pageSize, setPageSize] = useState(20)
// 筛选条件
const [keyword, setKeyword] = useState('')
const [statusFilter, setStatusFilter] = useState<UserStatus | undefined>()
const [createdFrom, setCreatedFrom] = useState<string | undefined>()
@@ -75,11 +75,9 @@ export function UsersPage() {
const [sortBy, setSortBy] = useState<string | undefined>()
const [sortOrder, setSortOrder] = useState<'asc' | 'desc' | undefined>()
// 角色列表(用于筛选和分配)
const [roles, setRoles] = useState<Role[]>([])
const [roleFilter, setRoleFilter] = useState<number | undefined>()
// 抽屉/弹窗
const [detailVisible, setDetailVisible] = useState(false)
const [createVisible, setCreateVisible] = useState(false)
const [editVisible, setEditVisible] = useState(false)
@@ -87,31 +85,31 @@ export function UsersPage() {
const [selectedUser, setSelectedUser] = useState<User | null>(null)
const [selectedUserRoles, setSelectedUserRoles] = useState<Role[]>([])
// 批量选择
const [selectedRowKeys, setSelectedRowKeys] = useState<Key[]>([])
const [batchDeleteConfirmOpen, setBatchDeleteConfirmOpen] = useState(false)
const [batchDeleteSubmitting, setBatchDeleteSubmitting] = useState(false)
// 加载角色列表
useEffect(() => {
const fetchRoles = async () => {
try {
const roleList = await listRoles({ page: 1, page_size: 100 })
setRoles(roleList.items)
} catch {
// 获取角色列表失败,忽略
// Ignore role prefetch failures so the page can still render the list.
}
}
fetchRoles()
void fetchRoles()
}, [])
// 筛选条件变化时重置到第一页
useEffect(() => {
setPage(1)
}, [keyword, statusFilter, roleFilter, createdFrom, createdTo, sortBy, sortOrder])
// 加载用户列表
const fetchUsers = useCallback(async () => {
setLoading(true)
setError(null)
try {
const params: UserListParams = {
page,
@@ -124,6 +122,7 @@ export function UsersPage() {
sort_by: sortBy,
sort_order: sortOrder,
}
const result = await listUsers(params)
setUsers(result.items)
setTotal(result.total)
@@ -132,13 +131,12 @@ export function UsersPage() {
} finally {
setLoading(false)
}
}, [page, pageSize, keyword, statusFilter, roleFilter, createdFrom, createdTo, sortBy, sortOrder])
}, [createdFrom, createdTo, keyword, page, pageSize, roleFilter, sortBy, sortOrder, statusFilter])
useEffect(() => {
fetchUsers()
void fetchUsers()
}, [fetchUsers])
// 重置筛选
const handleReset = () => {
setKeyword('')
setStatusFilter(undefined)
@@ -150,54 +148,46 @@ export function UsersPage() {
setPage(1)
}
// 查看详情
const handleViewDetail = async (user: User) => {
setSelectedUser(user)
setDetailVisible(true)
}
// 编辑用户
const handleEdit = async (user: User) => {
setSelectedUser(user)
setEditVisible(true)
}
// 删除用户
const handleDelete = async (user: User) => {
// 防止删除自己
if (currentUser && user.id === currentUser.id) {
message.error('不能删除当前登录的账号')
return
}
try {
await deleteUser(user.id)
message.success(`用户 ${user.username} 已删除`)
fetchUsers()
void fetchUsers()
} catch (err) {
message.error(getErrorMessage(err, '删除失败'))
}
}
// 切换状态
const handleToggleStatus = async (user: User) => {
// 状态转换逻辑:
// - 1已激活-> 3禁用
// - 0未激活-> 1激活
// - 2已锁定-> 1解锁并激活
// - 3已禁用-> 1激活
const newStatus: UserStatus = user.status === 1 ? 3 : 1
try {
await updateUserStatus(user.id, { status: newStatus })
message.success('状态已更新')
fetchUsers()
void fetchUsers()
} catch (err) {
message.error(getErrorMessage(err, '状态更新失败'))
}
}
// 分配角色
const handleAssignRoles = async (user: User) => {
setSelectedUser(user)
try {
const userRoles = await getUserRoles(user.id)
setSelectedUserRoles(userRoles)
@@ -207,86 +197,104 @@ export function UsersPage() {
}
}
// 编辑成功回调
const handleEditSuccess = () => {
setEditVisible(false)
fetchUsers()
void fetchUsers()
}
const handleCreateSuccess = () => {
setCreateVisible(false)
fetchUsers()
void fetchUsers()
}
// 角色分配成功回调
const handleAssignRolesSuccess = () => {
setAssignRolesVisible(false)
fetchUsers()
void fetchUsers()
}
// 批量启用
const handleBatchEnable = async () => {
if (selectedRowKeys.length === 0) {
message.warning('请先选择用户')
return
}
try {
const ids = selectedRowKeys.map(Number)
await batchUpdateStatus(ids, 1)
message.success(`已启用 ${ids.length} 个用户`)
setSelectedRowKeys([])
fetchUsers()
void fetchUsers()
} catch (err) {
message.error(getErrorMessage(err, '批量启用失败'))
}
}
// 批量禁用
const handleBatchDisable = async () => {
if (selectedRowKeys.length === 0) {
message.warning('请先选择用户')
return
}
try {
const ids = selectedRowKeys.map(Number)
await batchUpdateStatus(ids, 3)
message.success(`已禁用 ${ids.length} 个用户`)
setSelectedRowKeys([])
fetchUsers()
void fetchUsers()
} catch (err) {
message.error(getErrorMessage(err, '批量禁用失败'))
}
}
// 批量删除
const handleBatchDelete = async () => {
const handleOpenBatchDeleteConfirm = () => {
if (selectedRowKeys.length === 0) {
message.warning('请先选择用户')
return
}
// 防止删除自己
if (currentUser && selectedRowKeys.includes(currentUser.id)) {
message.error('不能删除当前登录的账号')
return
}
setBatchDeleteConfirmOpen(true)
}
const handleBatchDelete = async () => {
if (selectedRowKeys.length === 0) {
setBatchDeleteConfirmOpen(false)
return
}
if (currentUser && selectedRowKeys.includes(currentUser.id)) {
setBatchDeleteConfirmOpen(false)
message.error('不能删除当前登录的账号')
return
}
try {
setBatchDeleteSubmitting(true)
const ids = selectedRowKeys.map(Number)
await batchDelete(ids)
message.success(`已删除 ${ids.length} 个用户`)
setBatchDeleteConfirmOpen(false)
setSelectedRowKeys([])
fetchUsers()
void fetchUsers()
} catch (err) {
message.error(getErrorMessage(err, '批量删除失败'))
} finally {
setBatchDeleteSubmitting(false)
}
}
// 表格行选择配置
const selectedUserIds = new Set(selectedRowKeys.map(String))
const selectedUsers = users.filter((user) => selectedUserIds.has(String(user.id)))
const rowSelection = {
selectedRowKeys,
onChange: (keys: Key[]) => setSelectedRowKeys(keys),
}
// 表格列定义
const columns: TableColumnsType<User> = [
{
title: '用户名',
@@ -350,7 +358,7 @@ export function UsersPage() {
type="link"
size="small"
icon={<EyeOutlined />}
onClick={() => handleViewDetail(record)}
onClick={() => void handleViewDetail(record)}
>
</Button>
@@ -358,7 +366,7 @@ export function UsersPage() {
type="link"
size="small"
icon={<EditOutlined />}
onClick={() => handleEdit(record)}
onClick={() => void handleEdit(record)}
>
</Button>
@@ -366,14 +374,14 @@ export function UsersPage() {
type="link"
size="small"
icon={<TeamOutlined />}
onClick={() => handleAssignRoles(record)}
onClick={() => void handleAssignRoles(record)}
>
</Button>
{record.status === 1 ? (
<Popconfirm
title="确定要禁用该用户吗?"
onConfirm={() => handleToggleStatus(record)}
onConfirm={() => void handleToggleStatus(record)}
>
<Button type="link" size="small" danger>
@@ -382,7 +390,7 @@ export function UsersPage() {
) : record.status === 3 ? (
<Popconfirm
title="确定要激活该用户吗?"
onConfirm={() => handleToggleStatus(record)}
onConfirm={() => void handleToggleStatus(record)}
>
<Button type="link" size="small">
@@ -391,7 +399,7 @@ export function UsersPage() {
) : record.status === 2 ? (
<Popconfirm
title="该用户因多次失败已被锁定,确定要解锁并激活吗?"
onConfirm={() => handleToggleStatus(record)}
onConfirm={() => void handleToggleStatus(record)}
>
<Button type="link" size="small">
@@ -400,7 +408,7 @@ export function UsersPage() {
) : record.status === 0 ? (
<Popconfirm
title="该用户尚未激活,确定要激活该用户吗?"
onConfirm={() => handleToggleStatus(record)}
onConfirm={() => void handleToggleStatus(record)}
>
<Button type="link" size="small">
@@ -409,7 +417,7 @@ export function UsersPage() {
) : null}
<Popconfirm
title={`确定要删除用户「${record.username}」吗?此操作不可恢复。`}
onConfirm={() => handleDelete(record)}
onConfirm={() => void handleDelete(record)}
>
<Button
type="link"
@@ -425,22 +433,21 @@ export function UsersPage() {
},
]
// 分页配置
const paginationConfig: TablePaginationConfig = {
current: page,
pageSize,
total,
showSizeChanger: true,
showQuickJumper: true,
showTotal: (total) => `${total}`,
onChange: (p, ps) => {
setPage(p)
setPageSize(ps)
showTotal: (count) => `${count}`,
onChange: (nextPage, nextPageSize) => {
setPage(nextPage)
setPageSize(nextPageSize)
},
}
if (error) {
return <PageError description={error} onRetry={fetchUsers} />
return <PageError description={error} onRetry={() => void fetchUsers()} />
}
return (
@@ -448,46 +455,39 @@ export function UsersPage() {
<PageHeader
title="用户管理"
description="管理系统用户,支持创建、查看、编辑、状态管理和角色分配"
actions={
actions={(
<Space>
<Button type="primary" icon={<PlusOutlined />} onClick={() => setCreateVisible(true)}>
</Button>
<Button icon={<ReloadOutlined />} onClick={fetchUsers}>
<Button icon={<ReloadOutlined />} onClick={() => void fetchUsers()}>
</Button>
</Space>
}
)}
/>
{/* 批量操作工具栏 */}
{selectedRowKeys.length > 0 && (
{selectedRowKeys.length > 0 ? (
<div style={{ marginBottom: 16, padding: '8px 16px', background: '#f0f5ff', borderRadius: 4 }}>
<Space>
<span> {selectedRowKeys.length} </span>
<Button size="small" onClick={handleBatchEnable}></Button>
<Button size="small" onClick={handleBatchDisable}></Button>
<Popconfirm
title={`确定要删除选中的 ${selectedRowKeys.length} 个用户吗?此操作不可恢复。`}
onConfirm={handleBatchDelete}
>
<Button size="small" danger></Button>
</Popconfirm>
<Button size="small" onClick={() => void handleBatchEnable()}></Button>
<Button size="small" onClick={() => void handleBatchDisable()}></Button>
<Button size="small" danger onClick={handleOpenBatchDeleteConfirm}></Button>
<Button size="small" type="link" onClick={() => setSelectedRowKeys([])}>
</Button>
</Space>
</div>
)}
) : null}
{/* 筛选区域 */}
<FilterCard>
<Space wrap size="middle">
<Input
placeholder="用户名/邮箱/手机号"
prefix={<SearchOutlined />}
value={keyword}
onChange={(e) => setKeyword(e.target.value)}
onChange={(event) => setKeyword(event.target.value)}
onPressEnter={() => void fetchUsers()}
style={{ width: 200 }}
allowClear
@@ -511,7 +511,7 @@ export function UsersPage() {
onChange={setRoleFilter}
allowClear
style={{ width: 150 }}
options={roles.map((r) => ({ value: r.id, label: r.name }))}
options={roles.map((role) => ({ value: role.id, label: role.name }))}
/>
<RangePicker
placeholder={['创建开始', '创建结束']}
@@ -543,14 +543,13 @@ export function UsersPage() {
{ value: 'desc', label: '降序' },
]}
/>
<Button type="primary" icon={<SearchOutlined />} onClick={fetchUsers}>
<Button type="primary" icon={<SearchOutlined />} onClick={() => void fetchUsers()}>
</Button>
<Button onClick={handleReset}></Button>
</Space>
</FilterCard>
{/* 用户列表 */}
<TableCard>
<Table
columns={columns}
@@ -562,22 +561,18 @@ export function UsersPage() {
rowSelection={rowSelection}
locale={{
emptyText: (
<PageEmpty
description="暂无用户数据"
/>
<PageEmpty description="暂无用户数据" />
),
}}
/>
</TableCard>
{/* 详情抽屉 */}
<UserDetailDrawer
open={detailVisible}
userId={selectedUser?.id}
onClose={() => setDetailVisible(false)}
/>
{/* 编辑抽屉 */}
<UserEditDrawer
open={editVisible}
user={selectedUser}
@@ -585,7 +580,6 @@ export function UsersPage() {
onClose={() => setEditVisible(false)}
/>
{/* 创建用户弹窗 */}
<CreateUserModal
open={createVisible}
roles={roles}
@@ -593,7 +587,6 @@ export function UsersPage() {
onClose={() => setCreateVisible(false)}
/>
{/* 角色分配弹窗 */}
<AssignRolesModal
open={assignRolesVisible}
user={selectedUser}
@@ -602,6 +595,28 @@ export function UsersPage() {
onSuccess={handleAssignRolesSuccess}
onClose={() => setAssignRolesVisible(false)}
/>
<Modal
open={batchDeleteConfirmOpen}
title="确认批量删除"
onOk={() => void handleBatchDelete()}
onCancel={() => setBatchDeleteConfirmOpen(false)}
okText="确认批量删除"
cancelText="取消"
okButtonProps={{ danger: true }}
confirmLoading={batchDeleteSubmitting}
>
<Space direction="vertical" size="small">
<span> {selectedRowKeys.length} </span>
{selectedUsers.length > 0 ? (
<span>
{selectedUsers.slice(0, 3).map((user) => user.username).join('、')}
{selectedUsers.length > 3 ? `${selectedUsers.length}` : ''}
</span>
) : null}
</Space>
</Modal>
</PageLayout>
)
}

View File

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ vi.mock('@/services/auth', () => ({
function renderActivateAccountPage(initialEntry: string) {
return render(
<MemoryRouter future={{ v7_startTransition: true, v7_relativeSplatPath: true }} initialEntries={[initialEntry]}>
<MemoryRouter initialEntries={[initialEntry]}>
<Routes>
<Route path="/activate-account" element={<ActivateAccountPage />} />
</Routes>

View File

@@ -8,12 +8,12 @@ import type { AuthCapabilities, TokenBundle } from '@/types'
import { BootstrapAdminPage } from './BootstrapAdminPage'
const getAuthCapabilitiesMock = vi.fn<() => Promise<AuthCapabilities>>()
const bootstrapAdminMock = vi.fn<(payload: unknown) => Promise<TokenBundle>>()
const bootstrapAdminMock = vi.fn<(payload: unknown, bootstrapSecret: string) => Promise<TokenBundle>>()
const onLoginSuccessMock = vi.fn<(tokenBundle: TokenBundle) => Promise<void>>()
vi.mock('@/services/auth', () => ({
getAuthCapabilities: () => getAuthCapabilitiesMock(),
bootstrapAdmin: (payload: unknown) => bootstrapAdminMock(payload),
bootstrapAdmin: (payload: unknown, bootstrapSecret: string) => bootstrapAdminMock(payload, bootstrapSecret),
}))
const authContextValue: AuthContextValue = {
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ const authContextValue: AuthContextValue = {
function renderBootstrapAdminPage() {
return render(
<MemoryRouter future={{ v7_startTransition: true, v7_relativeSplatPath: true }} initialEntries={['/bootstrap-admin']}>
<MemoryRouter initialEntries={['/bootstrap-admin']}>
<AuthContext.Provider value={authContextValue}>
<BootstrapAdminPage />
</AuthContext.Provider>
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ describe('BootstrapAdminPage', () => {
expect(screen.getByRole('heading', { name: '初始化首个管理员账号' })).toBeInTheDocument()
expect(screen.getByPlaceholderText('管理员用户名')).toBeInTheDocument()
expect(screen.getByPlaceholderText('引导密钥')).toBeInTheDocument()
expect(screen.getByPlaceholderText('管理员密码')).toBeInTheDocument()
expect(screen.getByRole('button', { name: '完成初始化并进入系统' })).toBeInTheDocument()
})
@@ -88,20 +89,22 @@ describe('BootstrapAdminPage', () => {
await user.type(screen.getByPlaceholderText('管理员用户名'), 'bootstrap_admin')
await user.type(screen.getByPlaceholderText('管理员昵称(选填)'), 'Bootstrap Admin')
await user.type(screen.getByPlaceholderText('管理员邮箱'), 'bootstrap_admin@example.com')
await user.type(screen.getByPlaceholderText('Bootstrap Secret'), 'bootstrap-secret-demo')
await user.type(screen.getByPlaceholderText('管理员邮箱(选填)'), 'bootstrap_admin@example.com')
await user.type(screen.getByPlaceholderText('引导密钥'), 'bootstrap-secret')
await user.type(screen.getByPlaceholderText('管理员密码'), 'Bootstrap123!@#')
await user.type(screen.getByPlaceholderText('确认管理员密码'), 'Bootstrap123!@#')
await user.click(screen.getByRole('button', { name: '完成初始化并进入系统' }))
await waitFor(() =>
expect(bootstrapAdminMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
username: 'bootstrap_admin',
nickname: 'Bootstrap Admin',
email: 'bootstrap_admin@example.com',
password: 'Bootstrap123!@#',
bootstrap_secret: 'bootstrap-secret-demo',
}),
expect(bootstrapAdminMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
{
username: 'bootstrap_admin',
nickname: 'Bootstrap Admin',
email: 'bootstrap_admin@example.com',
password: 'Bootstrap123!@#',
},
'bootstrap-secret',
),
)
await waitFor(() =>

View File

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ const DEFAULT_CAPABILITIES: AuthCapabilities = {
type BootstrapAdminFormValues = {
username: string
nickname?: string
email: string
email?: string
bootstrapSecret: string
password: string
confirmPassword: string
@@ -69,13 +69,15 @@ export function BootstrapAdminPage() {
const handleSubmit = useCallback(async (values: BootstrapAdminFormValues) => {
setLoading(true)
try {
const tokenBundle = await bootstrapAdmin({
username: values.username.trim(),
nickname: values.nickname?.trim() || undefined,
email: values.email!.trim(),
bootstrap_secret: values.bootstrapSecret!.trim(),
password: values.password,
})
const tokenBundle = await bootstrapAdmin(
{
username: values.username.trim(),
nickname: values.nickname?.trim() || undefined,
email: values.email?.trim() || undefined,
password: values.password,
},
values.bootstrapSecret.trim(),
)
await onLoginSuccess(tokenBundle)
message.success('管理员初始化完成')
navigate('/dashboard', { replace: true })
@@ -112,7 +114,7 @@ export function BootstrapAdminPage() {
</Title>
<Paragraph type="secondary" style={{ marginBottom: 24 }}>
Bootstrap Secret
</Paragraph>
<Alert
@@ -145,27 +147,24 @@ export function BootstrapAdminPage() {
</Form.Item>
<Form.Item
name="email"
rules={[
{ required: true, message: '请输入管理员邮箱' },
{ type: 'email', message: '请输入有效的邮箱地址' },
]}
rules={[{ type: 'email', message: '请输入有效的邮箱地址' }]}
>
<Input
prefix={<MailOutlined />}
placeholder="管理员邮箱"
placeholder="管理员邮箱(选填)"
size="large"
autoComplete="email"
/>
</Form.Item>
<Form.Item
name="bootstrapSecret"
rules={[{ required: true, message: '请输入 Bootstrap Secret' }]}
rules={[{ required: true, message: '请输入引导密钥' }]}
>
<Input.Password
prefix={<LockOutlined />}
placeholder="Bootstrap Secret"
placeholder="引导密钥"
size="large"
autoComplete="one-time-code"
autoComplete="off"
/>
</Form.Item>
<Form.Item

View File

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ vi.mock('@/services/auth', () => ({
function renderForgotPasswordPage() {
return render(
<MemoryRouter future={{ v7_startTransition: true, v7_relativeSplatPath: true }} initialEntries={['/forgot-password']}>
<MemoryRouter initialEntries={['/forgot-password']}>
<Routes>
<Route path="/forgot-password" element={<ForgotPasswordPage />} />
</Routes>

View File

@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ const assignMock = vi.fn()
const getAuthCapabilitiesMock = vi.fn<() => Promise<AuthCapabilities>>()
const getOAuthAuthorizationUrlMock = vi.fn()
const loginByPasswordMock = vi.fn()
const verifyTOTPAfterPasswordLoginMock = vi.fn()
const loginByEmailCodeMock = vi.fn()
const loginBySmsCodeMock = vi.fn()
const sendEmailCodeMock = vi.fn()
@@ -73,6 +74,7 @@ vi.mock('@/services/auth', () => ({
getOAuthAuthorizationUrl: (provider: string, returnTo: string) =>
getOAuthAuthorizationUrlMock(provider, returnTo),
loginByPassword: (payload: unknown) => loginByPasswordMock(payload),
verifyTOTPAfterPasswordLogin: (payload: unknown) => verifyTOTPAfterPasswordLoginMock(payload),
loginByEmailCode: (payload: unknown) => loginByEmailCodeMock(payload),
loginBySmsCode: (payload: unknown) => loginBySmsCodeMock(payload),
sendEmailCode: (payload: unknown) => sendEmailCodeMock(payload),
@@ -100,7 +102,7 @@ function renderLoginPage(
} = '/login',
) {
return render(
<MemoryRouter future={{ v7_startTransition: true, v7_relativeSplatPath: true }} initialEntries={[initialEntry]}>
<MemoryRouter initialEntries={[initialEntry]}>
<AuthContext.Provider value={authContextValue}>
<LoginPage />
</AuthContext.Provider>
@@ -127,6 +129,7 @@ describe('LoginPage', () => {
getAuthCapabilitiesMock.mockReset()
getOAuthAuthorizationUrlMock.mockReset()
loginByPasswordMock.mockReset()
verifyTOTPAfterPasswordLoginMock.mockReset()
loginByEmailCodeMock.mockReset()
loginBySmsCodeMock.mockReset()
sendEmailCodeMock.mockReset()
@@ -280,6 +283,49 @@ describe('LoginPage', () => {
expect(navigateMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
it('holds password login on a TOTP challenge and completes verification before creating a session', async () => {
loginByPasswordMock.mockResolvedValue({
requires_totp: true,
user_id: 1,
temp_token: 'totp-challenge-token',
})
verifyTOTPAfterPasswordLoginMock.mockResolvedValue(loginTokenBundle)
renderLoginPage('/login?redirect=/profile')
await waitFor(() => expect(getAuthCapabilitiesMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1))
fireEvent.change(screen.getByPlaceholderText(TEXT.usernamePlaceholder), {
target: { value: 'admin' },
})
fireEvent.change(screen.getByPlaceholderText(TEXT.passwordPlaceholder), {
target: { value: 'SecurePass123!' },
})
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole('button'))
await waitFor(() => expect(loginByPasswordMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1))
expect(onLoginSuccessMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
expect(screen.getByPlaceholderText('TOTP code')).toBeInTheDocument()
fireEvent.change(screen.getByPlaceholderText('TOTP code'), {
target: { value: '123456' },
})
fireEvent.click(screen.getByRole('button', { name: /verify totp/i }))
await waitFor(() => {
expect(verifyTOTPAfterPasswordLoginMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
user_id: 1,
code: '123456',
device_id: expect.any(String),
temp_token: 'totp-challenge-token',
})
})
expect(onLoginSuccessMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(loginTokenBundle)
expect(navigateMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/profile', { replace: true })
})
it('sends an email verification code and starts the resend countdown', async () => {
getAuthCapabilitiesMock.mockResolvedValue({
...defaultCapabilities,

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
import { useCallback, useEffect, useMemo, useState } from 'react'
import { Link, useLocation, useNavigate, useSearchParams } from 'react-router-dom'
import { Alert, Button, Divider, Form, Input, Space, Tabs, Typography, message } from 'antd'
import { Alert, Button, Checkbox, Divider, Form, Input, Space, Tabs, Typography, message } from 'antd'
import {
LockOutlined,
MailOutlined,
@@ -22,8 +22,9 @@ import {
loginBySmsCode,
sendEmailCode,
sendSmsCode,
verifyTOTPAfterPasswordLogin,
} from '@/services/auth'
import type { AuthCapabilities, TokenBundle } from '@/types'
import type { AuthCapabilities, PasswordLoginChallenge, PasswordLoginResponse, TokenBundle } from '@/types'
const { Paragraph, Text, Title } = Typography
@@ -53,6 +54,19 @@ type SmsCodeFormValues = {
code: string
}
function isPasswordLoginChallenge(
result: PasswordLoginResponse,
): result is PasswordLoginChallenge {
return (
typeof result === 'object' &&
result !== null &&
'requires_totp' in result &&
result.requires_totp === true &&
typeof result.user_id === 'number' &&
typeof result.temp_token === 'string'
)
}
export function LoginPage() {
const [activeTab, setActiveTab] = useState('password')
const [loading, setLoading] = useState(false)
@@ -60,6 +74,9 @@ export function LoginPage() {
const [emailCountdown, setEmailCountdown] = useState(0)
const [smsCountdown, setSmsCountdown] = useState(0)
const [capabilities, setCapabilities] = useState<AuthCapabilities>(DEFAULT_CAPABILITIES)
const [pendingTOTP, setPendingTOTP] = useState<(PasswordLoginChallenge & { device_id?: string }) | null>(null)
const [totpCode, setTotpCode] = useState('')
const [rememberMe, setRememberMe] = useState(false)
const [emailForm] = Form.useForm<EmailCodeFormValues>()
const [smsForm] = Form.useForm<SmsCodeFormValues>()
@@ -151,6 +168,8 @@ export function LoginPage() {
const handlePasswordLogin = useCallback(async (values: LoginFormValues) => {
setLoading(true)
setPendingTOTP(null)
setTotpCode('')
try {
const deviceInfo = getDeviceFingerprint()
const tokenBundle = await loginByPassword({
@@ -158,6 +177,17 @@ export function LoginPage() {
password: values.password,
...deviceInfo,
})
if (isPasswordLoginChallenge(tokenBundle)) {
setPendingTOTP({
...tokenBundle,
device_id: deviceInfo.device_id,
})
setTotpCode('')
return
}
setPendingTOTP(null)
setTotpCode('')
await handleLoginSuccess(tokenBundle)
} catch (error) {
message.error(getErrorMessage(error, '登录失败,请检查用户名和密码'))
@@ -166,6 +196,29 @@ export function LoginPage() {
}
}, [handleLoginSuccess])
const handleTOTPVerification = useCallback(async () => {
if (!pendingTOTP) {
return
}
setLoading(true)
try {
const tokenBundle = await verifyTOTPAfterPasswordLogin({
user_id: pendingTOTP.user_id,
code: totpCode,
device_id: pendingTOTP.device_id,
temp_token: pendingTOTP.temp_token,
})
setPendingTOTP(null)
setTotpCode('')
await handleLoginSuccess(tokenBundle)
} catch (error) {
message.error(getErrorMessage(error, 'TOTP verification failed'))
} finally {
setLoading(false)
}
}, [handleLoginSuccess, pendingTOTP, totpCode])
const handleSendEmailCode = useCallback(async () => {
try {
const values = await emailForm.validateFields(['email'])
@@ -232,6 +285,33 @@ export function LoginPage() {
key: 'password',
label: '密码登录',
children: (
pendingTOTP ? (
<Space direction="vertical" size={16} style={{ width: '100%' }}>
<Alert
type="info"
showIcon
message="TOTP verification required"
description="Enter the code from your authenticator app to finish signing in."
/>
<Input
prefix={<SafetyOutlined />}
placeholder="TOTP code"
size="large"
maxLength={6}
value={totpCode}
onChange={(event) => setTotpCode(event.target.value)}
/>
<Button
type="primary"
size="large"
block
loading={loading}
onClick={() => void handleTOTPVerification()}
>
Verify TOTP
</Button>
</Space>
) : (
<Form<LoginFormValues> layout="vertical" onFinish={handlePasswordLogin} autoComplete="off">
<Form.Item name="username" rules={[{ required: true, message: '请输入用户名' }]}>
<Input
@@ -249,12 +329,18 @@ export function LoginPage() {
autoComplete="current-password"
/>
</Form.Item>
<Form.Item>
<Checkbox checked={rememberMe} onChange={(e) => setRememberMe(e.target.checked)}>
7
</Checkbox>
</Form.Item>
<Form.Item>
<Button type="primary" htmlType="submit" size="large" block loading={loading}>
</Button>
</Form.Item>
</Form>
)
),
},
]
@@ -387,12 +473,16 @@ export function LoginPage() {
emailForm,
handleEmailCodeLogin,
handlePasswordLogin,
handleTOTPVerification,
handleSendEmailCode,
handleSendSmsCode,
handleSmsCodeLogin,
loading,
pendingTOTP,
rememberMe,
smsCountdown,
smsForm,
totpCode,
])
const currentTab = tabItems.find((item) => item.key === activeTab) ?? tabItems[0]
@@ -446,6 +536,7 @@ export function LoginPage() {
size="large"
onClick={() => void handleOAuthLogin(provider.provider)}
loading={oauthLoadingProvider === provider.provider}
disabled={oauthLoadingProvider === provider.provider}
>
使 {provider.name}
</Button>

View File

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ const authContextValue: AuthContextValue = {
function renderOAuthCallbackPage(entry: string) {
return render(
<MemoryRouter future={{ v7_startTransition: true, v7_relativeSplatPath: true }} initialEntries={[entry]}>
<MemoryRouter initialEntries={[entry]}>
<AuthContext.Provider value={authContextValue}>
<OAuthCallbackPage />
</AuthContext.Provider>

View File

@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ vi.mock('@/services/auth', () => ({
function renderRegisterPage() {
return render(
<MemoryRouter future={{ v7_startTransition: true, v7_relativeSplatPath: true }} initialEntries={['/register']}>
<MemoryRouter initialEntries={['/register']}>
<RegisterPage />
</MemoryRouter>,
)

View File

@@ -8,9 +8,10 @@ import {
SafetyOutlined,
UserOutlined,
} from '@ant-design/icons'
import { Alert, Button, Form, Input, Result, Space, Typography, message } from 'antd'
import { Alert, Button, Checkbox, Form, Input, Result, Space, Typography, message } from 'antd'
import { AuthLayout } from '@/layouts'
import { PasswordStrengthIndicator } from '@/components/common/PasswordStrengthIndicator'
import { getErrorMessage, isFormValidationError } from '@/lib/errors'
import { getAuthCapabilities, register, sendSmsCode } from '@/services/auth'
import type { AuthCapabilities, RegisterResponse } from '@/types'
@@ -38,10 +39,10 @@ type RegisterFormValues = {
confirmPassword: string
}
function buildRegisterSummary(user: RegisterResponse) {
if (user.status === 0) {
if (user.email) {
return `账号已创建,激活邮件会发送到 ${user.email}。请完成激活后再登录。`
function buildRegisterSummary(result: RegisterResponse) {
if (result.status === 0) {
if (result.email) {
return `账号已创建,激活邮件会发送到 ${result.email}。请完成激活后再登录。`
}
return '账号已创建,请按页面提示完成激活后再登录。'
}
@@ -56,6 +57,7 @@ export function RegisterPage() {
const [capabilities, setCapabilities] = useState<AuthCapabilities>(DEFAULT_CAPABILITIES)
const [capabilitiesLoaded, setCapabilitiesLoaded] = useState(false)
const [submitted, setSubmitted] = useState<RegisterResponse | null>(null)
const [passwordValue, setPasswordValue] = useState('')
useEffect(() => {
if (smsCountdown <= 0) {
@@ -291,8 +293,12 @@ export function RegisterPage() {
placeholder="密码"
size="large"
autoComplete="new-password"
onChange={(e) => setPasswordValue(e.target.value)}
/>
</Form.Item>
<Form.Item style={{ marginBottom: 16 }}>
<PasswordStrengthIndicator password={passwordValue} />
</Form.Item>
<Form.Item
name="confirmPassword"
dependencies={['password']}
@@ -315,6 +321,20 @@ export function RegisterPage() {
autoComplete="new-password"
/>
</Form.Item>
<Form.Item
name="agreement"
valuePropName="checked"
rules={[
{
validator: (_, value) =>
value ? Promise.resolve() : Promise.reject(new Error('请阅读并同意用户协议和隐私政策')),
},
]}
>
<Checkbox>
<a href="/agreement" target="_blank"></a> <a href="/privacy" target="_blank"></a>
</Checkbox>
</Form.Item>
<Form.Item>
<Button type="primary" htmlType="submit" size="large" block loading={loading}>

View File

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ vi.mock('@/services/auth', () => ({
function renderResetPasswordPage(initialEntry: string) {
return render(
<MemoryRouter future={{ v7_startTransition: true, v7_relativeSplatPath: true }} initialEntries={[initialEntry]}>
<MemoryRouter initialEntries={[initialEntry]}>
<Routes>
<Route path="/reset-password" element={<ResetPasswordPage />} />
</Routes>

View File

@@ -2,21 +2,17 @@ import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
const getMock = vi.fn()
const postMock = vi.fn()
const refreshSessionBundleMock = vi.fn()
vi.mock('@/lib/http/client', () => ({
get: getMock,
post: postMock,
refreshSessionBundle: refreshSessionBundleMock,
}))
describe('auth service', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
getMock.mockReset()
postMock.mockReset()
refreshSessionBundleMock.mockReset()
postMock.mockResolvedValue(undefined)
refreshSessionBundleMock.mockResolvedValue(undefined)
})
it('loads public auth capabilities without auth headers', async () => {
@@ -88,28 +84,6 @@ describe('auth service', () => {
)
})
it('verifies password-login totp with the temporary challenge token', async () => {
const { verifyTOTPAfterPasswordLogin } = await import('./auth')
await verifyTOTPAfterPasswordLogin({
user_id: 42,
code: '123456',
device_id: 'device-1',
temp_token: 'temp-token-demo',
})
expect(postMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'/auth/login/totp-verify',
{
user_id: 42,
code: '123456',
device_id: 'device-1',
temp_token: 'temp-token-demo',
},
{ auth: false, credentials: 'include' },
)
})
it('submits public registration without auth headers', async () => {
const { register } = await import('./auth')
@@ -132,7 +106,7 @@ describe('auth service', () => {
)
})
it('submits first-admin bootstrap with bootstrap secret header', async () => {
it('submits first-admin bootstrap with the bootstrap secret header', async () => {
const { bootstrapAdmin } = await import('./auth')
await bootstrapAdmin({
@@ -140,8 +114,7 @@ describe('auth service', () => {
password: 'Bootstrap123!@#',
email: 'bootstrap_admin@example.com',
nickname: 'Bootstrap Admin',
bootstrap_secret: 'bootstrap-secret-demo',
})
}, 'bootstrap-secret')
expect(postMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'/auth/bootstrap-admin',
@@ -155,7 +128,7 @@ describe('auth service', () => {
auth: false,
credentials: 'include',
headers: {
'X-Bootstrap-Secret': 'bootstrap-secret-demo',
'X-Bootstrap-Secret': 'bootstrap-secret',
},
},
)
@@ -225,13 +198,12 @@ describe('auth service', () => {
expect(postMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/auth/logout', undefined, { credentials: 'include' })
})
it('refreshes the session through the shared refresh single-flight when no body token is supplied', async () => {
it('refreshes the session with credentials even when no body token is supplied', async () => {
const { refreshSession } = await import('./auth')
await refreshSession()
expect(refreshSessionBundleMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
expect(postMock).not.toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect(postMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'/auth/refresh',
undefined,
{ auth: false, credentials: 'include' },

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
import { get, post } from '@/lib/http/client'
import { refreshSessionBundle } from '@/lib/http/client'
import type {
ActionMessageResponse,
AuthCapabilities,
@@ -9,6 +8,7 @@ import type {
LoginByPasswordRequest,
LoginBySmsCodeRequest,
OAuthAuthorizationResponse,
PasswordLoginResponse,
RegisterRequest,
RegisterResponse,
ResendActivationEmailRequest,
@@ -38,8 +38,8 @@ export async function getAuthCapabilities(): Promise<AuthCapabilities> {
return normalizeAuthCapabilities(capabilities)
}
export function loginByPassword(data: LoginByPasswordRequest): Promise<TokenBundle> {
return post<TokenBundle>('/auth/login', data, { auth: false, credentials: 'include' })
export function loginByPassword(data: LoginByPasswordRequest): Promise<PasswordLoginResponse> {
return post<PasswordLoginResponse>('/auth/login', data, { auth: false, credentials: 'include' })
}
// Verify TOTP after password login when requires_totp is returned
@@ -59,13 +59,15 @@ export function register(data: RegisterRequest): Promise<RegisterResponse> {
return post<RegisterResponse>('/auth/register', data, { auth: false })
}
export function bootstrapAdmin(data: BootstrapAdminRequest): Promise<TokenBundle> {
const { bootstrap_secret, ...payload } = data
return post<TokenBundle>('/auth/bootstrap-admin', payload, {
export function bootstrapAdmin(
data: BootstrapAdminRequest,
bootstrapSecret: string,
): Promise<TokenBundle> {
return post<TokenBundle>('/auth/bootstrap-admin', data, {
auth: false,
credentials: 'include',
headers: {
'X-Bootstrap-Secret': bootstrap_secret,
'X-Bootstrap-Secret': bootstrapSecret,
},
})
}
@@ -89,11 +91,8 @@ export function sendSmsCode(data: SendSmsCodeRequest): Promise<void> {
}
export function refreshSession(refreshToken?: string | null): Promise<TokenBundle> {
if (!refreshToken) {
return refreshSessionBundle()
}
return post<TokenBundle>('/auth/refresh', { refresh_token: refreshToken }, { auth: false, credentials: 'include' })
const body = refreshToken ? { refresh_token: refreshToken } : undefined
return post<TokenBundle>('/auth/refresh', body, { auth: false, credentials: 'include' })
}
export function getOAuthAuthorizationUrl(

View File

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ describe('permissions service', () => {
it('gets permission tree', async () => {
const mockTree = [
{ id: 1, name: 'dashboard', children: [{ id: 2, name: 'view' }] },
{ id: 1, name: 'dashboard', type: 0, children: [{ id: 2, name: 'view', type: 2 }] },
]
getMock.mockResolvedValue(mockTree)
@@ -30,13 +30,15 @@ describe('permissions service', () => {
const result = await getPermissionTree()
expect(getMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/permissions/tree')
expect(result).toEqual(mockTree)
expect(result).toEqual([
{ id: 1, name: 'dashboard', type: 'menu', children: [{ id: 2, name: 'view', type: 'api' }] },
])
})
it('lists all permissions', async () => {
const mockPermissions = [
{ id: 1, name: 'view dashboard', code: 'dashboard:view' },
{ id: 2, name: 'edit dashboard', code: 'dashboard:edit' },
{ id: 1, name: 'view dashboard', code: 'dashboard:view', type: 0 },
{ id: 2, name: 'edit dashboard', code: 'dashboard:edit', type: 1 },
]
getMock.mockResolvedValue(mockPermissions)
@@ -44,40 +46,46 @@ describe('permissions service', () => {
const result = await listPermissions()
expect(getMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/permissions')
expect(result).toEqual(mockPermissions)
expect(result).toEqual([
{ id: 1, name: 'view dashboard', code: 'dashboard:view', type: 'menu' },
{ id: 2, name: 'edit dashboard', code: 'dashboard:edit', type: 'button' },
])
})
it('gets a single permission', async () => {
getMock.mockResolvedValue({ id: 5, name: 'view users', code: 'users:view' })
getMock.mockResolvedValue({ id: 5, name: 'view users', code: 'users:view', type: 2 })
const { getPermission } = await import('./permissions')
const result = await getPermission(5)
expect(getMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/permissions/5')
expect(result).toEqual({ id: 5, name: 'view users', code: 'users:view' })
expect(result).toEqual({ id: 5, name: 'view users', code: 'users:view', type: 'api' })
})
it('creates a permission', async () => {
const newPermission = { name: 'new permission', code: 'new:code', type: 'button' as const }
const created = { id: 10, ...newPermission }
const created = { id: 10, ...newPermission, type: 1 }
postMock.mockResolvedValue(created)
const { createPermission } = await import('./permissions')
const result = await createPermission(newPermission)
expect(postMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/permissions', newPermission)
expect(result).toEqual(created)
expect(postMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/permissions', {
...newPermission,
type: 1,
})
expect(result).toEqual({ id: 10, name: 'new permission', code: 'new:code', type: 'button' })
})
it('updates a permission', async () => {
const updateData = { name: 'updated name' }
putMock.mockResolvedValue({ id: 3, ...updateData })
putMock.mockResolvedValue({ id: 3, ...updateData, type: 0 })
const { updatePermission } = await import('./permissions')
const result = await updatePermission(3, updateData)
expect(putMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/permissions/3', updateData)
expect(result).toEqual({ id: 3, name: 'updated name' })
expect(result).toEqual({ id: 3, name: 'updated name', type: 'menu' })
})
it('deletes a permission', async () => {

View File

@@ -5,14 +5,58 @@
*/
import { get, post, put, del } from '@/lib/http/client'
import type { Permission, CreatePermissionRequest, UpdatePermissionRequest } from '@/types/permission'
import type {
Permission,
CreatePermissionRequest,
UpdatePermissionRequest,
PermissionType,
} from '@/types/permission'
type RawPermissionType = 0 | 1 | 2
interface RawPermission extends Omit<Permission, 'type' | 'children'> {
type: RawPermissionType
children?: RawPermission[]
}
function normalizePermissionType(type: RawPermissionType): PermissionType {
switch (type) {
case 0:
return 'menu'
case 1:
return 'button'
case 2:
return 'api'
default:
return 'api'
}
}
function serializePermissionType(type: PermissionType): RawPermissionType {
switch (type) {
case 'menu':
return 0
case 'button':
return 1
case 'api':
return 2
}
}
function normalizePermission(permission: RawPermission): Permission {
return {
...permission,
type: normalizePermissionType(permission.type),
children: permission.children?.map(normalizePermission),
}
}
/**
* 获取权限树
* GET /api/v1/permissions/tree
*/
export function getPermissionTree(): Promise<Permission[]> {
return get<Permission[]>('/permissions/tree')
return get<RawPermission[]>('/permissions/tree').then((permissions) => permissions.map(normalizePermission))
}
/**
@@ -20,7 +64,7 @@ export function getPermissionTree(): Promise<Permission[]> {
* GET /api/v1/permissions
*/
export function listPermissions(): Promise<Permission[]> {
return get<Permission[]>('/permissions')
return get<RawPermission[]>('/permissions').then((permissions) => permissions.map(normalizePermission))
}
/**
@@ -28,7 +72,7 @@ export function listPermissions(): Promise<Permission[]> {
* GET /api/v1/permissions/:id
*/
export function getPermission(id: number): Promise<Permission> {
return get<Permission>(`/permissions/${id}`)
return get<RawPermission>(`/permissions/${id}`).then(normalizePermission)
}
/**
@@ -36,7 +80,10 @@ export function getPermission(id: number): Promise<Permission> {
* POST /api/v1/permissions
*/
export function createPermission(data: CreatePermissionRequest): Promise<Permission> {
return post<Permission>('/permissions', data)
return post<RawPermission>('/permissions', {
...data,
type: serializePermissionType(data.type),
}).then(normalizePermission)
}
/**
@@ -44,7 +91,7 @@ export function createPermission(data: CreatePermissionRequest): Promise<Permiss
* PUT /api/v1/permissions/:id
*/
export function updatePermission(id: number, data: UpdatePermissionRequest): Promise<Permission> {
return put<Permission>(`/permissions/${id}`, data)
return put<RawPermission>(`/permissions/${id}`, data).then(normalizePermission)
}
/**

View File

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ describe('profile service', () => {
const { getCurrentProfile } = await import('./profile')
const result = await getCurrentProfile(1)
expect(getMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/auth/userinfo')
expect(getMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/users/1')
expect(result).toEqual({
user: { id: 1, username: 'admin', nickname: 'Admin' },
roles: [{ id: 2, name: '管理员' }],
@@ -76,9 +76,8 @@ describe('profile service', () => {
})
expect(putMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/users/1/password', {
current_password: 'OldPass123',
old_password: 'OldPass123',
new_password: 'NewPass123',
confirm_password: 'NewPass123',
})
})

View File

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ export interface TOTPSetupResponse {
export async function getCurrentProfile(userId: number): Promise<CurrentUserProfile> {
const [user, roles] = await Promise.all([
get<User>('/auth/userinfo'),
get<User>(`/users/${userId}`),
getUserRoles(userId),
])
@@ -50,7 +50,10 @@ export function uploadAvatar(userId: number, file: File): Promise<AvatarUploadRe
}
export function updatePassword(userId: number, data: UpdatePasswordRequest): Promise<void> {
return put<void>(`/users/${userId}/password`, data)
return put<void>(`/users/${userId}/password`, {
old_password: data.current_password,
new_password: data.new_password,
})
}
export function getTOTPStatus(): Promise<TOTPStatusResponse> {

View File

@@ -24,6 +24,11 @@ describe('additional service adapters', () => {
})
it('routes the remaining users service methods through the HTTP client', async () => {
getMock
.mockResolvedValueOnce({ items: [], total: 0, page: 2, page_size: 50 })
.mockResolvedValueOnce({ id: 7 })
.mockResolvedValueOnce([])
const {
listUsers,
getUser,
@@ -69,10 +74,22 @@ describe('additional service adapters', () => {
.mockResolvedValueOnce([{ id: 9 }, { id: 11 }])
.mockResolvedValueOnce({ items: [], total: 0, page: 1, page_size: 20 })
.mockResolvedValueOnce({ id: 3 })
.mockResolvedValueOnce([{ id: 1, name: 'menu:view' }])
.mockResolvedValueOnce([{ id: 2, name: 'menu:edit' }])
.mockResolvedValueOnce([{ id: 1, name: 'menu:view', type: 0 }])
.mockResolvedValueOnce([{ id: 2, name: 'menu:edit', type: 1 }])
.mockResolvedValueOnce({ total_users: 10 })
.mockResolvedValueOnce({ active_users: 8 })
postMock.mockImplementation(async (url: string, payload: Record<string, unknown>) => {
if (url === '/permissions') {
return { id: 6, ...payload }
}
return { id: 5, ...payload }
})
putMock.mockImplementation(async (url: string, payload: Record<string, unknown>) => {
if (url === '/permissions/6') {
return { id: 6, ...payload, type: 0 }
}
return undefined
})
const {
listRoles,
@@ -151,7 +168,7 @@ describe('additional service adapters', () => {
expect(postMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/permissions', {
name: 'view dashboard',
code: 'dashboard:view',
type: 'menu',
type: 0,
})
await updatePermission(6, { name: 'updated permission' })
@@ -221,7 +238,7 @@ describe('additional service adapters', () => {
user: { id: 1, username: 'admin' },
roles: [{ id: 2, name: '管理员' }],
})
expect(getMock).toHaveBeenNthCalledWith(1, '/auth/userinfo')
expect(getMock).toHaveBeenNthCalledWith(1, '/users/1')
expect(getMock).toHaveBeenNthCalledWith(2, '/users/1/roles')
await updateProfile(1, { nickname: 'Admin User' })
@@ -238,9 +255,8 @@ describe('additional service adapters', () => {
confirm_password: 'NewPass123',
})
expect(putMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/users/1/password', {
current_password: 'CurrentPass123',
old_password: 'CurrentPass123',
new_password: 'NewPass123',
confirm_password: 'NewPass123',
})
await expect(getTOTPStatus()).resolves.toEqual({ totp_enabled: true })

View File

@@ -80,7 +80,26 @@ describe('permissions service', () => {
it('gets permission tree', async () => {
const mockPermissions = [
{ id: 1, name: 'Users', code: 'users', children: [{ id: 2, name: 'View', code: 'users:view' }] },
{
id: 1,
name: 'Users',
code: 'users',
type: 0,
children: [
{ id: 2, name: 'View', code: 'users:view', type: 2 },
],
},
]
const expectedPermissions = [
{
id: 1,
name: 'Users',
code: 'users',
type: 'menu',
children: [
{ id: 2, name: 'View', code: 'users:view', type: 'api', children: undefined },
],
},
]
getMock.mockResolvedValue(mockPermissions)
@@ -88,7 +107,7 @@ describe('permissions service', () => {
const result = await getPermissionTree()
expect(getMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/permissions/tree')
expect(result).toEqual(mockPermissions)
expect(result).toEqual(expectedPermissions)
expect(result[0].children?.[0]?.name).toBe('View')
})
@@ -119,14 +138,15 @@ describe('permissions service', () => {
it('creates a permission', async () => {
const newPermission = { name: 'Test', code: 'test', type: 'button' as const }
const createdPermission = { id: 10, ...newPermission }
const createdPermission = { id: 10, ...newPermission, type: 1 }
postMock.mockResolvedValue(createdPermission)
const { createPermission } = await import('./permissions')
const result = await createPermission(newPermission)
expect(postMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/permissions', newPermission)
expect(postMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/permissions', { ...newPermission, type: 1 })
expect(result.id).toBe(10)
expect(result.type).toBe('button')
})
it('updates a permission', async () => {

View File

@@ -13,37 +13,35 @@ describe('settings service', () => {
it('gets system settings', async () => {
const mockSettings = {
data: {
system: {
name: 'UserSystem',
version: '1.0.0',
environment: 'production',
description: 'User management system',
},
security: {
password_min_length: 8,
password_require_uppercase: true,
password_require_lowercase: true,
password_require_numbers: true,
password_require_symbols: true,
password_history: 5,
totp_enabled: true,
login_fail_lock: true,
login_fail_threshold: 5,
login_fail_duration: 30,
session_timeout: 3600,
device_trust_duration: 2592000,
},
features: {
email_verification: true,
phone_verification: false,
oauth_providers: ['google', 'github'],
sso_enabled: false,
operation_log_enabled: true,
login_log_enabled: true,
data_export_enabled: true,
data_import_enabled: true,
},
system: {
name: 'UserSystem',
version: '1.0.0',
environment: 'production',
description: 'User management system',
},
security: {
password_min_length: 8,
password_require_uppercase: true,
password_require_lowercase: true,
password_require_numbers: true,
password_require_symbols: true,
password_history: 5,
totp_enabled: true,
login_fail_lock: true,
login_fail_threshold: 5,
login_fail_duration: 30,
session_timeout: 3600,
device_trust_duration: 2592000,
},
features: {
email_verification: true,
phone_verification: false,
oauth_providers: ['google', 'github'],
sso_enabled: false,
operation_log_enabled: true,
login_log_enabled: true,
data_export_enabled: true,
data_import_enabled: true,
},
}
@@ -53,6 +51,6 @@ describe('settings service', () => {
const result = await getSettings()
expect(getMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/admin/settings')
expect(result).toEqual(mockSettings.data)
expect(result).toEqual(mockSettings)
})
})

View File

@@ -45,14 +45,10 @@ export interface SystemSettings {
features: FeaturesInfo
}
interface SettingsResponse {
data: SystemSettings
}
/**
* 获取系统设置
* GET /api/v1/admin/settings
*/
export function getSettings(): Promise<SystemSettings> {
return get<SettingsResponse>('/admin/settings').then(res => res.data)
return get<SystemSettings>('/admin/settings')
}

View File

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ describe('social account service', () => {
getMock.mockReset()
postMock.mockReset()
delMock.mockReset()
getMock.mockResolvedValue([])
getMock.mockResolvedValue({ accounts: [] })
postMock.mockResolvedValue({ auth_url: 'https://oauth.example.com', state: 'state-demo' })
delMock.mockResolvedValue(undefined)
})
@@ -23,32 +23,31 @@ describe('social account service', () => {
it('lists current user social accounts', async () => {
const { listSocialAccounts } = await import('./social-accounts')
await listSocialAccounts()
expect(getMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/users/me/social-accounts')
})
it('normalizes object-wrapped social account payloads', async () => {
getMock.mockResolvedValue({
social_accounts: [
accounts: [
{
id: 1,
provider: 'github',
provider_user_id: '123',
provider_username: 'octocat',
bound_at: '2026-03-27 20:00:00',
open_id: 'github-open-id',
union_id: '',
nickname: 'octocat',
avatar: 'https://example.com/avatar.png',
gender: 0,
email: 'octocat@example.com',
phone: '',
extra: '{}',
status: 1,
created_at: '2026-03-27 20:00:00',
updated_at: '2026-03-27 20:00:00',
},
],
})
const { listSocialAccounts } = await import('./social-accounts')
const result = await listSocialAccounts()
const accounts = await listSocialAccounts()
expect(result).toEqual([
expect.objectContaining({
provider: 'github',
provider_username: 'octocat',
}),
])
expect(getMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/users/me/social-accounts')
expect(accounts).toHaveLength(1)
expect(accounts[0]).toMatchObject({ provider: 'github', nickname: 'octocat' })
})
it('starts social binding with the current verification payload', async () => {

View File

@@ -7,34 +7,13 @@ import type {
} from '@/types'
interface SocialAccountsResponse {
items?: SocialAccountInfo[]
accounts?: SocialAccountInfo[]
social_accounts?: SocialAccountInfo[]
accounts: SocialAccountInfo[] | null
}
function normalizeSocialAccounts(payload: SocialAccountInfo[] | SocialAccountsResponse): SocialAccountInfo[] {
if (Array.isArray(payload)) {
return payload
}
if (Array.isArray(payload.items)) {
return payload.items
}
if (Array.isArray(payload.accounts)) {
return payload.accounts
}
if (Array.isArray(payload.social_accounts)) {
return payload.social_accounts
}
return []
}
export async function listSocialAccounts(): Promise<SocialAccountInfo[]> {
const payload = await get<SocialAccountInfo[] | SocialAccountsResponse>('/users/me/social-accounts')
return normalizeSocialAccounts(payload)
export function listSocialAccounts(): Promise<SocialAccountInfo[]> {
return get<SocialAccountsResponse>('/users/me/social-accounts').then((result) => (
Array.isArray(result.accounts) ? result.accounts : []
))
}
export function startSocialBinding(

View File

@@ -20,52 +20,6 @@ describe('users service', () => {
delMock.mockReset()
})
it('normalizes backend user list payloads that use users/limit/offset fields', async () => {
getMock.mockResolvedValue({
users: [
{
id: 7,
username: 'e2e_admin',
email: 'admin@example.com',
nickname: '管理员',
status: '1',
},
],
total: 1,
limit: 20,
offset: 0,
})
const { listUsers } = await import('./users')
const result = await listUsers({ page: 1, page_size: 20 })
expect(getMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/users', { page: 1, page_size: 20 })
expect(result).toEqual({
items: [
{
id: 7,
username: 'e2e_admin',
email: 'admin@example.com',
phone: '',
nickname: '管理员',
avatar: '',
gender: 0,
birthday: '',
region: '',
bio: '',
status: 1,
last_login_at: '',
last_login_ip: '',
created_at: '',
updated_at: '',
},
],
total: 1,
page: 1,
page_size: 20,
})
})
it('creates a user through the protected users endpoint', async () => {
const payload = {
username: 'new-user',
@@ -78,4 +32,44 @@ describe('users service', () => {
expect(postMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/users', payload)
})
it('normalizes the legacy backend user list response', async () => {
getMock.mockResolvedValue({
users: [
{
id: 11,
username: 'legacy-admin',
email: 'legacy-admin@example.com',
nickname: 'Legacy Admin',
status: '1',
},
],
total: 1,
offset: 20,
limit: 10,
})
const { listUsers } = await import('./users')
const result = await listUsers({ page: 3, page_size: 10, keyword: 'legacy' })
expect(getMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/users', {
page: 3,
page_size: 10,
keyword: 'legacy',
})
expect(result).toEqual({
items: [
{
id: 11,
username: 'legacy-admin',
email: 'legacy-admin@example.com',
nickname: 'Legacy Admin',
status: '1',
},
],
total: 1,
page: 3,
page_size: 10,
})
})
})

View File

@@ -17,50 +17,17 @@ import type {
AssignUserRolesRequest,
} from '@/types/user'
interface RawUserListResponse {
items?: Partial<User>[]
users?: Partial<User>[]
total?: number
page?: number
page_size?: number
limit?: number
interface LegacyUserListResponse {
users: User[]
total: number
offset?: number
limit?: number
}
function normalizeUser(user: Partial<User>): User {
const numericStatus = typeof user.status === 'string' ? Number(user.status) : user.status
return {
id: user.id ?? 0,
username: user.username ?? '',
email: user.email ?? '',
phone: user.phone ?? '',
nickname: user.nickname ?? '',
avatar: user.avatar ?? '',
gender: user.gender ?? 0,
birthday: user.birthday ?? '',
region: user.region ?? '',
bio: user.bio ?? '',
status: (typeof numericStatus === 'number' && !Number.isNaN(numericStatus) ? numericStatus : 0) as UserStatus,
last_login_at: user.last_login_at ?? '',
last_login_ip: user.last_login_ip ?? '',
created_at: user.created_at ?? '',
updated_at: user.updated_at ?? '',
}
}
function normalizeUserListResponse(result?: RawUserListResponse | null): PaginatedData<User> {
const payload = result ?? {}
const items = Array.isArray(payload.items) ? payload.items : Array.isArray(payload.users) ? payload.users : []
const pageSize = payload.page_size ?? payload.limit ?? items.length
const offset = payload.offset ?? 0
const page = payload.page ?? (pageSize > 0 ? Math.floor(offset / pageSize) + 1 : 1)
return {
items: items.map(normalizeUser),
total: payload.total ?? items.length,
page,
page_size: pageSize,
}
function isLegacyUserListResponse(
result: PaginatedData<User> | LegacyUserListResponse,
): result is LegacyUserListResponse {
return Array.isArray((result as LegacyUserListResponse).users)
}
/**
@@ -68,8 +35,26 @@ function normalizeUserListResponse(result?: RawUserListResponse | null): Paginat
* GET /api/v1/users
*/
export async function listUsers(params: UserListParams): Promise<PaginatedData<User>> {
const result = await get<RawUserListResponse>('/users', params as Record<string, string | number | boolean | undefined>)
return normalizeUserListResponse(result)
const result = await get<PaginatedData<User> | LegacyUserListResponse>(
'/users',
params as Record<string, string | number | boolean | undefined>,
)
if (!isLegacyUserListResponse(result)) {
return result
}
const pageSize = result.limit ?? params.page_size
const page = pageSize && pageSize > 0
? Math.floor((result.offset ?? 0) / pageSize) + 1
: params.page
return {
items: result.users,
total: result.total,
page,
page_size: pageSize,
}
}
/**

View File

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ describe('webhooks service', () => {
it('normalizes mixed raw event payloads from the API', async () => {
getMock.mockResolvedValue({
data: [
list: [
{
id: 1,
name: 'String Events',
@@ -74,44 +74,6 @@ describe('webhooks service', () => {
expect(result.data[2].events).toEqual([])
})
it('normalizes backend webhook list payloads that use items/limit/offset fields', async () => {
getMock.mockResolvedValue({
items: [
{
id: 11,
name: 'Compat Hook',
url: 'https://example.com/compat',
events: '["user.updated"]',
status: 1,
max_retries: 3,
timeout_sec: 10,
created_by: 1,
created_at: '2026-03-27 20:20:00',
updated_at: '2026-03-27 20:20:00',
},
],
total: 1,
limit: 20,
offset: 0,
})
const { listWebhooks } = await import('./webhooks')
const result = await listWebhooks({ page: 1, page_size: 20 })
expect(result).toEqual({
data: [
expect.objectContaining({
id: 11,
name: 'Compat Hook',
events: ['user.updated'],
}),
],
total: 1,
page: 1,
page_size: 20,
})
})
it('sends create, update, delete, and delivery requests through the HTTP client', async () => {
postMock.mockResolvedValue({
id: 1,
@@ -125,7 +87,22 @@ describe('webhooks service', () => {
created_at: '2026-03-27 20:15:00',
updated_at: '2026-03-27 20:15:00',
})
getMock.mockResolvedValue([])
getMock.mockResolvedValue({
deliveries: [
{
id: 7,
webhook_id: 9,
event_type: 'user.updated',
payload: '{"id":1}',
status_code: 200,
response_body: 'ok',
attempt: 1,
success: true,
error: '',
created_at: '2026-03-27 20:20:00',
},
],
})
const {
createWebhook,
@@ -159,7 +136,9 @@ describe('webhooks service', () => {
await deleteWebhook(9)
expect(delMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/webhooks/9')
await getWebhookDeliveries(9, { limit: 20 })
const deliveries = await getWebhookDeliveries(9, { limit: 20 })
expect(getMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/webhooks/9/deliveries', { limit: 20 })
expect(deliveries).toHaveLength(1)
expect(deliveries[0]).toMatchObject({ webhook_id: 9, status_code: 200 })
})
})

View File

@@ -32,43 +32,26 @@ function normalizeWebhook(webhook: RawWebhook): Webhook {
}
}
interface PaginatedResponse<T> {
data?: T[]
items?: T[]
webhooks?: T[]
total?: number
page?: number
page_size?: number
limit?: number
offset?: number
interface WebhookListResponse<T> {
list: T[]
total: number
page: number
page_size: number
}
function normalizeWebhookList(result: PaginatedResponse<RawWebhook>): { data: Webhook[]; total: number; page: number; page_size: number } {
const rawItems = Array.isArray(result.data)
? result.data
: Array.isArray(result.items)
? result.items
: Array.isArray(result.webhooks)
? result.webhooks
: []
const data = rawItems.map(normalizeWebhook)
const pageSize = result.page_size ?? result.limit ?? data.length
const offset = result.offset ?? 0
const page = result.page ?? (pageSize > 0 ? Math.floor(offset / pageSize) + 1 : 1)
return {
data,
total: result.total ?? data.length,
page,
page_size: pageSize,
}
interface WebhookDeliveriesResponse {
deliveries: WebhookDelivery[]
}
export async function listWebhooks(
params?: WebhookListParams,
): Promise<{ data: Webhook[]; total: number; page: number; page_size: number }> {
const result = await get<PaginatedResponse<RawWebhook>>('/webhooks', params as Record<string, string | number | boolean | undefined>)
return normalizeWebhookList(result)
const result = await get<WebhookListResponse<RawWebhook>>(
'/webhooks',
params as Record<string, string | number | boolean | undefined>,
)
const webhooks = result.list.map(normalizeWebhook)
return { data: webhooks, total: result.total, page: result.page, page_size: result.page_size }
}
export function createWebhook(data: CreateWebhookRequest): Promise<Webhook> {
@@ -91,8 +74,8 @@ export function getWebhookDeliveries(
id: number,
params?: WebhookDeliveryListParams,
): Promise<WebhookDelivery[]> {
return get<WebhookDelivery[]>(
return get<WebhookDeliveriesResponse>(
`/webhooks/${id}/deliveries`,
params as Record<string, string | number | boolean | undefined>,
)
).then((result) => result.deliveries)
}

View File

@@ -15,12 +15,16 @@ export interface TokenBundle {
refresh_token?: string
expires_in: number
user: SessionUser
// TOTP required response (when user has TOTP enabled but device is not trusted)
requires_totp?: boolean
user_id?: number
}
// TOTP verification request after password login
export interface PasswordLoginChallenge {
requires_totp: true
user_id: number
temp_token: string
}
export type PasswordLoginResponse = TokenBundle | PasswordLoginChallenge
export interface TOTPVerifyRequest {
user_id: number
code: string
@@ -91,9 +95,8 @@ export interface RegisterRequest {
export interface BootstrapAdminRequest {
username: string
password: string
email: string
email?: string
nickname?: string
bootstrap_secret: string
}
export type RegisterResponse = SessionUser

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